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ABSTRACT 
The present study sets out to accomplish two things: first, to demonstrate that 
space and spatiality is the domain in which discourse partakes of the colonial 
project, and second, to isolate a number of textual strategies employed in the 
discursive production of colonial space. 
The first aim requires a lengthy theoretical discussion which occupies the first 
part of the study. Here I develop the thesis that spatiality as a J?hilosophical 
preoccupation has never been divorced from the questions of sigmfication and 
subjectivity, and that the production of significant and subjective space is always a 
production of social space. In support of this thesis, it is shown that vision and 
writing are the two functions in which subjective space becomes meaningful, and 
that in both cases it becomes meaningful only as social space. It is thus in the 
context of looking and writing that the production of colonial space may be 
examined as a social space within which meaning and subjectivity are :possible. 
The second aim requires an analytical study of a number of colorual texts, which 
I undertake in part II of the study. For simplicity, I have confined myself to the 
colonial discourse of German South West Africa in the period 1884-1915. The 
central thesis developed here is that discourse develops strategies for enclosing 
spaces by demarkating borders, privilegin~ certain passages between spaces and 
blockin~ others. This organization of space is presented as the ordering of a chaotic 
multi:phcity and, as such, as a process of civilization. The contradiction between the 
blocking and privileging of passages results in what I call a "ritual of crossing": an 
implicit set of rules prescribmg the conditions of possibility for crossing the borders 
it establishes. As a result, in its production of space, the colonial text assumes a 
mythical function which allows it to transcend the very spaces it produces. It is here 
that I attempt to situate colonial discourse's claims to uruversal truth. 
In conclusion, the detailed analysis of the production of space in colonial 
discourse may be understood as a strategic intervention. It attempts to use the texts 
of colonisation to counter colonization's claims to universal truth and a civilizing 
mission. 
PREFACE 
This study is an attempt to do justice to the subtlety of colonization. The 
popular view of colonization tends to view it as anything but subtle; that it is a 
process relying on brute force, and that the discourse of colonization attempts to 
reconcile the world-view of the colonizer with the fact of this force. I have always 
been struck by the simplicity and naivity of a discourse which is supposedly hiding a 
deeper knowledge of violence. I am convinced that colonial discourse has a more 
important and a more immediate role to play in the colonization process, and that 
the violence which it hides is to be found in its very function. What colonial 
discourse does is to present us with a set of instructions - on how to look upon the 
world and see only colonial space; how to move through the landscape and cross 
only colonial space; how to write about the world and mean only colonial space. 
That other, physical violence which always accompanies colonization comes later, 
when this unstable colonial space begins to collapse. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Peter Horn, for his valuable advice 
and assistance at all stages of this project. I am particularly grateful for his constant 
encouragement, in word and in example, to pursue lines of thought not confined to 
the rigid boundaries of one particular disciplice. 
I would also like to thank my family and my colleagues for providing the perfect 
atmosphere in which to complete what would otherwise have been a most traumatic 
enterprise: Prof. Reingard Nethersole, for her assistance in the formulation of this 
project; Dr. Ulrike Kistner and Dr. Gunther Pakendorf, for the interesting 
discussions on the topic; my students, whose critical reception helped me to 
formulate these ideas; Ms. Carlotta von Maltzan, for the proof reading of and 
commentary on the final draft. 
I would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of: the Harry 
Oppenheimer Center for African Studies, University of Cape Town, from which I 
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received a travel grant to visit the State Archives in Windhoek and the Sam Cohen 
Library in Swakopmund, Namibia; the University of Cape Town, who provided me 
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Only able, as soon as it appears, to operate 
at the interior of reason, the revolution 
against reason has only ever the limited 
scope of what is called - precisely in the 





The colonial literature of German South West Africa has enjoyed an erratic 
fate. This concerns its popularity among the general reading public, as well as its 
reception within the critical apparatus. In a way, this was inevitable for a body of 
texts which tend toward an unhappy mixture of fiction, personal narrative, 
tendentious journalism, and propaganda. Furthermore, this mixture was conceived 
at a time of major political restructuring within German society, and it spoke of one 
of the most controversial aspects of contemporary politics - Germany's colonial 
enterprise. This enterprise gave rise to intense debate, and the discourse of 
colonialism in Germany bears witness to this intensity. One indication of this is the 
sheer quantity of German colonial literature. My working list of fictional, semi-
fictional, and autobiographical works concerning German South West Africa and 
written between 1884 and 1945 exceeds 160 titles ( excluding the work of the most 
prolific German colonial author, Hans Grimm), of which approximately 90 were 
published between 1884 and 1914.1 And this for a population which never exceeded 
13 000 Germans, and a colonial reign which lasted only 20 years ( and cost the 
J 
Imperial Government some 280 million Marks).2 
The immediate critical reception of colonial literature was as polarized as the 
support or rejection of the colonial project as a whole.3 Thus while one writer 
recommends Gustav Frenssen's best-seller, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Sildwest,4 "for 
every school in the German Empire,"5 another notes with sarcasm that the argument 
1 Refering to German colonial literature in its entirity, Jurgen Bergmann mentions the figure of about 
750 first editions between the years 1881 and 1945. He does not state explicitly what type of text he is 
referring to, but I assume that this is based on a wider field, including a number of non-fictional works 
which I did not count. Jurgen Bergmann, "lmperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht: Bestimmungsfaktoren 
der deutschen belletristischen Kolonialliteratur" (PhD dissertation, Berlin, 1980), p. 64. 
2 Wilfried Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1987), pp. 350-1. 
3 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 64. 
4 Gustav Frenssen, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Stidwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht [Peter Moor goes to South 
West. Report of a campaign] (Berlin: G. Grotesche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906). Bergmann notes that 
Peter Moor had sold 100 000 copies in its first year, and a total of 430 00 by 1945. p. 64. 
5 C. Busse, Der Tag (1906), cit. Joachim Warmbold, "Ein Sttickchen neudeutsch Erd' ... " Deutsche 
Kolonial-Literatur, Aspekte ihrer Geschichte, Eigenart und Wirkung, dargestellt am Beispiel Afrikas 
(Frankfurt/M: Haag & Herchen, 1982), p. 96. 
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of 'Brotherly love', with which Frenssen sought to support the war against the 
Herero, could only have been formulated by a German pastor.6 Nevertheless, the 
appearance of German colonial literature was accompanied by a lively body of 
commentary.7 
The popularity of colonial literature dwindled after the loss of colonies in 1915. 
In spite of this, colonial literature continued to be produced. In addition, a number 
of voices continued to plead the colonial idea with passion throughout the following 
two decades.8 The production and commentary of colonial literature continued to 
gain momentum during the period of rising fascism and the second world war. This 
is marked by an increase in commentary on the colonial past, bringing with it not 
only a renewed vehemence in the polemic against the loss of colonies, but also a 
renewed interest in colonial literature. This took the form of various monographs, 
articles, and, above all, dissertations.9 
I do not intend to take issue explicitly with this considerable body of 
commentary, for a number of reasons. First of all, it lies, for the most part, outside 
of the time period I have chosen; that is, it was not generated during the period of 
colonization, and as such cannot be said to have participated directly in the 
colonization process. It is a retrospective and nostalgic attempt to re-capture a lost 
past. In addition, the changed framework of colonial discourse within fascism would 
require a modification of the analytical parameters I will be developing. I am 
concerned not with a phantasy of colonial expansion as mirrored in discourse, I am 
concerned with how discourse participated in a real colonial expansion. I certainly 
6 L. Berg, "Ein Fel~bericht," Das literarische Echo 9(7) (1907), p. 500, cit. Warmbold, p. 122. 
7 Thus, for example, the appearance, from 1899 onward of the review Die deutsche Kolonialliteratur 
im Jahre 11., ed. M Brose, later ed. Hubert Henoch. 
8 The titles speak for themselves; for example, Arthur Dix, Was Deutschland an seinen Kolonien verlor 
[What Germany lost with its colonies](Berlin, 192?); Heinrich Schnee, Die koloniale Schuldliige [The 
lie of colonial guilt] (Miinchen, 1927) Heinrich Schnee, Die deutschen Kolonien unter fremder 
Mandatherrschaft [German colonies under foreign mandate] (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1922). 
9 Most of these center around Hans Grimm. Again, the titles speak for themselves; for example, Heinz 
Kindermann, "Der Kiinder des Auslandsdeutschtums. Zurn 60. Geburtstag von Hans Grimm" [The 
herald of Germanity in foreign lands. On Hans Grimm's 60th birthday] Kultur (1935); Edgar Kirsch, 
Hans Grimm und der nordische Mensch [Hans Grimm and Nordic Man] (Miinchen, 1938); One 
important factor here is almost certainly the changes in institutional policies affecting the personnel at 
German Universities during the Third Reich. 
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believe that the fascist phantasy would provide a fruitful object for a study similar to 
the present one, but it would have to be a study in its own right. Finally, this 
commentary tends, even at its most profound, to be too banal to grant real insight 
into the workings of the colonial text.10 
Literary studies in Germany wanted little to do with colonial literature after 
1945; one reason was a general reluctance to enter into dialogue with the immediate 
past; however, another reason was almost certainly the fact that the banal 
enthusiasm of the commentary generated in the more immediate past had managed 
to overshadow any earlier attempts at criticism of colonial literature. Furthermore, 
the post-war period with its emphasis on close reading had neither method nor 
inclination to develop a position from which colonial literature could be dealt with 
meaningfully. 
2. Problems in the analysis of colonial discourse 
It was not until the early 1980's that literary studies in Germany began to tum 
its critical attention to its colonial literature. The theoretical debate surrounding the 
sociology of literature and the critique of ideology had prepared the way for an 
appraisal of literary functions within a wider social context. As a result, the concept 
of the literary object was expanded to the point where 'trivial' and 'tendentious' 
texts, such as predominated in colonial literature, could find their place within the 
literary corpus. These studies initially take the form of a demarkation of the field: 
the historical background, the authors, contemporary socio-political issues and the 
way these were manifested in the texts.11 The most important longer studies which 
must be mentioned in this connection are "Ein Stuckchen neudeutsche Erd',,.," by 
Joachim Warmbold; and Literatur und Kolonia1ismus I, edited by Wolfgang Bader 
10 For example, Hermann Pongs "Grimms afrikanische Novellen," Dichtuni und Volkstum (1934): 
393-399. 
11 See, for example, Gudrun Thie~ "Deutsche Literatur in Sildwestafrika 1820-1920" (MA dissertation, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1981) for a useful general introduction and overview. 
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and Janos Riesz. In addition to this, the more recent unpublished PhD dissertations 
of Jurgen Bergmann and Ulrike Kistner should be mentioned.12 
Of the works available in German, however, I found little which was of real help 
in tackling the specific problem of space and spatiality, with the (notable) exception 
of Kistner's study. The reason for this was almost invariably a methodological 
inadequacy in the sociology of literature and critique of ideology.13 In approaching 
texts as "literature," but being forced to admit that they are "bad literature" (which 
they are), analysis necessarily limits itself to listing stereotypes, reconstructing the 
socio-political framework, providing semi-biographical information and/ or unveiling 
ideological attitudes. When such a method attempts to go beyond this, it finds it has 
very little to offer in the way of actual textual analysis. There is, for example, usually 
no attempt to provide a detailed account of the strategies which the text employs in 
the creation of its stereotypes, or, more important, the mechanisms which link it to 
the social structure in which it functions. 14 Kistner's study is an exception, in that she 
attempts to develop a framework within which textual analysis of colonial literature 
becomes a meaningful endeavour. It is also notable that she does not see herself 
bound to the traditional distinction between pulp literature and belles lettres, but 
speaks of 'colonial discourse'. She is thus able to overcome the (self-imposed) 
12 See note 1 above; Ulrike Kistner, "Die kolonisierende Rede. Strukturen eines restringierenden 
Kodes am Beispiel eines Romans von Martin Jaekel." (PhD dissertation, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1986). German South West African colonial literature has also enjoyed a fruitful 
debate in South African academic circles. For example, see Gunther Pakendorf, Of colonizers and 
colonized: Hans Grimm on German South West Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town African 
Studies Publication, 1985); Gunther Pakendorf, "Mord in der Steppe. Zu einer Motiv bei Hans Grimm 
und Charles Sealsfield," Acta Germanica 16 (1983); Astrid von Kotze, "Teutonic ladies and their 
'savages': thoughts on women writers and their image of the black population of colonial South West 
Africa, 1900-1914," in Class. community and conflict: local perspectives. History workshop 1984. 
(Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Publication, 1984); Peter Hom, 
"Fremdheitskonstruktionen weiller Kolonisten," in Perspektiven und Verfahren interkultureller 
Germanistik, ed. Alois Wierlacher (Miinchen: judicium, 1987); Hom, Peter. "Die Versuchung durch die 
barbarische Schonheit. Zu Hans Grimms farbigen Frauen." Germanisch Romanische Monatsschrift 
(1985); Dorian Haarhoff, "'Emeralds, ex-gentlemen, Escom and Iscor': Frontier literature in Namibia 
circa 1925," and "Birds, beasts and flowers: the 19th century travelogue: frontier themes and images in 
pre-colonial Namibia," both unpublished mss. 
13 Kistner has delivered a convincing critique of the methodological shortcomings to be found here, 
and, rather than repeating what she has said, I refer the reader to her study, part 1.2 "problematique," 
and part 2 "Textuelle Territoria/isierungen." Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, pp 5-15; pp 16-20. 
14 This is my major criticism of Warmbold's book, and is plainly evident in Part B, "Koloniale Stoffe 
und ihre Gestaltung." 
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stumbling block which German literary studies inevitably encounters with the 
question of colonial literture; that is, the belief that, because the colonial text often 
masquerades as belles lettres, it must be approached as such. I am convinced that this 
masquerade is itself an important strategy of colonial discourse, and that it is 
ultimately connected to the question of spatiality. For this reason, it is significant 
that, in her analysis, Kistner finds herself constantly returning to the question of the 
spatiality of the text.15 
There is another, in my opinion more serious, shortcoming of the approach to 
colonial literature found in Warmbold's, but especially in Bader and Riesz' study. If 
it is to avoid repeating the very same strategies which were integral to colonization, 
a critique of the colonial text must find a way of speaking about its object without 
attempting to do so from a position of universal knowledge. Colonization always 
seemed most convincing when it justified itself in terms of a general advancement of 
the human race, and a general expansion of the frontiers of knowledge. How, then, 
are we to interpret it when Janos Riesz states in his ''Ten theses on the relation of 
colonialism to literature" that history increases our knowledge of colonial literature 
by constantly developing the inherent potential meaning of the text?16 Or that 
comparative studies would be in a position to overcome Eurocentricity in the study 
of literature simply by expanding its boundaries to include the literatures of the ex-
colonized! 17 Is that not exactly what colonization did? It expanded the boundaries of 
its knowledge to include the non-European world, and when it did so, it told itself it 
was developing some inherent potential in the world, and contributing to the 
15 See ch. 2: Textuelle Territorialisierunge!!, and especially parts 2.11, 2.12, 1.16 & 2.17. 
16 "In der Geschichte der literarischen Rezeption von Werken, die der Kolonial-Thematik zuzurechen 
sind, stellt sich die Aufgabe einer Analyse der sukzessiven Entfaltung des im dichterischen Werk 
angelegten Sinnpotentials: was erst noch unklar war, wird zunehmend deutlicher, i:;ewinnt schiirfere 
Konturen." Janos Riesz, "Zehn Thesen zum Verhaltnis von Kolonialismus und Literatur," in Literatur 
und Kolonialismus I, ed. Wolfgang Bader and Janos Riesz, Bayreuther Beitrage zur 
Literaturwissenschaft 4 (Frankfurt and Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), p. 10. My emphasis. 
17 "Die Komparatistik als supranationale und polyglotte Literaturwissenschaft bat in diesem 
Zusammenhang nicht nur die Auf gabe, die im Lichte der Kolonial-Themati.k sich ergebenden 
Gemeinsamkeiten der europaischen Literaturen im Hinblick auf eine neue Literaturgeschichte Europas 
zu erarbeiten, sondem auch - durch Einbeziehung der Literatur der ehemals Kolonisierten - unser 
eurozentrisch gepragtes Literaturverstandnis zu iiberwinden und dadurch zur Entwickluni der 
'Weltliteratur' beizutragen." Riesz, Zehn Thesen, p. 11. My emphasis. 
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advancement of humanity. This, then, is the problem which I intend to address: 
colonization depends upon this expansion of boundaries in the name of knowledge, 
and an analysis of colonial discourse must address the specific strategies by which 
this discourse sought to do so at any one place and time, without itself repeating 
them. 
There is a line of inquiry into the problem of colonial discourse, which I believe 
more fruitful than an attempt to criticize ideology from an abstract position of 
superior knowledge, and it is this debate which I will take as my frame of reference. 
I am referring to the discussion which was initiated in French intellectual circles by 
the experience of the Algerian war of independence.18 Without wishing to set up 
artificial lines of influence, it is important to realize that these authors intiated a 
debate on colonialism within the framework of psychoanalysis and Marxian theory, 
together with (particularly in Memmi's case) a certain existentialist input from 
Sartre, which is still being conducted, particularly in America.19 In bringing 
colonialism within the domain of Marxian and psychoanalytic theory, however, a 
number of problems were also raised, which continue to plague the study of colonial 
discourse. It is characteristic of a number of studies of colonial discourse that the 
combination of psychoanalysis and Marxian theory leads to an uncertainty as to the 
relations between 'socio-economic facts' and 'unconscious facts' in the production of 
the colonial text. 
18 This is most notably the work of Frantz Fanon, Black skin, white masks, trans. Charles Lam 
Markmann (New York: Grove, 1965); The wretched of the earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New 
York: Grove, 1965); A dyin~ colonialism, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, 1967); Toward 
the African revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, 1967). See also Albert Memm~ 
The colonizer and the colonized. introd. Jean-Paul Sartre (Boston: Beacon, 1967). 
19 See, for example, the publication of the "Group for the critical study of colonial discourse, University 
of California, Santa Cruz:" Inscriptions (1985-), to name but one example. The intital impetus for the 
study of colonial discourse in the United States was provided by Edward Said's Orientalism (London: 
Penguin, 1978), a study which owes much to the work of Foucault. In England, Homi Bhabha has 
developed the colonial discourse debate in an interesting direction by testing not only the ideas of 
Foucault, but those of Lacan and Derrida. The present study owes much to his ideas. The following 
articles should be mentioned, "Of mimicry and man: the ambivalence of colonial discourse," October 28 
(Spring 1984); "Difference, discrimination, and the discourse of colonization." In Literature, politics and 
theory. Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976-84, pp. 194-211. Edited by Francis Barker. London & 
New York: Methuen, 1986. "Signs taken as wonders: questions of ambivalence and authority under a 
tree outside Delhi, May 1817." In "Race,· writing, and difference, pp. 163-184. Edited by Henry Louis 
Gates Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Collected essays originally published in Critical 
Im~uiry, vol. 12(1) (1985), and vol. 13(1) (1986). 
INTRODUCTION• 8 
relations between 'socio-economic facts' and 'unconscious facts' in the production of 
the colonial text. 
In order to illustrate some of the difficulties which the analysis of colonial 
literature raises for a method which is not certain whether it is Freudian or Marxist, 
or both, I wish to discuss briefly Hugh Ridley's Images of imperial rule.20 Ridley's 
book on colonial literature presents many insights which have been of use for the 
present study. In particular, I would refer the reader to his informative (though 
brief) analysis of the relation between colonial literature and the contemporary 
European socio-economic and political environment.21 In the present study, 
however, I will be adopting an analytical position which I believe capable of 
overcoming a number of weaknesses in Ridley's method. There are certainly 
valuable lessons to be gained from a study such as his; however, I believe that if we 
are to understand colonial literature, we must attempt to see it, not "historically, as a 
reflection of the European mind," but as a functional component of colonial 
practice. 
The difficulty in Ridley's intent becomes apparent when he states the "method 
of historical reading" he will employ. Taking 0. Mannoni's lead, he begins with a 
reading of Robinson Crusoe as the symptom, not only of Defoe's "individual 
neurosis," but also of a collective or group neurosis characteristic of Defoe's 
Europe.22 This group neurosis is to be understod in its historical specificity, and 
causes Crusoe to people his island with "embodiments of his own fears."23 This is in 
itself a very good thesis, and I will be arguing along similar lines at a later stage. I 
also agree with Ridley when he implies that colonial literature, as a symptom of 
group neurosis "reflects its age both in the virtues which it parades and in the 
shortcomings and blind spots it contains" ( though I find the word 'reflect' ill-
chosen ). 24 Finally, I believe it possible to gain valuable analytical insights from the 
20 Hugh Ridley, Images of Imperial rule (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983). 
21 See particularly pp 50-52. 
22 0. Maooooi, Prospero and Caliban: the psychology of colonization (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
23 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 6. 
24 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 6. 
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idea that "the colonial praxis reflected in colonial literature was an acting-out of 
domestic pressures and unconscious attitudes."25 These insights, however, should 
have led him to an entirely different method. If neurosis is indeed group neurosis 
(and Deleuze and Guattari will put forward good arguments for this case), then how 
can we hope to find that something which is the "European mind"? We cannot 
interrogate something like a historical reality, since neurosis establishes its own 
reality; and in the case of a group neurosis as extensive as that suggested by Ridley, 
this alternative reality is. history. Nor can we interrogate other contemporary texts 
without first establishing definite criteria for the part they play in this group 
neurosis. Psychoanalytic theory instructs us, however, that analysis may be seen as a 
strategic intervention, designed to produce our own text on the basis of another 
given text which we do not wish to accept at face value, i.e. which gives us reason to 
believe that it is hiding something. Lacan tells us that the symptom is a metaphor, 
and that the metaphor produces meaning by the elision of a signifier which has been 
banished from the signifying chain. This elision is the European mind and we need 
not look beyond the surface of the text to find it. What we do need to ask is, what 
has been produced in the production of the symptom as a metaphor? The answer I 
am offering is the colony as a space in which meaning is possible. 
It is because of his disregard for the spatial production involved in colonial 
discourse that Ridley is able, for example, to regard the colonial landscape as "a 
morally and polically neutral topic," something which it certainly is not.26 Nor does 
it do justice to the spatializing work of colonial discourse to attempt to see the 
landscape as the site of "the range of relationships possible between the literary 
imagination and the concrete aims of imperial conquest."27 Colonial landscape is 
not found by the colonizer as a neutral and empty space, no matter how often he 
assures us that this is so. This is one of the most persistent myths of colonization. 
Colonial landscape is produced as one possible level of spatiality onto which desire 
25 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 146. 
26 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 63. 
27 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 63. 
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may be mapped in the service of social production. I will discuss this in more detail 
in Part II. In his sensitive reading of Kipling's landscapes, Ridley himself goes on to 
demonstrate this fact, particularly with reference to the ordering work which 
colonization effects on a chaotic landscape in order to make it more productive.28 
Again, however, his conclusion regarding the French writer Psichari is misleading. 
Here he claims that the "African landscape is one of self-affirmation, not of 
discovery."29 Having previously shown that discovery, as embodied in the French 
exotic novel, contains within itself the dialectic of the familiar and the strange,30 I 
do not see how he can uphold this claim. 
Ridley's basic indecision as to the correct method for dealing with the symptoms 
of a historically specific group neurosis also leads him to a certain confusion 
regarding the function of literature in imperialism. He is, of course, quite right in 
not attempting "to systematize colonial fiction in isolation from social and economic 
factors in Europe," and is certainly correct in examining it "in the explanation and 
justification which it offered for the practices of imperialism."31 This is, however, not 
where the efficacy of colonial literature lies. If we ask ourselves what colonial 
literature .did, how it worked, not what it reflected, explained or justified, then we 
will realize that it is one of the many specific praxes which constitute imperialism. It 
did surely possess a secondary (explanatory or justificatory) role, but it functioned 
primarily by serving to organize and coordinate a number of other imperialist 
functions on a different level. I will also be pursuing this function in more detail in 
part II. 
Finally, Ridley shows himself unable to appreciate the function of violence in 
colonial literature. By seeking to explain those abundant and overbearing scenes of 
violence in colonial fiction, and particularly that fiction centered around the Herero 
wars, he states quite rightly that "it was neither in the interests of the settlers, nor to 
the liking of the German public to fight the battles which German colonial writers 
28 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 63. 
29 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 67. 
30 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 15. 
31 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule. p. 100. 
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described with such realism... in short, they represented the interests of neither 
group of their readers .. " However, this does not permit the conclusion that "they saw 
an ideological message behind these depictions, and that even the most pointless 
violence suggested to them a view of life which they wanted to communicate."32 It is 
entirely unclear here how the question of individual intent in the production of 
ideological messages could be answered. I would rather suggest the explanation that, 
in order to clear a space in which writing is possible, the colonial novelists must 
enter the dialectic of aggression and narcissism which La.can describes as 
fundamental in the constitution of subjectivity as social being. This suggestion is 
supported by the sheer pleasure with which colonial discourse directs the eye to its 
scenes of horror. I will be focussing on the importance of this idea in the creation of 
spaces in which meaning becomes possible as social meaning. The model of 
literature (which could be termed a "critique of ideology") to which Ridley takes 
recourse whenever the question of intent begins to subvert the thesis of group 
neurosis is not convincing. Thus, for example, when he refers to E. Bloch's 
discussion of pulp literature in order to uncover an essential and potentially 
revolutionary (in the Marxian sense) tension within colonial literature. I agree with 
Ridley that this is a valuable idea indeed, but when he discusses this tension as a 
class tension and a "fearing assent to history,"33 we ask just what the mechanisms 
might be whereby these tensions find their way into the colonial text. As soon as we 
begin to pursue these mechanisms we find that the ideological model runs up 
against serious problems. In order to avoid these, I will be using Deleuze and 
Guattari's radical revision of Marxian tenets to claim that tensions within the 
colonial text must be read not so much on the level of class, but of desire. We will 
find much evidence in the colonial text for a conflict between an essentially chaotic 
desire and its manipulation and organization in the service of social production or, 
more specifically, in the production of spaces whose quality is conducive to social 
practices. 
32 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 142. 
33 Ridley, Ima@s of Imperial rule, p. 30. 
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A similar problem to that affecting Ridley's analysis is evident in Abdul R. 
JanMohammed's Manichean aesthetics. The politics of literature in colonial 
Africa.34 JanMohammed begins by rightly criticising any existing studies of colonial 
literature which have "examined such texts in a socio-political vacuum."35 However, 
when we read the introduction, it becomes increasingly clear that he himself is not 
entirely certain how the relation between the text and social reality are best to be 
analyzed. JanMohammed takes up the discussion of the dialectic of colonizer and 
colonized epitomized by the works of Fanon and Memmi.36 As a consequence, he 
grants a central importance to "the nature of the influence of colonial social 
structures of works produced within that ambiance."37 This he considers to be a 
necessity in terms of his object, since literature focusses on socio-political relations, 
not economic ones.38 This is perhaps correct, but it necessarily leads him to an 
analysis of his chosen texts as evidence of a "colonial experience," of which he sets 
out to provide "a phenomenologically accurate description."39 This in tum leads him 
to the belief that the quality of colonial experience can in some way dictate the main 
aspects of colonialism upon which textual analysis should focus.40 It is precisely here 
that the weakness of such a phenomenology of colonialism becomes apparent. If we 
approach the colonial text in terms of colonial experience, we are forcing ourselves 
to overlook any number of important motivating factors in the production of the 
text, simply because these factors were not experienced as important. In other 
34 Abdul R. JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics. The politics of literature m colonial Africa 
(Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press, 1983). 
35 JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 1. 
36 JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, pp. 4-5. 
37 JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 6. 
38 "Though it is quite true that social relations are largely determined by economic motives, that the 
economic imperatives behind imperialism lead to the rise of colonialism, and that the metropole-colony 
relationship is essentially the same as that between capital and labour, it is the socio-political aspects of 
the relation between colonizer and colonized that are, from a literary point of view, more significant." 
JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 2. 
39 JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 7. 
40 "The major distinction in such a society is experienced in terms of race, which, unlike the horizontal 
division that defines class relations, can function both horizontally and vertically: regardless of the 
native's relation to modes of production or the amount of wealth he may accumulate, he will always be 
considered inferior by the colonialist." JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 7, emphasis in 
original. 
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words, we are approaching the colonial text on its terms, not ours. I find this 
unacceptable as the basis for a methodology of colonial discourse-analysis. 
A similar problem emerges in JanMohammed's later essay, ''The economy of 
Manichean allegory: the function of racial difference in colonialist literature."41 
Here again, he attempts to employ the concept of a Manichean colonialist aesthetic 
in the service of a methodology which could do justice to the colonial text in "the 
political context of culture and history."42 When JanMohammed begins to discuss 
the "affective benefits proffered by the Manichean allegory," however, it becomes 
clear that he is actually talking about something else - the structure of signification 
and the uses this structure has in colonial relations.43 I have no argument with him 
here, save that it would have been better to call this function by its name and leave 
Manicheaism to a specific textual strategy within this general structuring factor of 
signification which is so important in colonial discourse. This would have led to a 
better understanding of the subtlety with which Manicheaism as a strategy can be 
activated and deactivated in order to produce the illusion of universally valid 
meaning in colonial discourse. I will be addressing this issue later. 
In this article, we also see JanMohammed's hypotheses leading him directly to 
what I consider to be the two dead ends of analysis of colonial discourse - author 
intention and character depiction. The fallacy of author intention becomes apparent 
when it is tied to a notion of what we might call 'imperialist intention' - the will of 
the conqueror. It is an important observation on JanMohammed's part when he 
states that in colonial literature the other world is perceived as "uncontrollable, 
chaotic, unattainable, and ultimately evil."44 This however cannot be explained by 
the motivating factor of an imperialist "desire to conquer and dominate."45 A careful 
reading of colonialist texts will show us that conquest and domination are an effect, 
an appearance of imperialist desire. The latter is often as 'innocent' as the desire to 
41 JanMohammed, "The economy of manichaen allegory: the function of racial difference in colonialist 
literature," in "Race," writing, and difference, ed. Gates. 
42 JanMohammed, Manichaen allecor,y, p. 78. 
43 JanMohammed, Manichaen allecor,y, p. 86-7. 
44 JanMohammed, Manichaen allecor,y, p. 83. 
45 JanMohammed, Manichaen alle~or,y, p. 83. 
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escape the restrictions of European life and experience wide open spaces. In 
discourse, desire is a textual strategy and JanMohammed's continual reference to 
what an author does or wants is far from convincing. It causes him to overlook the 
productive function of desire in the colonial situation, and the role which an 
aesthetic of the stereotype plays in this production. The fact that Manichean 
characterization draws borders is obvious. What we should ask is, how are these 
borders activated productively in colonial discourse. This forces us to confront the 
Manichean dialectic from an entirely different point of view. It will lead us also to 
ask whether the dialectic itself does not participate, on a higher logical level, in the 
Manichean strategy of boundaries. What if, because of its insistence on an original 
distinction between the fields of discourse and 'actual political practice', an analysis 
such as that envisaged by JanMohammed, "an analysis that maps [colonial 
discourse's] ideological function in relation to actual imperialist practices,"46 were 
always destined to reduce itself to that very same "central trope, the manichean 
allegory"47 which it claims to analyze? 
3. Outline of investigation 
In order to do justice to the complex interaction of subjectivity, signification, 
and social production in colonization, I will be asking the reader to bear with me in 
a rather lengthy discussion of how the spaces of meaning and of subjectivity are 
produced. Only after having offered an explanation of this production will I be 
asking how these spaces intersect with the spaces of social production, and it is in 
this context that the production of colonial space will be raised. The reader will 
appreciate that such a discussion takes us to the heart of the protracted, often very 
tedious, and no longer highly fashionable discussion surrounding the question of 
Freudo-Marxism. Rather than surveying a number of the fields in which this 
46 JanMohammed, Manichaen allegory, p. 80: 
47 JanMohammed, Manichaen alle~<m, p. 78. 
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discussion has been conducted, I will begin with a discussion of the spatiality of the 
sign, then address that field of the Freudo-Marxism debate which I believe is most 
fruitful for the present discussion: the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari. 
I will be working, then, with the hypothesis that discourse plays an integral and 
primary role in the colonization process, and that this role is to be found in a very 
real ability to organize space into structures conducive to the functioning of the 
colony. 
In arguing this hypothesis, I will be developing the following theses: 
1. Space as the object of philosophical inquiry is traditionally bound up with a 
discussion of positions capable of structuring an ambient field. This structuration 
extends not only to physical space, but also to what I will call the spatiality of the 
sign and the space of subjectivity. In the unities which present themselves to us as a 
subject or a sign, spatiality is preserved as the trace of difference which Derrida 
uncovers in philosophical discourse. 
2. If we are to understand how these unities are mobilized in colonization, we 
will have to understand the way in which their space is produced as a space of the 
socius. The most important functions which facilitate this production are vision and 
writing. Both vision and writing have a material dimension. This allows us to derive 
a materiality of space as the domain in which the production of subjectivity 
coincides with the production of social form. In the materialism proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari, this is not based upon an essential lack, as suggested by 
Lacan, but upon a productive mulitplicity of desire. A materialism of spatiality 
allows us to overcome the single major weakness of psychoanalytic theory, which, in 
oscillating between universal validity and specific appearance, repeats the structure 
of colonial knowledge. In contrast to this, my analysis understands itself as 
functional: it asks how a diverse and chaotic multiplicity has been organized into a 
spatial unity - colonial space. 
3. Colonization creates discreet spatial unities, and establishes privileged 
passages between them. This, in turn, creates a logically higher totality. These 
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passages also stipulate the manner in which it is possible to project one spatial 
quality onto another; for example, under what conditions it is possible to treat the 
space of the sign as if it were the same space as that of the subject. 
4. This totalization depends upon 'nodal points,' - points of transformation 
which have the power to separate one quality of space from another by defining the 
principle of passage. If, for example, a border is to be crossed, it must be crossed at 
a particular point, in a particular way; and if truth is to be seen, the eye must look 
from a particular point in a particular way. These points reserve a position for 
themselves outside of time and space; they are always marked by a leap from the 
determined and the specific to the transcendental and the universal. 
5. The subjective and signifying mechanisms which allow this leap from the 
specific to the universal always involves an investment in a loss of Being or Meaning. 
This loss is compensated in attempts to fix subjectivity and signification in physical 
space - in writing on the earth. As a result, the organization of colonial space 
becomes increasingly rigid and determined. 
6. The increasingly rigid organization of space in colonization is constantly 
threatening to fragment the totality of space it seeks to create. To counter this, 
colonial discourse develops a mythic function - it creates an unlimited mobility 
across borders, and in doing so, it reconfirms these borders within a totalized 
experience of space. This is what I call the mythical mastery of space. 
I will not be attempting to reconstruct a comprehensive socio-historical context. 
It is not my aim to develop an image of continuity; on the contrary, it should emerge 
that the space of the socius has nothing to do with continuity.48 The aim of my 
analysis is to show that the colony functions through interconnections of a different 
kind. Those who are interested in the general history of German South West Africa, 
as well as discussions of a more specific nature, will find some excellent reference 
works.49 
48 This is what Foucault took such pains to emphasize throughout The archaeoloi)' of knowled~e; 
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972). See particularly pp. 3-5. 
49 I found the following of interest, to mention but a few: Helmut Bley, South West Africa under 
German rule 1884-1914 (London: Heinemann, 1971). A. F. Calvert, South West Africa durin~ the 
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I have attempted at all times to use "space" in a definite way. I am not interested 
in descriptions of landscape, except where they serve to produce spaces as I define 
them. I am concerned with the spaces which are opened up in looking and writing, 
and the way these spaces are transformed as they move from the domains of 
subjective perception to various practices of movement and spatial organization, 
and to various inscribing practices.50 This means that I will also have to address such 
questions as "distance," "strangeness," or the "foreign" quality of the colony as 
questions of space.51 As a result of this concept of space, I am often more interested 
in tracing a certain theme through a number of texts than in examining its 'context'. 
I may therefore be criticized for my tendency to select certain passages from the 
works I have chosen and analyze them out of 'context'. What I hope to achieve 
whenever I do this is to show that spatializing textual constructions seem to wander 
almost at random through the body of colonial texts. The themes I analyze usually 
possess a coherence of their own which may be modified or enhanced by their 
German occupation (London: Laurie, 1916); Horst Drechsler, Let us die fighting. The struggle of the 
Herero and Nama against German imperialism (Berlin, 1966); Keith Gottschalk, Colonialism.. 
commonage. and proletarianization. A re-analysis of the Bondelswart rebellion (Cape Town: 
University of Cape Town African Studies Publication, 1985); Department of Publicity and Information, 
SWAPO of Namibia, To be born a nation. The liberation struggle for Namibia (London: Zed, 1981); 
V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind. Black man. yellow man, and white man in an age of Empire 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); R. J.B. Moorsom, Colonisation and proletarianisation. 
An exploratory investigation of the formation of the working class in Namibia and German South West 
Africa (Sussex: Sussex University Press, 1973). 
50 There are, nevertheless, some extremely interesting studies of literary space, which, while not 
directly relevant to the present study, are recommendable: Maurice Blanchot, The space of literature, 
trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982) is one of the finest works on 
literary space. A useful collection of essays is Alexander Ritter, ed., Landschaft und Raum in der 
Erzahlkunst, Wege der Forschung, vol. 418 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975). 
Also of interest are L. Gruszenska, "Polish studies in literary space" Essays in poetics 9(2) (Sept 1984): 
24 - 32; R. Jarvella and W. Klein, Speech. place and action. Studies in deixis and related topics (New 
York: John Wiley and sons 1982) - this is not, strictly speaking, a work on literary space, but I found it 
contained some useful concepts which could be applied to literature; Gabriel Zoran, "Towards a theory 
of space in narrative," Poetics today 5 (1984). Richard Alewyn, "Eine Landschaft Eichendorffs," 
Euphorion 51 (1957). 
51 This may be seen, for example, in Peter Horn's essay on the constuction of "foreignness" by white 
colonizers, in which it is shown that the "strange" or "foreign" as a European construction delegates its 
objects to that realm ( or space) defined by the negation of European consciousness. "Im Grunde ist das 
"Fremde" nichts anderes a1s jenes Menschliche, das wir aus unserem Bewu8tsein, unserer Sprache, 
unserem Verhalten verdrangt haben: das "Fremde" wird in dem Augenblick geschaffen, in dem das 
Subjekt aus der Spaltung von Bewu8tem und Unbewu8tem gesellschaftlich konstituiert wird." Peter 
Horn, Fremdheitskonstruktionen, p. 405. 
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'context', or may stand in contradiction to it (I have given a few examples of this 
interaction), but do not rely on it for their spatializing function. 
It is also not my intention to uncover or imply an 'objective event', whose 
existence may be demonstrated by continual textual references. I would rather 
choose to speak of textual spaces which are produced in certain discursive practices, 
and which open onto other spaces 'outside of the text. 
I will not be addressing the question of time directly, although it will become 
clear that the question of time borders constantly on that of space. As this study was 
nearing completion I came across the work of Johannes Fabian, in particular Time 
and the Other, in which I found preoccupations very similar to my own, but from the 
point of view of time, and with specific reference to anthrolopogical discourse. I 
found Fabian's central thesis of particular interest: that anthropological discourse 
creates its object through the construction of a temporal alterity, within which that 
object may be examined. This alterity allows the object to appear at a distance, 
which Fabian also recognizes as possessing a spatial dimension.52 It becomes 
particularly evident in his fourth chapter, entitled "The Other and the eye: time and 
the rhetoric of vision," that the question of time always opens onto the question of 
space. I will be addressing this opening from the other side, the side of space, where 
this becomes necessary, and I agree with Fabian that it is particularly in the realm of 
vision that this is so. 
Furthermore, Fabian's central thesis implies that the discipline of anthropology 
creates its object by establishing a space through the negation of time. In part I, I 
will be addressing the implications of the creation of space through the negation of 
time for a theory of the spatiality of the sign. In part II, I will return frequently to the 
idea that knowledge creates spaces, not only spaces in which its object is defined, 
but in which it may function as knowledge. I believe that it is not only anthropology 
which creates the space of its object through the negation of time, but that this is a 
52 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other. How anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), p. xi. 
INTRODUCTION• 19 
more general aspect of scientific objects-formation. This applies particularly to the 
natural sciences as they existed in the late 19th century. 
I also agree with Fabian's thesis that, with respect to anthropology, "it is 
naturalized-spatialized Time which gives meaning (in fact a variety of specific 
meanings) to the distribution of humanity in space."53 In attempting to gain insight 
from this thesis for a study of colonial discourse, I would, however, plead for certain 
reservations. Speaking in more general terms, I would claim that the creation of 
meaning is a more subtle process. In part I, I will attempt to show how meaning 
requires a dual gesture which spatializes time in the sign, but which is effective 
through an elision of this spatializing process. Thus I will attempt to show how, in 
colonization, meaning produces spaces while developing strategies for the elision of 
the spatializing process. This is a complex process, in which space is constantly being 
produced and elided. It is for this reason that I disagree with Fabian's claim that 
"little needs to be said ... about separation and distancing in colonial praxis which 
drew its ideological justification from Enlightenment thought and later 
evolutionism."54 The second part of this sentence, together with Fabian's insights 
into the ways in which disciplinary knowledge borders constantly on political praxis, 
would indicate to me that precisely such a study might be of great use. I hope to be 
able to demonstrate this here. 
A word needs to be said about my selection of primary texts. I may be accused 
of mixing fictional and non-fictional texts in a haphazard manner. It should emerge 
from my discussion that the distinction between the fictional and the non-fictional, 
precarious at all times, becomes even more so with reference to colonial discourse. 
Nevertheless, I do not wish to claim that no such difference exists. I would rather 
suggest that the difference lies not in one particular text, but in the various and 
diverse relations into which a given text may enter at any one time. I have also not 
attempted to be exhaustive in my selection of primary texts. I have, instead, chosen a 
number of prose works which I consider representative of the colonial discourse of 
53 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 25. 
54 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 27. 
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German South West Africa. I have not included lyric or dramatic forms in this study. 
It may surprise the reader to find that I have omitted the writer whose works come 
most immediately to mind when the theme of colonial space is mentioned - Hans 
Grimm, and more particularly his novel Volk ohne Raum.55 The reasons are the 
same as outlined earlier - the nostalgic phantasies of imperial expansion which 
Grimm (and others) entertained after the loss of German colonies fall outside of the 
scope of this study, since he is no longer writing within the colonial project.56 All 
translations from primary sources, which are listed under a separate heading in the 
bibliography, are my own. Wherever I translate from a secondary source, this is 
stated in the footnote. 
Finally, there is a problem of terminology when speaking of colonial discourse. 
This concerns the land and its inhabitants. The nation known as Namibia has 
struggled hard to free itself from colonial domination, and has, at the time of 
writing, still not succeeded entirely; it may thus seem inappropriate to refer to it 
with the old colonial label. My intention is purely historical - I refer to the territory 
which, from 1884 to 1914 was known as German South West Africa. The same 
problem applies to the inhabitants, those who were there before the colonizers 
arrived. How do we name them, without colonizing them? Even the ethnographer is 
guilty of fixing relatively static domains, both demographically and geographically, 
domains which the colonizer will later use when establishing his enclosures. Rather 
than resort to euphemisms, I have consistently used the colonial terms to denote the 
colonial 'objects:' "native" and "savage." It is my sincere wish that the reader accept 
my apologies and read these with the necessary irony. 
55 Hans Grimm, Volk ohne Raum [Nation without space], 
56 For those interested in pursuing the topic of Grimm and spatiality I recommend Jurgen Bergmann, 
Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, pp. 130-132, 148-150; Dieter Lattmann, "Raum a1s Traum: Hans 
Grimm und seine Saga von der Volkheit," in Propheten des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Karl Schwedhelm 
(Miinchen, 1969); Ernst Keller, "Ein Volle ohne Raum? Hans Grimm," in Nationalsozialismus und 
Literatur, by Ernst Keller (Bern, 1970); Peter Zimmermann, "Kampf um den Lebensraum. Ein Mythos 
der Kolonial- und Blut-und-Boden-Literatur," in Die deutsche Literatur im Dritten Reich, ed. Horst 
Denkler und Karl Priimm (Stuttgart: Reclam 1976). 
PART ONE: SPACE, SIGNIFYING SPACE, SUBJECTIVE SPACE 
CHAPTER 1: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE POINT: THE METAPHYSICAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE 
The opposition of our positions is indeed radical; 
in this, we are in complete agreement ... 
Jean-Francois Lyotard 
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In this chapter, I will be attempting to provide one of the many possible answers 
to the question: what is space? It is of the very nature of space that the manner in 
which the question is formulated will suggest the answer. In this first chapter, I wish 
to pursue the mode of questioning and some possible answers put forward by 
metaphysical philosophy. I agree with Cassirer when he insists on a sharp 
differentiation between mythical and geometrical space - the latter being to a large 
extent the space of metaphysics.1 But this qualitative differentiation does not allow 
us to dismiss a philosophy of space or a geometry as irrelevant to a discussion of 
literature and related discursive practices.2 
The present study is to a large extent a study of the point as a position in space -
a position capable of bearing meaning, and of structuring ambient space in a 
particular way. We begin here with an examination of the point as a vital concept in 
the metaphysical discussion of space. I will be attempting to show that, even in its 
'purest' form, the theories of Aristotle, the point is at all times "contaminating" itself 
with questions of signification and subjectivity. The reason for this is simple. 
Subjectivity and signification are themselves spatial. In later chapters I will be 
seeking to explore the nature of this contamination in more detail, with the aim of 
showing that a point is always in a relationship with more than one quality of space, 
irrespective of the quality in which we initially attempt to situate it. Having proven 
this to our satisfaction, I will then show more specifically that this multiple quality 
has definite discursive and hence "political" repercussions. 
1 ARISTOTELEAN PIACE, MOTION AND SPACE 
l.1 Aristotle s definition of place 
1 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Tei! II: Das mythische Denken (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), p. 105. 
2 This is evident in a number of recent approaches to the "literary" text, most notably the work of 
Michel Serres. 
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When, in the following, I examine Aristotle's concept of space, I hope to show 
that metaphysics is always in dialogue with its own limits. This is clear in the very 
origins of Aristotle's concept of space - his attempt to solve Zeno's famous paradox.3 
With this paradox, the entire metaphysical discussion of the nature of space is 
opened up. For, in order to solve the paradox, it must be demonstrated that 
everything is not in place, or that place itself is not something, or at least that it is 
something of a different nature than everything else which must be in place. 
Aristotle has been called "the philosopher of common sense," the defendant of 
the beliefs of "the plain man."4 And his discussion of space has been seen as an 
elaboration and systematization of common knowledge relating to objective space. 
The fundamental position of both of these concepts ( objectivity and common 
knowledge) in Aristotle's philosophy must in tum be seen in conjuntion with his 
mistrust of a philosophical usage of language aimed at introducing complexity on a 
metaphysical level where there is no objective justification for this complexity - in 
other words, his rejection of the Sophist tradition as he saw it.5 
I would like to suggest, tentatively at this stage, that this rejection could also 
assume the nature of a repression. If this is so, we should, in the following 
discussion, reach a point where we will be forced to confront Aristotle's silences, the 
aporia in his system which, without damaging it in the slightest, open onto a certain 
number of questions ( or a certain question) which may not be asked. Let us bear 
this in mind as we discuss his ideas. 
3 In Max Jammer's paraphrase, this says that "everything is in place; this means that it is in something; 
but if place is something, then place itself is in something, etc." Max Jammer, Concepts of space. The 
history of theories of space in physics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 16. 
4 Philip Wicksteed, Introduction to The Physics, by Aristotle (London: Heinemann, 1929), p. xxi. See 
also Aristotle's definition of a "problem" as a function of the opinion of the "masses" - The works of 
Aristotle, gen. ed. W. D. Ross, vol. I, Topica, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1928), para. 104bl-18; see also note 38 below) 
5 " ... the plain man who has not been accustomed to hard thinking can easily be misled by thinkers who 
have themselves gone astray or by sophists who take pleasure in misleading him. So Aristotle attempts 
to give precision to the plain man's conceptions, to release him from confusions into which the 
ambiguities and imperfections of language may have betrayed him .. ." Wicksteed (1929), p. xxii. 
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In the Cate~ories, space is described as a continuous quantity, and place is 
defined in terms of the continent function.6 What this means is that "'Space' here is 
conceived as the sum total of all places occupied by bodies, and 'place' (topos), 
conversely, is conceived as that part of space whose limits coincide with the limit of 
the occupying body."7 
It should be noted, however, that in the major work dealing with "space," De 
Physica, Aristotle "does not advance a theory of space at all, but only a theory of 
place or a theory of positions in space. However, since the Platonic and Democritian 
conceptions of space are unacceptable to the Aristotelian system of thought, and 
since the notion of empty space is incompatible with his physics, Aristotle develops 
only a theory of positions in space.118 
The Atomists had argued before him that a theory of the void was a necesary 
precondition to any concept of motion, since an empty space was required if a body 
was to vacate a space and move to another space, displacing the body which had 
occupied this latter space. According to Aristotle, however, the theory of the void is 
not only unnecessary, it is incapable of explaining motion, and furthermore it is 
confused in itself.9 
Aristotle argued that place is distinct from the bodies which occupy it to the 
extent that it may be seen as a "continent vessel" for these bodies. In rejecting 
previous attempts to define place (among these Plato's), he presents us with four 
possible definitions, of which only the final one can be upheld. 
From all this [the question of displacement of parts and wholes in 
motion] the answer to the question 'What is place ?' already emerges. 
For we may take it that it must be either (i.) the form or (ii.) the matter 
of the body itself, or (iii.) some kind of dimensional extension lying 
between the points of the containing surface, or (iv.) - if there be no 
such 'intervenient', apart from the bulk of the included body - the 
containin~ surface itself. 
Now it 1s clear that no one of the first three alternatives is 
admissable ... 10 
6 The works of Aristotle, vol. I, Categoriae, trans. E. M. Edgehill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), para. 5a8-
14, Aristotle, The Physics Vol IV. 
7 Jammer, Concepts of space, p. 15. 
8 Jammer, Concepts of space, p. 15. 
9 John J Drummond, "A note on Physica 21lb14-25." The new scholasticism 55 (1981), p. 220. 
10 Aristotle, The Physics, para. 211b6-10. 
SPACE, SIGNIFYING SPACE, SUBJECTIVE SPACE• 26 
The example which Aristotle uses here is that of a vessel which is the container 
of a liquid in the same manner as the place "contains" its object. However, as soon 
as the place of a body is defined in terms of the "interface" of its containing surfaces, 
the problem of motion presents itself. If a body is contained by another body, itself 
in motion with respect to a third containing body, etc, how can the place of the first 
body ever be localized? Aristotle solves this problem by stating that if we follow the 
sequence of moving vessel-continents we will eventually encounter a vessel-
contintent which is motionless. This is the place of the body. In the example he 
produces, this seems relatively clear: 
... we have as good a right to regard Glace as 'an immovable vessel' as we 
have to regard a~ as a 'movable p ace'. 
And, from this point of view, if one thing is moving about inside another, 
which other is also in motion, as when a boat moves through the water of a 
flowing river, the water is related to the boat as a vessel-continent rather 
than as a place-continent; and if one looks for stability in 'place', then the 
river as a permanent stable whole, rather than the flowing water in it at the 
moment, will be the boat's place. 
Thus wha1rver fixed environing surface we take our reckoning from will be 
the place. 
We can, however, see here the first indications of a serious problem in 
Aristotle's concept of space; that is the necessity to ultimately ground all judgments 
about a body's position in either the identity of subjective judgments about the 
relative stability of vessels, or else in an innate hierarchical spatial structure of the 
cosmos. As we shall see, Aristotle takes recourse to both of these solutions. 
1.2 The implication of time: Aristotle and the question of motion 
Although modem physics seems to have made the refutation of the second 
solution redundant, the problem of the immovable mover is by no means to be 
simply dismissed as outdated, in so far as traces of this concept follow through into 
Kant, thus being written into the parameters of what may and may not be thought by 
11 Aristotle, The Physics, para. 212a15-21 
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subsequent philosophy.12 We should thus not be too quick to reject the second 
solution to the problem of perception of motion. Indeed, the first solution is in many 
respects connected to it. This is evident in Derrida's demonstration of elements of 
circularity in Aristotle's thought - elements which place a high degree of 
interdependence between language, subjectivity and space.13 The very notion of 
subjectivity is itself intimately tied to notions of language and space. If we trace the 
etymology of the word subject to the latin subjectum, we find that it denotes a 
principle which constantly takes part in a process, even though it may change in this 
process.14 In keeping with this, Aristotle's subject of motion has two prime features. 
It is firstly a change in the position of a body which at all times takes part in that 
motion. But it can also be a change within that body. Motion is for Aristotle not only 
the spatial change in place, but it may also mean a qualitative change.15 In De 
Anima, He speaks of "four species of movement - locomotion, alteration, 
diminution, growth."16 
If we differentiate with Aristotle between the motion of bodies and the motions 
of the soul, we find that it is not only the former which is ordered hierarchically. 
Both motions are part of a system of active and passive levels of relations in which 
"the organic parts are suitably prepared by the affections, these again by desire, and 
12 "[Der unbewegte Beweger ist nacb Aristoteles] nicbt erster mecbaniscber, quantitiv, also exakt 
bestimmbarer AnstoB, sondern oberstes Ziel eines nicbt restlos determinierten Strebens. Diese 
Vorstellung tragt dem gegenseitigen sicb AusschlieBen von Bewegungsmoglichkeit und eindeutiger 
Determiniertheit Rechnung, wenngleich die Vorstellung des unbewegten Bewegers andererseits der 
Vorstellung eines schlieBlichen Zuendekommens aller Bewegung und damit dem Ubergewicht der 
Bestimmung in der Spannung zwischen Bestimmung und Bestimmtem entspricht. .. 
Was in der aristotelischen Philosophie nur fur den unbewegten Beweger zutreffen soll und deshalb das 
Moment der Willkiir an sich hat, wird bei Kant auf den Raum bezogen and damit auf alles ausgedehnt, 
insofern es nur vom auBeren Sinn gegeben ist... 
In diesem Sinn ist von Kant kritisch zu Ende gefiihrt, was bei Aristoteles in der Vorstellung des 
unbewegten Bewegers angestrebt war und woraufbin der Aristotelischen Pbysik zuf olge die Dinge als 
auf das Telos ihrer Bewegung streben: daB Notwendigkeit und Sein in ihnen zusammenfallen sollen." 
Joseph Simon, Sprache und Raum (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1%9), p. 100-101. 
13 This is particularly convincingly demonstrated by Jacques Derrida in the essay "Ousia and gramme," 
in: Maqpns of philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: Harvester, 1982), in which the Greek word hama is 
isolated as articulating and effacing a central aporia in Aristotle's thought on space. 
14 Frieda Ricken ed., Lexikon der Erkennnistheorie und Metaphysik, (Miinchen: Beck, 1984), p. 34. 
15 Alexander Gosztonyi, Der Raum: Geschichte seiner Probleme in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, 2 
vols. (Freiburg & Miinchen: Alber, 1976), vol. 1, p. 102. 
16 The works of Aristotle, vol. III, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931), para. 
406a13-14; See The works of Aristotle, vol. VIII, Metaphysica, trans. W. Christ (Leipzig 1895) rev. W. 
D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), para. 1069a12, Aristotle, The Physics, para. 200b33-201a4. 
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desire by imagination. Imagination in its turn depends either upon the conception or 
sense-perception."17 In the same way that the problem of motion of vessel-
continents forced him to postulate a level of place not subject to motion, so the 
hierarchical or causal ordering of these effects forces Aristotle to question the 
original cause of motion. Here he concludes that all bodies which are moved "by 
force,"18 that is not naturally as the upwards-motion of fire, are moved externally.19 
When the motion we are discussing is human motion, however, there is a moral 
problem at stake. If human motion is taken in the sense of activity and is always 
initiated externally, the concept of intention and therefore of ethical self-
responsibility becomes meaningless.20 In order to overcome this problem, the 
motion of animals (including human beings) is differentiated from that of the object, 
in that the motion of the former is determined externally, but with the qualification 
that this external initiater is "internalized" through sense perception,21 in other 
words through the act of assigning meaning to the physical world. The actual ethical 
differentiation between animal and human motion is based upon desire, which in 
the human mind is the desire for good as a practical goal of motion. 22 
Desire, however, according to Jacques Derrida, is not itself the "prime mover." 
Aristotle himself indicates this when he states that, although desire is the "final or 
unmediated release of motion,"23 it is itself moved by the imagination. Since in this 
interpretation desire is desire for the overcoming of a spatial distance, a lack, the 
presentation of what is not there, "desire is the desire of presence." Presence itself 
then "animates all movement by means of the desire it inspires."24 
What this means is that the attempt to define place immediately succumbs to 
the question of motion and in doing so merges with the question of time. Presence 
17 The works of Aristotle, vol. V, De moto animalium, trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1912), para. 702a18-20. 
18 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 103. 
19 This theme is developed in David J Furley, "Self movers," in: Aristotle on the mind and the 
~ ed. GER Lloyd and GEL Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
20 Aristotle, de anima 417a. 
21 Furley, Self movers, p. 173. 
22 Aristotle, de moto animalium, para. 700b25. 
23 Aristotle, de moto animalium, para. 701a35. 
24 Derrida, Ousia and warn me, p. 52. 
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itself is, as Derrida shows, subject to an aporia of time which Zeno had pronounced: 
that time must be thought as comprising endless distinct "nows," but that each "now" 
must be thought as neither past nor future; that is, outside of time. Aristotle 
understands time as "the measuring and measured measure of an irreversible 
elapsation whose elementary structure is understood as a transition from one point 
to another."25 However, he manages to evade the step taken by Zeno, in which time 
is constructed as a line. Nevertheless, in doing so, he retains that portion of the 
paradox which necessitates a distinction between time and "now," adopting a 
conception of "now" as outside time.26 The distinction between time and "now" is 
displaced onto that between potency and the act,27 whereby the temporal absence of 
the past or future "now" becomes the potential presence of the present "now."28 
In evading and preserving Zeno's aporia, Aristotle initiates a metaphysical 
tradition which believes "that it could think time on the basis of a being already 
silently determined in relation to time."29 The nature of this silently predetermined 
being is space, and in the following passages I shall present a few examples to show 
how, since Aristotle, all attempts to think space require a concept of time based on 
space; and a similar argument applies for the attempts to think time. I am following 
Derrida here, who speaks of an omission which constitutes the history of 
metaphysics.30 The presence of this omission in the texts of metaphysics necessitates 
a reading which apprehends not only what is written, but also the written trace of 
the unwritten. 
Let us return, however, to the two solutions to the problem of perception of a 
final motionless instance. If we reject the proposition that the real world is 
structured so as to contain an ultimate position which is absolutely fixed in space or 
in ethical status, our only alternative according to the Aristotelian system is to 
25 Rudolf Bernet, "ls the present ever present? Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence," 
Research in Phenomenolo2Y 12 (1982), p. 92. 
26 Bernet, Is the presentm p. 92. 
27 See Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 60. 
28 Bernet, Is the present. .. p. 92. 
29 Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 47. 
30 Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 47. 
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ground these in the possible identity of subjective perception, representation and 
the real world. When we pursue this solution, we are lead into the structure of 
Aristotelean logic. 
David Wiggins has shown that knowledge of place is not to be dissociated from 
knowledge of the identity of things.31 Our knowledge of the identity of a thing must 
be based on the production of so-called identity statements possessing a truth value. 
An identity statement is defined by Wiggins as a statement linking two noun phrases 
( as "things") by three logical operations. 
(1) The two noun phrases must each, independently and irrespective of 
whether the statement is true or false, serve to pick out a particular which is 
strictly referred to (and so directly or indirectly identified under a substance 
concept) by the speaker... . 
(2) There must be some substance-concept intended as that under which 
both particulars fall ... 
(3) ... a substance concept [is deemed satisfactory] for the purposes of 
conditions (1) and (2) if and only if it is possible to divide up the contents of 
the world and isolate the [quantit~ of this substance conceptj in one and only 
one way (See Aristotle 2b29-30) ... 2 
If an identity statement so defined is to possess truth value, it must furthermore 
be possible to define a field of each noun phrase in space and time such that the two 
fields coincide. It is here that the difficulties arise within the parameters of 
Aristotelian logic. The production of true identity statements pre-supposes a 
concept of spatiality, if these are to be recognized as true. The concept of spatiality 
developed by Aristotle, however, pre-supposes knowledge of identity, since the 
boundaries of places coincide with the boundaries of objects. 
Wiggins suggests that this circularity may possibly be overcome by the 
recognition of certain "privileged" objects which "can be identified by a 
thinker ... without support from the spatio-temporal framework"33 
Candidates for this privileged role are (1) one's own body (2) one's own 
spatio-temporal location, (3) an object continuously and directly observed by 
some thinker ... 34 
31 David Wiggins, "The individuation of things and places" Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 
XXXVII (1963). 
32 Wiggins, Things and places, p. 177-178. 
33 Wiggins, Thin~ and places, p. 180 .. 
34 Wiggins, Thin~ and places, p. 181. 
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Wiggins ultimately rejects all three possibilities. We need not concern ourselves 
here with the way in which he develops his argument, nor the attempts to overcome 
his dillemma in the reply of M J Wood.35 What is important for us is that, in terms 
of Aristotle's logic and theory of place, knowledge of truth and identity in 
statements must ultimately be grounded in the existence of a subject as either an 
infallible observer or as the guarantor of truth by virtue of his identity. The truth 
value of statements may not be dissociated from the identity of a subject in space. It 
is this which allows Simon to state that "Die Aristotelische Raumlehre schematisiert 
quasi die Aristotelische Syllogistik"36 
This would seem to lead to the conclusion that a system of knowledge pre-
requires the establishment of a hierarchy of subjective authorities similar to a law of 
knowledge and having access to a conventional language, or else the conclusion that 
spatial properties may be separated into the geometricaly true on the one hand, and 
the perspectively valid on the other hand, the latter of which cannot be described in 
ordinary language and must thus be investigated by means of a phenomenology.37 
We can see here the price which must be paid for Aristotle's refutation of the 
Sophist tradition, in particular of Zeno's paradoxes of space and time - speaking the 
truth about space or time pre-supposes an identity which must be vested in space 
itself, the speaking subject, or language itself, or all three. When we trace the 
development of Aristotle's observations on space and time, we shall see that any 
attempt to think their interrelationship will find itself confronted with the question 
of representation, and thus of subjectivity and its signs. 
1.3 Positions in space and the Aristotelian syllogism 
35 "What would make these [Mr Wiggins'] privileged cases exceptional, supposing such privileged cases 
could be found, would be, not that the truth conditions of the relevant identity statements could be 
specified independently of the notion of the identity of a place, but rather that the person who made 
the statements in question could know that the conditions were fulfilled without first identifying a 
place." M. J. Wood, Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. XXXVII (1963), p. 205 (my emphasis). 
36 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 92. 
37 See J. Harrison, "The third dimension." Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. LXI (1960). 
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Now it must be emphasized if we are to realize the far reaching consequences of 
Aristotelian theories of positions for the modern discussion of space, that such a 
dilemma as that posed by Wiggins is, strictly speaking, a misappropriation of the 
Aristotelian system. As Simon shows, Aristotle's logic is so firmly grounded in the 
knowledge of fixed positions mentioned above, that it is not at any place concerned 
with a proof of their existence.38 Instead, the intersubjectivity which grounds this 
knowledge is taken as a starting point.39 It is in this sense that we must understand 
the logics of Aristotle not as a model of the world as represented in language, but as 
a system of conjunctions which allow us to move from various accepted positions in 
an argument to other positions which must be accepted as a consequence of the 
acceptance of the previous positions. Simon is careful to point out that the position 
(topos) as it is understood in the Topica is not to be automatically dissociated from 
the positions in physical space described in the Physica.40 In fact, the structure of 
motion from one logical position to another calls forth the same criticisms as the 
structure of relative motion between physical places. Both are based on probability -
of perception on the one hand and of representation on the other. In the logics, this 
probability may be described as "der vernilnftigerweise eingenommene 'allgemeine' 
Standpunkt, fiir den die Umstande sprechen. 
Der 'Ort', den man mit einem SchluB einnimmt, besteht darin, daB map nur 
noch die formale Struktur dieser gegebenen Aussagen analysiert ... die 'Orter' 
der 'Topik' sind formale Gesichtspunkte auf dem schwankenden Boden 
wahrscheinlicher Aussagen. Der Raum ist nichts s1e inhaltlich 
38 "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of 
those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether 
one ought to honour the Gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are 
puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception." Aristotle, Topica, para. 105a5. 
39 "Nur iiusserlicher "Probierstein" der objektiven Realitiit eines im Urteil ausgesagten Verhaltnisses ist 
nach Kant die "Einstimmung" aller Urteile verschiedener Subjekte iiber dasselbe "ungeachtet der 
Verschiedenheit der Subjekte untereinander" [Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 848/9]. Von solchem 
iiusseren Anschein, von dem her die Objektivitat als wahrscheinlich gelten kann, geht Aristoteles in der 
"Topik, • der ersten und for alle weiteren Systeme grundlegenden Logik aus." Simon, Sprache und 
Raum, p. 93. Emphasis in original. 
40 Simon, Sprache und Raum. p. 94, See also E. Rolfes. Introduction to Topik. by Aristotle (Leipzig. 
1948). who speaks of "die Ahnlichkeit zwischen einem allgemein verwendbaren Vordersatz und einem 
Ort im gewohnlichen, raumlichen Sinne des W ortes." Cit Simon. Sprache und Raum. p. 94. 
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Bestimmendes, sondem ihr iiber ihren eigenen Bestimmtheitsgrad nicht 
hinausfiihrendes logisches Verhaltnis untereinander.41 
The direction of Simon's argument serves to underline the underlying problem 
in Wiggins' dilemma, that the structuration of places on the basis of probability is at 
the same time a structuration of positions of subjectivity. This applies to the physical 
positions which may be occupied in order to pronounce judgments about the relative 
motion of objects; it applies equally to the logical positions which must be occupied 
in order to connect statements of probability in a rigorous manner. 
When we consider that the logic which connects sentences in order that true 
statements may be made, it can be said that language prescribes positions from 
which positions may be described. This means that the circle of experience, its 
representation and the confirmation of experience through the formal 
intersubjectivity of the corresponding representation is supported by preexisting 
positions at the level of perception and representation. Since they are the 
competence required for the performance of statements these preexisting positions 
in tum serve as the confirmation of their reference value.42 It seems, then, that we 
may understand a critique of the metaphysical construction of space as a critique of 
the development from one position to the next, from this next position to another, 
and so on. What is primary in such a critique is the stage in this development where 
the individual positions disappear within the structure which they have grounded. 
Above, I have attempted to show that this construction of space is to be 
understood in the dual sense of an edifice of positions of objects and of positions in 
41 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 94. Emphasis in original. 
42 "Es ist aber eine Position vorausgesetzt, von der aus Satze in ihrem 'Wahrheitswert' veqpichen 
werden, d.h. ein Subjekt, das, indem es einen bestimmten Satz bejaht oder vemeint, immer auch schon 
einen bestimmten anderen Satz als bejaht oder verneint milifilt ... .Insofern die formale Logik Logik der 
Erfahrung.s-Wissenschaft ist, ist der behaltene Satz Prinzip gegeniiber einem Satz, iiber dessen 
Positivitat, bzw. Negativitat die Erfahrung aktuell entscheiden soil. Die Voraussetzung (durch das 
georderte Behalten mindesten eines bestimmten Satzes) vorherbestimmter Subjektivitat gegeniiber 
bestimmten anderen Satzen bedeutet eine Einschrankung der Selbstbestimmung des Subjekts gegeniiber 
diesen Satzen. Da.8 SchlieBen mit formaler Notwendigkeit moglich ist, ist bedingt durch eine dem Subjekt 
auferlegte Einschrankung seiner Subjektivitat, die es sich zwar, indem es spricht und darin anderen und 
sich selbst verstandlich bleiben ~ immer auch selbst auferlegt, die, als Bedingung wissenschaftlichen 
Verhaltens, aber insofem institutionalisiert wircl, als das Subjekt aufgefordert ist, die Satze, die 
Prinzipien gegeniiber anderen Satzen sein sollen, im voraus darzulegen und sich dadurch seiner 
Subjektivitat institutionell zu entauBern." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 271. Emphasis in original. 
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logical argument. In both cases, Aristotle circumvents an aporia which is to become 
one of the central aporia of metaphysical thought: If a position is the basis of a 
construction, and this position is, by necessity, without dimension in relation to that 
construction, how then can the construction itself possess dimension, being? 
It was mentioned at the outset that Aristotle is much more concerned in ~ 
Physica with developing a concept of position than of space, and it has been 
indicated that the question of the connection between the two is problematic. On 
the one hand, space must appear as the composite sum of positions in space; on the 
other hand, spatiality is given by the physis of time, which is itself related to 
movement and change, and "takes off from the possibility of the analogy constituted 
by what is traced determined as line ... "43 No matter which of these alternatives we 
seek to develop, we will find the Aristotelean notion of space caught in what 
Derrida reveals as a circularity of thought. Space determines presence and non-
presence, while at the same time being detemined by it. 
2 KANT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE 
2.1 The opening an.d bridging of space in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
If we accord the problematics of space in Aristotle's philosophy the status which 
Joseph Simon seems to indicate it must have, then we can regard Kant's philosophy 
of space as a preoccupation with the questions which for Aristotle had not yet 
attained the status of questions. That is to say, any number of the aporia which 
Aristotle saw himself able to circumvent, are seen to return in various forms. It is 
important to recognize that this re-appearance of some of the founding aporia of 
metaphysics is in itself in keeping with the metaphysical (in particular Kantian) 
attempt to see knowledge of the world validated in the structure of space. The 
43 Derrida, Ousia and Gramme, p. 49. 
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asking of a philosophical question, or the encircling of a topos which could be 
considered philosophical appears as an Auseinandersetzung, a thesei which opens a 
space between a questioning subject and the object of enquiry. In this sense, the 
interpretation of space plays a decisive role in the modern concept of reality.44 
The problem with which Kant found himself faced was that the dualistic concept 
of reality, no matter where the axis of this dualism happens to be drawn, can provide 
no rigorous (in the sense of possessing general validity) ideal mediating principle, 
such as time and/or space. And without this principle, argued Kant, the 
intelligibility of the world cannot be given. The development of Kant's critical 
philosophy thus revolves around the status which space must have in a revised 
notion of nature and ideality.45 
A concept of nature which ties subjectivity to general validity necessarily puts 
itself in a difficult position regarding the guarantee on knowledge. To put this in 
different terms, and leading on from the discussion of Aristotle, we may accept that 
the Aristotelian system of logic is valid as a technique of argumentation ( as does 
Kant)46• However, we may only be certain that a syllogistic argument is in fact a 
progression or a development from one position to another if we can be certain that 
the initial positions are in fact positions. If we are to take Aristotle's contentions 
seriously, that a position is such because it may be generally accepted as such, then a 
44 "In dem erstmalig von Descartes aufgestellten Dualismus von Denken und Korperwelt, Innen und 
AuBen, Idee und Sinnesempfindung, kam dem Raum in manchen Theorien die Aufgabe zu, die Einheit 
der beiden mitunter als unversohnlich gegeniiber-stehend empfundenen Seinsspharen wiederherzustellen 
bzw. zu sichem. Denn einerseits gait der Raum als etwas "Reales", das der Korperwelt "anhaftet" oder 
ihr zugrunde liegt. Eine "Zwischenstellung" nahm aber der Raum in metaphysischer Hinsicht ein, 
indem er als das Bindeglied zwischen Gottes Sein und der Existenz der Welt gait." Gosztonyi, Der 
Raum, p. 400. 
45 "Das Fundamentale Problem fiir Kant war ein zweifaches: 
1. Fiir die Dualitat der beiden Welten muBte ein verbindendes Prinzip gefunden werden, das nicht allein 
durch die Begriffe von Raum und Zeit gegeben war. Es sollte vielmehr <lurch die Beschaffenheit dieser 
beiden das Ineinandergreifen der zwei Wellen, das ja der Mensch praktisch bestandig erfahrt, erklarbar 
machen. So entstand in der Periode 1770-1781 ein neuer Naturbegriff. 
2. Die Verbindlichkeit von Raum und Zeit als "Konditionen.aller Erscheinungen" (Brief an Lambert 
vom 2. Nov. 1770) muBte durch die genaue Bestimmung des Wesens der "ldealitat" sichergestellt 
werden. Dies leistete Kant durch Einfilhrung und Eri:irterung des Begriffs der "transzendentalen 
Subjektivitat"." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 401. 
46 See Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 92. 
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critical examination of this position rests upon a critical examination of the 
experience upon which accepability must always be based. 
Experience, Kant argues, is not based on objects but on their perception. This is 
a far-reaching shift in emphasis which displaces the subjective/objective dialectic 
onto empirical judgments. What this means is that the structure of reality can be 
reduced to a duality only on the level of the validity of judgments, and there must be 
an ideality which links subjective and objective validity of judgments. A judgment 
can, however, only be said to possess general validity if it is constructed according to 
a transcendental law - the laws of mathematics or logics. Objectivity is thus founded 
on ideal laws of organisation of perception. It is this organisation which gives rise to 
concepts (Begriff e ). 
If we can speak of a logical position at all in Kant's philosophy, it is not based 
on the common ground of "opinions of the masses," but upon the transcendental 
laws which structure perception in order to prepare this common ground. Our 
knowledge of the world is not a knowledge of its objects, but of its laws.47 
Hence in the development of concepts we are not applying transformational 
rules aimed at maximizing the "transparency" of the representations of our 
perceptions; we are illuminating the laws which re-present these perceptions. This is 
effected by extending the same rules to a higher level from which they may be 
observed. After Kant, general validity may no longer be thought in terms of 
"common sense," but must be linked to transcendental laws.48 Objective knowledge 
is structured by a transcendental principle which is strictly mathematical, in that its 
two main axes, the synthetic and analytic judgments, correspond to mathematical 
statements and rules, whereby the latter is necessarily a subordinate form of the 
former.49 In applying these rules and statements in order to construct concepts, the 
47 "Nicht die Natur an sich, sondern ihre Gesetze und - dies ist fiir die Philosophie entscheidend - die 
Bedingungen, unter denen diese Gesetze zuganglich werden, konnen und miissen sogar erforscht 
werden." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 426. 
48 "Die Transzendentalitat ist die Grundlage der Objektivitat... im Sinne der Oberindividualitat der 
Bedingungen jeglicher (menschlicher) Erkenntnis iiberhaupt." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 427. 
49 "Mathematische Satze sind "synthetische Urteile a priori", synthetisch in dem Sinne, da8 jeder 
mathematische Schritt (Beweis, Deduktion) zur Explikation neuer mathematischer Begriffe und damit 
zu neuen Erkenntnissen fiihrt, a priori weil sie - wie Kant annimmt - im Begriff der Zahl bzw. der 
THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE• 37 
understanding (Verstand) is not simply synthesizing two positions to validate a third, 
it is synthesizing perception to give rise to objectivity by virtue of the general validity 
of the synthetic judgment itself. 
In Kant's transcendental aesthetics, the gesture in which the synthetic 
structuration of perception occurs is intuition (Anschauung), in its dual sense of 
sensation and conception.50 It is possible for intuition to exist in this dual sense 
because as a sensory faculty directed toward the external or the internal world, it is 
founded on the formal principle of space or time, a principle which organises it 
according to the categories of externality, shape, size and relative position; or past, 
present and future. 
We may disregard the conditions of temporality, and note the conditions of the 
formal principle of space, which Gosztonyi lists as follows: 
1. It is not an abstract concept which could be derived from experience, and as 
such cannot be the property of objects. Here we find the primary and most far-
reaching break with the concept of space put forward by Aristotle. 
2. It is necessarily a priori. 
3. It is singular and unitary, not composed of parts and thus not a discursive or 
general concept such as that of objects. 
4. It is endless.51 
It follows from this definition of space that it is both real and ideal - ideal in so 
far as it is meaningful only with respect to the world of appearances, and real 
because it possesses objective validity for this world of appearances.52 Objective 
validity is synonymous with general validity, which means that it is a "subjective 
condition of sensory perception.1153 In the course of this discussion, we will have to 
Abzahlbarkeit oder in den geometrischen Axiomen die Geometric potentiell schon enthalten ist. Sie 
sind ohne Bezug auf Erfahrung ... entwickelt." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 427. Emphasis in original. 
50 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 19, B 33. 
51 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 431; See also Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, suhrkamp 
taschenbuch wissenschaft 55 (Frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1974), para. A 23-25, B 38-40. 
52 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 28, B 40. 
53 "Sie [die objektive Gilltigkeit] liegt der Wahrnehmungsfahigkeit aller Menschen zugrunde, so da8 man 
nur "aus dem Standpunkt eines Menschen von Raum, ausgedehntem Wesen usw" reden kann." 
Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 431. 
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interrogate Kant's implication that space can be conceived as both real and ideal. If 
we were to attempt to solve this contradiction by equating the two words, the 
statement would be trivial. If it can then be two contradictory things at once, are 
these contradictories co-existing contingencies? The nature of space would speak 
against this. As we shall see, this ideal reality or real ideality bears within it the 
essential contradiction of metaphysics. 
If the intelligibility of the world rests on a generally valid structuration of 
sensory perception, and if this structuration takes space as its form, the question 
remains whether space is psychological, logical, or other. If it is psychological, then 
we find ourselves in the realm of Berkeley's idealism54 and we lose the connection 
between space and objectivity. If it is logical, then its structure must be 
mathematical, or more specifically, geometrical. This is indeed the direction which, 
since Descartes, philosophy had taken to explain the nature of space, and it is the 
solution which Kant proposes. 
Kant grounds his explanation of space as both real and ideal in the fact that it is 
structured according to mathematical and geometrical constraints. These constraints 
are not to be understood as derived from the understanding (Verstand), but as 
belonging to the realm of sense perception itself. They are immanent in the human 
ability to gain insight into relations of space by means of intuition. Particular 
knowledge of space, such as its three-dimensionality, or the fact that a straight line is 
the shortest distance between two points, is thus the result of experience.55 
However, Kant is concerned not with the experience of relations of space - here 
he diverges once again from Aristotle's physics - but with the apodeictic nature of 
the knowledge of space which grounds this experience in that it grounds the basic 
tenets of geometry - apodeictic because it is given in the basic human ability of 
intuition. For this reason and contrary to Aristotle, Kant is not concerned with 
movement as such. Movement of an object is not problematic in Kant's philosophy, 
54 See William Harper, "Kant on space, empirical realism and the foundations of geometry," Tol!Qi 3 
(1984), for proof that this is not the case. 
55 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 24, B 41. 
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since it may be recognized only through experience. It is not a form of a priori 
knowledge. 
It is thus interesting to note that Kant could provide us with two possible 
solutions to Wiggins' dilemma. Firstly, the continuous observation of a moving 
object is indeed a guarantee of its identity, since the fact that it moves is a 
realization gained through experience; and secondly, the fact that we are able to 
speak of i1 moving assures us that its identity has already been constructed through 
the intuitive isolation of its spatial form. Thus the faith in edges which Wiggins sees 
as one possible consequence of Aristotle's theory of space is not simply a 
metaphysical prerequisite to the confirmation of identity.56 It follows from the active 
construction of identity through geometric structuration of perception, and this 
structuration proceeds any observation of motion.57 
Since space is constructed; that is, it is an assembly of consecutive sensory 
perceptions, the primary form of inner sensory perception is temporal. This means 
that external sensory perceptions may always be traced back to internal sensory 
perceptions, which are constructed successively.58 There is, however, a sense in 
which time and space must be regarded not as hierarchical, but as equi-valent in 
Kant's philosophy. Since time is the axis of change, it is only through space and 
external intuition that we have access to permanence, to substance. Since external 
intuition gives rise to geometric figures which are substantial, they may be presented 
to internal intuition as simultaneously perceived, although they are constructed 
successively. If this were not the case, we would have no access to substance. 
It is important to realise that the fact that the spatial configuration, while 
embodying a substance independent of time, is in fact constructed in succession, 
56 " ... [if] anyone is more optimistic than I am about the third solution, ... then I suspect that his 
optimism rests on some kind of faith in the power of~ to mark things off in a way which is proof 
against illusion." Wiggins, Things and places, p. 202. 
57 "Der eigentliche BewuBtseinsvorgang ist dabei als eine Aufeinanderfolge von (virtuellen) Sinnes-
bzw. BewuBtseinsdaten, deren Einheit lediglich in der Einheit der Synthese, oder - in modemen 
Termini ausgedriickt - in der einheitlichen, geschlossenen Struktur des BewuBtseins gegriindet." 
Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 438. Emphasis in original. 
58 "Primar ist aber die Zeit, weil sie die Form des inneren Sinnes ist und damit die Sukzession der 
BewuBtseinsablauf e wie der BewuBtseinsdaten und schlie8Iich die einheitliche Synthese ermoglicht, der 
Raum hingegen ist sekundar." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 438. Emphasis in original. 
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since it is in this successive construction that the structure of perception corresponds 
to the laws which make up synthetic judgments a priori: the laws of geometric 
relations.59 Thus, the active construction of spatial configurations in the intuition 
itself embodies a pre-existent schema of spatial relations. This schema is the 
"'apodeictische Wissenschaft' (B41) [ der Geometrie ], darum a priori und 
allgemeingiil tig. ,,6() 
Space is virtual; that is, immaterial, yet capable of being activated and 
ascertained. For this reason, spatial relations can function as schemata; that is, as 
models which embody the temporal process of conceptualization. The schema is 
also a spatial abstraction, "die angibt, wie der (abstrakte) Inhalt eines Begriffs .d.urci.l 
Aktualisierun~ verstanden werden kann."61 What this means is that, in the same way 
perception must be organized according to geometric principals if it is to succeed via 
intuition to become Verstand, in other words if spatial relations are to be 
recognized, so only a certain type of concept can be 'visualized': 
Fi.inf Punkte veranschaulichen die Zahl fiinf. Die Zahl tausend kann auf diese 
Weise nicht veranschaulicht, sie muB abgezahlt werden. Der Begriff "tausend" 
wird erst dann "begriffen", db im BewuBtsein "realisiert", wenn man well, daB 
er eine genau abzahlbare Menge bedeutet.62 
3 THE SIGNIFYING POINT: THE METAPHYSICAL SPACE OF REPRESENTATION AND 
THE REPRESENTATION OF METAPHYSICAL SPACE 
59 "Kant will mit der Zuriickfuhrung der raumlichen Wahrnehmung auf den "inneren Sinn" und damit 
auf die Zeit gewill nicht behaupten, daB das Nebeneinander der Elemente des visuellen 
Wahmehmungsfeldes etwa nicht simultan wahrgenommen werden kann. Er meint wohl nur folgendes: 
Falls eine genaue, und das heiBt fiir ihn: eine geometrisch auswertbare bzw der Geometrie 
entsprechende Erfahrung von Riiumlichem stattfindet, so muB man - d.h. so muB das BewuBtsein in 
seiner Intention - auf irgendeine Art die Raumgebilde nachzeichnen. Und dies "Nachzeichnen" 
konstituiert Raumliches, ob es tatsachlich vollzogen wird, oder nur virtuell. Die riiumlich Wahrnehmung 
ist also kein passives Geschehen, sondern setzt die Aktivitiit des BewuBtseins voraus. Die Em:ugung von 
riiumlichen Vorstellungen bei der Synthese der Sinnesdaten bedeutet die Em:ugung des 
Wahmehmungsraumes. Dies ist auf Grund von Kant's Voraussetzung selbstverstiindlich, da das 
BewuBtsein von Raum und die riiumliche Erscheinungswelt zusammenfallen, weil ihre ontologischen 
Bedingungen gleich sind." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 440. Emphasis in original. 
60 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 443. 
61 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 441. Emphasis in original.; Ernst Cassirer will underline this function of 
spatial relationships in the formation of concepts when he states that the inherent spatiality of 
conceptual relations gives rise to the spatial metaphor in philosophy. See Cassirer, Philosophie der 
symbolischen Formen. 
62 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 441. 
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3.1 Kant and the spatiality of the sign 
From this short outline of the status of space in Kantian theory, it should be 
clear that here, too, the question of space is closely tied to the question of 
representation. It is this connection which I wish to pursue further in the present 
section. This is best done by examining the status of the transcendental law which 
structures perception. 
As Gordon Nagel observes, the criticism which Kant has drawn repeatedly with 
respect to his assumption that Euclidean geometry may assume the status of a 
transcendental law would only be valid if Kant had hinged his philosophy of space 
on the dogmatic assertion of the one-parallel system, or on the diagrammatic system 
of proof.63 The reason why such a criticism is, in Nagel's eyes, not valid, is that Kant 
is not committed to any one particular doctrine of mathematics, but to the ability of 
mathematics to generate knowledge by virtue of its system of repre assentation. It is 
here that the difference between mathematics and philosophy is seen to lie, for "the 
relationship between mathematical proofs and the symbols in which they are 
expressed [must be contrasted] with the relation between ethical arguments and 
their words ... The inference is abstract because it is from meaning to meaning, not 
from word to word. This contrasts with mathematical proof, which does depend 
directly on its notation.''64 
What Nagel is suggesting here is that in Kant's system, a priori knowledge is not 
examinable as a truth value in the same sense an ethical argument may be tested for 
63 "Since there are two senses of Euclidean geometry, Kant's proported commitment to Euclid can be 
taken in two ways. He can be taken to be committed to the Euclidean character of space, that is to the 
description of space given by Euclid's laws. Or he can be taken to be committed to the Euclidean type 
of proof in mathematics. Kant's critics standardly take it both ways, and they say he is mistaken about 
the one because he is mistaken about the other. He thinks that space is Euclidean because he thinks 
that the laws of space derive from what we can intuit or construct; and he adopts the theory of pure 
intuition to explain how we have and why we have synthetic a priori knowledge of the (Euclidean) 
character of space." Gordon Nagel, The structure of exverience. Kant's system of principles (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 35. 
64 Nagel, Structure of eXl)erience, p. 38. 
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truth or falsehood. Patterns of sensory experience do not have truth value, but they 
do have structure, and it is these structures which set up relations of representation. 
Geometry is the transcendental law which structures intuition, not because of its 
truth value, but because of its status as a mathematics of spatial relations.65 Nagel 
does not consider it to be of consequence whether these proofs are obtained 
diagrammatically or by other means, since Kant was concerned not with the truth of 
mathematical statements but with the projective capacity it possesses as a system of 
notation. 
If Nagel is correct in this assertion, it must have far-reaching consequences, 
because it is clear that in the above terms, the philosophy of space contains an 
implicit philosophy of language in the modern sense: 
Kant is not in utter opposition to modern philosophy after all. The common 
ground is the presumption that the mind supplies the form of experience and 
the senses supply the content. One major difference is in the 
characterization of the form supplied by the mind. Modern philosophers 
look to language and lo~ for examples or models of the forms. Kant looks, 
initially, to mathematics. 
The question which must be asked in evaluating Kant's philosophy of space .as....a 
philosophy of representation now becomes: just how far may the analogy be drawn 
between the production of objectivity through the spatial structuration under the 
transcendental laws of mathematics on the one hand, and the production of 
objectivity through spatial structuration under the transcendental laws of language 
on the other. It is at this point that Joseph Simon's analysis becomes important. 
Simon points out that the epistemology of Kant disallows any attempt to ground 
the validity of language in the liguistic practise of its users, i.e. in the fag that 
statements may be produced and received.67 Language as performance is not 
accessible to our understanding except via its own structures; as specific behaviour 
65 It must be borne in mind, however, that the status of mathematics as a practise is an entirely 
different problem. This emerges from Gaston Bachelard's examination of the relation between 
mathematics and science in The new scientific spirit (Boston: Beacon, 1986). Here the status of 
mathematical statements as synthetic judgements a priori becomes identical to their predictive value in 
scientific practice. This will become important in the discussion of the mapping of truth onto the 
landscape which characterizes imperialism. 
66 Nage~ Structure of experience, p. 53. 
67 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191. 
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its causes remain unknown.68 This is of vital importance, since any post-Kantian 
attempt to refute the implicit Kantian ideas of the determination of language is 
bound to do so without resorting to factual explanation, unless it is to abandon the 
very tenets of metaphysics. Factuality is accessible only by way of its appearance and 
the way in which it may be determined in space and time.69 
Kant's philosophy rests upon the structuration of experience being determined 
by the transcendental laws of intuition, and not being based on a dogmatic assertion. 
This is the essence of his Enlightenment project. According to Kant, the structure of 
spatiality conforms to this requirement. It is not a fact, nor is it dogmatically 
asserted; it is the separation which is opened up in knowledge, and upon which 
knowledge is based. The foundation of knowledge in the structuration of experience 
rests upon the role of space as "zugleich Form unserer sinnlichen Anschauung und 
formaler Gegenstand."70 Now, if Kant is to maintain one of the central theses of his 
philosophy, he must show that this statement about the function of space is not a 
dogmatic assertion. The only way in which this is possible, is if the statement of the 
nature of space is identical with the nature of space itself.71 
The significance of this for Kant's anti-dogmatic stance is simply that the 
sentence about space, because it is a sentence, must bear an identical structure of 
significance and disappearance as the spatial structure itself. It is here that Simon 
sees a "verdeckte Sprachlichkeit" in Kant's philosophy of space. Indeed, if he is 
correct, Kant's philosophy of space must also be seen as a philosophy of language. 
68 "In [dieser Tatsache) konnte sich verbergen, daB moglicherweise autontatives Verhalten und 
Befangenheit des einen Subjekts gegeniiber dem anderen nicht nur im Spie~ sondem bestimmend ist. 
Wenn auch der Horende sich "verhiilt", als hatten die Worte des Sprechenden fur ihn "Bedeutung", so 
konnen sie doch fur ihn in seiner Lage eine ganz andere Bedeutung haben als fur den Sprechenden." 
Simon, Sprache und Raum, p, 191. 
69 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191. 
70 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191. 
71 "Bedingung ist, daB gesagt werden kann, der Raum babe diesen doppelten Charakter, ohne daB dies 
wieder ein dogmatischer Satz ware. Es bleibt aber solange ein dogmatischer Satz, als der Raum als 
etwas anderes vorgestellt ist als diese Aussage iiber ihn, so daB vorgestellt sein muB, die Aussage habe 
sich nach seiner "Natur" zu richten oder aber der Raum nach ihr. Im letzteren Fall schriebe sie vor, was 
der Raum im lnteresse einer antidogmatischen Philosophie zu sein habe, und ware darin unmittelbar 
selber dogmatisch, im ersteren Fall ware ein realistischer Begriff von Erkenntnis, mit seinen 
dogmatischen Implikationen, die Kant selber aufdeckte, vorausgesetzt." Simon, Sprache und Raum. p. 
192. 
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Simon places the locus of the intersection of a philosophy of space and a philosophy 
of language at Kant's concept of the position, the point, as it must function in the 
progressive construction of spatiality in outer Intuition (aufJerer An.schauung). 
In order that a structure of space be actively constructed, as discussed above, a 
point must be simultaneously significant and disappearing.72 If it were not 
significant, it would not be able to bear a relation to the structure as a whole; and 
because it is significant; that is, it exists in a relationship - it is always disappearing 
within the structure. It is in the nature of Kant's dual concept of space that a point 
must be conceived as capable of being apprehended in intuition, and as a position 
which can be thought; that is, a determined negation of extension.73 It follows from 
this that the concept, too must be thought in a system and at the same time must 
mean something which can be intuited. This then, is, according to Simon, the nature 
of the Kantian sign. It is determined by its position within a system, and as such 
bears within itself the implicit assumption that a logical notation of thought is 
possible; at the same time, however, it is "streng intersubjektiv und deshalb streng 
objektiv gultig."74 For this reason, Simon states that Kant is dealing with a notion of 
language as physei as opposed to thesei. In doing so, however, he stresses that such a 
notion pre-requires "die von Kant geforderte doppelte Natur (des Raumes) als 
formaler Gegenstand und Form der sinnlichen Intuition."75 
, In such a conception, the sign relies on the sign system for its meaning. The 
geometric signification of spatial relations in a series of lines, points and surfaces 
creates these figures as significant concepts composed of subordinate figures. Or 
conversely, the subordinate figure is significant by virtue of its position within a 
superordinate concept. Thus, it is possible for Kant to sidestep the same aporia 
which Aristotle had retained and himself circumvented - the problem of how "aus 
einer Vielfalt von unausgedehnt gedachten Punkten so etwas wie eine ausgedehnte 
72 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 192. 
73 "Damit ist die Kantische "reine Intuition" analysiert in Bestandteile der Intuition und des die 
Intuition bestimmt negierenden Denkens. Denken und Intuition verschmelzen in ihrem Begriff." 
Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 124. See also p. 123. 
74 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 125. Emphasis in original. 
75 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 125. 
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Linie entstehen soll."76 The point, when thought in relation to a body in space, may 
be thought only as the negation of space. However, when constructed within a 
geometrical sign system, it gains significance in relation to the superordinate figures, 
the lines, of that system.77 
In Kant's discussion of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination as 
expounded in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in the 
second edition under the heading "The Principle of the Synthetic Unity is the 
Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding," we may see that his 
dual concept of space is not confined only to spatiality, but necessarily extends to the 
central ideas of his critique. If we examine the position accorded the imagination, 
we see that it is given a mediating centrality which, like all Kant's mediations, 
promises the coincidence of opposing principles. 
A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of 
the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the 
manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of 
the necessarx unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, 
namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection 
with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of the 
imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding 
appearances, would. sup17~ no objects of empirical knowledge, and 
consequently no expenence. 
In Derrida's words, this synthesis which is the function of the imagination "carries 
along with it the contradictory predicates of receptive passivity and productive 
spontaneity."79 
Thus where we speak above of the necessity of the point to appear as a 
disappearing and signifying moment in space, it is conversely - and Kant makes 
76 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 192. 
77 As Derrida will show, this solution is itself far from satisfactory. The point as conceived by Aristotle 
as well as by Kant is without presence, only potential and accidental, and exists only by virtue of the 
presence of the line. However, Derrida shows that the line itself is thought geometrically in terms of its 
extremities, its end points, and not its parts. What this means is that the extremities as non-points must 
be continually disappearing, in order to maintain their point quality, while continually reconstituting 
themselves as points, in order to act as determinants of geometric figures. The only figure in which the 
point may coexist in this manner with the line is, according to Derrida, the circle. The circle is therefore 
the metaphysical figure which allows us to think a relation of necessity between mutually conditioned 
non-presence and presence. See Derrida, Ousia and i(amme, p. 60-61. 
78 Immanuel Kant, The critique of pure reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 
1929) para. A 124. 
79 Derrida, "The pit and the pyramid: introduction to Hegel's semiology," in Derrida, Mar~ns of 
philosophy, p. 79. 
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repeated (if only implicit) reference to this in his discussion of the transcendental 
imagination - retained and produced if space is to be thought and represented. 
We cannot think a line without drawing it, or a circle without describin~ it. 
We cannot represent the three dimensions of space sMe by settin~ three 
lines at right angles to one another from the same point. 
The Kantian concept of space as we have been discussing it so far is "not yet [by 
itself] knowledge; it supplies only the manifold of a priori intuition for a possible 
knowledge. 
To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must ~ it, and thus 
synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given 
manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of 
consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of 
consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known.81 
When I seek to draw a line in thought, ... obviously the various manifold 
representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought 
one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the 
preceeding representations ... and did not reproduce them while advancing 
to those that follow, a complete representat10n would never be obtained: 
none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the ;mrest and most 
elementary representations of space and time, could arise.8 
The production of space from a point ( described here as the "combination of the 
manifold") requires not only the signifying erasure of the point, but also the ifaphic 
retention of the point. The act of drawing, setting, representation, that is to say the 
production of space is the other pole of the process which is knowledge of space. 
Now it must be emphasized that, in representation, this point has been negated, 
ceases to be a point. It seems then that the negation and graphic retention of the 
point, which is itself in tum a negation, - that this process, which is the process of 
signification, centers in the synthetic function of the imagination. That is to say, it 
centers in the synthesis of perception on the one hand and self-consciousness of the 
unity of mind on the other. Kant tells us that, for this synthesis to ground knowledge 
a priori, imagination must be productive, as opposed to its reproductive function, 
which is empirical. 83 
80 B 154. Kant himself emphasizes the words "drawing," "describing" and "setting." 
81 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. B 137-138. Emphasis in original. 
82 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. para. A 102. 
83 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 118. 
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When Kant speaks of the productive imagination, he is refering to the 
spontaneous ability to produce sensible intuitions of that which is absent. 
"Ima~nation is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself 
present."84 We can therefore make our interpretation of the Kantian sign more 
precise and say that it is the spatial construction of that which is absent - a 
construction whose presence is at the same time dependent upon the absence of its 
parts. For if we take Kant seriously that a priori knowledge is dependent upon the 
productive imagination, then the reproductive retention of the manifold out of 
which spatial figures are constructed is a strictly empirical act. This means that the 
creation of signs, the generation or production of signs upon which their empirical 
reception is based, cannot itself ground the figure it produces as a whole presence. 
The creation of a graphic presence to replace another absent presence labours 
under this paradox - as an a priori figure, its construction depends upon the erasure 
of its component parts, and as a whole figure, its significance depends upon the 
purely empirical reproduction of the significance of its parts. 
Language cannot be thought within the Kantian system except as partaking of 
this contradiction. It builds from the sign (the signifying point) to the sentence and 
from the sentence to discourse, and in doing so, it determines a corresponding 
concept of subjectivity.85 The subject itself must be created as a sustained 
coincidence of contradictory predicates, a combination of the manifold of positions 
of subjectivity. The fact that this is a graphic combination will become very 
important at a later stage in our discussion. 
If it is to contain not only the contradiction of disappearance and significance of 
positions in the manifold, but also that of the retention of the manifold in some 
form of inscription, this creation must in tum have its existence as a presentation of 
non-presence, as a sign. This again follows from the position of the transcendental 
84 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. B 151. 
85 "Der Satz als Satz halt sein Subjekt fest, indem er es verschwinden und in clieser Bewegung das 
Priidikat an seine Stelle treten liiBt. Die konkrete Bedeutung des Priidikats ergibt sich dadurch, da8 das 
Subjekt es bezeichnet, indem es zugleich sich in seiner Subjekteindeutigkeit aufhebt." Simon, Sprache 
und Raum, p. 193. 
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imagination in Kant's philosophy - between sensibility and apperception. Again, 
when we seek the site of the essential resolution or coincidence of opposites in 
Kant's philosophy of space, we find ourselves at the site of a resolution which is the 
sign. 
3.2 Space and the sign in Hegel's Encyclopaedia 
I 
In a discussion of Hegel's semiology, Derrida observes that Hegel's concept of 
the imagination is the place ''where the debate with Kant resembles most an 
explication and least a break."86 As we have found implicitly in Kant, we find more 
explicitly in Hegel the notion of the imagination as signifying imagination, 
production of signs. And like Kant, Hegel accords the sign the role of coincidence of 
opposites. The very status of the sign as the site of coincident contradictions, 
however, must, if we are to remain true to the logic of metaphysics, call this 
apparent unifying function into question.87 Hegel is more explicitly aware of the 
ambiguous nature - the limit nature - of the sign he is describing, particularly with 
respect to the necessity of retaining it in some form - in some inscription.88 
Once again, I would like to turn to the question of the position in space - the 
point - and attempt to establish the extent to which Hegel is able to uncover, or 
expose the limits of the Kantian problem of negation of the point in space, and in 
86 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p, 79. 
87 "Production .arui intuition, the concept of the sign thus will be the place where all contradictory 
concepts intersect. All oppositions of concepts are reassembled, summarized and swallowed up within 
it. All contradictions seem to be resolved in it... but simultaneously that which is announced beneath 
the same sign seems irreducible or inaccessible to any formal opposition of concepts; being bQ1h 
interior and exterior, spontaneous and receptive, intelligible and sensible, the same and the other, etc., 
the sign is none of these, neither this nor that..." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 79. Emphasis in 
original. 
88 "The moment of the sign is to be put on account, in provisional reserve. This is the limit of abstract 
formality. The semiotic moment remains formal in the extent to which the content and truth of 
meaning escape it, in the extent to which it remains inferior, anterior and exterior to them. Taken by 
itself, the sign is maintained only in sight of truth." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 80. Emphasis 
in original. 
THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE• 49 
doing so, to show how a metaphysical theory of space is necessarily a theory of the 
spatiality of the sign. 
Where Kant avoids the problem of the point as a negation of space, and its 
relation to a line, which, in turn would have to be thought as negation of the point, 
we find Hegel taking up this problematic, repeating it, and developing from it a 
dialectic of spatiality and of language. 
If we accept the argument above, that implicit in Kant's philosophy of space is a 
philosophy of language, then Hegel may be said to take as his point of departure 
and point of divergence the Kantian necessity that such a language is physei, and in 
no manner thesei. For Kant, such a concept of the sign is a necessity because of the 
central position of formal intuition. For Hegel, 
(ist) Formale Intuition ... fehlende Einsicht in die Zeichennatur des 
Ze1chens oder in die Zeichenhaftigkeit der Natur fiir ein sprachliches Wesen 
schon vor aller pragmatischen Zeichensetzung. Der formal Anschauende 
nimmt das von ihm in seiner Form Angeschaute unmittelbar fiir eine 
Sache.89 
Nature, according to Hegel, is undifferentiated, indeterminate and unqualified, 
and as such corresponds to the spatiality of space. Space, like nature, must be 
negated if it is to be determinate. And the negation must be a determined negation. 
Where nature in its indeterminate state is negated in a determined negation, it 
becomes the content of Hegel's intuition - it becomes operative in the realm of spirit 
( Geist). The activity of the spirit, in negating nature, determines nature as the 
content of intuition. This content, it follows, is meaningful as different from itself - it 
is a sign.90 It is for this reason that Hegel situates his theory of signs within the 
philosophy of spirit, as "a chapter in psychology, the science of spirit determining 
itself in itself as a subject for itself'91 
It is important that Simon speaks of the sign quality of nature "for a speakin~ 
being." In the following section, I intend to show that one of the possible negations 
of space may be developed in conjunction with speech and the voice which produces 
89 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 127. 
90 "Er reprasentiert mehr, als er unmittelbar ist." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 127. Emphasis in 
original. 
91 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 75. 
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signs - signs which disappear in the moment of their production and thus perform 
the function af signifying disappearance described above in a seemingly much more 
pure and ideal fashion than is achieved in the written signifier. 
3.2.1 The negation of space in the point and the spatiality of the sign 
Hegel describes the abstract generality of nature's Being- outside-itself as a 
non-mediate equivalence which is space. Since such vennittlungslose Gleichgiiltigkeit 
cannot function as a sign, the signifying aspect of nature - its difference from itself -
must lie, at least in one respect, in the negation of space. Hegel makes it quite clear 
that the negation of space is, firstly, to be found in the point.92 Thus when Hegel 
criticizes Kant, his criticism must at least implicitly mean the latter's inability to 
come to terms with the difference of the point from itself, and as such with the sign 
character of nature which resides in the negation of space by the spirit. 
In the essays Ousia and Gramme and The pit and the pyramid, Derrida 
discusses three negations of space in the Hegelian sense. These are the point, time 
and the voice. In the following, I will show (taking Derrida's lead) that all three of 
these negations arise from negation in and of the point. I also hope to show that 
each of these negations is subject to a reversal which takes the form of a graphic 
inscription and may not be thought as the negation of a negation. It is this reversal 
which characterizes the spatiality of the sign. 
Let us look more closely at what it means for the point to differ from itself. 
Hegel's philosophy of space is situated clearly within his philosophy by its position in 
the Encyclopaedia.93 According to Hegel, space belongs to the first dialectic 
92 "Von Raumpunkten zu sprechen, als ob sie das positive Element des Raums ausmachten, ist 
unstatthaft, da er um seiner Unterschiedslosigkeit willen nur die Moglichkeit, nicht das Gesetztsein des 
Negativen und daher schlechthin continuierlich ist; der Punkt ist deswegen vielmehr die Negation des 
Raumes." Hege~ Samtliche Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner, vol. 6, Enzyklopadie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaft im Grundrisse. (Stuttgart: F. Frommanns, 1927), para 127. Emphasis in original. 
93 I am following here the "architectonic" approach suggested by Derrida in his discussion of Hegelian 
semiology. See The pit and the pyramid, p. 73-75. 
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moment of the negation of the idea in nature, the idea outside of itself 
(AujJersichsein). As such, it stands foremost in the contradictory status of nature's 
existence. 
Wie sie [die Natur] ist, entspricht ihr Seyn ihrem Begriffe nicht, ihre 
existierende Wirklichkeit hat daher keine Wahrheit; ihr abstraktes Wesen ist 
das Ne&ative wie die Alten die Materie iiberhaupt als das non-ens gefaBt 
haben. 
Hegel's positioning of space as the first determination of nature, i.e. of the idea 
outside itself, requires it to be be seen not as a "logical determination," but as the 
state of being immediate and external.95 What the limitation thereby placed on a 
conception of space thus amounts to is, according to Derrida, that "space is this 
Being-outside-itself, is this nature to the extent that nature itself is itself outside 
itself."96 Original nature is undifferentiated, unqualified and indeterminate, and 
corresponds to the spatiality of space. This means that spatiality in this pure sense 
can become determinate only by negating itself. 
Hegel himself mentions two spatial negations of space which are at the same 
time determinations of space, and facilitate the construction or production of space. 
These are to be found in the three dimensions of geometry and in the point. 
The dimensions of geometry are accorded relatively minor status by Hegel, 
presumably because they are in themselves indeterminate, and have their 
differentiation not in themselves, but in the act of differentiation. He describes the 
three dimensions as "simply differing, completely indeterminate," and as "abstract 
quantity"97 
What Hegel is highlighting in this status of geometry is precisely the aporia of 
the question of thesei in the Kantian theory of space. As Hegel states, any question 
of the necessity of the geometric quality of space "cannot be put to geometry, since it 
is not a philosophical science, and may assume the prior existence of its object: 
space."98 This means that any necessity which might be accorded any of the figures 
94 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 193. 
95 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 197. 
96 Derrida, Ousia and warn me, p, 41. 
97 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 198. 
98 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 198. 
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of geometry (with a few exceptions) may be done so on the basis of the principle of 
identity of understanding, which in turn "die Verhaltnisse begriindet und hineinlegt, 
welche nun zu erkennen der Zweck der Wissenschaft ist."99 
Im Vorbeygehen kann bemerkt werden, daB es ein sonderbarer Einfall Kants 
war, zu behaupten, die Definition der geraden Linien, daB sie der kiirzeste 
Weg zwischen zwey Punkten sey, sey ein synthetischer Satz; denn mein 
Begriff vom Geraden enthalte nichts von Gr6Be, sondern nur eine Qualitat.100 
As Hegel notes, any definition would have to be regarded as synthetic in this 
sense. If we cast our glance back to Kant's theory of space, informed with Hegel's 
reading, we see the circularity of synthesis surfacing quite clearly. The dual nature of 
Kantian space, which has been discussed in detail above, grounds the synthesis 
which gives rise to knowledge. Because of this, it "must also condition the .concept 
of [its] objects"101 A little later, it is stated that "to bring this synthesis to concept is a 
function which belongs to the understanding."102 However, Kant states quite clearly 
that the "mathematics of space (geometry) is based upon this successive synthesis of 
the productive imagination in the generation of figures. This is the basis of the 
axioms which formulate the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which 
alone the schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can arise."103 
This successive synthesis begins in Kant (as we have seen) with the point. Hence 
(if we take Hegel's critique of Kant's axiom seriously) the construction of a concept 
pre-requires the concept of construction. The construction of space as the difference 
which arises in its own Being-outside-itself in the concept104 becomes essential as a 
determined qualitative difference. This qualitative difference knows three dialectic 
moments: 
a) zunachst die Negation des Raumes selbst, weil dieser das unmittelbare 
unterschiedslose Aussersichseyn ist; der Punkt. b) Die Negation ist aber, als 
Negation des Raumes; diese Beziehung des Punktes auf ihn ist die Linie, das 
erste Andersseyn des Punktes; c) die Wahrheit des Andersseyns ist aber die 
99 Hege~ Enzyklopiidie. para 199. 
100 Hege~ Enzyklopiidie. para 199. 
101 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 77, B 102. 
102 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 78, B 103. 
103 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 163. B 204, my emphasis. 
104 "Der Raum hat als Begriff iiberhaupt, (und besonders als das gleichgiiltige Aussereinanderseyn) 
dessen Unterschiede an ihm. a) unmittelbar in seiner Gleichgiiltigkeit als die bloB verschiedenen, ganz 
bestimmungslosen drey Dimensionen." Hegel, Enzyklopadie, para 198. 
THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE• 53 
Negation der Negation. Die Linie ~eht daher in Flache iiber, welche 
einerseits eine Bestimmtheit gegen Lime und Punkt, und so Flache iiberhaupt 
ist, andersseits aber ist sie die aufgehobene Negation des Raumes, somit 
Wiederherstellung der raumlichen Totalitat, welche aber das negative 
Moment an ihr ha&.,- umschliessende Oberflache, die einen einzelnen ganzen 
Raum absondert.1 
As this statement shows, and as Derrida emphasizes in Ousia and Gramme, 
Hegel is following Aristotle quite closely at this position in the Encyclopaedia. To 
begin with, the enveloping surface, if we are to think it as the true form of space, 
requires that we begin with the point as "das Erste und Positive," and that it forms 
the starting point of any construction of space in the dialectic sense.106 The 
geometrical construction of space is then to be thought only in terms of a series of 
consecutive negations. The point negates itself in relation to another point, and, in 
doing so, allows the line to emerge as the intuition of the point. Similarly, the plane 
emerges as the intuition of the line. Hegel describes the plane as "the sublated 
[Auf~ehobene] negation of space."107 What this amounts to is very close to the 
Aristotelian problematic of place and position, i.e. the question of how to situate the 
place of an object defined as its enveloping surface. It will be recalled that Aristotle 
found himself confronted with the problem of movement in the ascertainment of 
position with respect to enveloping surface. This problem may be restated as a 
question here: if the truth of space as the enveloping surface pre-requires the point 
as a positivity, how is it possible that this point be thought as the negation of space? 
It is, as Hegel observes, possible to think the point as the truth of the enveloping 
surface, provided we begin with the latter as a positivity. But that will clearly not 
free us from the aporia of a circularity which we are trying to overcome from Kant. 
There is an alternative solution which must be examined for soundness. The surface 
as truth of the point may be thought in terms of a positivity of the point which ~' 
but never ~.108 This is indeed the path that Hegel will take. And, as we will see 
105 Hegel, Enzyklopiidie, para 199. 
106 Hegel, Enzyklopiidie, para 199. 
107 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, ed. R. P. Horstmann & J. H. Trede, EnzyklQPaedie (Hamburg: 
Meiner Vlg, 1971). para 256. Cit Derrida, Ousia and gramme. 
108 "Why is Dasein in time the 1Il!e! form (wahrhafrere Gestalt) of intuition such as it may be~ in 
the sign? Because time is the~ - that is, in Hegelian terms, the truth, the essence (!fam) as Being-
past (Gewesenheil) - of space. Time is the true, essential, past space, space as it will have been thought, 
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presently, it also allows his notion of the sign as a sublation (Aujhebung) - as the 
truth - of space.109 
Just as Aristotle's definition of place as enveloping surface very quickly merged 
into the question of the truth of space thought as a function of time (in the form of 
the question of the perception of space in movement), so Hegel's construction of 
space as the truth of the negation of the point reverses itself, with the result that, in 
order that the point be thought, space becomes time in its own negation and 
determination. 
3.2.2 The negation of the point in time: time constituted as space 
Hegel's claim that the first negation of space in space is the point picks up and, 
in Derrida's reading, repeats the paradox of time which Aristotle opposed in the 
fourth chapter of de Physica. This states that time is not, since it consists of 
component "nows," none of which can be thought to have existence as time. What 
becomes important, however, is that the conception of time developed by Aristotle 
as well as by Hegel is, according to Derrida, necessary as a solution to the 
contradictions opened up in their respective ideas of space.110 Because the space of 
metaphysics is constructed as a contradiction which is built on a series of negations, 
it can be resolved only in a dialectical manner, for it is dialectics which offers a way 
of thinking the development of contradiction as a movement from potentiality to 
presence. Since the operation of the negation of space can be thought only 
that is, ~- What space will have meant is time." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 89. Emphasis 
in original. 
109 Hegel situates a theory of the sign at the moment of synthesis when "the idea comes back to itself 
after having, if we may put it thus, lost awareness, lost the consciousness and meaning of itself in 
nature, in its Being-other." Thus, Hegelian dialectics allows us to trace the difference between the 
constitution or production of space and the production of signs - a difference which threatened to 
disappear altogether in the aporias of Kant's concept of space. See Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 
74. 
110 "Aristotle affirms opposites, or rather defines time as a dialectic of opposites, and as the solution of 
the contradictions that arise in terms of space. As in the Encyclopaedia, time is the line, the solution of 
the contradiction of the point (unspatial spatiality). And yet it is not the line, etc. The contradictory 
terms posited in the aporia are simply taken up and affirmed together in order to define the physis of 
time." Derrida, Ousia and iuamme, p. 54. 
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consecutively, it is temporal. The negation of space then, is time. But a time built on 
a point which, as has already been seen, can be thought as a positivity only in its 
absence, its Being-past.111 
The conclusion which Derrida most rigorously draws from this is that time is 
space. This is a momentous conclusion to say the least, and yet Derrida sees it as a 
necessary one within the stipulations of metaphysics and the metaphysical 
conception of space. He uses it to demonstrate that the attempt to define one in 
terms of a negativity of the other cannot succeed, for three reasons: 
1. First of all, the negativity out of which each is constructed is in itself 
contradictory. This was already recognized by Aristotle in his rejection of the drawn 
line as a representation of time. According to Derrida, the same contradiction 
applies to space. Because the coexistence of the component parts of space as well as 
of time is a theoretical impossibility as well as a theoretical necessity, the dialectical 
method (which, Derrida notes, is employed identically by Hegel and Aristotle in the 
solution of this problem) requires a synthesis.112 
2. It is here that we find the second reason why, in Derrida's opinion, the 
metaphysical definition of time and space cannot succeed. Each is dependent upon 
the other as the synthesis which permits the co-maintenance of the mutually 
negative moments out of which it is constructed or produced. 
In effect, simultaneity can a{)pear as such, can be simultaneity, that is a 
relating of two points, only m a synthesis, a complicity: temporally. One 
cannot say that a point is with another point; and a point, whether one says 
it or not, cannot be with another point,there cannot be an ~ point with 
which, etc, without a temporahzation. Which maintains together two 
different nows. The with of spatial coexistence arises only out of the with of 
temporalization. As Hegel shows. There is a with of time which makes 
111 "The past and future of time as being in Nature are space, for space is negated time, just as 
sublated (aufgehobene) space is immediately the point, which developed for itself is time." Hege~ 
Enzyklopaedie, para. 2.59. Cit Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 46 n 22. 
lU "To speak Latin, the cum or the co- of coexistence has meaning only on the basis of its 
impossibility, and vice versa. The impossible - the co-existence of the two nows - appears only in a 
synthesis ... the impossible comaintenance of several present nows [maintenants] is possible as the 
maintenance of several present nows [maintenants]. Time is a name for this impossible possibility. 
Conversely, the space of possible coexistence, precisely that which one believes is known by the name 
of rn, the possibility of coexistences, is the space of the impossible coexistence." Derrida, Ousia and 
ifamme, p. 55. Emphasis in original. 
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possible the with of spa£n but which could not be produced as m without 
the possibility of space. 
The above two basic contradictions in the metaphysics of time and space arise 
immediately, as it were, from the argumentation of metaphysics. They are, however, 
just as quickly submerged again in various textual, narrative and rhetorical 
strategies which Derrida's methodology would seek to untangle. 
3. This brings us to the third reason for the failure of a metaphysical theory of 
time and space. This reason cannot be thought within metaphysics, but must be seen 
as part of Derrida's untangling procedure, perhaps even its motivation. The 
assumption underlying the definition of space in terms of time or vice versa is that 
each possesses an essence when absent. Since the line as the first negation of the 
point can be thought only in terms of its extremeties and not its parts, and since 
these extremeties may be thought only as continuously disappearing and re-
constituting themselves, the truth of space, time, can itself have no existence except 
as a closure whose every moment re-constitutes itself in the moment of its 
disappearance. And the dialectic production of space is also a production of closures 
through the disappearance and re-constitution of its parts. 
It is, according to Derrida, this disappearance and re-constitution which must be 
understood in its full gravity if the aporia of metaphysics are to be understood. For 
that which disappears when it is reached or focused on, but re-constitutes itself as 
soon as it is abandoned, ignored or left behind, can be granted presence only as that 
which signifies its own non-being by signifying itself as another. 
The presence of the sign is the presence of the point negated in space, but 
negated in such a manner as to develop its potentiality. Thus the identity which 
seems to follow from a hopeless contradition in the metaphysical conception of 
space and time (Derrida's statement that space ~ time) is at once the identity which 
allows signification. The circle whose presence is the negation of the line's 
113 Derrida, Ousia and wamme. p. 55. 
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delimiting points is the form of unity which allows signification as the bonding of 
word and concept.114 
It now remains to ask how this unity of identity is created as the site of erasure 
of an impossible contradiction, and how the contradiction re-surfaces as the trace of 
its own absence. This is the question of signification, and we cannot 'Confront 
metaphysical space without confronting this question. 
3.3 The primacy of the voice: the negation of space in speech 
3.3.1 Derrida on Hegel's Semiology 
When we speak with Joseph Simon of the signifying point as a solution to a 
contradiction in the Kantian philosophy of space, we must recognize that Simon is 
posing a solution to a problem in the Kantian position which Kant himself did not 
put forward. The value of Simon's critique is that he shows that the Kantian 
delimitation of metaphysical thought transposes the contradictions in a theory of 
space onto the theory of the sign. 
This also emerges in Ernst Cassirer's attempt to salvage Kantian space - an 
attempt which follows similar lines to that of Simon. According to Cassirer, Kant's 
metaphysics can cope with the essence of space (and time) only by mystifying 
them.115 Cassirer, like Simon, develops his criticism of Kant's (and of Newton's) 
philosophy of space in a direction which would attempt to solve the Kantian 
dilemma by equating spatial qualities with those which modem linguistics has 
114 Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 60. 
115 "[Raum und Zeit miissen] beide, mit Kant zu sprechen, zu 'existierenden Undingen' [gemacht 
werden]. Unter den Gesichtspunkt der Kategorie des Dinges, der bloBen Substanz- Kategorie gestellt 
und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt befragt, geht das absolute Sein des Raums alsbald in sein Nicht-Sein 
iiber, wird er aus einem umfassenden Ding zu einem Unding gemacht." Ernst Cassirer, "Mythischer, 
asthetischer, theoretischer Raum," in Landschaft und Raum in der Erzahlkunst. ed. Alexander Ritter, 
Wege der Forschung, vol. 418 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), p. 21. 
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uncovered in the sign. This he does via the Leibnizian philosophy of space. Leibniz 
had attempted to overcome what he saw as problems in Newton's concept of space 
by treating it as a relation, an order.116 When Cassirer speaks of "order" and 
"relations," it is apparent that he is speaking of what would now be called a 
structure. This is because, whereas the concept of existence is ruled by identity, that 
of a structure is ruled by difference.117 The nature of the spatial structure is, 
however, that of a signifying structure. The primacy of difference over identity, as 
Derrida has shown, is the moving force of signification. And signification, therefore, 
bears within it a gap, lack or distance, which is spatial to the extent that its meaning 
is gained by a distance to that which is always absent.118 
Now the initial moment of the imagination (Vorstellung); that is the moment of 
intuition in which the contents of Empfindung are "cast out" into space and time, is, 
in order that the particular intuition be subsumed under the generality of the ego, 
also the moment where the contents of Gejuhl are set in the "particular space and 
the particular time" of the intelligence.119 
In the moment of production of concrete images, this space and time becomes 
the relation of the concrete images.120 However - and here we return to the 
Hegelian critique of the Kantian sign - the concrete image, which, as thesei, does not 
116 " ... dieser Begriff der Beziehung und der Ordnung schlief3t ihm nun auch erst die wahre Natur von 
Raum und Zeit auf und gestattet ihm, beide dem System der Erkenntnis widerspruchslos einzufiigen. 
Die Widerspriiche, die sich aus Newtons Begriff des absoluten Raumes und der absoluten Zeit ergeben 
batten, werden von Leibniz dadurch beseitigt, daf3 er beide statt zu Dingen, vielmehr zu Ordnungen 
macht. Raum und Zeit sind keine Substanzen, sondern vielmehr 'reale Relationen'; sie haben ihre 
wahrhafte Objektivitat in der 'Wahrheit von Beziehungen', nicht in irgendeiner absoluten Wirklichkeit." 
Cassirer, Mythischer, asthetischer, theoretischer Raum, pp. 21-22. 
117 "Im Gegensatz zu dieser Starrheit des Seinsbegriffs ist der Begriff der Ordnung von Anfang an 
durch das Moment der Verschiedenheit, der inneren Vielgestaltigkeit bezeichnet und ausgezeicbnet. 
Sobald daher, in der tbeoretischen Gesamtanschauung der Wirklichkeit und speziell des Raumes, der 
Schwerpunkt der Betrachtung sich vom Pol des Seins nach dem Pol der Ordnung hin verschiebt, so ist 
damit stets ein Sieg des Pluralismus iiber den abstrakten Monismus, der Vielformigkeit iiber die 
Einformigkeit gegeben .. .Immer handelt es sich darum, das Unbegrenzte zu begrenzen, das 
Unbestimmte zu bestimmen." Cassirer, Mythischer. asthetischer. theoretischer Raum, pp. 23-24 
118 "Such is the strange "being" of the sign: half of it always "not there" and the other half always "not 
that." The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that which is forever absent." 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Translator's preface to Of grammatology, by Jacques Derrida, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. xvii. 
119 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 374. 
120 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 376. 
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possess the "Unmittelbarkeit der Existenz,"121 cannot gain independent existence 
until the space and time whose relation they are gain content. This happens in the 
moment of synthesis, in the production of signs.122 
For Hegel, the sign is situated at the moment of synthesis where the intelligence 
is reflected in itself. As such it is the "Einheit selbststandiger Vorstellung und der 
Anschauung, zu welcher jene als freie Phantasie sich aussert."123 What is of interest 
here is that this unity determines the object as the other of the subject, as well as the 
other of itsef - it is a unity of signification.124 
Die Anschauung gilt in dieser Identitat nicht als positiv und sich selbst, 
sondem als etwas anderes vorstellend; sie ist ein Bild, das eine selbststandige 
Vorstellung der Intelligenz als Seele in sich empfangen hat, seine 
Bedeutung. Diese Anschauung ist das Zeichen.125 
Hegel differentiates the sign from the symbol, in that the determination of 
intuition in the latter is essentially the same as the thought it expresses. In other 
words, the meaning of the symbol is visible.126 The sign on the other hand permits 
the intelligence a certain amount of arbitration and sovereignty in the determination 
of meaning. In commentating the passage in the Encyclopedia in which the 
difference between sign and symbol is articulated, Derrida states that "the 
production of arbitrary signs manifests the freedom of the spirit. And there is more 
manifest freedom in the production of the sign than in the production of the symbol. 
In the sign the spirit is more independent and closer to itself. In the symbol, 
conversely, it is a bit more exiled into nature."127 
Thus the story of the production of the sign is also that of the production of 
space and time in their fullness, only to be negated as non-mediate and unique 
121 Hege~ Enzyklopiidie, para 378. 
122 "Seine [des Zeichens] wahrhafte Stelle [in der Psychologie oder auch in der Logik] ist die 
aufgezeigte, daB die Intelligenz, welche als anschauend Zeit und Raum erzeugt, nun ihren 
selbststandigen Vorstellungen ein bestimmtes Daseyn gibt, den erfi.illten Raum und Zeit, die 
Aufschauung in der Bestimmtheit, die sie vom Stoffe der Empfindung hat, als die ihrige gebraucht, 
deren unmittelbare und eigenthiimliche Vorstellung tilgt, und ihr eine andere zur Bedeutung und Seele 
giebt." Hege~ Enzyklopiidie, para 379. 
123 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 379. 
124 Simon, Der Raum, p. 127. 
125 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 379. 
126 See Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 84. 
127 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 86 
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presentations (unmittelbare und eigenthiimliche Vorstellung) so as to give rise to 
meaning as something other: the soul dwelling in a body constituted in space and 
time, or as Hegel puts it, 
Das Zeichen ist irgend eine unmittelbare Anschauung, aber die eine 
Vorstellun$ von ganz anderem Inhalt vorstellt, als sie fiir sich filt; - die 
Pyramide, m welche eine fremde Seele versetzt und aufbewahrt ist. 
For this reason, Derrida sees Hegelian semiology as paradigmatic for the 
subsequent conception of the sign.129 This claim may be supported on two counts. 
First of all, the Hegelian sign partakes of the dialectic of appearance and 
disappearance which Saussure was later to explicate as linguistic value, analysing it 
into an associational and a substitutional dialectic. As such, Hegel states that signs 
are diverse, arbitrary in relation to one another, and collected into sequences which 
constitute fixed orders.130 Secondly, the production of objective meaning from a 
signifier (or "name," as Hegel calls it) is instituted as the disappearance of a previous 
purely subjective investment in the signifier. This subjective investment takes the 
form of a non-reflexive intelligence. In the activation of the sign, this intelligence 
becomes self-conscious through the function of memory, or as Hegel terms it, 
mechanische Gediichtnis.131 Later, Lacan will take up these ideas and demonstrate 
that the space which opens up in the dialectic of the signifier is a space in which the 
subject is constantly struggling to reconcile a reflexive and a non-reflexive 
subjectivity. This will be discussed in the following chapter. Let us note for the 
present that when we speak of signifying space and subjective space, we are making 
an analytic distinction. Neither can be thought without the other. 
It is in this sense that we must understand Hegel's attempt to link the question 
of signification to the relation between the body (as non-reflective intelligence) and 
the soul (as self-reflective intelligence). Hegel understands the question of the 
128 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 379, p. 269. 
129 "The sign, as the unity of the signifying body and the signified ideality, becomes a kind of 
incarnation. Therefore the opposition of soul and body, and analogically the opposition of the 
intelligible and the sensory, condition the difference between the signified and the signifier, between 
the signifying intention (bedeuten), which is an animating activity, and the inert body of the signifier. 
This will remain true for Saussure .. ." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. p. 82. 
130 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 382, 270-1. 
131 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 383, 271. 
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incarnation of the soul of pure meaning in the body of the signifier as the question 
of pure self-presence confronted by its own death.132 It will be shown below that 
when, in terms of his philosophy of history, Hegel criticizes systems of writing which 
depend upon what Derrida calls a "spacing" - that is those systems whose 
dependence upon intuition preserve the contradictions of spatiality - it is primarily 
this moment of death which he opposes. Death is inextricably tied to the spatiality of 
the sign. This follows because the process whereby the soul is breathed into the 
body, or deposited in the material of the pyramid, is the negation of the spatiality 
produced by the intelligence in intuition. 
Intelligence, then, is the name of the power which produces a sign by 
negating the sensory spatiality of intuition. It is the releve of spatial intuition. 
Now, as Hegel shows elsewhere, the releve (Aufhebung) of space is time. 
The latter is the truth of what it negates - space - in a moment of releve. 
Here, the truth or teleological essence of the sign as the releve of sensory-
spatial intuition will be the sign as time, the sign in the element of 
temporalization.133 
What this means is that the intuition, since it is constituted in space and time, 
must, in order to act as the vessel of a meaning, yield to the intuition of that which 
would have been present had the intuition not taken its place. As has already been 
shown, this detour to a presence which has been via the negation of a presence 
which is., is given in the negation of space in time. 
Die Anschauung, die fiir ein Zeichen gebraucht wird, ist als unmittelbare 
zunachst eine gegebene und raumliche. Aber indem sie nur als aufgehobene, 
und die Intelligenz diese ihre Ne§Itivitat ist, so ist die wahrhaftere Form des 
Daseyns des Zeichens, die Zeit ... 1 
The temporal negation of the spatial intuition of the sign ("ein Verschwinden, 
indem es ist"), Hegel goes on to say, is achieved in the sound: " ... der Ton ist die 
erfiillte Ausserung der sich kund gebenden Innerlichkeit. 
Der fiir die bestimmten Vorstellungen sich weiter articulierende Ton, die 
Rede und ihr System, die Sprache, giebt den Empfindungen, Anschauungen 
132 "The opposition between body and soul is not only at the center of this doctrine of signification, it is 
confirmed by it; and, as has always been at bottom the case in philosophy, it depends upon an 
interpretation of language. Visibility and spatiality as such could only destroy the self-presence of will 
and spiritual animation which opens up in discourse. They are literally the death of that self- presence." 
Derrida, Speech and phenomena, and other essays on Husserl's theory of signs, trans. David B. Allison 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 35. 
133 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 89. 
134 Hege~ Enzyklopiidie, para 380, p. 270. 
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ein zweytes hoheres, als ihr unmittelbares und drf Vorstellungen ilberhaupt 
ein Daseyn, das im Reiche der Vorstellungen gilt. 5 
According to Hegel, then, representations acquire Being through the negation 
of spatiality in the pronunciation of the sign, in speech and its system. Speech 
becomes for Hegel "sound releve from its naturalness and linked to spirit's relation 
to itself, the psyche as a subject for itself and affecting itself by itself."136 Or, again, 
" ... sound {Ton) is an externality which in its coming-to-be is annihilated again by its 
very existence, and it vanishes of itself."137 
3.3.2 Writing as spatial re-presentation of spatial negation 
It follows from this that Hegel must assign the production of written signs a 
secondary position after the production of speech. As Derrida indicates, this has 
direct consequences for a theory of space. 
This relevant, spiritual, and ideal excellence of the phonic makes every 
spatial language - and in general all spacing - remain inferior and exterior. 
Writing, according to an extension that transforms our nofiln of it, may be 
considered as an example or as the concept of this spacing. 
There is a certain difficulty here centering around the question of origins. If 
writing is to be understood as derivative, its place in Hegel's dialectics would have to 
be situated at the moment of negation of the spoken sign, where the pure self-
presence of meaning would be externalized. It would not be possible to see writing 
as a synthesis of the internal and external directions of the production of meaning, 
simply for the reason that it would then become the truth of the voice - the An-und-
jur-sich-Sein of the voice. If, however, writing is to be equated with the death of the 
self-presence of meaning in the negation of the voice, in what sense can it be 
understood to be derivative? That is, in what sense can writing re-present the self-
135 Hege~ Enzyklopadie, para 380, p. 270. 
136 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 89. 
137 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 92. 
138 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 94. 
THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE• 63 
presence of the spoken sign although it does not itself bear that same presence, that 
same punctuality which is, as we have seen, the negation of space? 
This question forms the basis of Derrida's critique of Husserl's theory of signs, 
and in clarifying this point it is worth turning briefly to the argument presented in 
Speech and phenomena. Derrida takes as the central issue in Husserl's theory of 
signs the latter's attempt to disinguish between the purely intentional aspect of 
meaning and its formal extension as a sign. These he distinguishes as expression 
(Ausdruck) and indication (Anzeichen) respectively. As Derrida shows, Husserl's 
effort to avoid a simple reduction of his distinction to that between non-material 
speech and the material (or physical) sign is what brings him to understand it in 
terms of the self-presence of consciousness on the one hand, and the negation of 
space on the other hand. Expression takes place in consciousness, not in nature and 
space, and as such it corresponds to an interior monologue. The positivity it 
represents is that of life, and it distinguishes itself from the physicality of the sign by 
the fact that the latter always refers to an "empirical worldly existence,"139 and as 
such it embodies an absence of self-presence which introduces death into 
language.140 
The parallels to Hegels first two dialectical movements of the imagination are 
apparent. And like Hegel, Husserl concludes that the phoneme must be the most 
ideal of signs. We must be careful to realize, however, that for Husserl, the ideality 
of the phoneme is not that of a synthesis, but of an origin - an originary self-
presence. The signifier as a phoneme escapes death, not as in Hegel, by a synthesis 
of the negation of death with the positivity it negates, but because it bears a self-
presence which is prior to all negativity. In other words, it has never known the 
moment of spatiality which characterizes the Hegelian representation of the 
imagination-in-itself. 
139 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 43. 
140 "In the final analysis what separates expression from indication could be called the immediate 
nonself-presence of the living present ... Indication takes place whenever the sense-giving act, the 
animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning- intention, is not fully present," Derrida, 
Speech and phenomena, p. 37-38. 
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If the sign is the body which bears this soul, this pure intentionality of meaning, 
this self-presence, any attempt to think pure meaning (and here we find Hegel the 
"metaphysician" much more conscious of the limits of his system than Husserl the 
"non-metaphysician") must think it as the negation of the body in which it is 
enclosed. The fact of this negation - this is what Derrida sets out to demonstrate -
will eventually contaminate any concept of originary self-presence. Self-presence 
(we have already followed Derrida's argument here) is a non-originary product 
which "must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present so as to have 
nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs."141 Derrida sees in Husserl's 
concepts of expression and indication the need to think a presence which knows 
nothing of its opposite. These two "significations" then become "two forms of the re-
turn or re-stitution of the present: re-tention and re-presentation."142 This 
distinction contains at each moment the re- of difference, be it temporal or spatial -
a difference which will eventually destroy the very possibility of such a distinction. 
And yet, it is upon the possibility of such a distinction that what Derrida calls the 
philosophy of the West143 - metaphysics - has been built. Inherent in it is the 
possibility of a subject as the situation of a consciousness never differing from itself, 
and, opposite this self-consciousness, a signifying ideality which is not dependent on 
intuition, on visuality, on space. M a consequence, the sign itself must obliterate 
itself, if it is to have meaning for a subject.144 Speech becomes the ideality of self-
presence, repeating itself indefinitely. It is an "ideal object. .. freed from all mundane 
141 Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 60. 
142 Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 67. 
143 I will return to this point at a later stage. 
144 "Signs can be eliminated in the classical manner in a philosophy of intuition and presence. Such a 
philosophy eliminates signs by making them derivative; it annuls reproduction and representation by 
making signs a modifcation of a simple presence. But because it is just such a philosophy - which is, in 
fact, the philosophy and history of the West - which has so constituted and established the very concept 
of signs, the sign is from its origin and to the core of its sense marked by this will to derivation or 
effacement. Thus to restore the original and non-derivative character of signs, in opposition to classical 
metaphysics is, by an apparent paradox, at the same time to eliminate a concept of signs whose whole 
history and meaning belong to the adventure of the metaphysics of presence. This also holds for the 
concepts of representation, repetition, difference, etc., as well as for the system they form." Derrida, 
Speech and phenomena, p. 51. 
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spatiality, .. a pure noema that I can express without having, at least apparently, to 
pass through the world."145 
It follows from the metaphysical arguments which place speech and writing as 
the re-tention and re-presentation of an absent moment of self-presence that, if 
there is a spatiality of the sign (spatiality in the sense indicated by metaphysics), it 
opens up in the inscription and closes - is preserved (aufgehoben) or prefigured, or 
otherwise given to a banishment which retains the mark of that which it banishes - in 
the voice. All attempts to understand an inwardness of speech must see this 
inwardness as a "pure difference" to all that which can be excluded from it, in other 
words, to "space, the outside, the world, the body, etc."146 This pure difference 
" ... produces sameness as self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as 
the non-identical."147 
We have already followed the argument by which Derrida would equate this 
production to the production of temporality from the pure difference of spatiality. 
The conclusion which Derrida draws for writing is that, if the spatiality negated in 
time is to be erased in pure self-presence, it is necessary that self-presence be 
conceived as a supplement to the meaning it bears, in the same way it is 
supplemented by writing. What this supplementation amounts to is the creation of 
signification by reference to a higher (more idealized and thus prior) level by 
substituting a signifier for another type of signifier. The circularity of metaphysics 
which Derrida discussed in Ousia and gramme is the determinant factor here, since 
it is this very circularity which allows the creation of signification by assigning 
temporal priority to the substituted signifier, which has become a signifier only 
through the act of being substituted. Writing, it follows, must be seen as the 
initiating factor_ and the completion of idealization.148 In constituting itself as 
something added on to the fullness of self-presence in speech, however, writing 
145 Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 75. 
146 Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 82. 
147 Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 82. 
148 "This writing cannot be added to speech because, from the moment speech awakens, this writing 
has duplicated it by animating it." Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 97. 
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defers ideality ad infinitum. It is this deferral of difference and spatiality which 
constitutes the metaphysics of presence as an impossibility and which, if we are to 
believe Derrida, necessarily means that the history of the West, which is the history 
of presence, has already ended.149 
If we accept Derrida's interpretation, the crux - in Hegel as in Husserl - lies in 
the mediating function of writing. As long as the difference which opens in action 
and signification mediates the ideal universality which is conceived as its telos, this 
universality cannot be reached. As soon, however, as we conceive of a pure meaning 
without signification, or, in terms of what has been said above, a voice without 
writing, the writing which has written that voice is effaced. And thus, the voice 
cannot be spoken of without obliterating that which has produced it. Nevertheless, 
Hegel attempts to do just that, to write about speaking as if, in terms of a philosophy 
of history, speech could be spoken without writing. 
As Derrida indicates, the prime target of Hegel's offensive against the status of 
the written sign is Leibniz and his "confidence in intelligence, that is, in a 
formalizing understanding bearing death."150 Hegel would have to have regarded 
such a preoccupation with the formalizing aspect of the intelligence in the same way 
he regarded the symbol: as a lower stage in the movement of the spirit. Both are 
tied to the space of the intelligence generalized within the intelligence and removed 
to the distance of re-presentation. Derrida places "the space of formal abstraction," 
which was Leibniz's medium of universality, on a level equivalent to space itself.151 
149 "The history of metaphysics therefore can be expressed as the unfolding of the structure or schema 
of an absolute will-to-hear-oneself-speak. This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears to 
itself as its own death. A voice without difference, a voice without writing, is at once absolutely alive 
and absolutely dead." Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 102. This same conclusion was seen by 
Alexander Kojeve as a necessary result of Hegel's philosophy of history. Alexander Kojeve, Introduction 
to the reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nicholls Jr (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 435n. 
150 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 97. 
151 "In assigning the limits of so-called universal writing, that is a mute writing, released from the voice 
and from every natural language, Hegel also criticizes the pretensions of mathematical symbolism and 
of arithmetic, the operations of formal understanding. The silence of this writing and the space of 
calculation would interrupt the movement of the Auibebung, or in any case would resist the 
interiorization of the past (Erinnerung), the relevant idealization, the history of the spirit, the 
reappropriation of the logos in self-presence and infinite parousia. If the passage through mathematical 
abstraction, through formal understanding, spacing, extcriority and death ... is a necessary passage ... , 
this necessity becomes perversion and regression as soon as it is taken as a philosophical model." 
Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 105. 
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Taldng up Hegel's plea for the necessity of the development of the spirit in the 
movement of Aujhebung, we would then have to acccept the passage from the 
symbol to the sign as the passage from space to no-longer-space, from death to its 
absence. And we would have to accept the further passage from the sign to thought 
as that from which spatiality has been forever banished. Alternatively, we would 
have to reserve a position for the voice as an originary self-presence, as in Husserl, 
which escapes death by never assuming substance and spatiality.152 
Yet, as Derrida points out, the very idea of this passage indicates that 
Aujhebung might not be as simple and safe a movement as implied by Hegel. For to 
think this passage would be to think a spatiality of the sign from which all spatiality 
has been banished. If we are to understand the relation between thought and the 
spatiality of the sign, Derrida suggests we should understand the negativity in which 
difference has been lost as a machine "in its pure functioning, and not in its final 
utility, its meaning, its result, its work."153 For a philosophy of space, the question 
would now become: can the working of such a machine be specified? And can it be 
specified in terms of a space which while signifying (since signifying is its mode of 
functioning) would signify nothing, not even its own space, not even the fact that it 
were signifying nothing? These questions lead on from Derrida's problematic of how 
to name the machine without its product, how to think what is "unthinkable in that it 
inscribes within itself an effect of pure loss. It would be unthinkable as a non-
thought that no thought could relever, could constitute as its other."154 The task of 
such a mechanics of the sign would then be to thiHk its spatiality not as an intuition 
(which is after all the Auj7zebung of the indeterminacy of nature) but as the work 
which would be the sign's permanent "non-presence" (because it is permanent), a 
non-presence which forever refuses to disappear in the production of signification. 
It should be clear from the above attempt to define a metaphysical spatiality of 
the sign, that such a concept of spatiality would have to differ radically from its 
152 See Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 77. 
153 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 107. 
154 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, 107. 
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metaphysical heritage. Although such a theory of the spatiality of the sign is of great 
interest, we will not be addressing it here. Instead, let us accept Derrida's critique of 
metaphysical space as the starting point for another discussion. If metaphysical 
space is lost in a machinic function which has no privileged relation to truth or 
identity, and if this loss produces the illusion of such a privileged relation, then it 
seems to me to be a fruitful path of inquiry to investigate the mechanics of 
production at work here. For, as I have shown, the production of space is not only a 
philosophical problem - it is a production of a space in which specific modes of unity 
seem to prevail. Not only~. but also knowledge, subjectivity and the socius are 
such unities. In the following chapter, I will be attempting to show that these unities 
are constructed of functions (which, for want of a better word, I am forced to call 
"spaces") which are diverse and complex. 
CHAYTER 2: THE PRODUCTION OF THE OEDIPAL DRAMA: THE 
PRODUCTION OF OED IP AL SPACE 
OEDIPUS: Nonsense, I must pursue this trail 
to the end, 
till I have unravelled the mystery of 
my birth. 
JOCASTA: No! In God's name - if you want 
to live, 
this quest must not go on. .. 
Sophocles 
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1 THE SPACE OF DESIRE AS AN IMAGINARY QUANTITY 
1.1 Philosophy and the spatializing machine 
In the previous chapter, I set out to show that space, as we know it within the 
metaphysical tradition, is the domain where subjectivity and signification enter into 
a dialectic of presence and absence. As a result, their own specific spatiality, the 
unity they present, is the product of an act of repression. We followed Derrida's 
argument that what is repressed is difference, and, in conclusion, we saw that this 
difference is to be thought as a machinic function which would have to embrace 
thought itself. 
In this chapter, I will turn my attention to the genesis of the productive mechanisms 
which condition the seemingly united spaces of subjectivity and signification. I will 
show that if we are to develop a theory which does justice to these unities as they 
function in colonization, we will have to understand them in relation to the space of 
the socius. To this end, I will be developing the thesis that vision and writing are the 
functions which allow subjectivity and signification to appear as unities within the 
space of the socius. It should emerge from this discussion that the status of the 
border plays a crucial role in defining the conditions under which these unities can 
prevail, as well as in defining the conditions under which they can give way to other 
unities. What I am pleading for is a materialist theory of space. 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the metaphysical conception of space has 
been developed as a function of a boundary - be this the enclosing surface of a 
continent vessel, the horizon of vision implied by Kant's theory of spatiality, or the 
dividing line of difference which is crossed and recrossed in the Hegelian dialectic. 
Metaphysics encircles the present as a space whose spatiality has been erased, 
opening the way for a critical philosophy which, by uncovering the traces of this 
banished spatiality, would seek to dramatize the limits of the metaphysical 
discourse. 
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When we shift our attention to the specific application of metaphysical 
discourse - to that discourse which would speak the truth about a specific territory, a 
specific demarkation of spatiality, a geographical space - we find that, by 
dramatizing the limits of this discourse's spatiality, we are repeating the work of 
discourse, which has been to draw this boundary as a mark of enclosure - a line, on 
both sides of which knowledge is produced as the power which drew the line. In re-
tracing the spatiality of a territory which a metaphysical discourse has produced as 
true, we are ourselves exercising the same discourse. Derrida himself has said as 
much in his critique of metaphysics. And yet, we must recognise the subtle 
difference between the way in which we partake of such a discourse when we 
dramatize the limits of philosophy, and when we dramatize the limits of any of those 
unities which can function as the domain of truth which discourse establishes. 
Homi Bhabha touches upon this when he refers to the essential contradiction of 
colonial representation arising from a need to articulate difference and non-
difference simultaneously. According to Bhabha, the simultaneity of this articulation 
creates colonial space as a space in which a discourse of resistance is inevitably 
present in the form of a "hybridity" which "terrorizes authority with the ruse of 
recognition, its mimicry, its mockery."1 
Hybridity is the name of this displacement of value from symbol to sign that 
causes the dominant discourse to split along the axis of its power to be 
representative, authoritative.2 
This axis of colonial representation is, however, different from the bar of the sign, in 
that it serves not to erase difference with a promise of presence, but to pursue 
meaning as the productive display of difference. Bhabha refers to colonial discourse 
here in terms of Derrida's concept of the double inscription. In doing so, however, 
he insists that this concept, as Derrida employs it, is inadequate for an 
understanding of colonial discourse. For Derrida, presence is to be grasped in terms 
of the transparency of the sign, or, for our purposes, as a negation of the spatiality of 
1 Homi Bhabha, "Signs taken as wonders: questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside 
Delhi, May 1817.," in "Race," writing, and difference, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1986), p. 176. Collected essays originally published in Critical Inguiry, vol. 12(1) (1985), 
and vol. 13(1) (1986). 
2 Bhabha, Si~s taken as wonders, p. 174. 
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the sign. The "reality effect," which Derrida sees as resulting from this transparency, 
is marginalized. Bhabha, however, suggests that, when it comes to colonial 
discourse, these "reality effects" are to be understood in relation to a transparency 
which does not erase difference (or the spatiality of the sign) in a mimetic gesture, 
but opens the differences of signification and textuality onto a series of other 
differences and spatialities. 
Transparency is the action of the distribution and arrangement of differential 
spaces, !)OSitions, knowledges in relation to each other, relative to a 
differential, not inherent sense of order. This effects a regulation of spaces 
and places that is authoritatively assigned; it put~ the addressee into the 
proper frame or condition for some action or result. 
Thus Bhabha sees the reality effect as functioning by equivocation between what he 
calls "disposal, as the bestowal of a frame of reference, and disposition, as mental 
inclination, a frame of mind."4 This equivocation should be understood as a 
relationship neither of difference (subject/object), nor of identity 
(signifier=signified), but as an alignment of two spaces along an agonistic and 
shifting surface. This surface is not adequately described if we attempt to grasp it as 
the bar of signification. 
We shall see in the following that Bhabha is describing a representative regime 
very similar to the one Deleuze and Guattari suggest as issuing from the capitalist 
machine. The authority which aligns differential spaces does so in much the same 
way as their "quasi-cause." Bhabha is not explicit here, but I take the principle of 
equivocation by which the alignment is sustained to be what he calls a disavowal in 
which "the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something 
different."5 This repetition of difference is essential in colonization, for it draws the 
boundary between the discrete spaces upon which the existence of the colony 
depends. And it does this at the same time that it holds them together in a kind of 
concatenation or syntax. I will be arguing in the following that the capture and 
production of colonial space depends upon the articulation of this boundary. To 
articulate this boundary is to produce spatial unities whose management and 
3 Bhabha, Siiros taken as wonders, p. 170. 
4 Bhabha, Siiros taken as wonders, p. 171. 
5 Bhabha, Siiros taken as wonders, p. 172. 
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maintenance require a specific set of strategies. Colonization sets itself the task of 
developing these strategies. 
In the act of philosophy as Derrida pursues it, it may suffice for us to uncover 
the traces of difference which de-limit the discourse of metaphysics; but it is 
precisely this trace of difference which clings to the intuited presence of the borders 
of the colony (taking the word "border" in the widest sense) and marks it with a 
transcendental truth value. In the concatenating gesture which draws the borders 
upon which the colony depends, the difference which marks here from there, within 
from beyond, is a dividing line which has been displaced from the external limits of 
truth, beyond which there is only the unthinkable, the edge of the world. This limit 
has been displaced onto the surface which Bhabha describes and has assumed the 
function of an internal limit - internal because it is constantly being denied or 
disavowed. This is possible because the drawing and crossing of borders is 
necessarily an operation which multiplies itself ad infinitum. As we shall see, this 
displacement of the limit of knowledge is that which renders knowledge functional 
in what Deleuze and Guattari call the capitalist social formation. Here knowledge is 
not motivated, as it is in the despotic formation, by a transcendental desire to which 
it may then be attached. Within capitalist knowledge, " ... every limit is constantly 
transgressed, ... what is important is not the other side of the frontier, it is that both 
sides are already posited, composed in one and the same world."6 Lyotard repeats 
this elsewhere in more direct terms: 
Meteque criticism [criticism from the position of the outsider - J.N.] is the 
weapon of big companies; it determines boundaries, the outside and the 
inside, Romans and non-Romans, citizens and foreigners. 
All your authors, ,n your assemblages of words, only reinforce this boundary, 
this frontier zone. 
We find ourselves forced to pose questions centering on the production of the 
limit, and its inscription within the subject, who is produced alongside it as if he 
were its natural product. We will find, in following this path, that it is necessary to 
postulate a spatializing machine which seizes upon the spatiality of the sign (as 
noted by Derrida), but whose working depends upon different mechanisms. Again, it 
6 Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Energumen capitalism," Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977), p. 25. 
7 Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Passages from Le mur du Pacijique" Substance 37 /?,8 (1983), p. 94. 
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is Derrida himself who points to this necessity via the possibility of formulating a 
textual analysis (which is at the same time a strategic political intervention) on the 
recognition "that text, as I use the word, is not the book. No more than writing or 
trace, it is not limited to the paper with which you cover your graphism. It is 
precisely for strategic reasons ... that I found it necessary to recast the concept of text 
by generalizing it almost without limit, in any case without present or perceptible 
limit, without any limit that is."8 
Now if we de-limit the text as radically as this, we run the risk of failing to 
recognize the fact that some texts are written, others inscribed or doubly-inscribed, 
and others produced according to gestures which can scarcely be called writing, 
since they produce meaning at the same time that they produces spaces. The limit of 
the sign produces meaning in the place of the sign's spatiality, simply because 
neither can present itself except at the expense of the other. This does not apply to 
the border, which produces spaces by rendering "difference"9 visible. Where the text 
is the product of a deliberate tracing, a limit or delimiting line, an enclosing gesture 
or boundary, a number of things happen. First, it should be possible to analyse this 
limit without seeking to apprehend it as a symbol; that is, in terms of the field it has 
visualized through exclusion. Second, any spatiality to which it may give rise must be 
understood as encompassing a spatiality of the sign, but also a more pervasive 
spatiality which has the power to unify a number of disparate spatial levels without 
producing meaning through mutual exclusion. Third, this line constantly refuses to 
mean, and in doing so, is constantly reducing itself to the status of the ontological. 
To put it succinctly, the spatiality of the sign partakes of a broader production of 
space. 
Does this broader field in which the spatiality of the sign functions pose a 
serious threat to Derrida's theory? In another article on difference in colonial 
discourse, Homi Bhabha has addressed the problems of differance as a theory which 
8 Jacques Derrida, "But, beyond ... (Open letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon)," in ~ 
writin~ and difference, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986), p. 176. 
Collected essays originally published in Critical Inquiry, vol. 12(1) (1985), and vol. 13(1) (1986), p. 366. 
9 The apostrophes are intended to emphasize that, because of the visibility of difference, it cannot be 
equated with the difference which Derrida attempts to unveil. 
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spatializes its field of application.10 Bhabha takes up Mark Cousins' claim that the 
notion of lack constitutive of difference in a philosophy of presence must confine 
philosophy (or analysis) to an endless repetition of the same in the name of a 
discovery of difference.11 According to Bhabha, the strategy which differance 
employs to bypass this pitfall is "the recognition of otherness as a symbol (not sign) 
of the presence of signifiance or differance: otherness is the point of equivalence or 
identity in a circle in which what needs to be proved (the limits of logocentricity) is 
assumed."12 What is interesting here - and I refer to Ulrike Kistner's study of 
colonial codification - is that this establishment of a border which must be 
continually crossed in order that the principle of a border be confirmed has a ~ual 
correlate in capitalist primary accumulation and in the expansionism of imperialism. 
Kistner quotes Marx in this connection: 
Dieser Widerspruch zwischen der quantitativen Schranke und der 
qualitativen Schrankenlosigkeit des Geldes treibt den Schatzbildner stets 
zuriick zur Sisyphusarbeit der Akkumulation. Es geht ihm wie dem 
Welteroberer, der mit jedem neuen Land nur eine neue Grenze erobert.13 
As Kistner points out, this activity is precisely that of capitalist de- and 
reterritorialization, as Deleuze and Guattari discuss it. It should be clear from what 
we have seen of Derrida's critique of the circle of metaphysics that Bhabha's claim is 
a very strong indictment of his textual activity indeed. Bhabha continues: 
What is denied is any knowledge of cultural otherness as a differential si~n, 
implicated in specific historical and discursive conditions, requirmg 
construction in differential practices of reading. The place of otherness is 
fixed in the West as a subversion of Western metaphysics and is finally 
appropriated by the West as its limit-text, the Anti-West. This results in a 
disciplinary gaze upon difference that disavows the castrating and negating 
return of the gaze of the Other.14 
I would be cautious of Bhabha's critique as identifying a general weakness of 
deconstructive method. Although it is a constantly recurring theme in his writing, I 
10 Bhabha bases this claim upon Derrida's recurrent reference to "The West" as a spatial limit of the 
text. Homi Bhabha, "Difference, discrimination, and the discourse of colonization," in Literature, 
politics and theory. Papers from the Essex Conference 1976-84, ed. Francis Barker (London & New 
York: Methuen 1986). 
11 Mark Cousins, "The logic of deconstruction," The Oxford Literary Review 3(2) (1978), p. 76. Cit 
Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195. 
12 Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195. 
13 Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, Werke, Bd 23: Das Kapital I (Berlin: Institut fiir Marxismus-
Leninismus beim Zentralkommitee der SED 1956-58), p. 147. Cit Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 
18. 
14 Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195. 
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do not see that a spatialized field of otherness is a necessary goal of Derrida's 
differance. It is true: ''what Derrida does is to fix the problem of ethnocentricity 
repeatedly at the limits of logocentricity."15 But in doing so, Derrida would have to 
reply, he is quite conscious of the paradoxical role, and for that matter, the political 
implications of speaking the limits of a discourse from within that discourse. 
It is in the interest of one side and the other to represent deconstruction as a 
turning inward and an enclosure by the limits of language, whereas in fact, 
deconstruction begins by deconstructing logocentrism, the linguistics of the 
word, and this very enclosure itself.16 
Nevertheless, I believe that Bhabha is quite correct in posing the question: given the 
fact of a (multiple) construction of a spatial field of otherness (as the product of 
what I would call a spatializing machine), is deconstruction capable of an adequate 
analysis of this place? Or to put the question differently: when confronted with 
colonial power, is it enough, is it an adequate strategy ( does it even deserve the term 
"strategy") when the philosopher realizes the paradoxical position of a philosopher 
who does not wish to engage in the discourse which gave rise to this power? 
Although in the final analysis I will agree with Bhabha in answering in the negative, 
Bhabha himself shows that colonization cannot be adequately understood without 
understanding the role played by discourse. And it is my claim that this in tum 
cannot be understood without a concept of the spatiality of the sign, such as may be 
derived from Derrida. 
Thus, having followed Derrida's de-limiting activity along certain crucial nodes 
of metaphysical discourse, we may now approach the question of the working of the 
spatializing machine. We will be doing this by way of a series of tracings, whereby 
we hope to follow certain productive mechanisms of this machine. It is unavoidable 
that these tracings remain within the metaphysical as conceived by Derrida. 
However, I hope that I will be dramatizing not only the limits of a discourse, but the 
way in which these limits are used; that is, the product which emerges from the 
spatializing machine, and in emerging, presents itself as if it had produced itself. 
15 Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 196. 
16 Derrida, But, beyond, p. '367. 
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1.2 Desire, the space of the subject, the space of history 
We may derive from Derrida's critique of metaphysics that the spatiality of 
metaphysical discourse is not only guaranteed by the temporality which displaces it, 
but that it is guaranteed by its own structure. The space which the signifying order 
reserves for the speaking subject intersects with that which history reserves for the 
subject acting within the social order. These two dimensions of spatiality determine 
and condition one another mutually, each providing a fictional "context" within 
which the "truth" of the other might be postulated. Thus the paramaters of social 
space seem capable of functioning as constants within which subjective space may be 
investigated, or vice versa. It is, however, my intention to investigate this spatiality 
not as the product of a history - be this the history of the subject or of the socius -
but as a productive function - a machine - out of which both may arise, and out of 
which another quantity, truth, may appear alongside them. It is the difference 
between given spaces and a spatializing function which I hope to preserve in the 
term "spatializing machine." In order to perform such analysis, it is necessary to 
approach this machine from along one of the fictional axes on whose intersection it 
functions. Whereas a theory of the fictionality of phylogenetic space is as good as 
non-existent (perhaps the closest to such a theory is Freud's Totem and Tabu), 
psychoanalysis has gone very far toward constructing a theory of the fictionality of 
ontogenetic space. If we are to approach the spactializing machine at work in the 
production of colonial space, it thus seems sensible to approach it from the insights 
of psychoanalysis, rather than from those of history. 
Lacan has shown that the construction of the subject may be conceived in a 
number of different ways, all of them centering about a desire for Being, which 
forces the subject to conceive of representation as providing the only position from 
which the question of its own being may be confronted. Generally speaking, Lacan 
tells the story of the subject's spatiality in two phases, both of which are tied to the 
question of self-perception in vision. Firstly, we see perception attempting to 
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construct its own body as the space from which it issues forth. Secondly, subjectivity 
emerges by inserting its self-consciousness into a social space. This is accomplished 
by gazing on a fictional position which serves to represent itself as a social being, 
and by gazing upon itself from this fictional position. The second phase of spatiality 
has not received adequate attention in commentaries on La.can's theory of the 
subject, and will be receiving greater attention here, since it is here that the space of 
subjectivity intersects with a socially constructed space that we must seek the subject 
of colonization. We will, nevertheless, note a certain colouring of this space with the 
imaginary space out of which it is built. For this reason, we will first turn our 
attention briefly to the spatial construction of subjectivity in the mirror stage17• 
It is of interest to note that the existence of the subject is presided over by a 
determination which is neither social nor rational, but spatial. La.can's mirror stage 
is described by Anika Lemaire as "the advent of coanaesthetic subjectivity preceded 
by the feeling that one's body is in pieces. The reflection of the body is, then, 
salutary in that it is unitary and localized in time and space."18 La.can expressly 
states that this experience of the cohesion of one's own body is a first step in a 
production of subjectivity which "leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing 
from the cogito."19 Furthermore, the cognition of self as an imago possesses a 
primordial symbolic quality preceding the objectified and universal subjectivity 
which is given in the "dialectic of identification with the other"20 and in language. 
The imago hence functions as an "Ideal-I," which "situates the agency of the ego, 
before its social determination, in a fictional direction ... "21 
La.can will carry these two aspects of spatial determination throughout his entire 
work. Emphasizing not the what, but the where of being, he is constantly restating 
Descartes' famous maxim of being in terms of position.22 And, as we shall see in his 
17 Jaques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic 
experience," in Ecrits. a selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock 1977). 
18 Anika Lemaire, Jagues Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul 1977), p. 81. 
19 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 1. 
20 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 2. 
21 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 2. 
22 For example, "I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do 
not think to think." Lacan, "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," in ~. 
p.166. 
THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIAL SPACE• 79 
discussion of aggressivity, social aggression (such as war) seizes upon "limitations of 
the individual,"23 which are spatial in nature and which serve to assign him a 
position in the social order. 
It is important for us to note at the outset that Lacan describes the construction 
of the ego in the mirror stage as a fiction.24 It must also be noted that this initial 
construction of the ego is not to be confused with the self-reflections of 
consciousness. It is, on the contrary, prior to such activity. It is a construction 
characterized by space in so far as it seizes upon visual perception as a mediation 
''between the organism and its reality - ... between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt."25 
The intitial constructions of subjectivity are thus performed as spatial constructions 
upon which a dialectic of self-reflection as the self-questioning of being may be 
based. "What is hereby created, therefore, is not a self-consciousness but rather an 
organizing matrix, a statue ([Lacan, 1949] p 2), and this organizing matrix Lacan 
calls "I"."26 This organizing matrix is something which must be assumed and 
appropriated by the child, not as the result of an act of consciousness,27 but as an 
organically vital discovery of "the signification of space for the living organism."28 
The dialectic of self-recognition and -misrecognition is not instituted on the level of 
consciousness, as in the Hegelian dialectic, but on the level of spatiality. 
If we can go on to base the dialectic of consciousness encountering itself on this 
spatial dialectic, as Lacan does, then it seems justified to see in the Lacanian 
dialectic that signifying spatiality which we have already discussed as sublated in the 
Hegelian sign. Lacan attempts to grasp the initial spatiality of the subject as an 
organic necessity marked by the general function of the imago in mimesis as well as 
23 John Muller and William Richardson, Lacan and Language. A reader's guide to Ecrits (New York: 
International Universities Press 1982), p. 51. 
24 According to Muller and Richardson, this fictionality is twofold. Firstly, when the child attempts to 
situate itself in a unity of its own body perceived as a reflection, "the ideal of total unity, projected onto 
this alientating identity, is an unattainable one .. ." (p. 31.) And secondly, the reflection that the mirror 
bears is subject to all the distortions characteristic of the visual field, resulting in a distorted 
apprehension of oneself. Although Muller and Richardson mention specifically only that of parity, we 
shall see later that distortion in the visual field will have to be understood in a much wider sense. 
25 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 4. 
26 Wilfried ver Eecke, "Hegel as Lacan's souce for necessity in psychoanalytic theory," in lnter:pretin~ 
~ ed. Joseph Smith and William Kerrigan, Psychiatry and the Humanities, vol. 6 (New Haven & 
Londen: Yale University Press 1983), p. 125. 
Tl Wilfried ver Eecke, Hegel as Lacan's source, p. 125. 
28 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 3. 
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by a prematurity of the human organism at birth, the latter fact acting upon the 
imago to determine it as something immediate, identical to the self, and yet external, 
fixed, and not yet "filled" by the self perceived as internal. 
As Lacan goes on to say, this perception of the imago as not yet oneself "is 
experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the 
individual into history."29 The recognition of the specular image is thus not simply 
an appropriation of the spatiality of the body, it is also an appropriation of the 
temporality of that body as a history. And it is more, the history of the body must be 
understood as opening up onto the history of a socius, by way of the spatial insertion 
of the self into the social field which marks the end of the mirror stage. 
In developing the idea of a "paranoiac alienation, which dates from the 
deflection of the specular / into the social /,1130 Lacan is closely following Hegel's 
construction of consciousness in the dialectic of the master and servant. However, 
Lacan does not see alienation as socially determined, as does Hegel, but as a quality 
of subjectivity upon which social existence expands.31 
And yet, Lacan's discussion of the spatiality of the subject immediately 
problematizes any attempt to distinguish spatiality from the social domain. It is the 
task posed in the essay on aggressivity to explain how the subject, collecting itself 
into an image invested with primary narcissism and aggression, can transfer this 
image onto other figures which serve to mediate it in the social field. For our 
purposes it is necessary only to note that this mediatory development aligns the 
spatiality of the subject with the space of the socius by mapping it onto the space of 
an other. 
This mapping is "dependent, in man, on a cultural mediation as exemplified, in 
the case of the sexual object, by the Oedipus complex."32 The Oedipus complex 
functions to socialize the aggressivity of the subject by what Lacan calls "the 
'29 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 4. 
30 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 5. 
31 "Hegel locates the unavoidability of aggressivity in the social domain. Aggressivity becomes 
unavoidable because the individual remains individualistic and requires that for any societal rule to be 
acceptable, it must conform to the wishes of his own heart. Lacan, on the contrary, situates the 
aggressivity in the spatial dimension of man." Wilfried ver Eecke, Hegel as Lacan's source, p. 133. 
32 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 5-6. 
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passifying function of the ego ideal, the connexion between its libidinal normativity 
and a cultural normativity bound up from the dawn of history with the imago of the 
father."33 Although the subject may perceive itself as a body in the indeterminate 
oscillation of its own specular gaze, the perception of its individuality is necessarily a 
perception presided over by the gaze of another - the gaze of the law. 
It is this constitution of desire subject to the law that forms the 'Juncture of 
nature and culture."34 The social mediation of subjectivity may thus be described as 
a spatial dimension marked by narcissism and aggressivity, and yet a space in which 
aggressivity is at least partially surrendered to a sublimation prescribed by the law. 
The territoriality of social being seems to be understood by Lacan as an organic 
necessity, a fact which does not prevent him from criticizing the 'discontents' of 
civilization resulting from this territoriality. Before moving on to examine the 
problems in deducing an ontological territoriality from a fictionality of the subject, 
and more particularly of the role of the Oedipal drama in mediating between the 
space of subjectivity and that of the socius, let us briefly examine the manifestations 
of territoriality in the social field, as Lacan sees them. 
Although there are far-reaching differences between the two, Lacan aligns 
himself with Hegel's "ultimate theory of the proper function of aggressivity in human 
ontology,"35 that is, the dialectic of master and servant.36 It is from this dialectic, 
Lacan claims, that Hegel "deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of 
our history."37 What is decisive in Hegel's analysis is the role played by desire. 'The 
satisfaction of human desire is possible only when mediated by the desire and labour 
of the other."38 We have, however, already noted that the Lacanian dialectic is to be 
understood not as a dialectic of consciousness, but of space. It follows that where 
Hegel sees the insertion of the individual into the socius as the work of a desiring 
conciousness,39 Lacan sees it in the constitution of the space of the subject as the 
33 Lacan, "Aggressivity in psychoanalysis," in Ecrits, p. 22. 
34 Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 7. 
35 Lacan, A~gressivity, p. 26. 
36 The similarities and differences between Hegel's and Lacan's theories of aggressivity are discussed 
by Wilfried ver Eecke, and need not be rehearsed here. 
37 Lacan, A~gressivity, p. 26. 
38 Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 26. 
39 Wilfried ver Eecke, Hegel as Lacan's source, p. 35. 
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space of an Other's desire, an infusion which takes place through the mediation of 
vision. He even goes as far as to state that "it is the subjective possibility of the 
mirror projection of such a field [i.e. a field "mapped socially, in a way that raises it 
to the category of subjective membership"] into the field of the other that gives 
human space its originally 'geometric' structure, a structure that I would be happy to 
call kaleidoscopic."40 
The spatial dimension of being as social being is genetically derived from a 
space marked by relatively indeterminate positions of subjectivity and objectivity in 
a dialectic relation. This allows Lacan to speak of "the relation existing between the 
dimension of space and a subjective tension, which in the 'discontents' (malaise) of 
civilization intersects with that of anxiety... which is developed in the temporal 
dimension.',41 The space of the subject as a social space determines subjectivity as 
absent in the spatial as well as temporal sense. In mapping subjective space onto the 
space of the other - the social space - the subject invests its desire for being in an 
image which, as a representation, marks it as not here, and not W here. Social 
space is the domain of Freud's death drive.42 
La.can's attitude toward social space is determined by this realization. Hence he 
shows the same ambivalent attitude to war, for example, which he has toward the 
Symbolic order as a whole. War, for Hegel, is "a rational form of aggressivity 
because it subordinates individualistic and particularistic interests to the interests of 
40 Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 27. Muller and Richardson take this latter term to mean "distorted in myriad 
ways."(p. 50) From this point of view, Kant's philosophy of space must be seen in relation to vision and 
more particularly to optics. We may trace a certain analogy here, which may be stretched to the point 
of comparing the transcendentality of Kantian law with the transcendentality of the law presiding over 
the Lacanian Symbolic order. What is important is that this law, although it is the law of the socius, as 
well as that of representation and of subjectivity, nonetheless bears the traces of these myriad 
distortions which desire has mapped onto the space of the Other and onto that of the subject's own 
body. A similar argument is put forward by Frederick Jameson in his reading of Lacan's "Kant avec 
Sade" (Critigue 191, April 1963) "in which the very prototype of an attempt to construct a rationally 
coherent (or in other words, Symbolic) system of ethics by the first-named is thoroughly discredited by 
a structural analogy with the delirious rationality of the second." Frederick Jameson, "Psychoanalytic 
criticism and the problem of the subject," in Literature and Psychoanalysis. The guestion of readin~: 
Otherwise, ed. Shoshona Felman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1982), p. 370. 
41 Lacan, Aggressivity. p. 28. 
42 "Only at the intersection of these two tensions should one envisage that assumption by man of his 
original splitting (dechirement), by which it might be said that at every moment he constitutes his world 
by his suicide, and the psychological experience of which Freud had the audacity to formulate, however 
paradoxical its expression in biological terms, as the 'death instinct'." Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 28. 
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the state, interpreted by Hegel as universal"43. For Lacan, it is the natural form of 
spatial experience in the field of the socius, while at the same time a showplace of 
the contradictions between the technical requirements of what we might call the 
"war-machine," and the limitations of the subject in fulfilling such needs. He is, 
however, less vague in his denunciation of "the barbarism of the Darwinian 
century.'44 Darwin's emphasis on natural selection is described as a "laissez-faire of 
the strongest in competition for their natural prey,"45 and should serve in the 
present context to show how the theories of "social Darwinism" could justify the 
territorial expansion of imperialism according to the tennets of liberal capitalism. 
Thus, in terms of Lacanian theory, if we can refer at all to an ideology of the 
Darwinian era, we would have to qualify it as the representation of a spatial 
appropriation which provides the very essence of subjectivity within the social space. 
Lacan prefers to speak of Darwin's success deriving from "the fact that he projected 
the predations of Victorian society and the economic euphoria that sanctioned for 
that society the social devastation that it initiated on a planetary scale ... "46 We are 
dealing with the mapping of a space infused with desire onto a social space marked 
by the desire of the Other, and a theory of that mapping which attains the status of a 
law, because of its ability to represent the desire of the Other as a transcendental 
value.47 
These considerations are fleetingly dealt with in the fifth "critical" thesis of 
Ac~essivity in psychoanalysis, which Lacan states as follows: 
Such a notion of aggressivity as one of the intentional co-ordinates of the 
human ego, especially relative to the category of space, allows us to conceive 
of its role in modern neurosis and in the 'discontents' of civilization.48 
As Muller and Richardson observantly state, 
Perhaps the importance of this final thesis simply consists in the fact that 
Lacan felt constrained to formulate it, as if to re-affirm his concern for the 
43 Wilfried ver Eecke, Hegel as Lacan's source, p. 135. 
44 Lacan, Aggressivity. p. 26. 
45 Lacan, AG;gressivity, p. 26. 
46 Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 26. 
47 Hence, any attempt to justify colonization on the basis of that brand of social Darwinism which 
flourished at the end of the 19th century may be reduced to a desire for space infused with 
transcendental law, be this in the form of an ethics of colonization in the discourse of humanism or a 
. ' Kantian evaluation of the colonial space through the ideal mediation of scientific discourse. 
48 Lacan, AgG;Iessivity, p. 50. 
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social dimension of man, even when dealing with the most elementary 
processes through which the individual is formed.49 
We cannot fault the ethical stance which Lacan takes in formulating such a thesis, 
nor would it be appropriate to criticise him for the peripheral and subdued nature of 
his criticism of imperialism. What we must ask at this stage is whether this is a 
necessary consequence of a theory of the spatiality of social being. Should we not 
attempt to qualify what Lacan takes as the basis of his argument, in order to allow a 
critique of colonial space which bears more weight that a token gesture of concern,_ 
which from the very start is doomed by the force of organic necessity to failure? The 
direction which such a qualification must take is indicated first of all by Lacan 
himself, and is closely related to the role of aggression in the appropriation of social 
space. In the following sections, I will attempt to develop this qualification, taking as 
my points of departure desire and the Oedipal drama. Let me state here, however, 
that if Lacan's theory is to be of use in a critique of colonial space, we will have to 
reverse the all-too popular reading which grants subjective space an experiential and 
ontogenetic priority over social space. 
1.3 Desire, the space of the socius, the space of the gaze 
Where the subject intersects with the socms, the nature of desire is 
indeterminate to the extent that it seems inappropriate to speak of a mapping of a 
space of subjective desire onto a social space infused with the desire of the Other. 
Indeed, if we read Lacan carefully, it seems inappropriate to attempt to isolate 
(even analytically) the moments of subjective desire and the desire of the Other. 
The much-quoted dictum that human desire is the desire of the Other should be 
sufficient to tell us this. 
If we can accept that the genesis of the subject provides for an initial 
apprehension of the body as the seat of consciousness before arrival at the stage of 
49 Muller and Richardson, Reading: Lacan, p. 50. 
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transitivism aimed at the imago of the other,50 and if the latter stage provides the 
social space into which the subject may expand, it does not necessarily follow that 
the quality of social space is in any way derivative of the quality of subjective space. 
Indeed, everything La.can says about desire would seem to point to the opposite 
being true. Frantz Fanon recognised the importance of this aspect of La.can's 
psychoanalysis for a theory of colonial relations as early as 1952, in which he 
repeatedly implies that social relations structure imaginary space.51 Let us pursue 
the manner in which this is effected. 
The spatiality of human existence is characterized not only by an indeterminate 
dialectic of subject and object, but by an investment of these positions with desire, 
effecting a "stagnation" of "phenomenological moments in social behaviour" and a 
resultant fixing of positions of subject and object.52 Because the very appearance of 
relatively stable subject and object positions depends on this stagnation of the 
specular dialectic, La.can calls human knowledge 'paranoiac'. It allows the subject to 
enter into a relationship with "his" objects by assuming a coherent ego identity as 
"that which is reflected of his form in his objects."53 And yet, it is not by means of a 
subjective projection, nor of an objective affinity that the postitions of subject and 
object are fixed in relation to one another. The space of the specular image opens 
up into a relatively stable social space in the moment when a transcendental value 
appears which can preserve this space as a space of representation. And in doing so, 
it is also preserved (we might say solidified) as a stable field in which vision is 
functionalized as the privileged mediator of truth. Fanon speaks of a "real dialectic 
between my body and the world."54 He goes on to show that we are dealing here not 
50 "This moment in which the mirror-stage comes to an end inaugurates, by the identification with the 
imago of the couterpart and the drama of primordial jealousy (so well brought out in the school of 
Charlotte Buhler in the phenomenon of infantile transitivism ), the dialectic that will henceforth link the 
I to socially elaborated situations." Lacan, The mirror stage, p. 5. Italics in original .. 
51 For example, "It may perhaps be objected that if the white man is subject to the elaboration of the 
imago of his peer, an analogous phenomenon should occur in the Antillean, visual perception being the 
sketch for such an elaboration. But to say this is to forget that in the Antilles perception always occurs 
on the level of the imaginary. It is in white terms that one perceives one's fellows." Frantz Fanon, Black 
skin, white masks, p. 163n25. 
52 "Now, this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of human knowledge: that which 
constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and substantiality .. ." Lacan, 
Aa;~essivity, p. 17. 
53 Lacan, "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis," in ~. p. 194. 
54 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 111. 
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only with a physiological privilege of vision, but with a socially privileged quality of 
looking which acts upon and overdetermines the physiological. This is, in Fanon's 
opinion, the essence of negritude as an object of colonial knowledge. 
I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the "idea" that 
others have of me but of my own appearance... And ~lready I am being 
dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. 
In keeping with La.can, Fanon indicates that the symbolic overdetermination of 
perception negates the physiological as a primary cause. 
Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The 
elements that I had used had been provided for me not by 'residual 
sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and 
visual character , but by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a 
thousand details, anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I had in hand was to 
construct~ physiological self, to localize sensations, and here I was called on 
for more. 
Once the subject has been thus inserted into a statutory system of representation, 
the genetically prior stage of primary narcissism is attainable only via a 
representation, and cannot prevail of itself.57 Desire, then, invests the space of the 
socius with a transcendental signification out of which the fiction of the subject must 
be produced. What this would seem to indicate is that specular space gains meaning 
as subjective space only in retrospect. What the subject ~ can only be represented 
by the subject who is through a dramatisation of that gap which the infant in front of 
the mirror had to transverse, in order to collect itself into an image. The motivation 
of this traversal of space may thus be represented as the desire of Oedipus only if we 
realize that Oedipus' desire, by its very definition, infuses that space in which the 
subject can exist only as absent, both temporally and spatially. What this means is 
that if we are to question the space of subjectivity as the space of the socius we must 
begin by interrogating desire, and more particularly, desire in the field of vision. 
In expanding upon Fanon's initial appraisal of the significance of desire and 
vision for colonization, Homi Bhabha equates the establishment of colonizer and 
colonized stereotypes with Freudian fetishism. This he does by way of Said's 
55 Fanon, Black skin. white masks, p. 116. 
56 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 111. The quote refers to Jean Lhermitte, "L'image de notre 
corps," in Nouvelle Revue critique (1939), p. 17. 
57 "For if [the Other] is taken away, man can no longer sustain himself in the position of Narcissism." 
Lacan, Treatment of psychosis, p. 195. 
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observation that between the absolutely new and the thoroughly known "a new 
median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen 
for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing."58 This amounts to an 
"encapsulation or fixation which moves between the recognition of cultural and 
racial difference and its disavowal, by affixing the unfamiliar to something 
established, in a form that is repetitious and vacillates between delight and fear."59 
Bhabha shows the functionality of this structure in the establishment of colonial 
relations of power. In establishing vision as the privileged channel through which the 
stereotype is apprehended, colonization increases "the visibility of the subject as an 
object of surveillance, tabulation, enumeration and, indeed, paranoia and fantasy.',60 
This paranoiac knowledge which apprehends the space of the colony, just as it does 
the space of the colonized, is, however, constantly threatened by its very structure. 
To put it succinctly, the recognition and disavowal of 'difference' is always 
disturbed by the question of its re-~resentation or construction. The 
stereotype is in fact an impossible object. 1 
The impossibility of the object paradoxically serves to reinforce the privileged status 
of the visual field, since its characteristic indeterminacy is well-suited to the 
oscillation between recognition and disavowal which characterizes the latter. I have 
already shown the importance of this oscillation in the construction of the imago. In 
the representation of the stereotype, however, this oscillation takes on a more 
complex form. Bhabha speaks of "a tie-up between the metaphoric or masking 
function of the fetish and the narcissistic object-choice and an opposing alliance 
between the metonymic figuring of lack and the aggressive phase of the Imaginary. 
One has then a repertoire of conflictual positions that constitute the subject 
in colonial discourse. The taking up of any one :position, within a specific 
discursive form, in a particular historical conJuncture, is then always 
problematic - the site of both fixity and fantasy. It :provides a colonial 
'identity' that is played out - like all fantasies of originality and origination -
in the fac~. and !face of the disruption and threat from the heterogeneity of 
other pos1t1ons. 
58 Edward Said, Orientalism, cit. Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 201. 
59 Bhabha, Difference. discrimination, p. 201. 
60 Bhabha, Difference. discrimination, p. 199. 
61 Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 208. 
62 Bhabha, Difference. discrimination, p. 204. 
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Bhabha stresses the importance of the resultant ambivalence of colonial 
representations of subjectivity. It is hoped that in the following discussion it should 
become clearer why this ambivalence is tied so closely to the subject's spatiality, and 
why the visual field plays such an important role in this respect. Let us note for the 
moment that paranoiac knowledge, although it fixes positions of subjectivity and 
objectivity, does so in a manner which is constantly threatening those very positions, 
and that this has definite consequences for colonial discourse. 
Although the 'authority' of colonial discourse depends crucially on its 
location in narcissism and the Imaginary, my concept of stereotype-as-suture 
is a recognition of the ambivalence of that authority and those orders of 
identification. The role of fetishistic identification, m the construction of 
discriminatory knowledges that depend on the 'presence of the difference', is 
to provide a :process of splitting and multiple/contradictory belief at the 
point of enunciation and subjectification.63 
We shall be returning to the question of the binding of conflictual positions into a 
subjective identity when we discuss the Lacanian function of suture, and we will be 
rejoining Bhabha's discussion of the colonial stereotype in this connection. Let us 
first, however, investigate the role of vision in the constitution of subjective space as 
social space. 
We have seen that the establishment of human knowledge as a self-knowledge 
of the subject and a knowlege of the object as "his" object is effected by a 
transcendental desire, and it is this which establishes a social function of the 
subjective investment of desire in objects. This is "how the a functions in its social 
repercussions.',64 This is understandable if we take the a to be an "element of 
ineluctable mediation uniting the subject with the Other.',65 Indeed, it is the 
ineluctability of the mediation which gives vision its epistemological and structural 
primacy. What we should further note is that vision not only yields the intersection 
of subjective and social space; it also structures the subject's relation to a "nucleus," 
which Lacan describes as "belonging to the real - the real in so far as the identity of 
perception is its rule .',66 
63 Bhabha, Difference. discrimination, p. '207. 
64 Lacan, The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London: Penguin 1979), p. 113. 
65 Andre Green, "Logic of Lacan's objet (a) and Freudian theory: convergences and questions," in 
Inter:pretini: Laca!!, p. 164. Emphasis in original. 
66 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 68. My emphasis. 
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The identity of perception in the realm of the real is accessible to the subject 
and to knowledge either via memory traces or in representation. In the same way 
that the space of subjectivity is produced in retrospect as a function of the space of 
the socius, reality is preserved as an encouter (tuche) through repetition in the 
signifying chain.67 This preservation, since it bears the elision characteristic of 
signification, is at the same time a veiling of reality. Where knowledge and 
representation aim themselves at a truth situated elsewhere and elsewhen, the truth 
they specify attains the quality of a lack. When the subject encounters its own lack in 
its desire for a space of being, it also establishes a knowledge of itself as a loss of 
being, and of its desire as a desire for an object which may repeat the ineluctable 
mediation in which the space of the subject first appeared. This it attempts to do 
through an imaginary relation to an apparantly lost object.68 Thus the objet (a) 
appears to the subject as the form of its knowledge, and as a representation of what 
is missing from its own being.69 
It follows that the fiction of the subject is the story of that unthinkable absence 
upon which knowledge is built.70 Whether it appears as knowledge of the self or of 
reality, knowledge as knowledge of an object separated from the subject in space is 
built upon an identity which is spatial to the extent that its non-spatial qualities 
appear to be derivative of an ignorance of the infant subject. What this means is that 
knowledge is capable of encircling a field of ignorance as a domain of pre-historic 
mythology out of which knowledge arose and which it must suppress, but which 
nevertheless persists as its subliminal motivation. Within this domain of ignorance, 
67 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 69. 
68 "It is precisely to the extent that this objet (a) comes forth as the object of lack (the missing object) 
that it will operate on two levels: as the revelation of the lack of the Other and as the lack appearing 
within the signifying process." Green, Logic of obiet (a), p. 169. Emphasis in original. 
69 "That which is missing in the Other is that which one cannot conceive of. The ( -phi) which enters 
here in the guise of that which does not appear - that is, the Nothing which it is impossible to represent 
- organizes the confrontation with castration as that which is unthinkable: this gap in the possibilities of 
thought is filled in by the process of significance ("significantisation"), by the mirage of knowledge." 
Green, ~c of olzfet Ca), p. 169. 
70 "(a) symbolizes that which, in the realm of the signifier as lost, loses itself to "significantisation." It is 
the designated subject who resists this loss; at the moment the process of knowledge comes into play, at 
the moment of knowing, something is lost." Lacan, unpublished seminar on Plato's Symposium. Quoted 
in Green, We of obiet (a), p. 169. Emphasis in original. 
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knowledge produces a fictional lost object which may not be thought because it may 
not be reflected or reflected upon: it is, as Andre Green says, nonspecularizable.71 
And yet, this loss persists, functions, works. For the subject, it persists as a dual 
inscription: on memory and in self-representation. The lost object insists in the 
history of the subject by inscribing subjective space as the space of that loss. 
If knowledge is that which comes forth in the place of truth, after loss of the 
object, shouldn't they be linked to one another by the marks (traces) of this 
loss and the attempts to efface them? 
These questions will allow us to consider the objet (a) less as a support for 
the partial object than as the passage of a tracing hand: inscription, letter, 
a.n 
What is important for Lacan is that when space opens up to vision as a space of 
knowledge - a space in which subject and object interrogate one another across a 
field of representation - that space is itself infused with a desire caused by a fictional 
lost identity. The spatializing machine not only produces space as the space in which 
knowledge may appear, it produces it as a space in which the desire of the Other 
may attach subjectivity to the objects of knowledge by virtue of their ability to signify 
a primal lost object. And furthermore, it is the appearance of spatiality as the 
signifying space of vision which allows desire to persist, and in doing so to leap from 
one object to another in the same motions as those with which it scans the signifying 
chain of language.73 
It is the constitution of reality as an encounter which has been that allows Lacan 
to speak of the object of knowledge as a screen, upon which reality is projected for 
the faculty of vision. Lacan equates the screen, as a surface for projection, to what 
he calls the "stain": 
71 "This appearance of the form of the object of lack brings out the specific focus of our expost, that is, 
the nonspecularizable nature of the (a). The course of events is ... as if the subject short-circuiting the 
impossible specularization of lack were to identify itself with the knowledge which, emerging at the site 
of that loss which brings it into play, covers over this loss to the point of forgetting its existence." Green, 
~c ofobiet Cal, p. 169. Emphasis in original. 
72 Green, Logic of obiet (a 1, p. 171. 
73 "The function of assembling, of subsuming, allies itself with the notion of a power which puts things 
together and which, at the expense of a separation (coupure) - operating between the assembling power 
and the thing presented - represents. It is separation (coupure) which allows for representation ... It is 
through the very operation of separation that the subject comes forth, or constitutes itself as subject - at 
the expense of the object, it seems to me. As if one could say: the separation (of the subject) is of no 
importance since the suture ( of the object ( a)) remains. Desire's sacrifice of the object renders this real, 
so to speak. The loss of the object is of no importance as long as desire survives and extends it. Or 
something along the lines of: the object is dead, long live desire (of the Other)." Green, Lo~ic of obiet 
UL1.. p. lTl. Emphasis in original. 
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If the function of the stain is recognized in its autonomy and identified with 
that of the gaze, we can see its track, its thread, its trace, at every stage of the 
constitution of the world, in the scopic field. We will then realize that the 
function of the stain and of the gaze is both that which governs the gaze most 
secretly and that which always escapes from the grasp of tha1 form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as consciousness. 4
As such, the screen, or the stain, functions as objet (a). This it does by acting as a 
real object capable of entrapping the gaze of the Other. Again, it was Fanon who 
realized the importance for colonisation of this dialectic of object constitution in the 
field of vision and determination of the quality of vision. As a result, he has no 
hesitation in stating that "the white man is not only The Other, but also the master, 
whether real or imaginary."75 
We have already seen that the gaze is charaterized by a certain indeterminacy, 
which is given, among other things, by the ambivalent nature of the investment of 
sight by the subject.76 The ambivalent nature of vision conditions the relationship 
between the gazing subject and the screen, the objet (a). Reality, in offering a 
surface upon which the ob jet ( a) may be projected, appears to the subject as 
implicating him in the act of gazing. Thus, in gazing upon privileged objects, the 
subject is not simply gazing, but is constituting himself as the eye from which the 
74 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 74. 
75 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 138n24. Unfortunately, in the same work Fanon later contradicts 
this important insight by claiming that "when one has grasped the mechanism described by Lacan, one 
can have no doubt that the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man. "(p. 
161n25) Not only is there no indication in Lacan's writings that the dialectic of subjectivity in the social 
field involves a possibility of a simple reversal of positions; Fanon is also contradicting his important 
extensions of Lacan's work to the question of the socius. If the dialectic of identity and difference is 
capable of oscillating at random between various positions determined by physiological characteristics 
(such as skin colour), how do we explain the social fixing of positions of subjectivity and the resulting 
statutory repression of the colonized subject? 
76 In the "Three essays on the theory of sexuality" of 1905, Freud had already emphasized the 
importance of the ambivalence of vision in the polar organization of the drives. (In The standard 
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, vol. VII, ed. James Strachey, London: 
Hogarth 1963) Furthermore, in the same essay, he attempted to relate this polar organization to the 
appearance of the object as distinct from the body in the anal-sadistic phase (p. 99). In "Instincts and 
their vicissitudes" (1915) he applies a linguistic model to show that, in the evolution of a drive into its 
opposite (sadism into masochism, or voyeurism into exhibitionism), the subject maintains a constant 
investment in the drive, while its object as well as the relation to the subject remain variable. (In 
Standard Edition, vol. XIV, 117-140.) The relation of the subject to the drive is that of the subject to a 
verb, in this case the verb "to see." This idea is still further elaborated in 1919, "A child is being beaten." 
(In Standard Edition, vol. XVII, pp 179-204.) See also Forrester: "The thesis in question, then, is that a 
neurosis is formed around a 'core proposition', whose structure is grammatically simple, consisting in a 
subject, a verb and an object. The relation between subject and object is defined by the verb. The verb 
itself corresponds to the instinct, or, more strictly, each component-instinct corresponds to a class of 
verbs." John Forrester, Language and the origins of psychoanalysis (London: MacMillan 1980), p. 142. 
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gaze issues forth, and as such, is gazing upon himself from a position he cannot 
occupy. 
In order to reflect upon itself as a self-consciousness, the subject requires a real 
surface through which the ambivalence and the self-elision of vision may be 
mediated. Lacan's split between the gaze and the eye reads here as an implicit 
elaboration of the Kantian theory of space as the form of outer intuition, only to 
subvert Kant's theory by showing its dependance upon the law.77 Thus the possibility 
of the construction of a body in space tied to a consciousness in time requires the 
retention of imaginary lines of vision through memory traces. When the subject 
gazes upon objects, the implicit return of the gaze inscribes itself in the subject's 
self-consciousness as one of the radii of a circle, the center of which is occupied by 
the subject. Consciousness requires a temporal synthesis of spatial configurations 
under the auspices of a transcendental law. This law is borne by the geometry of 
light, however, not because of an epistemologically privileged status of geometric 
axioms, but because of the genetically and structurally privileged role of vision in 
establishing knowledge in the place of truth. The law presiding over the Lacanian 
relation of the subject to reality will thus be transcendental only to the extent that 
desire persists in the transcendental law presiding over representation. Or, as 
Michel Serres puts it, the earth is measured (geo-metry) by means of just measure 
(the King).78 The reality of objects is given to the subject by virtue of desire's need 
to abandon the privileged object in search of another. Hence, when Lacan states 
that "the screen reestablishes things in their status as real,"79 he makes the further 
qualification that "in relation to desire, reality is only marginal."80 In other words, 
the presence of the real surface, the screen, as an object of the gaze, is given only 
through its ability to function as objet (a). It represents the lack which is the truth of 
the subject, and which is guaranteed by the traces in representation of an absent 
Other. This modification of the status of the law is, to a certain extent, a reversal of 
77 See note 40 above. 
78 Michel Serres, "Language and space: from Oedipus to Zola," in Hermes. Literature, science, 
philosophy, by Michel Serres, ed. Josue Harari and David Bell (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983), pp. 52-3. 
79 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts. p. 107. 
80 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 108. 
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Kant. As soon as the question of desire is introduced into the system of Ding-an-sich, 
knowing subject and the complex mediation of representation and its law, we find 
that this law indeed plays a constitutive role at every stage of mediation, yet it 
conditions not truth but illusion. 
As an example of this function of desire, Lacan discusses the desire of painting 
as paradigmatic for the presence of the desire of the Other in visual perception. The 
function of the painting as objet (a) depends on its ability to "tame" the gaze; that is, 
to allign the viewer's gaze not with the eye of the painter, but with the gaze of the 
painter's desire. This quality of the viewer's gaze is designated as a gaze of envy 
(invidia).81 What is essential in the function of envy is not only the lack of a primal 
object for the subject, but also the lack of that being which one would have if the 
gazed-upon object were able to satisfy the longing it arouses. In other words, the 
envy which characterizes the desire of the gaze is a desire for the being which the 
gazer lacks, and which is the being of the Other. This is how the objet (a) functions. 
It is experienced as lack, not simply because it isn't there, but because it is visible as 
the object of the Other's desire. Lacan speaks here of the "taming, civilizing and 
fascinating power of the function of the picture."82 The word "civilizing" is important 
to us, and may serve to elaborate the implications of Lacan's theory for a theory of 
colonization. In order to illustrate that this "civilizing" effect of the painting is not to 
be understood in purely abstract terms, Lacan presents us with two examples of the 
presence of the gaze of the Other in the painting: the icon and what we might call 
the jubilant recording of power in a certain type of historical painting. The icon is 
created under the authorizing gaze of the Other. It is a representation of God, 
created by God's authority with the aim of pleasing God. More interesting in the 
present context is the example of the battle scenes on the walls of the Doges palace, 
in which Lacan sees a "communal" investment in the gaze of the Other. 
Let us go to the great hall of the Doges' Palace in which are painted all kinds 
of battles, such as the battle of Lepanto, etc. The social function ... is now 
becoming clear. Who comes here? Those who form what Retz calls 'les 
peuples', the audiences. And what do the audiences see in these vast 
compositions. They see the gaze of those persons who, when the audience are 
81 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 115. 
82 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 116. 
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not there, deliberate in this hall. Behind the picture, it is their gaze that is 
there.83 
This has a more immediate historical correlative in the colonial project as 
initiated by the early explorers in their search for privileged objects which might be 
gazed upon from the position of the Other. The explorer strove to transport these 
objects, either in the flesh or in representation, back to that realm presided over by 
the Other. But in order to desire the representation of the object, the explorer must 
first constitute desire as the desire of a particular mode of gazing. This initiates an 
objectification of a certain quality of vision, a process which becomes crucial for the 
subsequent unfolding of colonial knowledge. Indeed, it is upon the objectification of 
the gaze that the surveillance of the colonial object will later be founded, at the 
stage where colonization becomes a matter of encircling and marking spaces. As 
Bhabha notes, "one has to see the surveillance of colonial power as functioning in 
relation to the regime of the scopic drive. That is, the drive that represents the 
pleasure in 'seeing', which has the look as the object of desire. This drive is related 
to the myth of origins, the primal scene, and the problematic of fetishism, and 
locates the surveyed object within the 'imaginary' relation."84 
It is important to stress that the specific quality of this mode of gazing is socially 
conditioned. The paranoiac fixing of knowledge takes place at all times on a social 
stage - a stage which opens the space of knowledge as it determines the quality of 
the gaze in which the objects of knowledge may be apprehended. What this means is 
that the gazing subject in a strange land produces a relation of knowledge to the 
objects of vision by the authority of the absent Other whose desire is borne in vision. 
In a later section we will be investigating how this functions in respect of the 
practice of colonization and its representation. We will also see that the practice of 
colonization involves the establishment of a series of strategies for reinforcing the 
transcendentality of the Other's gaze, ranging from discursive conventions (such as 
the form of description in travel reports) to technological appropriations of the gaze 
(primarily in surveying, but also in the techniques of topographical route description 
83 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 113. 
84 Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 204. 
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and mapping) and what might be called the "policing of the gaze" (i.e. the 
employment of the police and army to enforce a particular manner of gazing on the 
boundaries of colonial enclosures). We are dealing with a constant dialogue 
between textual and geographical space. In respect of the Orient, Said notes that 
What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by 
which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself 
from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic 
and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical 
one, or rather it was a change in the quality ~f geographical and spatial 
apprehension as far as the Orient was concerned. 5 
As we shall see, this description is only partially accurate. We are dealing not 
only with a transformation from the textual to the administrative etc, but a dialogue 
between the two spatial determinations. Each is unthinkable without the other, and 
each supports the other. The mastery of space which marks the subject's status in 
the socius also causes European knowledge to "fatally tend towards the systematic 
accumulation of human beings and territories ... reconstructive precision, science, 
even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and 
bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient."86 
2 THE PRODUCTION OF THE OEDIPAL DRAMA: THE CAPITALIST PRODUCTION OF 
SPACE 
2.l The birth (and death) of the subject in the space of tragedy 
As we have seen, spatial knowledge, be it knowledge of the space of the subject 
or of the space of the world constructed from the configurations of his objects, can 
only prevail as a representation of a space which was. In the establishment of a 
signifying space of being, the subject is split into two dimensions, one of which is a 
signified subject who can speak, represent and be represented only from within this 
structure of knowledge, but who acts in space not necessarily co-extensive with the 
space of signification. The other is a seat of consciousness capable of interrogating 
85 Said, Orientalism, p. 210. 
86 Said, Orientalism, p. 123. 
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its own existance within signifying space. Out of this split arises a subjective space 
which shares a complex relationship with the space of the world. The development 
of this relationship in all its complexity is historically tied to the question of the 
subject as posed by psychoanalysis. 
The historical crisis of J?Sychology coincides with the moment when it was no 
longer possible to mamtain a certain position: this position consisted of 
placing images in consciousness and movements in space. In consciousness, 
there would only be qualitative, unextended images. In space, there would 
only be extended, quantitative movements. But how would it be possible to 
pass from one order to the other? How could one explain that movements 
might suddenly produce an image, as in a perception, or that the image might 
produce a movement, as in voluntary action? ... It was necessary at all costs to 
ov.erc~,ne this duality of image and movement, of the consciousness and the 
thmg. 
This observation is made by Deleuze in the context of Bergson's and Husserl's 
respective attempts to link consciousness to the world. We can, however, re-state it 
in the present context. We have seen that the question of space is not separable 
from the question of consciousness, and more particularly from that of perception. 
Nor is it to be separated from the question of representation. As soon as it is posed, 
the question of space becomes a question of the production of space. We have seen 
that this question may be framed within the bounds of the spatiality of the sign; that 
is, the production of spatiality in signification. However, the space of signification 
opens onto other spaces, without which it is not possible. Speaking about space 
entails an examination of the ways in which it is possible to move from one spatial 
framework, one point of reference to another. This movement has nothing to do 
with the question of truth, and is thus not a question of philosophy, but of fiction.88 
What paths may be taken to move from one position to another? What 
transformations accompany the crossing of borders? What spaces can move through 
others, bearing with them points of reference which might act as seats of 
consciousness? How might such spaces be layered, so that configurations arise which 
acquire a certain stability? What happens when we try to re-stratify them - where do 
87 Gilles Deleuze, "Image-movement and its three varieties: second commentary about Bergson," in 
SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 81. 
88 "To concern oneself with the founding concepts of the entire history of philosophy, to deconstitute 
them, is not to undertake the work of the philologist or of the classical historian of philosophy. Despite 
appearances, it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of 
philosophy.• Jacques Derrida, "Structure, sign and play," cit. Bhabha, Signs taken as wonder&, p. 194. 
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we cut? These are the questions which fiction asks. To situate signification within 
the subjective and social orders is thus to develop a fiction of spaces. 
In the fiction favoured by Freud and Lacan to elaborate the ontogenesis of the 
subject, the drama of Oedipus, the subject is represented as that being who emerges 
from a specific traversal of space. This is first of all the space which Oedipus had 
placed between his own desire and the desire codified in the law. It is, however, -
and here the departure from Freud and Lacan begins, even though both point 
tentatively in this direction - the space of the stage upon which the Oedipal drama is 
produced, as a socially determinate space in which the subject must, by specular 
identification, perform all the motions of Oedipus' denial of his desire. 
Given the fact of Oedipus in the space of the stage, the question which we must 
ask concerns the relation of a fictionality of the subject to the material conditions 
which place Oedipus within this space as a representation of subjectivity within a 
representing space of being: When we constitute ourselves within the space of the 
socius by aligning our gaze with that transcendental body into which our own body is 
about to be incorporated, we constitute ourselves as a knowable object. The 
knowledge out of which subjectivity arises is itself a reduction " ... of desiring 
production to a system of representation called unconscious, ... reduction of the 
factories of the unconscious to a theater stage, Oedipus, Hamlet; reduction of social 
investments of the libido to familial investments, onto familial coordinates, Oedipus 
again."89 
The tragedy of Oedipus is the tragedy of the man who, in spite of all warnings, 
will not desist from asking the fated question: who am I? 90 In asking this question 
up to the point where its answer presents itself as the impossibility of his being, 
89 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "Sur capitalisme et schizophrenie," in L'Arc 49 (1972), p. 50, cit. 
Charles Stivale, "Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Schizoanalysis & literary discourse," in SubStance 
29 (1981), p. 47. 
90 " Let all come out, 
However vile! However base it be, 
I must unlock the secret of my birth. 
Born thus, I ask to be no other man 
Than that I am, and will know who I am." 
Sophocles, Kin~ Oedipus, in The Theban plays, trans. E. F. Watling, Penguin Classics (London: 
Penguin 1947), verses 1061-1085, p. 55. Italics in original. 
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Oedipus reduces all dimensions of being to familial relations. If we are to think the 
question of what we are in terms of famial relations, it can only be thought from the 
position of Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that there is, nevertheless, a path 
which might re-open the question beyond the bounds of Oedipus and Oedipal 
knowledge - to circumvent an apparent objectivity yielded in a particular mode of 
representation, and to interrogate the mechanics with which that representation has 
been inscribed. This is to interrogate the machine which produces Oedipus as a 
signifying space, and places him within the space of the stage. Or as Deleuze and 
Guattari state in a slightly different context, to abandon that form of enquiry 
whereby " ... one retains the apparent movement as it is described on the socius, 
without taking into account the real instance that inscribes it, and the forces -
economic and political - with which it is inscribed."91 
Freud himself seemed to be perfectly aware of the fact that, in placing Oedipus 
on the stage of psychoanalytic discourse, he was determining subjectivity as that 
which cannot be known. In his essay, "Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse" (1917), he 
states that ''jeder Neurotiker selbst ein Odipus war oder, was auf dasselbe ausgeht, in 
der Reaktion auf den Komplex ein Hamlet geworden ist."92 We could interpret this 
statement as meaning that the representation which hides the subject from 
subjective knowledge represents not the subject, but another representation. It is, 
presumably, this aspect of Freudian epistemology which authorizes Lacan's well-
known dictum that a signifier represents a subject for another signifier.93 Lacan 
shows that this predominance of the register of the signifier may serve to explain the 
split structure of subjectivity. In representing the subject in the domain of 
representation, the signifier draws a line between the subject who speaks and the 
subject spoken of. We have already seen how this effect of the signifier opens up a 
space of subjectivity which expands into a space socially determined. It will, 
however, be necessary to specify more precisely just what the subjective and social 
determination of space is, how it comes about, and what consequences it has for 
91 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking 1975), p. 188. 
92 Sigmund Freud, "Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse," in Gesammelte Werke, Bd XI, S 347. 
93 Lacan, ~ (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1966). p. 32. 
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spatial knowledge. In order to do so, let us briefly review the status of causality in 
the Oedipal structuration of the subject. 
In describing the role of the signifier, Lacan states that it acts as a cause of the 
structure of the subject.94 The space of the subject, which we have seen Lacan 
elaborating as a significant space and a space socially pervaded, is also discussed as 
a space presided over by a certain causality. Although this causality is by no means 
unproblematic, I shall not be concerned here with the logical or terminological 
problems of Lacan's concept of causality.95 It seems possible to argue that, at one 
stage or other not only causa fonnalis, but also causa materialis, causa efficiens and 
causa finalis are all incorporated into his conception of the causality of the signifier. 
Whatever the precise nature of causality instrumental in the structuration of the 
subject, the subject's alienation, which characterizes his spatiality as a social space, 
"resides in the division of the subject from its cause."96 What this amounts to is that 
the space of the subject, as a virtually social space, is a space presided over by the 
signifier because of a logical imperative issuing from the binary structure of the 
latter. This imperative is in keeping with the spatiality of the sign, as elaborated in 
the previous chapter, that is to say, it issues from a trace of the signifier's absence, 
which marks its disappearance within a signifying whole. The way in which this 
imperative can function as cause is indicated by Lacan with the term vel - that choice 
between meaning and being in which the subject is alienated. 
94 "Being produced in the place of the Other (the symbolic), the signifier causes the subject to arise 
there, but at the cost of becoming fixed... That the Other should be for the subject the site of its 
significant cause merely motivates the reason for which no subject can be said to be its own cause .. ." 
Lacan Ecrits (1966), p. 32. 
95 The strongest criticism of the Lacanian conception of causality is probably that formulated by 
Anthony Wilden, who implies that Lacan "conceals his model of causality in the term 'absence'" - a 
term which for Wilden is a "covert metaphor for teleonomy or goalseeking." He then goes on to 
evaluate Lacanian causality in terms of cybernetic theory: "For an ecosystemic perspective, the 'absent 
cause' is simply the diachronic GOAL or the synchronic REGUIATION of the relationship of the 
subsystem and whatever is defined as its environment. Both goal and regulation involve considerations 
of constraint, (transmitted) difference, possibility, optimum organization, ideals, and so on, but not the 
concept of causality as such. Moreover, as Lacan's definition of metonymy as desire already 
emphasizes, metonymy is not primarily an effect of structure, but an effec5. of system." (System and 
Structure, Essays in communication and exchange (London: Tavistock 1980 ), p. 336-7) The fact that 
Lacan's discussion of the social dimension of desire attempts (at least implicitly) to give due credit to 
the systemic dimension of the structuration of subjectivity would, in my opinion, reduce Wilden's 
critique to a quibble about terminology. 
96 Lacan, ~ (1966), p. 32. 
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If we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-
meaning. If we choose meamng, the meaning survives only deprived of that 
part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in the 
realization of the subject, the unconscious. In other words, it is of the nature 
of this meaning, as it emerges in the field of the Other, to be in a large part 
of its field, eclipsed b~ the disappearance of being, induced by the very 
function of the signifier. 7 
What Lacan is saying is that, in tying the field of being to the field of meaning, 
the signifier imposes a choice between the two - being QI meaning. But this is a 
choice which in either case necessarily excludes that dimension of being an.Q 
meaning which allows the two to be united in the first place. However, being and 
meaning, as the intersection of two sets, is not defined as a quantity present to both, 
but absent from both. This is because, where being has meaning, it no longer is, and 
where meaning has being, it no longer signifies.98 
The correlates in colonization are easily established. As Fanon shows, when the 
colonized subject, the negro, confronts his own being with the knowledge of the 
white man, reason and being negate one another. 
Reason was confident of victory on every level... That victory played cat and 
mouse; it made a fool of me. As the o;her put it, when I was present, it was 
not; when it was there, I was no longer. 9 
The space of alienation into which the subject must expand if it is to acquire 
subjectivity is the space of Oedipus' choice: being ( =the King of Thebes), or 
meaning (=a place within the familial structure). It is because of the double impasse 
inscribed in this choice that the human being's birth as a subject takes place in the 
shadow of death. Lacan makes it clear that this happens in a manner parallel to that 
described by Hegel in the Phenomenology, but with one decisive difference. 
Your freedom or your life! If he chooses freedom, h&loses both immediately -
if he chooses life, he has life deprived of freedom.1 
Because it is not born in an act of self-consciousness, however, subjectivity emerges 
in a choice which might be called 'fated', in the same way as the choice of Oedipus is 
'fated'. The subject's choice is 
97 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 211. 
98 "The vel of alienation is defined by a choice whose properties depend on this, that there is, in the 
joining, one element that, whatever the choice may be, has as its consequence a neither one, nor the 
other. The choice, then, is a matter of knowing whether one wishes to preserve one of the parts, the 
other disappearing in any case." Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 211. 
99 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 119-120. 
100 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 212. 
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freedom or death! There, because death comes into play, there occurs an 
effect with ~ rather different structure. This is because, in both cases, I will 
have both.1 1 
The operation (which is a logical as well as a cathectic operation) which unites the 
two fields persists in the structuration of the subject as a field in its own right - a 
field which has a logical and cathectic presence, but which, if it can be said to have 
existence and meaning at all, does so only as an absence. This is the field of desire, 
which is also that of metonymy. It coincides with the field of signification in the 
function of metaphor. This operation of conjunction produces meaning by eliding 
being, and produces being by eliding meaning. And it allows the two to appear to 
co-exist by the constant disappearance of the authority presiding over its ~fficacity, 
an authority which Lacan calls the Phallus. This authority also presides over the 
Oedipal choice.102 
The opening up of a space of subjectivity in the difference between being and 
meaning becomes the concrete manifestation of social space through the elision of 
that imaginary realm where the two meet. The splitting of the subject is at the same 
time the subject's origin as a social being.103 The unified social space as it appears in 
the field of the signifier is mapped onto subjective space through an operation 
whose operant is at all times absent in both subjective space and the space of the 
signifier, but which persists in the very force of conjunction which keeps the two 
fields aligned. In Lacanian theory, this force is powered by a lack which cuts through 
the space of the subject, the socius and the signifier. It is here that Lacan explicitly 
alignes himself in opposition to Hegel, and those attempts at a dialectic of colonial 
identity (most notably Albert Memmi) which set themselves the task of applying 
Hegel to a colonial situation would do well to take note of the basis of this 
opposition. Lacan states that" ... we must bring everything back to the function of the 
cut in discourse, the strongest being that which acts as a bar between the signifier 
101 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 213. 
102 See Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 212; also Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 251. 
103 "Here separare, separate, ends in se parare, to engender oneself ... Parare is firstly to procure. This is 
why the subject can procure what concerns him here, a status which we will qualify as civil (etat civil)." 
Lacan, ~ (1966), p. 32. 
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and the signified.11104 This bar is described by Lacan as "a barrier resisting 
signification, "105 since it separates the two orders whose identity signification 
implies. As such, the spatiality of the sign resides in the bar as explicated by Lacan. 
This spatiality grants subjectivity its space in the moment it splits the subject into 
being and meaning, since " ... the subject designates his being only by barring 
everything he signifies ... 11106 In the space of signified subjectivity, there emerges a 
repression of being, which is at the same time a repression of the desire for identity 
whose signifier is the phallus. For reasons I have already discussed, this space must 
stand in for the space of a socius. 
The key to the Oedipal question of being therefore lies in the fact that it must 
be posed in spatial terms. It is the same as Lacan's question: 
Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric 9r eccentric, 
in relation to the place that I occupy as subject of the signified?10 
Oedipus' desire is to know who he is in terms of familial ties, but the only way to 
pose that question is in spatial terms - as a matter of knowing where he is. This 
formulation becomes crucial in the scene where Oedipus' "true" identity emerges. 
And Teiresias had spoken it earlier in the play: 
The killer of Laius - that man is here; ... 108 
And when the chorus defines this space within the socius, it uses the following 
words: 
I only ask to live, with pure faith keeping 
In word and deed that Law which leaps the sky, 
Made of no mortal mould, undimmed, unsleeping 
Whose living godhead does not age or die.109 
The question of Oedipus' identity in turn becomes a question of transposing both 
spaces onto the space of the world "at a place where three roads meet."110 Finally, 
the space in which Oedipus moves is traced onto the space of the family. 
104 Lacan, 'The subversion of the subject and the dia1ectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious," in 
~p.299. 
105 Lacan, 'The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," in Ecrits, p. 149. 
106 Lacan, 'The signification of the phallus," in Ecrits, p. 288. 
107 Lacan, Agency of the letter, p. 165. 
108 Sophocles, King Oedipus, 449. Watling, p. 38. Italics in original. 
109 Sophocles, King Oedipus, 875-878. Watling, p. 49. 
110 Sophocles, King Oedipus, 716-780. Watling, p. 45-6. 
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Oedipus is driven back from the narrow defile by Laius' team of horses, 
insulted by Polyphontes. The fact that the murder of the father takes place at 
this cross, this interrupted, joined edge, this limit or fault, is a catastrophe. 
Thus the circumstance is the murder and the law is traced upon the ground. 
To cross the broken threshold of the word. The essential thing is indeed the 
bifurcation. As soon as the father is involved, once again we come back to 
the law, a bifurcation traced onto the family tree: father, mother, son, here 
again on the graph is inscribed the triviality of the narrative. To the left the 
one, to the right the other, and incest, as we have seen, is still another 
connection upon the disconnected. The text turns inside out like a glove and 
shows its function: the establishment of separations between spaces and their 
difficult junction.111 
The question of the position of the subject which is opened up in the Oedipal 
question of being ( or the self-interrogation of consciousness) is of necessity posed 
within the space of signification. This space is presided over by the absent phallus, 
the barred phallus, as the signifier of desire - the separation of subject and object, 
signifier and signified - as well as the operator of their conjunction. The lack which 
Lacan tells us motivates this dialectic determines the impossibility of positioning the 
subject at a given place.112 For if the subject's desire is the desire of the Other, then 
the question of subjective being as posed in the self-interrogation of consciousness 
always encounters in its own lack of being the lack which characterizes the Other, 
the barred phallus which signifies the desire of the Other. 
The dialectic of the objects of desire ... creates the link between the desire of 
the subject and the desire of the Other. .. 113 
This link establishes subjective space as indeterminate, yet intersecting the signifying 
chain at that point where meaning elides being- " ... at the point of lack perceived in 
the Other."114 And furthermore: 
If he is apprehended at his birth in the field of the Other, the characteristic of 
the subject of the unconscious is that of being, beneath the signifier t1fit 
develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place.1 
111 Michel Serres, Language and space, p. 46-7. 
112 "The signifying game between metonymy and metaphor, up to and including the active edge that 
splits my desire between a refusal of the signifier and a lack of being, and links my fate to the question 
of my destiny, this game, in all its inexorable subtlety, is played until the match is called, there where I 
am not, because I cannot situate myself there." Lacan, Agency of the letter, p. 166. 
113 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 214. 
114 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 214. 
115 Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 208. The fact that the mapping of social space onto 
subjective space in the causality of the signifier renders subjective space indeterminate does not mean 
that this causality is purely qualitative and not in any way quantitative. It would seem more accurate to 
say that in its concrete actualization through the mapping onto subjective space, the quantitatively 
determined space of the socius causes the space of the subject to appear in qualitative terms only. This 
will be one of the important aspects of spatiality to be discussed below in connection with Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept of colonization. 
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It is, however, important that we recognize this indeterminate place of lack not 
simply as a space which has been opened in the interval of two mutually exclusive 
positions. The function of the sign is to re-close this gap which has opened in its 
midst, to synthesize this mutual exclusion by rendering visible the sign's non-identity 
to itself. It is here that the sign's spatiality appears where the point which positions 
the signifier disappears. The point of lack in the Other, the desire of the Other, 
which serves as operant in signification, is the absence of the phallus - symbolic 
castration (-phi) - and serves hence to elevate the phallus to the status of that object 
which links the subject to its cause. 
This is the reason why spatiality cannot be dealt with adequately if we attempt 
to think of it as a function of the signifier or of the signified. Nor can we grasp it as a 
transcendental function residing in a gap between the two. The space of signification 
functions - works - in conjunction with the production of a spatiality which we come 
to regard as comprising individual spaces, spaces identical to themselves.116 This 
function is, however, complicated by the fact that we are not simply dealing with the 
subject ( as a body in space), the signifier ( as a virtual space) and the law presiding 
over concatenation, out of which signification arises. We are also dealing with the 
origin of spatial knowledge, in which spatiality is determined as the distance 
between the subject and object of desire. We have already seen that knowledge as 
knowledge of the world infuses objectivity with lack. The desire by which the subject 
measures his being can be said to be caused by the positioning of the object within a 
field of knowledge. The phallus, in linking the subject to its cause, also ties alienated 
subjectivity to its objects of desire. In the field of the signified (which is the field of 
knowledge) the world is constructed by a concatenation of objects infused with 
desire, and for that reason, the phallus appears once again as the law presiding over 
concatenation, over knowledge. Here Green speaks of the "resectioning of the 
signified," which, he states, takes place in "this metonymic series of the different 
116 "It is here that we encounter the function of cause developed by Jacques Lacan. If, according to 
Frege, identity to itself allows the passage from thing to object, may we not posit that what we have just 
shown can function as the relationship of object to cause? One may conclude that the object is the 
signifying relationship linking the two terms, the thing and the cause." Green, Logic of obiet (a), p. 176. 
Italics in original. 
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partial objects," and may be considered to be "represented by the phallus - precisely 
in that it appears, in the form (- phi), through its different partial objects."117 The 
word "appears" is not chosen randomly here. What is important is that the phallus as 
object is present to intuition in the traces of its own absence. It is the law presiding 
over representation because it is the principle of the signification of the 
disappearing point, as discussed in chapter 1. As such, it is, indeed, transcendental in 
the Kantian sense. 
If we accept La.can's basic hypothesis that the space of the subject is a space 
which has been split by the force of an essential lack and resectioned, and that this 
operation is presided over by the signifier and its transcendental principle, the 
phallus, then his conclusions are indisputable. It is this coupling of the signifier and 
the phallus which marks the co-presentation of subjective and social space as the 
space of Oedipus. It is a space in which "the phallus constitutes the standard of 
exchange, the cause of exchange."118 What, however, are the consequences if we 
begin to question the hypothesis that lack plays a constitutive role in the formation 
of subjectivity? What if this hypothesis is untenable because it can only lead to a 
tautology of desire, whereby desire can have being only by seeking what it cannot be 
nor have? When we interrogate the phylogenetic dimension of subjective space, we 
are forced to realize that causality must be situated elsewhere than in the domain of 
signification. 
2.2 The cause of cause: situating tlze Oed;pal cut and its re-section 
As long as we confine ourselves to the Oedipal question (what am I? = where is 
my place within the representation of familial order?), the hypothesis of the 
causality of the signifier seems perfectly acceptable. As soon as we attempt to survey 
the space of a socius into which the Oedipal subject is born, however, the matter 
becomes more difficult. We have seen that for Lacan the subject comes to occupy its 
117 Green, Lo~c of obiet (a), p. 176. 
118 Green, Lo~c of obiet (a), p. 176. 
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space under the shadow of the signifier. Furthermore, this space appears in the act 
of separation which characterizes (and facilitates) signification. As such, the 
appearance of subjectivity as a space of the socius follows under the auspices of the 
signifier and its transcendental law. As a model of subjectivity, however, the Oedipal 
myth finds its validity within historically (and geographically) definable limits. 
Oedipus can have no claim to universality. This leaves us with a choice. We can 
either accept Lacan's model of causality as possessing limited validity within specific 
social and historical constraints. Or else we can attempt to establish its universality 
by attempting to read the phallus, the Name-of-the-Father, the objet a, etc., as 
metaphors which could be extended at will to virtually any social system. I believe 
that the latter option would render most of Lacan's insights worthless, simply 
because they would be deprived of their specificity. I will thus be accepting the 
former alternative. It now remains to establish the limits of the model. In the course 
of this investigation, I will be following Deleuze and Guattari's attempts to establish 
a materialism of desire.119 
When the force of the signifier slashes through the subject's desire for identity, 
it leaves its mark in a form of inscription which Deleuze and Guattari call despotic: 
" .. .it is the despot who establishes the practice of writing."120 In doing so, the despot 
grants writing its ambiguous spatiality. Within the despotic machine, we see the 
inscription of a graphic mark whose trace testifies to the efficacy of a banished 
voice. The despotic machine characterizes a civilization which is "written, not 
because the voice has been lost, but because the graphic system has lost its 
independence and its particular dimensions, has aligned itself on the voice and has 
become subordinated to the voice... In short, graphism in one and the same 
movement begins to depend on the voice, and induces a mute voice from on high or 
from the beyond, a voice that begins to depend on graphism. It is by subordinating 
itself to the voice that writing supplants it."121 
119 Jacques Donzelot, "An antisociology" Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977), p. 36. 
120 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 202. 
Ul Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 202. Italics in original. 
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In this initial process, we find Deleuze and Guattari introducing the outline for 
a genesis of the sign which might serve as a phylogenetic model for the development 
of the spatiality of the sign as we have been discussing it. This particular approach is 
of interest to us, since it is my goal to establish a model for the discursive 
deployment of spatiality in colonization. Although Deleuze and Guattari are not 
explicit on this point, they imply that the process of colonization is situated at that 
point where Oedipus is "installed within the savage territorial machine."122 It should 
be clear from what has just been noted about the function of Oedipus in the 
structuration of subjectivity that such an installation would create subjectivity as a 
residue of its own discourse. This has both an ontogenetic (described in section 1.5 
of Anti-Oedipus: "The machines") as well as a phylogenetic structural dimension 
(described in section 3: "Savages, barbarians, civilized men"). It is the latter 
dimension which makes it possible to describe the structuration of space and spatial 
knowledge, and of the spatiality of the subject which takes place in the process of 
colonization. According to Jacques Donzelot, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and 
Guattari " ... sketch the evolution of mankind from its origins to the present day," an 
aspect of the book which " ... has been for the most part ignored, which is too bad 
since here, on the scale of the whole of the human sciences, there is an attempt at 
subversion ... "123 It is via this subversive moment that I hope here to depart from a 
mode of spatial knowledge which, no matter how "critically" employed, finds itself 
forced to frame any discussion of colonialism within the boundaries defined by the 
colonizing act. I hope here to show that a critique of the colony must also be a 
critique of colonial space, and ultimately a critique of spatial knowledge. For if 
knowledge is Oedipal knowledge, then any investigation of colonization which does 
not understand itself as a fiction of space, continually departing from spaces already 
de-scribed, will simply repeat the gestures of colonization.124 
It is by allowing the question of desire to preceed the question of Being that 
Deleuze and Guattari hope to find the path that will circumvent the double-bind of 
122 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 166. 
123 Donzelot, Antisociology, p. 27. 
124 See R A Brinkley and Robert Dyer, " ... returns home (Mythologies, Dialectics, Structures): 
Disruptions" Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977). 
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the Oedipal choice.125 In the following discussion, I will outline some of the 
consequences of this priority of desire. I aim ulimately to show that, in the ordering 
of unified spaces of colonization - be these spaces of subjectivity, signification, or 
geographical spaces - we are dealing not with a primary binary split and suture, but 
a unification of diverse and multiple functions. This unification presents itself in 
psychoanalysis as binary, simply because split and suture are techniques, a 
technocracy in which psychoanalysis participates. As such, it calls for an analytic 
response which focusses not on universals, but on concrete relations. As Foucault 
states in his preface to Anti-Oedipus, 
Informed by the seemingly abstract notions of multiplicities, flows, 
arrangements, and connections, the analysis of the relationship of desire to 
reality and to the capitalist "machine" yields answers to concrete questions. 
Questions that are less concerned with why this or that than with how to 
proceed. How does one introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into 
action? 
Deleuze and Guattari offer answers to concrete questions because for them 
"desire is not. .. interior to any subject, nor does it tend toward an object: it is strictly 
immanent to a plane which it does not pre-exist, to a plane which must be 
constructed, where particles will emit themselves, where fluxes will combine."126 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the model of subjectivity which may be 
described by the drama of Oedipus serves to describe not an intrinsic structure of 
the subject, but the image in which desire appears (as subjectivity) in capitalism - an 
image which should not be regarded as having any necessary connection to the flows 
of desire. It is possible to interpret such a claim as a radicalization of the role played 
by alienation and the gaze in the structuring of subjective space as Lacan explains it. 
In the end, however, Deleuze and Guattari will have abandoned Lacan's model 
thoroughly as a kind of tautology of the subject. This is because the Oedipus drama 
serves to structure desire as that which is outside of the statutory discourse, free-
flowing, chaotic, while at the same time naming it as that which effects its own 
banishment. Psychoanalysis allows the flows of desire to appear only as a function of 
125 " ... the double-bind is none other than the whole of Oedipus." Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, 
p. 80. Italics in original. 
126 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Flammarion 1977), p. 108, cit. and trans. Alice 
Jardine, "Woman in limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)," SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 48. 
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the creation of a social space of subjectivity. Desire aligns itself with signification 
and the content of desire is thereby determined in retrospect.127 What this amounts 
to is to shift the limit of the statutory discourse (that which divides the social being 
from the undifferentiated wiles of desire), making it a function of the discourse 
itself.128 
It is in this regard that we see the failings of an attempt to found a theory of 
colonialism exclusively on psychoanalysis. The impasse in which such an attempt 
must inevitably end is particularly visible in Fanon's indecision whether the synthesis 
which might end the dialectic of alienation in the colonial situation is to be sought in 
the specificity of the flesh - "Mankind... digging into its own flesh to find a 
meaning"129 - or the "universality inherent in the human condition."130 Fanon's 
misrecognition of the role of psychoanalytic knowledge in stipulating the object of 
desire culminates in a displacement of social factors onto a concept of female desire 
which cannot be distinguished in any way from the "racist" models of desire to which 
he opposes himself: 
If we go farther into the labyrinth, we discover that when a woman lives the 
fantasy of rape by a Negro, it is in some way the fulfilment of a private 
dream, of an inner wish. Accomplishing the phenomenon of turning a~ainst 
self, it is the woman who rapes herself. We can find clear proof of this m the 
fact that it is commonplace for women, during the sexual act, to cry to their 
partners: "Hurt me!"13 
In his study of the dialectic of colonizer and colonized, which appeared 5 years 
after Fanon's Black skin. white masks, Albert Memmi is much more cautious of the 
usefulness of the psychoanalytic approach, precisely because of the way it constitutes 
its object. 
Psychoanalysis or Marxism must not, under the pretext of having discovered 
the source or one of the main sources of human conduct, pre-empt all 
experience, all feeling, all suffering, all the bywar:s of human behaviour, and 
call them the profit motive or Oedipus complex.1 2 
127 • ... Oedipus is indeed the limit, but the displaced limit that now passes into the interior of the 
socius. Oedipus is the baited image with which desire allows itself to be caught (That's what you 
wanted!)" Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 166. 
128 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 165. 
129 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 9. 
130 Fanon, Black skin. white masks, p. 10. 
131 Fanon, Black skin. white masks, p. 179. 
132 Albert Memmi, The colonizer and the colonized (Boston: Beacon 1967), p. xiii. 
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Memmi is moving in the direction of Deleuze and Guattari's critique of both 
Marxism and Psychoanalysis. However, like Fanon, his attempt to bypass them leads 
him to a concept of universality which cannot do justice to the colonial situation, or 
to be more exact, must ultimately agree with the colonial project. Like Fanon, 
Memmi attempts a critique of colonization's universals from a position of specificity, 
and of colonization's specificity from the position of universality. This is the thrust of 
Jean-Paul Sartre's implicit criticism in his introduction to Memmi's work: 
The book is ... the fonnulation of an experience: caught between the racist 
usurpation of the colonizers and the building of a future nation by the 
colonized, where the author "suspects he will have no place," he attempts to 
live his particularity by transcending it in the direction of the universal... This 
lucid and sober work may be classed among the "passionate geometries." .. 133 
And again later: 
The whole difference between us arises perhaps because he sees a situation 
where I see a system.134 
In recognizing the problem as a universalizing formulation of the particular, Sartre 
suggests an alternative which moves yet closer to the preoccupations of Deleuze and 
Guattari: 
Perhaps it would have been better to show the colonizer and his victim both 
throttled by the colonial apparatus, that cumbersome machine, constructed at 
the close of the Second Empire and under the Third Republic, that now, 
after giving the coloniz~rs every satisfaction, turns against them and 
threatens to crush them.13 
The issue at stake in the representational system of the colonial machine is signs 
and how they function in the historically and geographically concrete spaces which 
define the colony and colonial subjectivity. For this reason it is worthwhile outlining 
the phylogenesis of representation as postulated by Deleuze and Guattari. The aim 
of this will be to emphasize that the inherent conflict residing in colonial 
representation and colonial space must be analysed in specific terms, not as a 
function of a universal structure. 
133 Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction Colonizer and colonized, by Albert Memmi, p. xxii. 
134 Sartre, Introduction to Colonizer and colonized, p. xxv. 
135 Sartre, Introduction to Colonizer and colonized, p. xxiii. Sartre in turn becomes unconvincing 
where he attempts to reinsert the dialectic of particular and universal into the system (as opposed to 
the situation), universalizing the machine and particularizing colonizer and colonized. The failings of 
this approach become visible when he asks us to feel sorry for colonizers and colonized alike, since 
both are caught in the same machine. 
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To begin with, Deleuze and Guattari postulate an intital visibility of meaning in 
the sign, present within a regime of territorial representation. This visibility gives 
way to that blindness out of which meaning is produced in systems of writing - a 
blindness toward the world, and out of which truth is born. Finally, a trace of vision 
re-opens in signification, whereby vision becomes the gaze of the subject by being 
aligned to the gaze of the despot. 
The visibility of Deleuze and Guattari's sign is, however, not to be confused 
with the visibility of symbolic meaning as elaborated by Hegel. In contrast to Hegel, 
Deleuze and Guattari do not attempt to postulate a visibility of meaning in which 
the selective intelligence of the subject is itself subjected to an exterior 
determination of meaning. First of all, where meaning is visible, the question of the 
subject cannot be posed. Secondly, if the structure of subjectivity in capitalism 
(Oedipal subjectivity) is to be made compatible with the Hegelian notion of a 
subjective freedom to determine meaning, the latter will have to be modified to take 
cognisance of the cut which opens up subjective space.136 Deleuze and Guattari 
avoid the complications which might arise from an attempt to enter into such a 
dialogue with Hegel by postulating the visibility of meaning as situated prior to the 
question of subjectivity as it is posed in psychoanalysis. For this reason, a visibility of 
meaning in the sign cannot function in relation to the Oedipal subject or to the 
capitalist social order. Instead, it functions where "society is not exchangist, [but 
instead,] the socius is inscriptive: not exchanging, but marking bodies, which are 
part of the earth."137 The visibility of meaning creates the individual as an individual 
by situating him/her within the socius and within representation. This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the nomadic regime of territorial representation. 
What is important here is that inscription ( as the installation of visible meaning) 
has nothing to do with the establishment of a universal system of exchange which 
136 "But we analysts have to deal with slaves who think they are masters, and who find in a language 
whose mission is universal the support of their servitude and the bonds of its ambiguity. So much so 
that, as one might humorously put it, our goal is to restore in them the sovereign freedom displayed by 
Humpty Dumpty when he reminds Alice that after all he is the master of the signifier, even if he isn't 
the master of the signified in which his being took on its form." Lacan, "The function and field of 
speech and language in psychoanalysis," in ecrits, p. 81. 
137 Deleure and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 185. 
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would determine subjectivity as a function of the signifier. In the territorial regime, 
subjects and things are given being by what is written on them, not by what they 
might be exchanged for. The question of being is not the question of subjectivity, 
since it is not reducible to the question of what could take the place of the person or 
thing if it were absent, or inversely, what would have to be absent for them to be 
present. The space of being-a-person is not thinkable as the spatiality of the sign, 
since here neither representation nor being incorporates the function of the 
signifying point. Instead, the spatiality of being-a-person is to be thought as a 
geography, a territoriality.138 
Deleuze and Guattari call the space of this inscription a territory for several 
reasons. It marks bodies in relation to the earth, thereby setting up barriers to the 
nomadic flows of desire. "The apparent objective movement of inscription" serves 
the purpose of suppressing the "real movement of nomadism."139 What is more, 
these barriers form segments, which serve as units of transformation from relations 
of filiation to relations of alliance.140 This is the territorial transformation. Deleuze 
and Guattari make it clear that their concept of territoriality does not imply "a 
principle of residence or of geographic distribution... Only the State will be 
territorial in this sense ... "141 Indeed, it is the earth itself, which, as a "full-body," must 
be repressed, if the socius is to emerge.142 What this means is that the production of 
persons within the socius requires the establishment of a barrier between each 
individual and his original engendure, in order that he might be defined within the 
social space of being-a-person. Because the earth is indivisible, the segmentation out 
of which alliance arises cannot be derived from nor repeated in a demarkation of 
segments on the earth.143 Instead, bodies must be marked. 
This entails a twofold spatiality - it establishes the person within the territory of 
the socius, and it renders meaning visible. Deleuze and Guattari describe this 
138 "A dance on the earth, a drawing on a wall, a mark on the body are graphic systems, a geo-graphy, 
a geography." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 188. 
139 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 148. 
140 See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 185. 
141 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 145. 
142 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 203. 
143 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 140. 
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system as connotative, " ... a way of jumping that cannot be contained within an order 
of meaning, still less within a signifier."144 A person is created through the jump of 
the eye from the word, which names a position in the filiative order, to the mark on 
the body, which designates the body as part of the socius. 
As soon as it is inserted into a system of writing, the visuality of the sign which 
governs territorial representation succumbs to what Deleuze and Guattari call "a 
kind of blindness."145 We have mentioned already that writing, by allowing the 
written mark to stand in for the voice, initiates signification. This it does through a 
scission which causes graphism to " ... [subordinate] itself to the voice in order to 
subordinate the voice and supplant it."146 Where the signifier is visible, it bears 
meaning only through the trace of authority vested in an absent and invisible 
voice.147 I have already discussed in detail the numerous consequences of this 
scission: for spatiality, subjectivity, knowledge. We have seen that for signification to 
work, the scission must be closed by an operation of suture effected by the operator 
which presides over scission. In the fiction of psychoanalysis, this operator is 
designated the phallus, and its operation structures subjectivity as Oedipal. But, 
acccording to Deleuze and Guattari, this is only the end of the story. If we are to 
appreciate the historical, social, or evolutionary nature of this structuration, we must 
ask how it comes about that the Oedipal structure of subjectivity is caused by the 
workings of the signifier. Deleuze and Guattari are quite content to concede the 
Lacanian realization that the Oedipal triangulation of subjectivity is, in the last 
instance, caused by the signifier, provided we recognize that the signifier itself 
stands within an open system of causation - a system which proceeds from the 
workings of the despotic machine. 
Oedipus would be nothing if the symbolic position of an object from on hi~h, 
in the despotic machine, did not first make possible the folding and flattemng 
144 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 204. 
145 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 205. 
146 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 205. 
147 " ... the voice no longer sings but dictates, decrees; the graphy no longer dances, it ceases to animate 
bodies, but is set into writing on tablets, stones, and books; the eye sets itself to reading. (Writing does 
not entail, but implies a kind of blindness, a loss of vision and of the ability to appraise; it is now the 
eye that suffers ... " Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 205. 
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operations that will constitute Oedipus in the modern social field: the 
triangulation's cause.148 
This object from on high, which characterizes the despotic machine is, in the final 
analysis, equivalent to the Lacanian function of the phallus. The banished voice is 
proof of the presence of a transcendental object outside of the signifying chain, 
presiding over it's power to signify that which is absent, and injecting into the chain 
a continual shifting from one signifier to the next - a linearity, a temporality which 
appears as an initial negation of the space opened up in the visuality of meaning.149 
But, in the initial analysis, this voice from on high is the voice of the despot, and 
the trace of presence which the signifier bears is that of the despot. The despot is 
able to function as the agent of suture, linking the two realms which have been 
separated in writing, because of the act of overcoding out of which meaning arises in 
this regime. Barbarian or imperial inscription overcodes territorial inscription by 
integrating the closed territorial segments of the latter as working components in 
the machinery of the former. This overcoding is a radical re-organization of the 
socius - it seizes upon the segmented territorial socius and assigns it a different 
mode of functioning, integrates it into a different system of power and imbues it 
with a different mode of representation. This is effected because it is of what 
Anthony Wilden would call a "higher logical type," within which all old meanings 
cannot help but to mean something else, something new.150 It is of this higher 
logical type that the state is born. 
When the state appears to supplant the territorial regime, the transcendental 
unity of the earth is replaced with the transcendental unity of the despot and the 
machinery of the state.151 This machine integrates the territorial segments as 
148 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 267-8. Italics in original. 
149 "The subordination of graphism to the voice induces a fictitious voice from on high which, 
inversely, no longer expresses itself except through the writing signs that it emits (revelation). This is 
perhaps the first assembling of formal operations that will lead to Oedipus ... : the flattening out of a set 
of biunivocal relations that leads to the breakaway and elevation of a detached object, and the 
lineariz.ation of the chain that derives from this object." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 205-6. 
150 Wilden, System and structure, p. 171. 
151 " ... in place of the territorial machine, there is the "megamachine" of the State, a functional pyramid 
that has the despot at its apex, an immobile motor, with the bureaucratic apparatus as its lateral surface 
and its transmission gear, and the villagers at its base, serving as its working parts." Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 194. 
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working parts with such ease, because it establishes a higher logical type of filiation 
and alliance, centered at all times on the transcendental identity of the despot.152 
The result which this new transcendental unity has on representation is that the 
graphic, vocal and visual dimensions all "converge toward the eminent unity of the 
despot."153 The graphic mark is the mark of the absent despot's voice; the gaze is 
the gaze of the absent despot's desire. In despotic representation, this convergence 
is maintained by the state machinery. It is thus not possible to speak of the reign of 
the signifier without speaking at the same time of the bureaucratic and state 
apparatus whereby this reign is installed on the levels of subjectivity, space and 
knowledge. The scene of the transcendental signifier will be able to act as the cause 
of the Oedipal triangulation (where it will become the Other, coalescing into the 
Name-of-the-Father and the detached, self-erecting phallus) because it is that empty 
position at the apex of the entire structure of despotic machinery, whose efficacity at 
all levels issues from the fact that its position at the apex is precisely demarkated by 
the very machinery it supports. It is a limit which is constantly being approached for 
authority, by the writing hand, and the gazing eye. And although this position can 
never be reached, as a limit it may be pinpointed exactly. It is true, subjectivity 
seems to structure itself naturally about this empty position, and we have seen how 
this takes place, but - and this is what Michel Foucault has repeatedly demonstrated 
- alongside the affective, cathectic and epistemological imperatives there exists a 
vast institutional and bureaucratic machinery for forcibly installing persons as 
subjects, for forcibly socializing them. 
Barbarian inscription and the despotic machine give persons subjectivity and a 
social existence independent of the territories they might previously have occupied -
previously in either a phylogenetic or ontogenetic sense. This it does by measuring 
their spatiality in relation to the signified empty position of the despot, and not the 
invisible unity of the earth.154 For this reason, the inital overcoding effected by the 
152 "The despot challenges the lateral alliances and the extended filiations of the old community. He 
imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity .. ." Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 192. 
153 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 205. 
154 "In the despotic formations, the Oedipal limit is occupied, symbolically occupied but not lived or 
inhabited, inasmuch as the imperial incest effects an overcoding that in turn surveys the entire social 
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despotic machinery is at the same time a de-territorialization. The basic territories 
in which persons emerged in territorial representation, the segments detached from 
filiation, are overcoded in such a way that their boundaries must become fluid, if 
persons are to have being. The scission out of which signification and subjectivity 
arise also cuts into the territory of being-a-person as it existed in the previous 
regime. As we have mentioned, this de-territorialization enables the state to 
establish geographic territories. This is because, in the act of scission with which the 
mark is attached to the voice, the subject is attached to the world as object. We have 
seen that it is in this attachment that knowledge arises. This world, the earth, is then 
infinitely divisible, but only in relation to the despot - only as the despot's object. 
Alongside the signifier as the bearer of the despot's desire in representation, the 
state establishes a monetary system as an abstract mediation between the despot's 
desire and his objects. The appearance of money in the despotic machine does not 
provide a means of liberating desire as a pre-requisite for a free market; it is a 
codification of the despot's desire.155 It enables the subject to codify his relation to 
the earth as a relation of the despot's desire to the despot's object. It assigns the 
subject a fixed position in the socius by projecting the space of his subjectivity onto a 
space of the earth. Furthermore, for reasons I have already set forth, this relation of 
spaces is codified as a relation of knowledge - the infinite diversity of objects issuing 
from the division of the earth all become objects of desire measurable by the 
despot's coins. 
On the level of the sign, the introduction of the subject into the socius through 
the assumption of the despot's desire has a further consequence. The territorial 
visuality of the sign upon which imperial representation imposes an initial blindness 
is reopened where subjectivity is inserted into the socius. This is done along lines 
field from above (the repressing representation): the formal operations of flattening, extrapolation, and 
so on, that later belong to Oedipus, are already sketched out, but within a symbolic space where the 
object on high is formed." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 266. 
155 "For without question, money docs not begin by serving the needs of commerce, or at least it has 
no autonomous mercantile model. The despotic machine holds the following in common with the 
primitive machine, it confirms the latter in this respect: the dread of decoded flows - flows of 
production, but also mercantile flows (flux 111archa11ds) of exchange and commerce which might escape 
the State monopoly, with its tight restrictions and plugging of flows." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, p. 197. 
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similar to those already described by Lacan, whereby the subject is positioned in 
space by the force that aligns his gaze with the gaze of the despot. Subjectivity is 
produced as a function of the socius through overcoding, because every desire is 
represented as the despot's desire. All organs of all persons through which desire 
might flow must become attached to what Deleuze and Guattari call the full body of 
the despot, with the result that the despotic regime is characterized by the 
immanence of incest.156 
Incest is simulated in the workings of signification by the operation which, in 
tying every subject's desire to the desire of the despot, inseminates the space of 
every body with the touch of the absent body of the despot in an act of signification 
out of which the subject is born. Here the spatiality of the sign is revealed as that 
space in which the subject appears as a social being, i.e. a space which cannot be 
detached from the spaces produced by the machinery of the socius. Therefore, the 
signifying machinery of spatiality, the spatiality of the sign, must be recognized as 
partaking of a more extensive machinery which produces space as the space of 
knowledge, subjectivity and representation. If we wish to develop models of this 
machinery, we will have to do more than interrogate only subjectity, knowledge or 
representation, or a combination thereof - we will have to examine the spaces 
themselves, the boundaries that are drawn, the resultant enclosures, the paths of 
interconnection, barriers and lines of flux, and we must examine them in terms of 
the strategies which preserve them and the forces of resistance they evoke. It is 
through this spatial configuration that bodies, things, words and marks must pass, 
situating themselves thus within a matrix of subjectivity, knowledge and meaning. 
This is how I would seek access to the criticism which Deleuze and Guattari offer in 
respect of Derrida's conception of a graphic machine. 
Jacques Derrida is correct in saying that every language presupposes a 
writmg system from which it originates, if by that he means the existence and 
the connection of some sort of graphism - writing in the largest sense of the 
term. He is also right in saying that, within writing in the narrow sense, hardly 
156 "Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by 
the despot, from the borders to the center: all the debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt 
of the new alliance, and all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation ... Incest has become 
possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appelations, in the union of the signifier with 
its signifieds." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 209. 
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any breaks can be established between pictographic, ideogrammic, and 
phonetic procedures: there is always and already an alignment on the voice, 
at the same time as a substitution for the voice (supplementarity) ... He is 
again correct in linking writing to incest in a mysterious fashion. But we see 
nothing in this link that would lead us to conclude in favour of the constancy 
of an .app~,tus of psychic repression, operating in the manner of a graphic 
machine ... 
When we attempt to situate the spatiality of the sign within the working of 
another machine, a spatializing machine, we begin to realize that the arrangements 
out of which signification arises are concrete arrangements, pertaining to real spaces 
- geographic regions, the space of things as objects, bodies as social subjects. Hence 
Deleuze and Guattari's hesitation when confronting any claim to constancy which 
may be placed upon these relations. I must, however, state categorically here that I 
am not using Deleuze and Guattari to repeat Foucault's critique of Derrida. The 
question of whether these concrete arrangements are textual or institutional, 
discursive arrangements or arrangements of power, cannot be posed as long as we 
realize that they are spatial arrangements. For spatial arrangements are both. There 
are paths which might take us from textual spaces to the spaces of subjectivity or of 
institutions, and back again, and it seems most fruitful to read the texts of the "post-
modernist" critical project as attempts to block certain existing paths between 
concrete spaces and to trace alternative ones.158 
It is, however, precisely this blocking of paths and unblocking of others which is 
resisted by the Oedipal form of knowledge, and the way in which this resistance is 
effected is through a displacement of the space of the socius onto the space of 
familial relations. The suture which the despot authorizes and out of which 
signification arises is a re-closing of the gap between his own voice and the marks 
which stand in for it. This suture marks subjective space as the space of the despot, 
and in doing so, it marks it as the space of the socius. Spaces of knowledge and 
geographic territories (enclosures) may then be inscribed as functions of this space. 
157 Deleure and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 203. 
158 This seems to be the direction taken by Edward Said in his essay on the Foucault/Derrida 
controversy: "For if the text is important to Derrida because its real situation is literally a textual 
element with no ground in actuality ... then for Foucault the text is important because it inhabits an 
element of power (pouvoir) with a decisive claim on actuality, even though that power is invisible or 
implied. Derrida's criticism moves us into the text, Foucault's in and out." Edward Said, The world, the 
text, and the critic (London: Faber and Faber 1984), p. 183. 
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This suture has the function which we examined in the previous section; that is, it is 
authorized by a transcendental signifier; it authorizes signification, and establishes 
the space of the subject and his knowledge as the space of the sign. 
In the capitalist form of representation, in the capitalist machine, the full body 
of the despot, which we saw was always potentially disappearing because of its limit 
position outside of signification, is seized upon by the relations of familialism. "It is 
only in the capitalist formation that the Oedipal limit finds itself not only occupied, 
but inhabited and lived, in the sense in which the social images produced by the 
decoded flows actually fall back on restricted familial images invested in desire."159 
The result of this operation is an internalization of the scission of signification. What 
this means is that the codification of the despot, which measured all meanings in 
relation to his desire, becomes the codification of Oedipus, in which desire becomes 
the desire of the Other, at which position the Name-of-the-Father resides with his 
transcendental object and his Law. But the law of the father is not " ... the 
configuration of the great castrator, but that of equality: equality in the sense of the 
commutibility of men in one place and of places for one man, of men and women, 
objects, spaces, organs.11160 Because the empty position of the despot, which is 
perfectly localizable as a position in the socius, becomes a no less empty, yet 
transcendental position, which must be fixed within a subject if he is to have 
existence as a social being, it assumes universal proportions. In its encroachment on 
the signifying chain, universal representation is born. And in representation lies 
capitalism's universality in every other respect.161 
159 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 266-7. 
160 Lyotard, Ener~men capitalism, p. 22. 
161 "[In Anti-Oedipus] the critical universality of capitalism is outlined as well, the hypothesis that with 
indifference, the effect of the principle of equivalence - of decoding - the empty space, the void in which 
the great categories of work and value can be constituted arises in labor or in the capitalist practice of 
capitalism, and the assumption is made that it will be possible to apply these categories retroactively to 
systems ('precapitalist' forms) in which the modalities had been covered over by codes, by markings 
and representations that did not permit a generalized political economics, that is, that maintained 
political and libidinal economics exterior to one another, the latter diverted into religion, customs, 
rituals of inscription (tattooing, scarification), cruelty, and terror." Lyotard, Ener~men capitalism, p. 
16. In outlining the retroactive universality of capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari are indicating a 
historiography similar to Foucault's genealogy, in which the pursuit of universal truth is abandoned for 
a micro-mechanics of power. 
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When the capitalist machine replaces the despotic machine, desire no longer 
aligns itself in the first instance with the desire of the despot, but with the desire of 
this universal position presiding over signification and familial relations, 
internalized within the triangulated Oedipal subject.162 This process of 
internalization requires a decoding of the social field, which the despot had 
overcoded by relating all positions of social being to his own body. The question of 
being no longer presents itself from a position within the social field, but from a 
position projected onto the space of the family, and ultimately, the space of the 
subject. Hence La.can's model of the genesis of the subject, in which the borders of 
subjective space are determined at the mirror stage by the positions of the child (as 
consciousness), the object ( as mother), and the ambiguous shift between scission 
and suture which defines the mirror image, and which prepares subjective desire for 
the desire of the Other. 
But La.can did not go far enough in his situation of the causality of subjective 
structuration. ''The family only expresses what it no longer dominates and this 
simulation of the social field allows the latter to catch desire in the trap of its 
primary cathexes and to draw the maximum benefits from the very process of 
making desire guilty."163 It is this changed function of the social field in capitalist 
representation which require Deleuze and Guattari to qualify the nature and 
operation of causality in subjectivity. In John Rajchman's words, "La.can separates 
the Oedipal function from the family cell itself, presenting it not as a relation 
between child and family, but between child and a larger "symbolic" order. Next he 
derives the authority of the father from this order, rather than the other way 
around ... While La.can's treatment of this theme is quite ingeneous, ... it certainly 
seems objectionable to claim that the cause of the father's authority is its symbolic 
support, or that the authority is this support."164 It is in this claim that we find" ... the 
162 "Hence desire, having completed its migration, will have to experience this extreme affliction of 
being turned against itself, bad conscience ... " Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 217. 
163 Donzelot, Antisociology, p. 43. 
164 John Rajchmao, "Analysis in power. A few Foucauldian theses" in Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977), p. 50. 
Italics in original. The case is put in stronger terms by Lotrioger, when he states that in Lacan's "'return 
to Freud'... Oedipus and castration were turned into incontrovertible scientific truths and the 
unconscious into an object of pure knowledge reserved strictly for techoo-academics." Sylvere Lotringer, 
"Libido unbound: the politics of 'schizophrenia'," in Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977), p. 5. 
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extreme importance - but also the indeterminate nature, the nondecidability - of the 
argument advanced by psychoanalysis' most profound innovator, which makes the 
displaced limit pass between the Symbolic and the Imaginary, between symbolic 
castration and imaginary Oedipus."165 
In capitalist representation, the family is " ... simply the form of human matter or 
material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic 
reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned it by the latter."166 This 
places the family outside of the social field in such a way that the social field may 
still be applied to it. This application is twofold. First of all, social persons emerge at 
the site of conjunction of two disjunct forces or decoded flows. These are the flows 
of labor capacity and capital, which have burst the boundaries of the overcoded 
spaces of subjective and objective knowledge in the despotic machine. The major 
thrust of this decoding is an abstraction of the flows of labor capacity and capital, 
which renders any meaning they might have purely virtual prior to their 
actualization in the subject; that is, prior to their concretization "in their becoming 
related or their conjunction."167 What this amounts to is that the social person, the 
subject of the enunciation, exists as an image. "They [ social persons] are nothing 
more nor less than configurations or images produced by the point-signs ... of 
capitalism."168 Secondly, private persons are constituted retrospectively as those 
persons outside the social field whose form approximates these images - as 
simulacra.169 
When the private person is born as that being to which meaning is given in 
signification, or to which objective knowledge is given in his relation to the world, 
this person is located at the site of transformation of abstract quantities into 
concrete qualities. This site is a conjunction of decoded flows, whose production is 
part of the de-territorializing work of capitalism. We saw that the de-territorializing 
165 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 268. 
166 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 263. 
167 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 263. 
168 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 264. 
169 "Private persons are therefore images of the second order, images of images - that is, simulacra 
that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first-order images of social persons." 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 264. 
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tendency initated in the despotic machine was to be conceived as a dissolution of the 
boundaries demarking the "segments" in which the person had being in the 
territorial machine. This was effected primarily by the twin agents of money and the 
signifier. Furthermore, in both cases, the body of the despot authorized a suture out 
of which meaning arose. In the capitalist machine, this tendency is carried to its 
completion, with the de-territorialization of labor power (the de-territorialized 
worker) and the decoding of money (capital). The prime effect of this decoding is 
that, in contradistinction to the despotic regime, desire is invested not in the despot, 
but in the de-territorialized flows themselves. "Since everything becomes 
interchangeable (law of value), nothing, or almost nothing, resists the flow of capital 
whose economy is one, at least potentially, with that of desire."170 In order that this 
may come about, there must be a gradual evolution of the despotic machine, so that 
the decoded flows might be conjoined "in a space that takes time."171 This gradual 
emergence of capitalism within the spaces it defines by its own conjuntions of 
decoded flows corresponds to the emergence of temporality as the universal truth of 
spatiality. This comes about by the production of spaces in which abstract quantities 
are continually transformed into concrete qualities. As such, all spaces are 
apparently reducible to the abstract quantities out of which they arose. What must 
be noted however, is that these spaces arise not in relation to one or other of the 
decoded flows, but out of the "differential relation" between the flows. The 
transformation which takes place in the differential relation of labor and capital is a 
"transformation of the surplus value of code into a surplus value of flux."1n 
Wherever spaces exist in which meaning is overcoded with the desire of the despot, 
the capitalist decoding and conjuntion serves to re-establish meaning as the change 
in capital which can be measured over a certain time period.173 The capitalist 
machine establishes capital itself as the full body of the socius by allowing it to 
170 Lotringer, Libido unbound. p. 8. Italics in original. 
171 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 224. 
1 n Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 228. 
173 "In no way is capitalism the reign of freedom, for it too is the mapping back of the flows of 
production onto the socius; and Kapital is this mapping-back-onto; but it must happen only in the fonn 
of profit, and not at all in that of some gain in sacred power (numen ), in what Deleuze and Guattari call 
code surplus value .. ." Lyotard, EneriJ!men capitalism, p. 14. Italics in original. 
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funcion as filiative. "Capital becomes filiative when money begets money, or value a 
surplus value."174 Money determines the quality of decoded flows as dependent on a 
concrete relation . This it does by the conjunction of flows. 
And thus nothing is left but an enormous moving around, objects appear and 
disappear, fins of dolphins, on the surface of the sea, and objectness gives 
way to sheer obsolescence, what is important is no longer the object, a 
concretion inherited from the codes, but metamorphosis, q~Jdity. Not a 
dolphin, but a trail, an energetic trace inscribed on the surface. 
The well-defined space in which this transformation takes place is the space of 
the family. The family is activated in the capitalist machine as the stage on which the 
drama of social being can be played out. Its illusory quality is achieved by its 
apparent detachment from the social field. This amounts to a binary opposition, an 
exclusive disjunction between the family and the" ... forces and means of production 
as abstract quantities. Whence a placing out of play of the family, a segregation 
making it the locale for an abstract equality. The family becomes, then, a deceptive 
microcosm of what it is separated from, a surface of application of the social field 
which, while fitting itself over the familial determinations, performs a transmutation 
of social persons into private persons and vice versa. As the smallest possible 
theater, the smallest colony of capitalism, the family causes the entire social field to 
pass into the images of private life."176 
Fanon recognized the importance of this "smallest colony" in the structure of 
colonial relations. He also realized that the discourse of psychoanalysis, in fixing 
upon the family, was practising a Eurocentricity which is not to be dissociated from 
colonization itself. 
In Europe the family represents in effect a certain fashion in which the world 
presents itself to the child. There are close connections between the structure 
of the family and the structure of the nation. Militarization and the 
centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of 
the authority of the father. In Europe and in every country characterized as 
civilized or civilizing, the family is a miniature of the nation ... Ther5-,is no 
disproportion between the life of the family and the life of the nation.1 
174 Deleure and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 227. 
175 Lyotard, Ener~men capitalism, p. 15. 
176 Donrelot, Antisociology, p. 43. 
1n Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 141-2. 
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He also saw that the Hegelian dialectic comes up against enormous obstacles when 
it attempts to explain the relations of individual and socius in capitalism.178 On 
many occasions, Fanon comes remarkably close to a model of the harnessing of 
"liberated" desire in the representational system of colonization. Perhaps the 
weakness of Fanon's analysis is most succinctly stated if we say that he did not 
develop this insight to its logical conclusion. 
The consequences of the function of capital described by Deleuze and Guattari, 
which I have repeated in a cursory fashion here, are to provide an apparent 
liberation of desire, while actually directing it in two directions: in the direction of 
the decoded flows of labor and capital, in which it has virtuality only; and in the 
direction of the site of transformation of abstract quantity in these flows into 
concrete quality, i.e. the image of the social person. What this means is that desire is 
"liberated" into an investment in the social field, an investment which re-presents 
itself only as an investment in the private person, the banished image of the social 
person.179 This is why Deleuze and Guattari refer to Oedipus as the displaced 
represented of desire.180 We should note that this final emergence of the truth of 
desire is a determination in retrospect. It cannot be otherwise. Again, this is why the 
capitalist machine - the machine which produces universal truth and universal 
history - produces spaces which negate themselves in time, and traces of spatiality 
which cling to this negation. In capitalism, the spatiality of the sign, which we saw 
being constructed within the despotic machine, frees itself from the machine out of 
which it arises, and appears to lead an independent existence, self-determinant and 
universal. It appears to produce spaces by the power of its own universality. 
But what is this spatiality which signification appears to clear for itself? It is the 
re-territorializing function of the conjunction out of which subjectivity arises. In 
closing the gap between the disjunct decoded flows of labor and capital, the 
conjunction inserts the spatiality of the sign into the space of subjectivity. This it 
does in exactly the same way as the suture of signification, which closed the gap 
178 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 220. 
179 Deleure and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus, p. 274-5. 
180 Deleure and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus. p. 166. 
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between being and meaning. But it is important to realize that we are not dealing 
with the signifier as an operator, and an operation out of which desire is born; we 
are dealing with desire as an operator, and an operation out of which the subject .Qf 
the enunciation is born. In the Lacanian model the subject was the site of a negated 
spatiality preseived in a graphic trace (the unconscious). In the model of Deleuze 
and Guattari the subject of capitalism arises at a nodal point, a point of intersection 
of two domains of negated spatiality within the socius, and this intersection produces 
the trace of that negated spatiality by way of a re-territorialization which we may 
refer to as the space of the subject. The space of the subject opens onto the space of 
the world, and is characterized by "transient cathexes causing all territories confined 
and marked by codes to disappear in their wake - not only on the side of objects ... 
but as well on the side of 'subjects', whether individual or social, which can only 
appear in this transit, as indifferent concretions themselves exchangeable and 
anonymous, whose illusion of existence can only be maintained at the price of 
special expenditures of energy."181 Capitalism cannot function without continually 
displacing the limit it negates in the decoding of flows onto this other internal limit 
drawn through the center of the subject. The apparent removal of barriers to desire 
in the liberation of labor and capital is countered by the ever more concrete 
specification of internal barriers within the socius, barriers which define territories 
of private existence, territories to which desire can seemingly be confined. 
Civilized modern societies are defined by processes of decoding and 
deterritorialization. But what they deterritorialize with one hand, they 
reterritorialize with the other. 182 
This reterritorialization which encircles the space of the subject as Oedipus is 
also mapped upon the socius, and serves to define relatively closed groups - so-
called interest groups. What is characteristic of these reterritorializations is that they 
bear the full ambiguity of the transformation of amorphous multiplicities into 
socially conditioned molar unities.183 
181 Lyotard, Ener~men capitalism, p. 16. Italics in original. 
182 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 257. Italics in original. 
183 "These neoterritorialities are often artificia~ residual, archaic; but they are archaisms having a 
perfectly current function, our modern way of "imbricating," of sectioning off, of reintroducting code 
fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo codes or jargons ... These modern archaisms are 
extremely complex and varied. Some are mainly folkloric, but they nonetheless represent social and 
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For the present, I shall not pursue the model of capitalism suggested by Deleuze 
and Guattari any further than this. It will suffice here to note that colonial space is 
not a universal space, but that it must be situated in the phylogenesis of 
representation, somewhere between the despotic and the capitalist regimes. It will 
have to be grasped as a historically specific organization of multiplicities into a unity 
within which subjectivity has meaning. 
2.3 Spatial multiplicity and paranoiac knowledge 
We saw in connection with La.can's theory of subjectivity that human knowledge 
is paranoic, in so far as it issues from a formal stagnation of the subject and object 
positions in the specular dialectic. We saw furthermore that this stagnation is 
effected by the transcendental operator which presides over signification. In the 
Lacanian model, this operator authorizes subjectivity as a space of representation, 
and it does this by linking the subject's desire to a transcendental Law. We have also 
seen that the transcendental signifier functions as an operator when it unites the 
schism which has opened up in the scission between consciousness and perception, 
or that between being and meaning. The result is the space of the speaking subject. 
Since the causality of the signifier arises in the social formation which Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as the despotic machine, it should come as no surprise that 
they also characterize this machine as "a great paranoiac machine," and the despot 
as "the paranoiac: there is no reason to forego such a statement, once one has freed 
oneself from the characteristic familialism of the concept of paranoia m 
psychoanalysis and psychiatry, and provided one sees in paranoia a type of 
investment of a social formation."184 We have seen why it is necessary to project the 
potentially political forces (from domino players to home brewers via the Veterans of Foreign Wars). 
Others are enclaves whose archaism is just as capable of nourisching a modem fascism as of freeing a 
revolutionary charge (the ethnic minorities, the Basque problem, the Irish Catholics, the Indian 
reservations). Some of these archaisms take form spontaneously, in the very current of the movement 
of deterritorializ.ation (neighborhood territorialities, territorialities of the large aggregates, "gangs") ... 
The famous personaliz.ation of power is like a territoriality that accompanies the deterritorializ.ation of 
the machine, as its other side." Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 257-8. 
184 Dele117.C and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 193. 
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Lacanian structure of subjectivity beyond the bounds of familial relations into the 
social field, in which desire is constantly coalescing into and escaping from its own 
inscription in spaces of subjectivity. 
In the despotic machine, the domain out of which the causality of the signifier 
issues forth, the space of knowledge is defined by the position of the subject as the 
being of the despot's desire on the one hand and the object as the meaning of the 
despot's desire on the other. The paranoiac knowledge of the despot is immanent in 
the social field. When this orientation is reduced to the Oedipal triangle, the 
signifier itself, elevated to a transcendental position, stands in for the despot, 
transfers his authority to the empty value of (-phi) and becomes a position of 
universal truth. The structure of knowledge, however, remains the same: a subject 
tied to his object across the space of a signifying scission - a space which has been 
unified again in the production of knowledge. And, in capitalism, a social space 
given by the conjunction of two temporally determined fields. The structure of 
Oedipal knowledge, however, presents us with a serious problem in the critique of 
colonial space. We approach the space of the colony as a finished product, a unity 
whose appearance of monumental homogeneity thinly glosses a multiplicity which 
seemingly has nothing to do with the colonial space. Our problem is how to chart 
the interconnections of this multiplicity from a position of paranoiac knowledge. 
However, we must realize that the cut which characterizes Oedipal knowledge does 
not simply slash through the center of the sign, the subject, the world, making one 
half accessible to knowledge while banishing the other as its forever absent goal. It 
provides at the same time an axis along which a multiplicity of spaces are 
interconnected. And furthermore, this axis may serve as a pathway along which it is 
possible to move in the act of description. That is, it is possible to speak or write 
about the space of the subject as if it were naturally coextensive with the space of 
the world.185 And, irrespecitve of the myth of banishment which surrounds 
185 In this respect, Charles Stivale shows that the literary analyses in Milles Plateaux (Milles Plateaux: 
Capitalisme et Schizophrenie, II, Paris: Minuit 1980) are not confined to the purely literary," ... because 
for Deleure and Guattari, 'lines of writing conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines of good and bad 
luck, lines which bring about the variation of the line of writing itself, lines which are between the lines 
written ... We want to show that the nouvelle is defined as a function of living lines, lines of flesh' (p. 
238). These are lines by which we and our map are crisscr~ and traced, lines which language must 
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psychoanalysis, it is possible to move between back and forth the space of self-
reflexive consciousness and that of a consciousness without an object. There exist a 
number of pre-determined paths for doing this. What we must realize is that the 
multiplicity of spaces gives rise to a ~ by the manner in which they are 
connected. In Milles Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a "stratification" 
which accompanies articulation, "like the world's creation from chaos."186 If we wish 
to dismantle the space of the colony by examining it as a multiplicity of spaces, the 
question then becomes, how to move from one space to another without re-tracing 
these cuts, these pathways, along which thought must move in the construction of 
Oedipal knowledge. How to occupy positions relative to a multiplicity of spaces 
without these positions being those already defined by Oedipal knowledge. Is such a 
project feasible? 
I believe it is, provided we remain by the machinic model of spatiality which 
Deleuze and Guattari attempt to develop. This means that we are not concerned 
with developing another, alternative knowledge of the colony, which is in some way 
better than that which it replaces, or which might reveal its predecessor as false. 
What we are concerned with is the mechanics whereby a multiplicity of spaces have 
been linked, amalgamated, and held together to form a relatively stable spatial 
configuration, a configuration which possesses certain qualities and in which 
knowledge is determined as not having access to the chaotic appearance which 
mulitplicity acquires. 
Paranoiac knowledge opposes any tendency to develop a mechanics of 
mulitiplicities. It collects diversity into a single structure, a single device. This 
problem is at the heart of any theory of signification, and it is also a problem with 
which La.can is constantly at issue in his theory of subjectivity. And yet, the 
follow, lines on the hardest of which a signifier emerges and into the lowest of which the subject is 
born ... ' ... lines which can be those of a life as well as those of a work of literature or art, of a society, 
depending on the particular system of coordinates retained." (pp. 248-249)" Charles J Stivale, "The 
literary element in Milles Plateua.x: the new cartography of Deleure and Guattari," in Substance 44/45 
(1984), p. 29. 
186 "Three great strata are summarily and traditionally distinguished: physical-chemical, organic, 
anthropomorphic ( or 'alloplastic')" Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "Concrete rules and abstract 
machines. Plateau 15, Conclusion, from Milles Plateaux," in SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 7-8. 
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collection of multiplicity into unity is not situated primarily m textuality or 
signification, but in what Deleuze calls an arrangement. 
The minimal real Unity is not the word, the idea, or the concept, nor the 
signifer, but the (llTangement, the configuration. It is always an arrangement 
which produces utterances ... The utterance is a product of an arrangement, 
always collective, which puts into play, in us and oritjide of us, populations, 
multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events. 8 
In Anti-Oedipus the arrangement presents itself initially in the overcoding work 
of the despot, and then in the complementary motions of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization which characterize the capitalist machine. Anti-Oedipus focusses 
its attack on psychoanalysis, because, in the opinion of the authors, it is here that 
paranoiac knowledge is seen most clearly to be partaking of the social mechanisms 
of power, while pretending a detached humanistic knowledge.188 The service which 
psychoanalytic knowledge yields to these power mechanisms is its isolation of an 
object which becomes pathological in every form of its self-reflection. This object is 
the human consciousness with its unconscious structured like a language. 
"Consequently the individual explored by the human sciences is correlative to a 
specific form of subjugation. The sickness of man is nothing but his individuality, an 
untenable construction that requires a continual libidinal investment onto 
repression. To be oneself or nothing, to possess or to die ... "189 Deleuze and Guattari 
certainly do not deny repression, but instead of following Freud in locating primary 
and secondary repression in the realm of the signifying chain, they establish a 
complex model of syntheses of the unconscious which serves to provide a theory of 
the relationship between desire and social repression.190 This relationship serves to 
link the two regions which are later generalized into the distinction between the 
molar and the molecular. 
187 Deleuze, Dialwes, p. 65, cit. and trans. Jardine, Woman in limbo, p. 49. Italics in original. 
188 "Psychoanalytic interpretation, for as much as it seeks causes and goals, explanations and meanings 
under the protection of an unconscious conceived on the model of a language, remains a tributary to 
the logic of power." Lotringer, Libido unbound, p. 10. 
189 Lotringer, Libido unbound, p. 7. 
190 See Rajchman, Analysis in power, p. 52-3. I agree with Rajchman when he states that the 
importance of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of repression "resides less in the details of the 'three 
syntheses' of desire than in the possibility it opens to discern a form of its social repression." (p. 54) For 
this reason, I will not embark on a discussion of the complexities of the three syntheses. For a brief, but 
useful elucidation see Charles J Stivale, "Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Schiz.oanalysis and literary 
discourse," in SubStance 29 (1981), pp. 46-57. 
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At times we contrasted the molar and the molecular as the paranoiac, 
signifying, and structured lines of integration, and the schizophrenic, 
machinic, and dispersed lines of escape; or again as the staking out of the 
perverse reterritorializations, and as the movement of the schizophrenic 
deterritorializations. At other times, on the contrary, we contrasted them as 
the two major types of equally social investments: the one sedentary and 
biunivocalizmg, and of a reactionary or fascist ~1ndency; the other nomadic and polyvocal, and of a revolutionary tendency.1 
This distinction, however, is not to be understood as a rigid duality. Although 
Deleuze and Guattari do not specifically refer to them as such, the molar and the 
molecular are probably better understood as organizational levels, the molecular 
formations being continually and exclusively invested in molar formations.192 
The fact that the two levels of organization are inseparably united in one 
process of production, i.e. social production, means that any attempt to separate the 
two levels, either analytically, politically, therapeutically, or by other means, must be 
grasped as an attempt to undermine the molar constitution of social production. 
The conjunction out of which Oedipal subjectivity arises creates a molar unity 
from a multiplicity of investments of desiring machines in the social field. The 
Oedipal subject and its microcosm, the family, thereby attain a unity which can stave 
off its actual multiplicity only on the level of representation. As Lotringer notes, the 
family is not " ... the microcosm for society, for it has no more unity save at the level 
of ideological representation." The creation of representational unities which serve 
as apparent microcosms are nothing more than " ... a basic logico-political 
manipulation by which capitalism strains to choke off its own overfiowing."193 The 
fact that these unities exist as relative multiplicities compared to the molar unity 
which had preceded it in the despotic machine serves only to give the appearance of 
a liberation of desire. What we are in fact faced with is a reterritorialization of 
191 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 340. 
192 "There are no desiring-machines that exist outside the social machines that they form on a laFge 
scale; and no social machines without the desiring machines that inhabit them on a small scale ... The 
desiring micromultiplicities are no less collective than the large social aggregates; they are strictly 
inseparable and constitute one and the same process of production. From this point of view, the duality 
of the poles passes less between the molar and the molecular than to the interior of the molar social 
investments .. ." Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 340. My emphasis. If we attempt to grasp the 
distinction as other than levels of organization, we could reduce the entire project of Anti-Oedipus 
to a redrawing of the signifying scission of Lacanian subjectivity within a widened social context. In 
doing so we would overlook what might be called its anarchist intention: the liberation of the 
constituent Omvs from their organizational capture. 
193 Lotringer, Libido unbound, p. 7. Italics in original. 
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multiplicity into the molar Oedipal formation. This happens in the same motion in 
which there is a deterritorialization of the despotic machine. Because of this, we 
must be cautious not to situate the molecular organization of the capitalist machine 
on the level of the individual person, for it is precisely here that the molecular 
formations of desiring-machines are organized into the molar formations of social 
being.194 This transformation is, however, not limited to the creation of the person 
as a totality. It should rather be understood as occuring wherever molecular 
multiplicities converge into the unity of an organism. "This unity can be the 
biological unity of a species or the structural unity of a socius: an organism, social or 
living, is composed as a whole, as a global or complete object. tt195 It can also be the 
geographical unity of a colony. This brings us to the point where we can state 
explicitly that the production of colonial space is an organization and unification of 
a chaotic multiplicity. By postulating desiring production as the basis of such 
multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari allow us to develop the idea of a spatializing 
machine which operates in an entirely different manner from the spatiality of the 
sign. Instead of continually synthesizing spaces of lack into signifying unities, 
themselves engraved with traces of this lack, the spatializing machine continually 
produces spaces (territorialities) - or more exactly, it continually produces a space; 
and it produces it out of a multiplicity of abstract quantities, the movements of 
desire across the social field. 
The desiring machines are " chronogeneous machines... bringing into play 
processes of temporalization ... ,"196 and where they appear in space they do so as 
motion. In the capitalist machine they have assumed the appearance of pure motion 
towards a lack - towards a space whose spatiality may be described only in terms of 
that which does not fill it - the void. This apparent dependence on the void as a 
motivating force characterizes representation, for "... every time that production, 
rather than being apprehended in its originality, in its reality, becomes reduced 
(rabattue) in this manner to a representational space, it can no longer have value 
194 "Doubtless it would be a mistake to contrast these two dimensions [molar and molecular] in terms 
of the collective and the individual." Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 280. 
195 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 342. 
196 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 286. 
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except by its own absence, and it appears as a lack within this space."197 It is the 
theory of the void, of lack as an originary motivation which Deleuze and Guattari 
find so unacceptible. The reason for this is simple: a theory which aligns itself with 
lack as a motivating force, no matter how revolutionary its intention, is functioning 
in the same way as the capitalist machine, by situating an absence at the heart of the 
socius, an absence which cannot be filled, since our desire begins and ends there 
where absence is. This is why Deleuze and Guattari go to great lengths to develop 
concepts which at first glance may seem hopelessly obscure or contrived. The point 
which they are trying to press home is that organisms in the widest sense of the word 
are not ruled by any of the driving forces which have been postulated as originary 
causes by psychoanalysis or Marxism. Theory, as grasped by Deleuze and Guattari, 
is intended first and foremost as a means of changing society; and ''we cannot 
change society without simultaneously unhinging the individual and all the power 
mechanisms that maintain his position (logic, dialectics, meaning)."198 From the 
point of view of machinic assemblages, causes are quasi-causes - " .. .ideas that affect 
bodies by suggesting actions; arousing passions; by obscuring, clearing, or 
intensifying conceptions; or transforming emotion (affect) to perception."199 What 
this amounts to is to state that cause itself must always be "caused" or constructed 
ideationally and in retrospect, as a kind of ideology of origins into which theory is 
continually being functionalized. As a result, theory adopts a rhetoric of truth which 
is supported by its functionality, and an ideology of functionalism justified by its 
truth value. It is only from this realization that we can appreciate the complex 
interrelations of the molar and the molecular. 
This is, first of all, a distinction " ... between two states of the machine ... The real 
difference is therefore between on the one hand the molar machines - whether 
social, technical, or organic - and on the other the desiring machines, which are of a 
molecular order."200 Now these two states of the machine could conceivably relate 
to one another in a number of ways. There could be a periodic shift from one to the 
197 Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 306. Italics in original. 
198 Lotringer, Libido unbound. p. 9. 
199 Peter Canning, "Fluideotity," in Substance 44/45 (1984), p. 39. 
200 Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. p. 286. 
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other on the temporal scale; or there could be a spatial shift between two distinct 
fields of molar or molecular predominance within the machine; or there could be an 
analytical shift, whereby in certain senses the machine is molar, while in others it is 
molecular; or finally there could be a functional shift from one functional emphasis 
to another. It would seem most probable that Deleuze and Guattari understand the 
interrelation between the molecular and molar in terms of the latter two 
alternatives. First of all, the difference is analytical: "Desiring machines in one 
sense, but organic, technical, or social machines in the other: these are the same 
machines under determinate conditions."201 What is more important is that the 
functional difference between the two states gives rise to the notion of an interface 
between a molar and molecular organization of machines, where the machine which 
partakes of the two organizations is " ... the same machine, but not at all the same 
regime, the same relationships of magnitude, or the same uses of syntheses."202 This 
interface marks the limit of the socius, dividing desiring-production from social-
production. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to show that this limit exists at any one 
time analytically. However, they also show that for the space of the socius this limit 
has been drawn in the temporal dimension, it has been constructed. If the space of 
the socius can exist as a space, it is because of the limit, which is constantly 
transforming the multiplicities of the "chronogeneous" desiring machines into molar 
aggregates. In these aggregates, the machines have " ... an existence as visible as a 
plate of steel."203 But for the analyst of history or of the social space there is another 
dimension to its visibility. The space of the socius and its visibility is quite different 
from the visibility of the sign and its dialectic of disappearance and reappearance in 
signification. The space of the socius does not mask an absent realm of desiring 
production - the two are coextensive. Thus it is the analyst's task "to discover at the 
heart of the social molar machines the presence of desiring-machines and the 
variations of affinity between the two. Hence a primary mechanic's task aimed at 
studying the incompatibilities in functioning, the immobilizations, by confronting 
201 Deleuz.e and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 287. 
202 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 288. 
203 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 287. My emphasis. 
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desiring-machines and molar machines."204 The analyst's task lies not in speaking 
the truth, speaking of Being205 - but in writin~, as Deleuze and Guattari define the 
term: 
We speak of nothin~ but multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentations, lines 
of flight and intensities, machinic arrangements and their different types, 
bodies without organs (BwO) and their construction, their selection, the 
plane of consistency, and the units of measure in each case. Measures of 
stratification and measures of deletio-n, the BwO units of density, and the BwO 
units of convergence not only provide a quantification of literature, but define 
the latter as always b~inf the measure of something else. Writin~ has nothing 
to do with signifyin~ut with land-surveying and map-making, even of 
countries yet to come. 
This has a number of important consequences for the present project. Firstly, 
the concept of writing cuts across the disciplinary boundaries separating philosophy 
from literature, fiction from non-fiction. When we begin to examine the texts of 
colonialism it will be seen immediately why it is essential to found an analytic of 
colonial texts on a non-disciplinary theory.207 Secondly, such an analytics may be 
understood as what Deleuze and Guattari call "map-making." In keeping with this 
idea, my intention is to reveal the spatial modifications which produce the space of 
the colony, without having to repeat those same representational gestures which had 
originally effaced their own violence, veiling it with the apparent truth of its 
consequences.208 Finally, it is hoped that this might serve as a kind of strategic 
intervention, an intervention which need not apologize for its remove from praxis, 
but which is a real intervention.209 
204 Donz.elot, Antisociology. p. 39. 
205 "The tree imposes the verb 'to be', but the rhizome is woven together with conjunctions: 'and ... 
and ... and .. .' In this conjunction there is enough force to shake up and uproot the verb 'to be'." Deleuze 
and Guattari, Rhizome, (New York: Semiotext( e) 1983), pp. 57-58. 
206 Deleuze and Guattari, Rhizome, pp. 4-5. Italics in original. 
'1iJ7 Thus Edward Said speaks of • ... the great contribution of imaginary and travel literature, which 
strengthened the divisions established by Orientalists between the various geographical, temporal, and 
racial departments of the Orient. .. [F]or the Islamic Orient this literature is especially rich and makes a 
significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse." Edward Said, Orientalism, p. 99. I will be 
arguing at a later stage that one of the ways literature partakes of this discourse is to establish a 
mythological mobility across these divisions. 
208 "If the map is opposed to the trace, it's because its whole orientation is toward establishing contact 
with the real experimentally ... The map is open, connectable in all its dimensions, and capable of being 
dismantled; it is reversible, and susceptible to constant modification... Contrary to a tracing, which 
always returns to the 'same', a map has multiple entrances." Deleuze and Guattari, Rhizome, p. 26. 
209 "An arrangement in its multiplicity necessarily works all at once on semiotic, material, and social 
flows (independently of its possible re-utilization within a theoretical or scientific corpus). There is no 
longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world), a field of representation (the book), 
and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather an arrangement connects together certain multiplicities 
caught up in each of these orders .. ." Deleuze and Guattar~ Rhizome, p. 52. 
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To engage in writing, not as a medium through which Being may be spoken of, 
but " ... in the name of an outside [which] has no image, no signification, no 
subjectivity"210 presupposes a level of reality, materiality, whose existence may be 
posited outside of the arrangements in which it is given to us through 
representation, but which is in no way ideal or transcendental. This material surface 
and the machines that are constantly being connected across it are rendered distinct 
from the strata of articulation or the various machinic assemblages by what Deleuze 
and Guattari call their "abstract" nature: 
They [the abstract machines] are ... -always singular and immanent. Contrary 
to what happens in the strata, and also in the assemblages considered from 
other angles, the abstract machines ignore forms and substances. This is what 
makes them abstract, but it is also the rigorous sense of the machine concept. 
They exceed any mechanism. They are opposed to the abstract in its ordinary 
sense... Abstract, singular and creative
1 
here and now, real although not 
concrete, actual though not completed ... 11 
We saw above that the socius is limited by the continual transformation of 
molecular flows into molar aggregates and by the possibility of reversal of, or escape 
(flight) from, this transformation. We also saw that these two formations correspond 
to two states of the same machine - one participating in social production, the other 
in desiring production. I concluded that these two states may be understood 
functionally or analytically. What is important to note is that the Deleuzian project 
of une pensee du dehors would be lost in this transformation were it to be understood 
in~ the one way m: the other. That is to say, pensee is to dehors as analysis is to 
function. The point is that for the two to enter into such a relationship with one 
another, a material site (plane or surface) of transformation is required. This site is 
given by matter in its zero degree of intensity - the body without organs.212 Upon 
this raw-materiality, "space" is either the smooth space of multiplicities or the 
striated space of molar functions. Let us briefly review these two conceptions of 
space as outlined by Deleuze and Guattari. 
210 Deleuze and Guattar~ Rhizome, p. 52. 
211 Deleuze and Guatt~ Concrete rules, p. 14-15. 
212 "The two sides of the body without organs arc, therefore, the side on which the mass phenomenon 
and the paranoiac investment corresponding to it are organized on a microscopic scale, and the other 
side on which, on a submicroscopic scale, the molecular phenomena and their schirophrenic investment 
are arranged. It is on the body without organs, as a pivot, as a frontier betweeen the molar and the 
molecular, that the paranoia-schirophrenia division is made." Deleuze and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 
281. 
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The concept of a body without organs allows a materialist analysis of desire by 
situating desiring production/social production on a material surface. The way in 
which desire relates to this surface by way of production, recording, and 
consumption will not only be determined by the type of machinic assemblage which 
characterizes the social arrangement in question, it will also determine the extent to 
which production participates in the social formation and the extent to which it 
follows the positive thrust of desire. The positivity of the intensities which fill the 
body without organs allow desire to prevail as the pure energy of systems, and 
ensures that it is not of necessity dependent on the Law which structures language, 
subjectivity and familial relations.213 
The body without organs takes its place as antiproduction in the ontogenetic 
schema traced at the beginning of Anti-Oedipus, repelling and attracting the organs, 
so as to free desire for production and incorporate it into the stases of recording. 
The body without organs is produced as the nonproductive in the productive activity 
of desire, which is to say that its substance is implicated as zero intensity in relation 
to the partial objects of desire.214 Out of the productive and recording relations of 
desiring-production and the body without organs emerges the "space" of an 
indeterminate subject as a kind of capture of the object. In this emergence we can 
already note the transformation coming into effect; that is, the multiple flows of 
desiring production have begun to collect themselves into a unity. This unity "is a 
strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body 
without organs ... "215 At this ontogenetic level we can discern a "subject" only 
because it is implicated by those tracings on the body without organs which it is able 
to confirm as its own - be these intensities focussed on the materiality of the body 
without organs, or representations inscribed upon it. In Milles-Plateaux, the word 
hecceite is introduced to show the indeterminate spatiality or positionality of this 
"subject." 
On the plane of consistence, a body is defined only by a longitude and a 
latitude ... two elements of cartography. There is a very different mode of 
213 Rajchman, Analysis in power, p. 53. 
214 Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, pp.I 8-9. See Donzelot (1977), p. 31. 
215 Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 16. 
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individuation than that of a person, a subject, a thing, or a substance. We 
reserve for it the name of hecceite ... [where] everything is in a relation of 
movement ~ng rest between molecules or particles, the power to affect and 
be affected. 1 
What lends this ontogenetically defined "subject" its molecular indeterminacy, 
its schizophrenia, 217 is the fact that the surface of the body without organs, to which 
it owes its immediate existence, has a spatiality characterized by the indeterminacy 
of 'dormant' materiality. This is intially described in Anti-Oedipus as a "smooth, 
slippery, opaque, taut surface,"218 but in Milles-Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari will 
speak of "smooth space." It is characteristic of smooth space that it belongs to 
multiplicities. "From the point of view of theory, the status of multiplicities is 
correlative to the status of spaces, and inversely: the smooth spaces of the desert, 
steppe, or sea type are not without people or depopulated, but are populated by 
mulitiplicities ... "219 If multiplicity is to be encompassed in theoretical thought (one 
hesitates to use the word 'knowledge'), it must be encountered as space. And this 
space presents itself to theory as an inscription of the body without organs. 
The body without organs may be activated ("put into play") in a number of ways, 
including the "smoothing of space."220 The smoothing of space is an operation which 
is performed on the spatial organization characteristic of molar formations - on 
striated space. In order to elaborate the smooth and striated nature of space in 
molecular and molar formations, Deleuze and Guattari consider the nature of the 
lines which define these spaces. Here they seem to be taking up the description of 
the body without organs presented in Anti-Oedipus: 
The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, 
with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients 
marking the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject 
developing along these particular vectors. Nothing here is representative; 
rather, it is all life and lived experience.221 
In the transformation of the molecular formations into molar organization, we 
see at this ontogenetic level that subjectivity emerges with the increased 
216 Deleuz.e and Guattar~ Mille plateaux, p. 318, cit. and trans. Stivale, The new cartq~aphy, p. 33n13. 
217 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 20ff. 
218 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 9. 
219 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Cqncrete rules, p. 10. 
220 Deleuz.e and Guattar~ Concrete rules, p. 12. 
221 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 19. Italics in original. 
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representability, retraceability, of these lines. This is as much as to say that it 
emerges with their increased geometric determination. The link between the 
geometric determination of the line on the one hand and, on the other hand, the 
visibility of being, but also the dialectic of disappearance and appearance out of 
which signification arises, has already been noted. What Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasize is that this determination of being and meaning can only take place in 
social space. In the socially determined space of the machinic assemblages, " ... the 
line is subordinate to the point; the diagonal, to the horizontal and vertical; the line 
creates contour, figurative or not; the space that it traces is of striated nature (de 
striage); the innumerable multiplicity that it constitutes remains subject to the One 
in an always superior or supplementary dimension. The lines of this type are molar 
and form an arborescent, binary, circular, segmentary system."222 In molecular 
formations the "diagonal is freed, is broken or meanders. The line no longer creates 
contour and passes between things, between points. It belongs to a smooth space. The 
line traces a plane which has no more dimensions than what pervades it; also, the 
multiplicity that the line constitutes is no longer subordinated to the One, but 
achieves consistence through itself."223 On the body without organs, the geometric 
organization of lines in striated space gives way to the plane of consistence and its 
meandering lines, the "tangent of deterritorialization." For this reason the body 
without organs can accomodate neither meaning nor subjective being; " .. .it has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the body itself, or with an image of the body. It is the 
body without an image."224 
What is important for a theory of capitalism (or of colonialism) is that Deleuze 
and Guattari posit a " .. .limit of the socius, its tangent of deterritorialization, the 
ultimate residue of a deterritorialized socius."225 It is possible for Deleuze and 
Guattari to posit a space or surface which limits the socius, because for them, the 
"social is no longer an autonomous whole but a field of variations situated between 
222 Deleure and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 10. 
223 Deleure and Guattar~ Concrete rules, p. 10. 
224 Deleure and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 8. 
225 Deleure and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 281. 
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an impetus of aggregation and a surface on which flows of all sorts wander."226 For 
this reason, it is pointless for us to attempt to understand the relations of desiring-
production as a materiality unless we see it "within the phylogenetic perspective that 
aligns the different stages of history."227 Capitalism appropriates production while 
shifting its limits to an internal division which we have described above. In the same 
gesture, it liberates desire as a productive force while repressing the multiple 
chaotic thrust of its flows.228 Here we can begin to see the way in which Deleuze 
and Guattari conceive of theory as an intervention, as a map of paths to an 'outside'. 
The concept of the body without organs is established in opposition to Being 
and Time, as a smooth space upon which multiplicities may proliferate. What is 
decisive in the conception of smooth space is its opposition to the space of the State. 
For smooth space does not only implicate a method opposed to "the philosopher as 
State functionary (Kant) ... the 'method' of a striated space (cogilo universalis)."229 It 
serves as the showplace and goal of actual physical opposition to the State. 
226 Donz.elot, Antisociology. p. 38. 
1.27 Donz.elot, Antisocioloi:y. p. 31. 
228 "For Deleure and Guattari repression is inseparable from the self-repression proper to the logic of 
capitalism, which can only exist by liberating generic production while at the same time containing it 
within well-defined limits so that it does't flee in all directions and escape everywhere. Repression is 
not an exterior condition of capitalism, but rather its intemal contradiction." Donrelot, Antisociol~, p. 
36-37. 
229 Stivale, The new carto~aphy, p. 26. 
PART TWO: COLONIAL SPACE 
CHAPTER 1:BORDERS 
The question of boundaries is the first to be 
encountered. From it all others flow. To 
draw a border around anything is to define, 
analyse and reconstruct it ... 
F. Braudel 
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1 TERRITORIES 
1.1 De- and reterritorialization: writing and the earth 
The concept of the body without organs may be situated within the thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari as an attempt to accomodate the fact of Being without 
confronting it as a question. When Deleuze and Guattari decenter the question of 
Being, this decentering shifts our focus of attention onto a material surface of 
transformation, upon which the various motions between molecular and molar 
formations, qualitative and quantitative change may be traced. But how is such a 
surface to be approached analytically without interrogating its Being? If the 
question of multiplicity is a question of space, how do we chart the transformation of 
spatial multiplicity into spatial unity? This question centers around the status of the 
earth in the transformation from molecular to molar formations. An analytic which 
is to do justice to the complex process of colonization must address the mechanics of 
inscription. In this chapter I will show how colonization develops a writing which 
"captures" space by establishing borders and limited passages across them. This is 
done through limited modifications of physical space - in the establishment of what I 
will call "nodal points," that is points capable of differentiating qualities of space 
where previously no such differentiation had been.1 This has effects in subjective 
and signifying space, as well as in geo-political space. I will then show that this 
strategy is also that employed in the 'expansion of the frontiers of knowledge.' 
Finally, I will show that this writing necessitates a mythology of mobility which can 
totalize a fragmented spatiality by an unlimited ability to cross borders. In this way I 
hope to provide a more specific framework within which the analyses in chapters 2 
and 3 may be conducted. 
1 In using this term, I must emphasize the fact that it is not to be confused with the term "node" in 
linguistics as used by Chomsky and Tesniere. See A. J. Greimas & J. Courtes, Semiotics and language. 
An analytical dictionary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 213. 
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Before addressing these questions in more detail, however, let us briefly review 
the historical framework within which we may speak of such strategies of inscription. 
Donzelot observes that the historical tendency to the liberation of flows coupled 
with their ever more rigid regimentation has a definite correlative in the status of 
the earth as a surface: 
The historical process ... tends to do one of two things: make the earth an 
equivalent of the body without organs; or solidify the whole of desiring-
production into a mass and rigidify it into meta-organisms, pseudo-worlds, 
the hidden face of the earth.2 
In other words, in retrospect, from the point of view of capitalism, it is always a 
question of de- and reterritorialization. I have already noted that, in the sense in 
which Deleuze and Guattari use the word, territoriality is not to be confused with 
the geographic division, demarkation and enclosure of the surface of the earth 
which is instituted in the despotic regime. This is not to say, however, that 
territorialization as a concept has nothing to do with the earth. On the contrary, 
"territorialization stocks the flows of production on the body of the earth."3 This is 
precisely why a deterritorialization is said to take place in the despotic machine, in 
which production is possible only in relation to the body of the despot. The 
appearance of a transcendental authority, which directs production to itself, gives 
rise to boundaries indicating enclosures of ownership. This establishment of 
boundaries, which is fundamental to colonization, is a form of writing - it objectifies 
the earth, removing it to those nebulous regions which characterize the signified. 
The overcoding instituted by the despot supports this entire process, since he is the 
transcendental authority presiding over signification. It is by his gestures that the 
earth is designated as something else; that is, the earth is always seen through his 
eyes. For this reason, the writing of borders implies a certain way of looking, just as 
the writing of subjectivity requires, in the Lacanian model, a certain determination 
2 Donzelot, Antisocioloi:;y, p. 31. 
3 Donzelot, Antisociology, p. 40. 
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of the gaze. As Donzelot observes, a pseudo-world of meta-organisms hides the face 
of the earth. 4 This is why Deleuze and Guattari say of the State: 
It appears to be set back at a remove from what it transects and from what it 
resects, as though it were giving evidence of another dimension, a cerebral 
ideality that is added to, superimposed on the material evolution of societies, 
a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts 
and the flows into a whole. What is transected, supersected, or overcoded by 
the despotic State is what comes before - the territorial machine, which is 
reduced to th~ state of bricks, of working parts henceforth subjected to the 
cerebral idea. 
Overcoding introduces meaning into the system at the same time that it 
transects, superimposes and regulates by way of the idea. What this amounts to is a 
writing about the earth and on the earth, taking the earth as its surface and its 
object. 
The molar lines which characterize striated space appear in colonization as 
written lines and lines of truth traced across the surface of the deterritorialized 
earth. There are a number of ways in which this writing can be conceived, and I 
intend to explore some of them in the following chapter. Let it suffice here to 
imagine the following scenario: 
In the desert, water is a goal, even for nomads. The meandering lines traced by 
their feet tend to converge at certain privileged points - water holes, power places, 
and the like. When the traders and explorers, scientific expeditions and missionaries 
arrive, their oxen/horses/wagons/feet privilege the paths of least resistance, and 
their goals are defined in different terms. These goals may relate to the land 
(geographical features, mineral deposits, etc.) or its inhabitants (as in trade and 
missionary activities). A set of points emerge, between which lines may be traced to 
yield a grid of pathways. When the railway is to be built, or borders are to be 
surveyed, or a grid of triangulation is to be established, the land surveyor arrives 
with the techniques and machines for tracing (near) perfect geometrical (Euclidean) 
lines across the earth. Their perfection is given by their straightness and by their 
4 "Delimiting a territory, marking out its limits, taking account of its resources, attributing a Center to 
it, leaving the surface of the earth in order to enter into the sphere of representation ... These two things 
are inseparable: the relinquishing by the earth of its primary privilege, and the advent of pseudo-
worlds, those of the territory and the despot..." Donzelot, Antisociology, p. 41. 
5 Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 219. 
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ideality. We are in the realm of mapping. But eventually, the map has to be applied 
to the surface of the earth - the railway line is built, roads are built, the ideality of 
the border crystalizes into nodal points marked by border posts, beacons, fences. 
But before this, the settlers have arrived, buying or swindling land from the "natives" 
(who after all, the settlers say - and they are right -, have never owned the land; not 
in the sense that the despot uses the word). Ideal lines are drawn from a tree to the 
top of a hill, to a water hole - lines which, similarly, will eventually have to be 
repeated materially in the form of fences. But what happens to the "natives," whose 
land is disappearing, and who must be preserved, if not for humanitarian reasons, 
then because they provide the labor source of the colony? Sooner or later, conflict 
will arise - they will rebel against the new regime. This conflict will in turn 
determine the tracing of new lines and the establishment of a network of 
communication. Initially, the highly formalized system of transportation which the 
colonizer has established will prove a hindrance to the free movement of troops, and 
the natives will take advantage of this. Guerilla warfare is born. However, the 
natives will eventually be defeated. They are then confined to reserves whose 
boundaries are demarkated by treaty and enforced as real enclosures by the law - by 
the carrying of passes, the administration of land sale and purchase etc. The list 
could go on - canals, projected deposits of ore and limits of mining rights, the 
widening of the artery of roads as it approaches the city, to be interrupted by traffic 
lights and stop signs, the lines through the urban areas which divide the white 
residents from the "natives," the lines traced by migrant laborers on their way to the 
cities or back home again, etc, etc. These are all writings which are traced on the 
face of the earth in the process of colonization. 
This is the one thing that history can do - it can write across the face of the 
earth; and this is what will provide the focus of the present study. But we saw above 
that there is another alternative, to make the earth a body without organs - that is to 
release multiple flows in a manner which may not be utilized in social production. 
Because of the deterritorializing/reterritorializing work of capitalism, 
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deterritorialization can become a liberating force in the capitalist machine. In Mille-
plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari show how a war machine sets itself up as a nomadic 
force opposed to the State as a despotic arrangement or as a regulating arrangement 
in the capitalist machine. We shall see how this opposition attempts to transform the 
nature of space in the colonization process, and how the colonizing machine replies. 
If history knows an opposing force to capitalism, this is the claim of Deleuze and 
Guattari, we must grasp it as a deterritorialization which knows no 
reterritorialization. What this means is that " .. .it is not enough to construct a new 
socius as full body; one must also pass to the other side of this social full body, 
where the molecular formations of desire that must master the new molar aggregate 
operate and are inscribed."6 Striated space, the molar space of the socius, must itself 
be transformed into the smooth space of the body without organs - the earth must 
become the equivalent of a body without organs. Deleuze and Guattari seem to be 
presenting this revolutionary imperative as a practice which is a Nietzschean 
affirmation of life - the being of the body without organs as matter, substance, etc. is 
none other than life, and it is the life of the earth.7 And it is also the life of the 
concept - abstraction.8 
When molar organization seizes on this life, the indeterminate meandering lines 
of molecular formations are made to participate in the act of enclosure which 
characterizes the spatial manipulation of the civilized machine. I would argue with 
6 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 377. 
7 "The earth is not at all the contrary of the D[ eterritorialization ]: we already see it in the mystery of 
the "native" (natal), where the earth as ardent, eccentric, or intense home (foyer) is outside the territory 
and only exists in the movement of the D[ eterritorialization ]. But, moreover, it is the earth, the glacial, 
which is the Deterritorialized par excellence: it is in this sense that the earth belongs to the Cosmos 
and that it appears as the material by which man channels cosmic forces. We will say that the earth, in 
so far as it is deterritorialized, is itself the strict correlate of the D[ eterritorialization ], to such an extent 
that the D[eterritorialization] can be called the creator of the earth - a new earth, a universe, and no 
longer only a reterritorialization." Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 13. 
8 "The notion of abstraction is very complicated: a line can represent nothing, be purely geometric, but 
still not be truly abstract as long as it traces a contour. The abstract line is the one which does not trace 
a contour, which passes between things, a mutant line. It has been said a propos Pollock's line. In this 
sense, the abstract line is not at all geometric, it is the most living, the most creative line. Real 
abstraction is non-organic life. The idea of a non-organic life is constant in Mille-plateaux; it is 
precisely the life of the concept." Gilles Deleuze, Interview with Catherine Clement, "Entretien 1980," 
L'Arc 49 (rev. ed. 1980), cit. Paul Patton, "Conceptual politics and the war-machine in Mille Plateaux," 
Substance 44/45 (1984), p. 65. 
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Foucault that enclosure is the privileged gesture of these molar lines, be this 
enclosure of an individual, an institution, an ideality or discursive domain, or a 
nation/ colony.9 I believe also that this is the nature of the spatial striations to which 
Deleuze and Guattari refer: they determine the spatiality of the socius by setting up 
regions of equal potential marked by lines which cannot be crossed without 
transformations of energy. Hence Lyotard describes " ... all territories confined and 
marked by codes ... - not only on the side of objects, ... but as well on the side of 
'subjects'" as " .. .indifferent concretions themselves exchangeable and anonymous, 
whose illusion of existence can only be maintained at the price of special 
expenditures of energy."10 Furthermore, there exist lines joining fixed points within 
one of these regions with those of another - molar lines marking privileged passages 
from one space to another, passages along which energy gain or loss can be 
channelled into or from another quality of spatial division. 
It is not only the despotic regime which knows the moment of 
deterritorialization. It is gradually merged into the capitalist machinery by way of 
"the deterritorialized worker... the deterritorialization of the soil through 
privatization ... the deterritorialization of wealth through monetary abstraction."11 
However, if this process were to carry on at its own volition with no limit but the 
external limit of expansion, production would eventually become deterritorialized to 
the extent that it would exist for its own sake only. That is to say that the 
deterritorialization of production tends ultimately to oppose social production in the 
name of desiring-production. This tendency is seized upon by the capitalist machine 
and forms " ... the foundation of political economy properly speaking: the discovery of 
an abstract subjective essence of wealth, in labor or production - and in desire as 
9 See Foucault's concept of primary, secondary and tertiary spatialization: The birth of the clinic. An 
archaeoloiO' of medical perception, trans. A. M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1986), p. 15-16. Also: 
"Questions of geography," in Power /Knowled~e. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, ed. 
and trans. Colin Gordon (Brighto11: Harvester, 1980). Note also the nature of Foucault's strategic 
opposition to the unities of discourse, in The archaeology of knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith 
(London: Tavistock, 1972). Foucault's discussion of the spatiality of the statement is elucidated by 
Gilles Deleuze in Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
10 Lyotard, Energumen capitalism, pp. 16-17. Italics in original. 
11 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 225. 
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well, it would seem."+ 12 For obvious reasons, this process could not continue 
unchecked if the socius is to prevail. This is why "civilized modern societies are 
defined by processes of decoding and deterritorialization. But what they 
deterritorialize with one hand, they reterritorialize with the other. "13 We have already 
seen that the capitalist machine is characterized by this dual motion of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as 
"mutually enmeshed, or like opposite faces of one and the same process." 
Furthermore, the reterritorialization effected by capitalism is "the very conjunction 
of the deterritorialized flows that delineates archaic or artificial 
neoterritorialities."14 When the capitalist machine transforms the despotic machine, 
and the State assumes the function of the regulation of decoded flows, meaning is 
already something which has been removed from the socius. The coding of 
production against the socius disappears, and there emerges an apparent reduction 
of the meaning of social production to desiring-production itself; this reduction is, as 
we have seen, the reduction of the image of social reproduction to another image. 
This reduction into an image is a mythic function and is of great importance in the 
discourse of colonization. It provides a schema or itinerary for linking discursive 
space to the real space of the colony, and founds its claim to universality.15 
The status of universality exists at the level of representation, but it also 
pervades the real spaces of the capitalist socius. This is because the conjunction of 
decoded flows re-inserts spatiality into signification (as we have already seen in 
connection with the spatiality of the sign), while at the same time apparently 
returning production to the earth. When the capitalist machine supercedes the 
despotic machine, the earth is not only divided and owned by the despot, marked 
12 Deleuz.e and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 258. 
13 Deleuz.e and Guatt~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 257. Italics in original. 
14 Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 258. 
15 "Decoded desires and desires for decoding have always existed: history is full of them. But we have 
just seen that only through their encounter in a place, and their conjunction in a space that takes time, 
do decoded flows constitute a desire - a desire that, instead of just dreaming or lacking it, actually 
produces a desiring-machine that is at the same time social and technical. That is why capitalism and its 
break are defined not solely by decoded flows, but by the generalized decoding of flows... the 
conjunction of deterritorialized flows." Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 224. My emphasis. 
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with the despot's desire, charted by his explorers, and inscribed with the knowledge 
he authorizes, - it is also developed. This is not Deleuze and Guattari's expression, 
but it seems to me an adequate description of the way in which reterritorialization 
returns production to the surface of the earth.16 Land assumes an anchoring status 
in the triangular relation of land, labor and capital, not only as the showplace of 
production, but also as production's material origin. And conversely, social 
production appears as the only possible goal of land. Where the despot colonizes, 
the capitalist "develops." This is reflected in "land development" projects, in research 
and development programs, as well as in the development aid provided by the major 
capitalist nations to the "underdeveloped" countries of the "third world". The 
despot's appearance, the face he shows the world, is a countenance upon which 
force is written. If the capitalist were able to show a face to the world, it would bear 
a friendly countenance, that of the developer. This development should also be read 
in a moral sense, as a 'development of character'. Thus the cruel inscription of the 
despot's will on those who transgress his laws is replaced in the modern "civilized" 
system by the myriad disciplinary mechanisms investigated by Foucault. The 
capitalist's knowledge does not consist in knowing what the despot wants, but in 
knowing what is best for us and for the earth. Knowledge in the modern socius 
replaces the gaze of the despot with that indeterminate gaze of power /knowledge 
which Foucault describes as an "inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under 
its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each 
individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself."17 
Paradigmatic for the emergence of this knowledge is the Panopticon - "the diagram 
of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form."18 Foucault shows how the 
Panopticon functioned not only to modify the despot's gaze in the name of an 
16 This is always a return - "it goes without saying that ownership of the earth, public or private, is not 
territorial, but reterritorializing." Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 13. 
17 Michel Foucault, "The eye of power" in Power /knowled"e, p. 155. 
18 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Peregrine, 1979), p. 205. 
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expansion of benevolent knowledge, but also to provide an analytic of space, not 
only as signfying space, but the real physical space of the prison, factory, school, etc. 
One finds in the programme of the Panopticon a similar concern [ similar to 
the royal menagerie at Versailles - JN] wtth individualizing observation, with 
characterization and classification, with the analytic arrangement of space ... 
the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping 
and the king by the machmery of a furtive power.19 
This involves a management of space on every possible level. When the 
capitalist develops space, and develops (disciplines) the subject as a function of 
space, he fixes production back onto the earth, he develops the earth.20 
Furthermore, he establishes the conditions under which it is possible to speak of the 
objects he has developed. Thus the disciplines become sharply delineated in the 
form of a specialization of mental labor. 
Capitalism arrives at the end of history to show, once and for all, not only what 
history has always wanted, but also what the earth has always wanted, and more 
than that, what we have always wanted.21 According to Lyotard, the "critical 
universality of capitalism" suggested in Anti-Oedipus amounts to the "hypothesis 
that with indifference, with the effect of the principle of equivalence - of decoding -
the empty space, the void in which the great categories of work and value can be 
constituted, arises in labor or in the capitalist practice of capitalism ... "22 Because the 
spaces of capitalism are intensely productive, it demands that the form of intuition 
in which meanings are sought be gradually replaced by one in which positive - in 
every sense of the word - relationships (relationships of presence) are produced. 
Contrary to what Derrida claims - and Derrida himself is the best example of this -
writing as we know it today does not erase spatiality with the productive power of an 
absent presence, it clears fields which are continually being filled by all that is 
19 Foucault, Discipline and punish, p. 203. 
20 " ... one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique." Foucault, 
Discipline and punish, p. 218. 
21 We need only think of the ecological programs of the oil multinationals, for example, in which we 
are shown how the earth !!CCfil to be enclosed into reserves from which industry is banished, in order 
to rescue the flora and fauna which industry threatens to extinguish. But even here the earth produces 
capital in the form of tourism. And isn't that what we all most dearly desire - a holiday in some far-
away place where we won't have to look at or be looked at by factories and the like? 
22 Lyotard, Enerc:umen capitalism, p. 16. 
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present when desire is freed as a productive force. The benevolence of capitalist 
knowledge allows this productive spatiality to appear gradually within the despotic 
arrangement, in a way that can never be possible for the despot's armies, 
missionaries and explorers.23 
When we examine the colonial discourse of the late 19th/early 20th century, we 
must take care to appreciate the complexity of texts which find themselves poised 
between two different systems of meaning and intuition, two different productive 
machines - the despotic and the capitalist. I believe that it is possible to read 
virtually any colonial text from this period (and perhaps any text of 19th century 
"realism") in terms of conflicts between these two productive machines, between two 
forms of representation and the intuitions they require. 
It would thus be incorrect to attempt to see the colonization of South West 
Africa purely as a transfer of or integration into the despot's machine. It is true, the 
despot is there, at that limit to which all values are reducible. We will be 
encountering him again and again. He is Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, God, Hans 
Grimm's father; but who is Bismarck, who is Kaiser Wilhelm? When Margarethe 
von Eckenbrecher describes the celebration of the Kaiser's birthday under siege at 
Okombahe during the Herero war - "in front of the station, in the shade of a wagon, 
my husband proposed the toast to the Kaiser."24 - can we be sure that this act of 
veneration is the expression of a desire which is the Kaiser's? Is it the despot's 
omnipresence which keeps these people defending the land they have gained, 
supposedly in his name? Is it not just the opposite - that desire, following its own 
directions, seizes here on the figure of the Kaiser because he seems to represent 
everything which these individuals want? After all, it is 'their' farms, 'their' land 
23 This is one reason why Deleuze and Guattari say that the appearance of the (despotic) State is 
"history's only break" (Anti-Oedipus, p. 261). This is in keeping with what Homi Bhabha sees as the 
eventual aim of colonization: the establishment of a machine whose "predominant strategic function is 
the creation of a space for a 'subject peoples' through the production of knowledges in terms of which 
surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited." Bhabha, Difference, 
discrimination, p. 198. 
24 Margarethe von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir ~ab und nahm. Erlebnisse einer deutschen Frau in 
Siidwestafrika 1902-1936 [What Africa gave me an~ took from me. Experiences of a German woman in 
South West Africa 1902-1936](Berlin: Mittler, 1940 ), p. 139. 
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which they are defending. The repetition of ceremonies devoted to the fatherland 
was, in the colonies, little more than the starting point for a liberation from these 
ceremonies. This is the potentially revolutionary force which Ridley recognizes in 
the colonial text. The attempt to develop a social 'politics' (for it was never a theory) 
on the basis of direct colonial experience may, in his view, be read as a recognition 
of the unsuitability of European form for colonial experience. This is, however, 
where the revolutionary potential ends, for in the discourse of colonialism it 
develops into a recognition that the forms in which the European fatherland 
projects itself are often in direct conflict with the movements of capital. This conflict 
is also evident as a conflict between the myth of a civilizing mission in colonization 
and the actual demands of colonial experience.25 Ridley also quotes Leutwein as 
stating that "the final objective of all colonization is to make money."26 
To understand the complex relationship between the binding of desire in the 
despotic order and its freeing according to the workings of the capitalist machine, 
we need only witness the constant libidinal outpourings directed at 'Southwest' as a 
showplace of personal desire.27 
At the end of the 19th century the disappearance of the despot is almost 
complete. Even where he can still be recognized, the thriving capitalist machine has 
begun to reduce him to a cardboard figure, whose existence owes to the necessities 
of the flows of capital and labor. We will recall that, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, this is a gradual process. And always these flows are mapped onto the 
coordinates of personal desire. When, in 1884, Bismarck gave the support and 
25 Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 124. 
26 Cit. L. H. Gann & P. Duignan, The rulers of German Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1977), p. 44, cit. Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 101. 
27 A representative passage is provided by von Eckenbrecher: "I stood at the railing, and my heart was 
ready to break. Southwest, land of our ideals and dreams, how basely you deceived us! With how much 
love and hope we came to you. Disappointment on disappointment was what you brought us. You were 
miserly with your gifts, and you took from us all we had. I leave you with empty hands and a sore heart. 
And yet, I love you like no other land. A longing wakes even now in my heart. I wish to God I could 
look again on your defiant cliffs with their deep blue shadows where the baboons and the rock rabbits 
live. I wish to hear soon again the monotonous songs of the kaffirs as they sit at their camp fires, and 
the cry of the jackal in the dark of night. I wish to look out over the endless yellow Namib, when the 
glowing heat of midday rests upon it, or when the silver moon shines through the thorn trees. I wish ... I 
wish .. ." Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir Kah und nahm, p. 153-154. 
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protection of the German Reich to the colonial project, he was not in any way 
motivated by a desire to gain new territory, but intended to provide a secure ground 
for German trade in competition with other nations. It is this desire for a 
commercial function of the colonies which prevented Bismarck from committing the 
Reich to governing the new territories and inspired him instead to have them 
administered by private companies.28 It is no longer possible to state that the people 
live by the despot's will. The movements of people and money, the divisions of land 
may still occur in the name of the despot, but they are also moving according to the 
free flows liberated by the capitalist machine.29 
The transformation whereby this is effected takes place in the space of the sign. 
Because of this it appears as one effected in the name of the despot. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the wording of a proclamation read out by Captain Schering of the 
"Elisabeth" at the hoisting of the German flag over Angra Pequena on 7 Aug 1884: 
His Majestey the Emperor of German, Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, has 
commanded me to proceed with the corvette "Elisabeth" under His Majesty's 
protection to Angra Pequena, and to place the territory on the west coast of 
Africa b~i°nging to Mr Liideritz under the direct protection of His 
Majesty ... 
However, we must not overlook the significance of the phrasing in proclaiming 
that the territory belongs to Liideritz and is under the protection of the Kaiser. 
Possession remains in the hands of the entrepreneur, whose desire is sanctioned in 
retrospect as the desire of the despot. And yet, this sanctioning ceremony is 
necessary if colonization is to be possible. It was through Liideritz that writing was 
effected on the earth, but the writing is the Kaiser's, and it is by his authority only 
28 Herbert Grundmann, gen. ed., Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, vol. 16: Von der 
ReichswundunG bis zum ersten WeltkrieG by Karl Erich Born (Miinchen: dtv, 1975), p. 124. 
'29 This transformation is situated on any number of different levels, and appears in a number of 
different ways. For example, in a discussion of Charles Temple's "The native races and their rulers" 
(1918), Homi Bhabha mentions the "tension between 'the free and continual circulation' that natural 
selection requires and the effects of colonial power whicxh claims to assist natural selection by 
controlling racial degeneracy but, through that intervention, must necessarily impede free circulation." 
He cites Temple's text as marking "the shift in the form of colonial government, from a juridical 
sovereign exercise of power as punitive and restrictive - as harbinger of death - to a disciplinary form of 
power." Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 198.) 
30 Cit. E.G. Jacob, ed. Deutsche Kolonialpolitik in Dokumente!!, p. 61. 
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that boundaries can be demarkated. We find this same process at work in the case 
of the establishment of the Colonial Societies and the allotment of their territories. 
The conflict between the social representation of the state (which belongs to the 
realm of the despot) and the demands of capital is a constant one throughout the 
history of German colonialism. It becomes increasingly intense when the Herera 
wars demand a vast increase in Germany's capital commitment to the colony. This is 
particularly evident in Erzbergers pointed criticism of colonial management. 
Does it not make a mockery of Colonial politics as it has been practiced to 
the present day when one is forced to confront the following facts? In twenty 
years of activity in times of peace, the German Colonial Society for South 
West Africa was not able to distribute a single penny in dividends. But in the 
year 1905, in a time of war, it immediately pays a 20% dividend!... And who 
pays for this 20% dividend? 90% of it is payed for by the German Empire 
itself. The gentlemen congratulate themselves on their patriotism. Where 
does this patriotism lie? It lies in the fact that they have exploited the plight 
of the Empire in the most shameless manner!31 
Erzberger seems to be calling the bluff of those who speak in the name of the 
despot, but are motivated by prinicples which are already well on their way to 
heralding the despot's downfall. It is in this framework that Westphal analyses the 
role of Kaiser Wilhelm II in the colonial venture. 
Wilhelm II. gilt als Inbegriff des deutschen Imperialismus: Was Bismarck nur 
zogemd und widerwillig duldete - wenn auch zum eigenen Nutzen -, das 
forderte der Kaiser - der ihn nicht zuletzt auch deshalb entlieB - mit aller 
Kraft: dem Deutschen Reich zu Weltgeltung zu verhelfen, auf das jeg~r 
aufhorchte und sich fragte: "Was sagt und was denkt der deutsche Kaiser?" 
It is important to recognize that in the colonization of South West Africa there 
are these two tendencies at work: meanings are created in the overcoding work of 
the despot, but at the same time there is a coupling of de- and reterritorialization in 
the name of production. The conflict between the two regimes is particularly 
apparent in the disagreements between the mission and the settlers. 
Often, however, it is difficult to separate the two. This is because, although the 
arrival of the despot presents the initial conquest of the territory, the final goal of 
colonization will always be the "installation" of Oedipus: the freeing of production 
31 Matthias Erzberger, "Rede vor dem Reichstag," cit. Wilfried Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen 
Kolonien (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1984), p. 239-240. My translation. 
32 Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonie11, p. 236. My translation. 
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for the maintenance of the capitalist machine. And furthermore, the despot's 
representations do not only mediate between his desire and the world, they mediate, 
phylogenetically, between the codified territoriality of the primitive machine and the 
decoding, de- and reterritorializing work of the capitalist machine. Looking back 
from our position of apparently universal knowledge, how could we portray it 
otherwise? Our very presence seems to prove the necessity of prior structures as 
preparing the ground for us. As a result, I will not be attempting a strict division of 
the functioning of the despotic and the capitalist machines. Instead I will be 
concentrating on those 'in-between' regions of colonization: the primal encounter 
has already happened and been repressed in representation, and Oedipus is not yet 
there with a certainty that has banished the despot entirely from the stage. We are 
still concerned with that regime where space is determined by the two despotic 
machine-movements which are its prime characterization: writing and looking. I will 
be attempting to show, however, that the colonizer is always looking on the verge of 
writing, and is always writing on the verge of a de-limitation, a crossing and re-
establishment of borders, which is opposed to writing. 
1.2 Lines, borders and nodal points 
If it is the aim of colonization to establish a machine whose function is the 
creation of a specific quality of space, the question which must concern us is how 
such a spatializing machine functions. I have indicated above that the answer would 
have to be formulated in concrete terms. For this reason, it is best to begin with an 
example. Let us consider a story by the well-known colonial author Hans Grimm, 
Die Geschichte vom alten Blut und der unGeheuren Verlassenheit.33 Grimm 
describes the emigration of two young men to South West Africa, sons from a family 
with a long lineage of nobility, and their inability to come to terms with the 
33 Hans Grimm, "Die Geschichte vom alten Blut und der ungeheuren Verlassenheit" [The story of the 
old blood and the immense desolation], in Ljideritzland (Miinchen: Albert Langen, 1936), pp. 85-148. 
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desolation of their new home. The topography which the story projects - like so 
many examples of colonial fiction - depends upon a polarization of space between 
civilization and savagery. This polarization reaches its climax when one of the sons 
is confronted by a border post which the occupying South African Union forces had 
established to mark the limits of the 'Police-Zone': 
On the road returning home, five days from Outjo and two days from home 
as he was travelling, the German had a peculiar experience. The kaffirs said: 
"Do you see that smoke? There's a camp fire and a tent." Fifteen minutes 
later they said: "Police live there." And sure enough, a boer policeman came 
up and asked: "Where are you ~oing?" The German answered: ''To 
Ombangonde! Home!" The boer pohceman said: ''This is the border of the 
police zone. No one may leave the police zone for Kaokoland." The German 
asked: ''Then where am I allowed to go? The war is over, and my house is 
west of here on my farm. I came from there eight days ago. I admit we drove 
through a short distance south of here because it's shorter, but you must have 
seen our wagon tracks in the sand." The boer shrugged his shoulders, and 
each of them only understood half of what the other said. It took two hours 
before he let the wagon through. What helped most in obtaining permission 
to pass was the way the two kaffirs persisted with the policeman's kaffir 
servant. The German said nothing, he just sat and played with the kitten, 
then the boer stepped out of the tent and pronounced: "You can go J.f> 
Ombangonde if you belong there, but this is the border of the police zone!" 
On the desert a line is traced, molar in its definition between two points (Outjo 
and Ombangonde) but molecular in its ability to wander from the track at will, a bit 
south if the route is shorter there. The line exists as a more or less privileged 
passage between two spaces: home and the dealer's general store, or in the context 
of Grimm's story, between the farmer's decay into a savage condition and the link 
with civilization. But where is the cut-off point? Five days from Outjo and two days 
from home? - are they home yet, are they still within the sphere of influence of 
civilization? Grimm is trying to show that the transition is a fluid one - in one 
direction, necessity drives the farmer to the dealer, but in the other direction there 
is a flight from civilization. And what is more, the German does not try to resist the 
transformation which must accompany this flight -the tracing of this line - he doesn't 
care one way or the other. But when the border post arises out of nowhere (nowhere 
in Grimm's story does the social machine appear which placed the policeman there), 
the quality of the line has changed, and with it the quality of the passage between 
34 Grimm, Die Geschichte vom alten Blut, pp. 115-116. 
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the spaces defined by home (i.e. savagery) and Outjo (i.e. civilization). The journey 
becomes a transgression each time this point is crossed, and this is what ties the 
border as a real border, a line traced on the earth, to a quality of social space and of 
subjective space. The passage of this nodal point involves a transformation of 
energy: an investment in the law, in the concept of a line on the earth bisecting the 
road. This subjective libidinal investment underlines the German's break with the 
sphere of civilization. As a result, the nodal point has two important effects. It 
divides individual spaces from one another by specifying the conditions of passage 
between them, thereby creating the illusion of a border. Furthermore, it specifies 
various levels of spatial reality, which can only be related to one another in given 
ways. Thus, for example, the border post dramatizes the discrepancy between 
physical space, which the German can cross with no difficulty, and another space, 
which we might call subjective space. This latter space comes into being in the act of 
speaking, and is initally structured in the rhetorical attitude of the German - the 
imploring tone of his questions already serves to define the quality of the distance 
between himself and his interlocutor. This is the space which Lacanian theory tells 
us is structured by a transcendental signifier. However, the imperative which rules 
this space is transcendental only in the sense that its ultimate cause (causa prima) 
can only be thought as absent. A materialist analysis of desire, in decentering the 
question of Being, must situate its concept of cause closer to causa occasionalis and 
causa effeciens. Here the structure of subjective space can appear as an effect only in 
conjunction with a concrete, visible and contingent position - a nodal point, such as 
that exemplified by the border post. And yet, in spite of its materiality, there is 
another sense in which the nodal point is transcendental - it is outside of time and 
space. It is effective because it occupies none of the various spatial fields it 
separates; nor is it a part of the border itself, since it is the only place where the 
border may legally be crossed. And it is effective not by its absence, but by its 
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material presence. For this reason, it cannot be said to exist m the temporal 
dimension. If it has Being, it is that paradoxical Being of stigme.35 
Where does the subject stand in the face of this imperative, this causality? What 
about subjective desire, subjective freedom? Following the episode above, there is 
an attempt to counter the border post's stratification of space with strategies to 
smooth the space between home and the dealer's store once again. 
But at the end of the first week he drove by night and passed south of the 
police post to avoid being delayed ... 36 
The question we must ask is: does this nomad strategy reintroduce desiring-
production into social production, or does it count as an act of social production, 
reconfirming the border by willfully avoiding it? The answer is complex, and I would 
suggest that in one sense it opposes the border with effective resistance. In Grimm's 
story, it serves to show how easily a determined geographical space may be 
transformed into a space where only subjective desire reigns. In this sense, the 
German's journey is a nomadic one.37 When the border post appears, however, 
subjective desire itself is unable to reverse the transformation which it has effected. 
Emotionally, the German farmer finds himself increasingly unable to make the 
journey to Outjo, and he falls increasingly into "savagery." Grimm is certainly not 
trying to demonstrate this, but the German's problem is not that he has fled from 
civilization. On the contrary, it is that the quality of geographic space has seized 
upon the nodal point (the border post) - perhaps it would be more accurate to say it 
has represented itself in the nodal point - and effected a striation of space on a 
number of different qualitative levels, one of the most important of which is the 
subjective economy of the German. The journey he now takes by ox-wagon to avoid 
35 See my outline of Derrida's argument regarding Hegel's theory of the point. Part 1, chapter 1, 
36 Grimm, Die Geschichte vom alten Blut, p. 124. 
37 "Foremost among these [the conditions of nomadic existance - JN] is the nomad's relation to space ... 
Nomadic life is essentially en route, and the routes followed serve a different purpose to the roads and 
highways which enable communication between the parts of sedentary societies: they distribute beings 
across an open, indefinite space ( 472). Nomads are essentially deterritorialized, which is not to say that 
they have no territory. They do have a territory which they are traditionally disinclined to quit unless 
driven by force. But it is a special relation to that territory which renders the nomad deterritorialized: it 
is a pure surface for mobile existence, without enclosures or fixed patterns of distribution." Patton, 
Conceptual politics, pp. 71-72. The page number in brackets refers to Mille-Platea!!& by Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
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the border control may be the same one he took originally, a bit south of the border 
post - after all, it is even shorter that way. But with the appearance of the policeman, 
everything has changed - the wagon tracks become a writing in the sand, preserving 
the traveller's transgression for all to see. This writing is effected under the gaze of a 
transcendental eye, but this eye itself requires the presence of a tent and a 
policeman. And because writing issues forth from the nodal point, it also serves to 
tie discursive space to non-discursive space, organizing these in terms of one 
another. 
Deleuze and Guattari speak of what I have been calling a nodal point in terms 
of an "arborification of multiplicities." 
It is what happens when ... stems form segments which striate space in every 
way and render it comparable, divisible, homogeneous... It is also what 
happens when the movements of "mass," the molecular flows, conju~te onto 
pomts of accumulation or stoppage which segment and rectify them. 
The way these points of accumulation or stoppage function is well illustrated in 
the establishment of the border post in Grimm's story. This one point establishes 
any number of distinct fields in geographical space, and certain transformations 
must occcur when it is passed. But these transformations are geographical only on 
the level of the signified. The geographical enclosure is the end product of the 
liberation of desire from objects - a liberation upon which signification depends. As 
such, geographical space becomes a space of knowledge, provided it is entered in a 
specific way. 
Over and above the physical traversal of space, a certain amount of energy is 
now consumed in the creation of a dividing line with all its geographical, social and 
subjective ramifications. This is something that can be known only in retrospect, 
only after the border has been crossed. It is important for us to note that a number 
of mechanisms exist in order to reduce this expenditure of energy to an investment 
in a knowledge which transcends the individual spaces and their privileged lines of 
passage. The border appears to separate two fields, each being created as 
homogeneous and possessing a distinct quality. Although an expenditure of energy is 
38 Deleuz.e and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 11. 
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required to cross the border, once the border has been crossed, it becomes clear 
that this energy takes the form of an investment in a transcendental knowledge. And 
once this investment has been made, the physical passage from one space to another 
is no more difficult than before the establishment of the border post. It is simply a 
matter of the relevant authority pronouncing the words: "You can go to 
Ombangonde if you belong there, but this is the border of the police zone!" That is 
to say that de- and reterritorialization, the motions which objectify the earth and 
naturalize its development, accompany a universalization which groups diverse 
spaces into a unified space of knowledge, while defining the principle of passage. 
The establishment of such a unifying principle has been the work of science, first in 
the name of the despot, and second in the name of universal truth itself.39 
Colonization brings with it a quality of space which is stratified, yet held 
together by a transcendental principle of knowledge. It is no chance matter that, in 
the 19th century, the armies of colonization are always preceded by the missionaries 
and scientists, the one infusing space with the desire of an omnipresent despot, the 
other subjecting it to an omniscient gaze intent upon a tabulation of knowledge. It is 
this principle which serves to 'capture' the spaces it invades even without a 
thoroughly saturated occupation of an entire area. Instead, we see the establishment 
of a matrix in which knowledge is organized into fields. This matrix defines objective 
spaces in the virtual spaces of tabulation. Johannes Fabian refers here to the 
"taxonomic game," which "consists of demonstrating synchronic relations of order 
beneath the flux and confusion of historical events, and the expressions of personal 
39 "Until recently, science had convinced us that in the classification of the spaces of knowledge the 
local was included in the global, in other words that a path always existed between one local 
configuration and another, that from local configurations one could always move without break or 
interruption to a more encompassing global configuration. Clearly this assumption implied a 
homogeneous space of knowledge ruled entirely by a single scientific or universal truth that guaranteed 
the validity of the operation of passage. Such a space differs qualitatively from a more complex space in 
which the passage from one local singularity to another would always require an arduous effort." Josue 
Harari and David Bell, Journal plusiers voies, introduction to Hermes, by Michel Serres (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. xiii. 
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experience ... What we get is a hierarchy made up of relationships of order which are 
sequential and irreversible; hence the seriousness of the taxonomic game."40 
The game of ordering a chaotic universe into the tabular space of 19th century 
knowledge is not to be divorced from the manipulations of physical space taking 
place simultaneously. In the colony, this is accompanied in the first instance by the 
establishment of nodal points - mission stations, base camps, etc - from which the 
surrounding space may be qualitatively transformed, and which link different 
qualities of space to one another. There is nothing idealistic about this procedure. 
The missionary and the scientist both possess a number of strategies of material 
intervention to ensure that this transformation is successful. Michel Serres suggests 
that metaphysics should be regarded as one of these strategies, but privileged 
because of its totalizing effect.41 We could even tentatively suggest at this stage that 
19th century colonization (as opposed to the invasions, conquests and genocides of, 
for example, the Spaniards in South America) is characterized by this material 
capture and metaphysical totalization of nodal points by scientists, missionaries and 
administrative officials, with the armies only intervening subsequently, when the 
new equilibrium becomes threatened by forces of resistance. It was an open secret 
at the time of the German colonization of South West Africa. Bernhard Demburg, 
head of the Colonial Division of the Foreign Office, himself stated on 8 January 
1907: "Whereas colonization was once carried out by means of destruction, today we 
are able to colonize by means of preservation. This includes the missionary and the 
doctor, the railway and the machine, that is to say, the advanced theoretical and 
applied sciences in all fields."42 The army is no longer in the sole service of the 
despot, but appears as the necessary companion of knowledge, simply because 
knowledge is only possible as a function of borders which define its field of 
effectiveness, and only if certain passages betweeen these fields are observed. The 
40 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other. How anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), p. 99. 
41 "Metaphysics is operatory, it is the strategic set without which physics and the exact sciences are 
nothing but partial and dispersed tactics." Michel Serres, "Knowledge in the classical age: La Fontaine 
and Descartes," in Hermes, p. 27. 
42 Cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien. p. 252 My translation. 
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borders which define the fields of knowledge in 19th century science function in the 
same way as borders between geo-political fields - they attain the status of law. The 
role this law plays will be determined by its constitution as either the despot's 
desire, or else as a unifying and self-defining principle - a scientific principle. When 
we examine the relations between the various (European) military powers which 
established the borders of colonies in 19th century Africa, we see that the borders of 
colonies repeat the borders between nations in Europe. In both cases, the border is 
a product of a dialogue which can be conducted only by recognizing certain common 
interests which transcend the specificity of national interest. In both cases, well 
defined spaces (the European nation and its political interest) are connected by 
privileged paths of communication (dialogue and negotiation). These spaces may be 
regarded as distinct and separate only as a result of the commitment to a common 
truth which links them. Thus Edward Said notes the political consensus of France 
and England in their attitude to the Orient -
For despite their differences, the British and French saw the Orient as a 
geographical... entity over whose destiny they believed themselves to have 
traditional entitlement. The Orient to them was no sudden discovery, no 
historical accident, but an area to the east of Europe whose principle worth 
was uniformly defined in terms of Europe ... 43 
Similarly, Ridley has the following to say of European colonial discourse in the late 
19th century: 
... even when imperial rivalry dictated a criticism of the imperial activity of 
another European power, writers invariably formulated their criticism in 
terms of a common purpose to which all imperial ,aowers had subscribed but 
which the offending power had failed to live up to. 
This basic agreement, without which disagreement cannot be formulated, 1s 
fundamental not only to politics, but, as Serres points out, to dialogue itself: 
... such communication is a sort of game played by two interlocutors 
considered as united against the phenomena of interference and confusion, 
or against individuals with some stake in interrupting communication. These 
interlocutors are in no way opposed, as in the traditional conception of the 
dialectic game; on the contrary, they are on the same side, tied together by a 
mutual interest: they battle against noise ... They exchange roles sufficienpy 
often for us to view them as struggling together against a common enemy.4 
43 Said, Orientalism, p. 221. 
44 Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 103. 
45 Serres, "Platonic dialogue," in Hermes, pp. 66-67. 
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The common enemy in every respect is a multiplicity which must be ordered. 
Domination and truth go hand in hand. 
This brings us to the importance of a realist representation - and more 
specifically the novel - in the capture of space. Realism is able to act as another 
ordering principle because of a structural analogy between realist discourse, the 
border post and the tabulation of knowledge. The novel creates reality effects in the 
same manner as the tabulation and application of knowledge in colonization. This is 
perhaps best explained using Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope. Bakhtin 
describes chronotopes as "the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative 
events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots of the narrative are 
tied and untied."46 As the term indicates, this nodal point has the power to suspend 
both categories of space and time in order to draw diverse events and places 
together. When Fabain notes that "for human communication to occur, coevalness 
has to be created ... ,'"47 we realize (as Fabian does) that this creation is a textual 
strategy. Thus it will become apparent that this strategy is not possible without the 
creation of positions around which diverse times and spaces can be organized. The 
organizing force is to be found in the peculiar characteristics of stigme, whose status 
as both time and space, but ultimately neither time nor space, were noted in part I. 
It is precisely in the suspension of time and space that the nodal point draws 
together diverse levels of temporal and spatial organization. Returning to our 
example, we may say that the border post in Hans Grimm's narrative acquires an 
ontological status not by representing something in as faithful a manner as possible, 
but by suspending the spatial and temporal axes of representation in order to 
produce a position (stigme) outside of representation. One such reality effect is the 
definition of a subjective space which the reader shares with the actant(s); another 
would be the description of positions in a landscape by simulating a line of vision to 
46 M M Bakhtin, "Forms of time and of the chronotope in the novel. Notes toward a historical poetics," 
in The dial~cal imagination: four essays, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1981), p. 250. 
47 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 30-31. 
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which the reader has access via his/her memory. In all cases, it is in the nodal point 
or chronotope that the spatiality of the sign opens onto other spaces.48 
If we pursue this idea further, we will see that in colonial discourse the subject 
of the statement is capable of functioning as a kind of mobile border post - a 
position outside of time and space which captures space by its very presence. Thus, 
in the context of Grimm's story, the border captures a space which can indeed be 
characterized by a nomadic movement, but which is a space already colonized by the 
previous sudden arrival of the German farmer. Grimm's description of the arrival of 
the farmer and his brother at Ombangonde implies another capture of a position 
and subsequent transformation of space: 
His brother said: "I met up with a whole tribe of klip-kaffirs this afternoon. 
Suddenly they were just there. They live here somewhere in the mountains. 
They want to work for us once we're started. That'll be worth something. You 
need to have people.1149 
A space which, from the point of view of the brothers, is completely 
indeterminate, characterizable only in the vaguest of terms ("They live here 
somewhere in the mountains"), achieves dimension with the establishment of a focal 
point which they themselves constitute. It is nothing more than the appearance of 
the brothers at a fixed point which transforms the surrounding space into one 
characterized by relations of production. And these relations in turn become 
spatialized relations of knowledge and of domination. Thus, 
In order to keep a distance, but also because of the smell, they .§Yd not allow 
the tribe of kaffirs which had gathered there to live in the gorge. 
Although Grimm does not stress the point (simply because it is not in the 
interest of his narrative strategy to do so), we can see that there is a transformation 
of space here similar to that which will later take place with the appearance of the 
border post. As a matter of fact, the effectiveness of the border post as a narrative 
strategy in the story is precisely this: it displaces the colonizing act of the white 
48 As Kistner observes: "Wo Ort und Zeit dermaBen in den zufalligen Treffen zusammenfallen, werden 
die Koordinaten des Textes als unabanderlich niedergelegt. Mit diesen Koordinaten wird nicht our der 
Held, sondern auch die Position des Subjekts allgemein definiert. Dieser Position wird die Garantie 
des Ontologischen verliehen." Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 157. 
49 Grimm, Die Geschichte vom alten Blut, p. 100. 
50 Grimm, Die Geschichte vom alten Blut, p. 101. 
BORDERS • 165 
settler onto a conflict between the affect value of the land and the burocratic 
moment involved in its partitioning. Or, to uncover an entirely different dimension 
of the story, between, on the one hand, the grave conflict between civilization and 
savagery which the German had internalized and given tragic proportions, and on 
the other hand the rather stupid way in which the Boer policeman overlooks this 
tragic dimension. In doing so, he is overlooking what Grimm would like to see as a 
very German problem transposed onto a German space about to be usurped by 
South Africa. We shall see in the following section that Grimm's attempt to mark 
the territory with a sign of German ownership is part of a larger project which marks 
the colony with the suffering of the colonizer. 
But to return to the conflict between the German and the Boer, such a conflict 
of interest may be historically verifiable, but we should not allow its rhetoric of 
disagreement to blind us to the initial agreement which makes this possible. This 
agreement determines the technique of colonization to be employed and explains 
the similarity in the spatial transformation effected by the farm on the one hand, 
and the border post on the other. The establishment of the farm creates a field 
which cannot be entered without the expenditure of a certain energy, which effects a 
transformation in subjective space. No matter where and according to what 
indeterminate coordinates the "somewhere in the mountains" where the savages live 
might have been positioned, as soon as the farm is built, its space becomes a part of 
the field of the farm. And to cross the boundary between dwelling place and 
working place involves not only the establishment of a path as a physical line of 
privileged passage. It also involves a path of privileged subjective transformation 
which will serve as a technique for adopting the relations of production being 
imposed - we might speak here of a masquerade. The native arrives at a new space 
to find not only that the old space exists only as an extension of the new one, but 
that he/she is also something new. All that is left is memory, and this too is destined 
to become a form of the white man's writing. 
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But why is there no need of a border post between the native settlement and the 
farm? The answer I would suggest is that, for the German brothers, this line cannot 
be drawn because, as a moral imperative, it has already been violated. From the 
moment they arrive in the valley, their morality becomes tainted through sexual 
relations to two native women. When they dismantle the barrier between their race 
and the other race, their desire has already refused that social imperative which 
Grimm wishes to raise to the status of truth. By refusing the essential subjective split 
which the socius installs in its subjects, the German brothers have, for Grimm, 
already crossed the border.51 
2 ENCOUNTER: GAZING WITH KNOWLEDGE 
The discourse of colonization creates positions which define passages into the 
text and out again - positions which allow the reader to suspend time and space, and 
to define his/her own subjective space in terms of the signifying space of the text. 
This is important if we are to understand the function of vision in colonization. 
Discourse defines space not only in terms of motion across a border, but also by a 
line of vision separating positions of subjectivity from those of objectivity - a line of 
vision which is not experienced but imagined. This is theatrical space. Here, the 
space of the colony is created as a theater stage, on which the human drama unfolds 
for its white audience. The processes which this drama depicts are classical and 
conform to the three unities. But there are two moments which are elided here 
which we would do well to call briefly to mind. Firstly, the direction or perspective 
of the presentation is erased in the act of imaginary identification, and secondly, the 
space of the stage is erased in a signifying gesture the nature of which we have 
already examined. This dual elision characterizes both literary and scientific 
51 For the way in which the subjective split displaces itself onto the split between the familiar and the 
foreign, and the way this displacement is employed by Grimm, see Peter Horn, 
Fremdheitskonstruktionen. 
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discourse. Both share the role of a regimentation of space intended to order the 
chaos of the savage land or the empty space of "virgin nature." Both involve a 
presentation to vision and a blindness, which are well described by Bachelard when 
he speaks of a "dialectics of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as 
soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains."52 The spatiality of the 
literary text, even (and, perhaps, especially) at its most "realistic," is blind in so far as 
it is not only the spatiality of vision, but of the negation of time.53 It does not see its 
own truth, but imagines its own presence. Science, too, effects a presentation of 
principles whose invisibility seems to confirm the necessity of the presentation. How 
this works for a science of other places ("area studies") has been admirably shown by 
Edward Said. 
We have remarked how, during the nineteenth century in such writers as 
Renan, Lane, Flaubert, Caussin de Perceval, Marx, and Lamartine, a 
generalization about "the Orient" drew its power from the presumed 
representativeness of everything Oriental; each particle of the Orient told of 
its Orientalness ... Such radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences ( or 
discourses, as I would prefer to call them) th~t took a backward and 
downward direction towards the species category ... 4 
Although Said does not follow this line, we are dealing here with a scientific 
principle typified by Hegel's symbolism, whereby the truth of generality is 
supposedly visible in the specific. But the question is: visible for whom? Or to be 
more accurate: in whose line of vision must we place ourselves, if we are to see the 
general in the specific? Here Said refers to the origins of 19th century Orientalism 
in a "new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness. 
Such consciousness is dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it 
were, where its totality can be readily surveyed. Addressed to the King [ of 
France], [Bon Joseph] Dacier's preface [to the Tableau historique de 
/'erudition francaise, ou Ra_pport sur les progres de l'histoire et de la litterature 
ancienne depuis 1789 (1810)] stated the theme perfectly. Such a survey as this 
52 Gaston Bachelard, The poetics of space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon, 1969), p. 211. 
53 "And since the work appears, then, as pure deferral, a void or vacuum, it lends itself to being filled 
up with everything it isn't: with useful meanings, for example, which multiply and change as history 
progresses. Or this void can masquerade as the prestigious aura that surrounds the timeless 
masterpiece in its museum case. Yet these apparent travesties, these various ways in which the work is 
misrepresented and forgotten, sustain it; they protect its essence, which is to disappear. They provide it 
with its 'space,' which is not its location." Ann Smock, translator's introduction to The space of 
literature, by Maurice Blanchot (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 11. 
Emphasis in original. 
54 Said, Orientalism, p. 231. 
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made it possible to do something no other sovereign had atte~~ted, namely 
to take in, with one coup d'oeil, the whole of human knowledge. 
I have already examined what is taking place here, writing is possible when the 
scientist places himself within the line of vision of the despot and adopts his gaze at 
the same time that he is giving it content. Where the despot's gaze prevails, 
spatiality (including the space of the stage) is the space of the sign. Thus it is 
possible to look past the materiality of the stage to the general truth it hides. This 
applies as much to the physical space of the stage as it does to the subjective space 
of an actor, rendered perfectly visible by his dramatic gestures. As Homi Bhabha 
notes, 
Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed reality which is at once an 
'other' and yet entirely knowable and visible. It resembles a form of narrative 
in which the productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a 
reformed and recognizable totality. It employs a syst~m of representation, a 
regime of truth, that is structurally similar to Realism. 
And here we come to the second point made above: where knowledge is on 
display, the space of the stage must attain universality. We have seen that capitalist 
universality is attained in retrospect. The same does not apply to the despot - his 
universality is here and now, since everywhere he looks, everywhere his gaze is 
carried, the world is imbued with his meanings. Of course it is not necessary (it is in 
fact not even desirable) that he gaze with his own eyes. The essence of his gaze as a 
universalizing gesture is its detachment from any body. Indeed, what the despot's 
gaze elides is the gazing body, the gazing eye. 
For this reason, behind and prior to every universal presentation of knowledge, 
be this on the scientific or the literary stage, is another absent eye which is somehow 
more real than the eye which gazes on the stage here and now. This is the eye for 
whom the stage is the space of truth. Now the importance of this absent eye in 
science and in literature, and particularly in colonial literature, is that this eye was 
there and saw it happen; and had you or I been there instead, we would have seen 
the same thing. The following two passages may be presented without commentary 
55 Said, Orientalism, p. 126. 
56 Bhabha, Difference. discriminatio11, p. 199. 
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to illustrate this point. The first is one of the final paragraphs in Wilhelm 
Mattenklodt's Afrikanische Jaiden und Abenteuer, and the narrative voice is the 
editor, Captain Steinhardt: 
I don't know how long I sat and thou~ht... I only know that I shouldered my 
rucksack and gun and climbed down mto the valley to fulfill the wish of my 
friend and companion Wilhelm Mattenklodt, spoken through the mouth of his 
old father - to clothe in my own words and complete by my own inspiration 
everything which his rough hand, calloused from the plough tail and gun 
stock, had so hurriedly and incompletely brought to paper before he left for 
his fourth trip to Africa, driven by a longing for the distant black continent. 
This day I saw with my own eyes again in a magical vision all that he had 
experienced, and all that he had told me by the camp fire - my own 
experiences swelled up from out of the rich treasures of my own heart's 
memories and mingled with all thaJ my friend had tasted of adventure and 
happy hunting down in Holy Africa. 7 
The second passage is from the dedication preceding Hans Grimm's collection 
of short stories on South West Africa, Li.ideritzland: 
My father, from you I learned to cast a long gaze back, and on my path, 
whose richness I had not earned, I have found the faith of my early years 
confirmed up to the present day - that, among all men before whom I have 
stood, you are the man of most character. Your character was not only 
devout and refined, not only did you command a kingly composure and 
modesty, but you possessed a hard- earned learning which was naturally 
opposed to any idle chatter and ~11 kinds of rationalism, and which you had 
raised to the level of universality. 8 
In one case, the gaze removed from the body by the writing hand, in the other, 
the father-despot authorizing universality. Both framing the stage of fiction which 
claims to be truth - a real encouter. Beneath the facade of science, truth, and 
universal experience, there is an original and specific encounter which is marked by 
violence. When the gaze of the despot elides the gazing eye, it is in the final instance 
eliding the moment of encounter, the moment in which something never gazed upon 
before is placed in the line of vision and prepared for the stage. This is always a 
moment of violence, since the encircling of an object and a space of presentation 
cannot be effected without the forceful determination of a hierarchy of subject and 
57 Mattenklodt, Afrikanische Jagden und Abenteuer [African hunts and adventures], rev. and ed. 
Hauptmann Steinhardt (Miinchen: FC Mayer, 1936), p. 246. Remarkably enough, the editor states in a 
letter of dedication accompanying the copy I perused that this book " ... bears the name Mattenklodt, but 
is in fact the most genuine Steinhardt, - it is 20% Mattenklodt and 80% my own thoughts and 
experiences." We need not take this as an admission of falsification or plagiarism, but rather as a sign 
of the interchangeability of the gaze mentioned above. 
58 Grimm, Liideritzland, pp. 7-8. 
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object positions. One space is for looking and writing, the other is the space of the 
object - the stage. Let us turn our attention to this moment of encounter. 
Even when the colonial encounter is, in the first instance, gentle, compassionate 
and marked by an urge to mutual understanding, the violence of a will to meaning 
on the part of the conqueror can always be found hovering in the background. 59 
When we look closer, the violence of encounter lies in the very fact of encounter. As 
Deleuze and Guattari stress, taking Nietzsche's comments on the origins of bad 
conscience as their point of departure, the colonizer arrives at once, like a flash.60 
They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as 
lightning appears, too terrible, too convincing, too sudden, too different even 
to be hated ... wherever they appear something new arises, a ruling structure 
that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in 
which nothing whatever finds a ~lace that has not first been assigned a 
'meaning' in relation to the whole. 1 
This is the violence of encounter, that the arrival of the 'blond beast' is 
unspeakable, it is unnamable within the sign system of the conquered. Their 
inferiority is a semiocratic inferiority - an inferior ability to harness the power of the 
sign. Universal truth produces their cosmogony as a hopelessly narrow system of 
signs hedged in on all sides by the awe they feel for their own ignorance. And yet, 
this ignorance is not a ~ but a q_uality of knowledge which is produced as lack in 
the moment of encounter. 
Fanon realized that this structuration of knowledge in encounter is a problem 
fundamental to pszchoanalysis. He observes that the unconscious of colonized 
59 This has been convincingly demonstrated by Tzvetan Todorov, The conguest of America. The 
guestion of the Other, transl. R. Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). 
60 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsches Werke, vol. 8: Zur Genealo~e der Moral (1887), 2. Abteilung: 
'Schuld', 'schlechtes Gewissen' und Verwandtes, ch. 17 (Leipzig: Kroner, 1919). 
61 Nietzsche, On the a;enealoi:y of morals, II, 17, (New York: Random House, 1969), cit. Anti-Oedipus, 
by Deleuze and Guattari, p. 191. Italics in original. Niet?.Sche states his attitude to colonization and 
conquest quite clearly. "Ich gebrauchte das Wort "Staat": es versteht sich von selbst, wer damit gemeint 
ist - irgend ein Rudel blonder Raubthiere, eine Eroberer- und Herren-Rasse, welche, kriegerisch 
organisiert und mit der Kraft, zu organisieren, unbedenklich ihre furchtbaren Tatzen auf eine der Zahl 
nach vielleicht ungeheuer iiberlegene, aber noch a;estaltlose, noch schweif ende Bevolkerung legt." (Zur 
GeneaJQ.&ie der Moral, p. 382. My emphasis.); or: "Charakteristik des Europaers: der Widerspruch 
zwischen Wort und That; ... Wieder Europaer Colonien gegriindet hat, beweist seine Raubthier-Natur." 
(Nietzsches Werke, vol. 8: "Zu 'Volker und Vaterlander' (Aus dem NachlaB, 1886)," p. 487.) 
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individuals in Madagascar, which Mannoni analyses in search of an inferiority 
complex, 62 is produced as inferior in the encounter with the new. 
The landing of the white man on Madagascar inflicted injury without 
measure. The consequences of that irruption of Europeans onto Madagascar 
were not psychological alone ... 63 
Mannoni's retrospective projection of a real semiocratic inferiority onto an 
unconscious desire for the encounter with a "master race" is quite correctly displaced 
by Fanon onto the level of the socius. 
1. My patient is suffering from an inferiority complex. His psychic structure is 
in danger of aisintegration. What has to be done 1s to save him from this and, 
little by little, to rid him of this unconscious desire. 
2. If he is overwhelmed to such a degree by the wish to be white, it is because 
he lives in a society that makes his inferiority complex possible ... M 
Nevertheless, it is clear in the above quote that Fanon himself somehow takes it 
as given that the psychoanalyst is capable of naming desire in retrospect, and from a 
position within the sign system of the colonizer. It is misleading to attempt to 
understand either the psychoanalytic situation or the moment of encounter in 
colonization by posing the question of an actual superior knowledge of the analyst, 
or an actual military, scientific or "cultural" superiority of the conqueror. Although 
Todorov is not explicit in this regard, he indicates that the questions of difference 
and superiority must be separated if we are to do justice to the problem of 
encounter.65 Obviously, from the point of view of universal truth the conquerors are 
superior, militarily, culturally and in every other sense - including morally. How 
could it be otherwise, since, in retrospect, universal truth is theirs, and does not 
belong to the conquered? The problem is not superiority, but universal truth.66 
62 See O Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban. 
63 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 97. 
64 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 100. 
65 "As we have already seen with Columbus, the postulate of difference readily involves the feeling of 
superiority, the postulate of equality that of indifference, and it is always hard to resist this double 
movement, especially since the final result of this encounter seems to indicate the victor explicitly 
enough: are not the Spaniards superior, and not merely different?" Todorov, The cong_uest of America, 
p. 63. 
66 This is also the reason why it would be misleading to explain the lack of Mexican resistance to 
Cortes by the fact that Cortes' colonization was just another chapter in a long line of colonizations, and 
wasn't necessarily worse than those which preceded it. Because we are writing in the wake and in the 
legacy of the Spaniard conquest, no prior "colonization," no matter how blatant a domination, can be 
regarded in retrospect as colonization. This point must be stated quite clearly. It is not that we are 
somehow morally no worse than what came before us, it is that we have transformed what came before 
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Cortes and his army were not the gods for which Moctezuma's nation mistook them -
they were gods in the sense that Nietzsche's conquerors were gods appearing "like 
fate, like lightning.',67 
Conquest is not only, not necessarily genocide, it is also the marking of bodies 
with the desire of the despot. When the despot gazes upon his signs, he extracts 
meaning by a surveillance which, in an act of terror, writes the law on the body.68 
The conquerors arrive not only gazing the despot's gaze, but writing his signs on the 
bodies of the natives. For this reason, the massacre of the innocents is as certain a 
consequence of the arrival of the despot as is the very gaze he casts over the land. 
The fact that the horrifying details of these massacres remain sickening even to the 
modern mind with its knowledge of Hiroshima and Vietnam, is because of the 
detached systematicity and moral conviction with which they were perpetrated. It is 
the same gesture as that which designed the gas chambers at Auschwitz. It is 
essential that we recognize this gesture - it is that of writing - the subject removed 
from the object by the mediation of a meaning which is created in the moment of its 
execution. This writing founds the knowledge of the despot - a paranoiac knowledge 
which Todorov aptly terms "the understanding-that-kills.',69 
Taken from the native's point of view, the first encounter with the white man 
must remain an unnamed mystery.70 And in those rare cases where we do have 
records written by one of the savages, it is only possible because it is recorded in the 
despot's writing. Everything is already over, it is too late. The horror with which the 
us entirely into a part of what we are. For that reason, we cannot interrogate our precedent on a 
universal level, - we fil universality. After the Spaniards, the only colonization which can possibly 
follow will have to come from the stars! 
67 Todorov cites the following entry in Columbus' journal, which I take as support of the present 
argument. "One of the Indians taken by the Admiral spoke with their king, telling him how the 
Christians came from the sky and that they were seeking gold." Cristobal ColAn (Columbus), Journals 
and other documents (New York: Heritage Press, 1963), 16/12/1492. Cit Todorov, The conguest of 
America, p. 42. My emphasis. 
68 Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 211. Hence the practice of torture within the despotic 
machine is "not an economy of example ... (that the representation of the penalty should be greater than 
the interest of the crime), but a policy of terror: to make everyone aware, through the body of the 
criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign." Foucault, Discipline and punish, p. 49. 
69 Todorov, The cong_uest of America, p. 128. 
70 "Can we guess, reading Columbus's notes, how the Indians, for their part, perceive the Spaniards? 
Hardly." Todorov, The cong_uest of America, p. 41. 
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invading army is witnessed has become domesticated following exactly that pattern 
outlined by Freud in his discussion of the way the primal scene is repressed in 
language. Here too, horror must be spoken in the language of him who has 
conquered. 
Let us return, however, to the case at hand in the present study, and pose the 
question of encounter. Here the encounter was an indefinite event, quite different 
from Columbus' arrival in America. 
The discovery of America, or of the Americans, is certainly the most 
astonishing encounter of our history. We do not have the same sense of 
radical difference in the 'discovery' of other continents and of other peoples; 
Europeans have never been altogether ignorant of Africa, India, or China; 
some me~ory of these places was always there already - from the 
beginning. 1 
Perhaps the original encounter in Africa was the arrival of the Phoenecians, 
perhaps the Arab traders. In some parts it would have been the Portuguese. But it is 
only from mu: point of view that this was not a sudden, absolute event. Africa was 
always there on the horizon of our memory and imagination. Yet the transformation 
of Africa into a colonized continent can only be conceived as a series of encounters -
encounters which may have been vaguely familiar in advance to us, a kind of 
conqueror's a priori, but which, in every case, was a sudden arrival of Nietzsche's 
master race. This is because, with each conquest or colonization, there is a point 
when suddenly the old system of meaning is nothing but a narrow slice of the new 
universe which the conquerors have brought with them. Like the encounter of the 
West with the Orient, the creation of European knowledge of Africa is always either 
a return to the already known, or an integration into universal knowledge.72 This is 
the essence of encounter. After all, as Todorov observes, it was not in the first 
instance Cortes' might which allowed the extermination of Moctezuma's people, but 
the system of signs he brought with him.73 
The conquest we are studying is more subtle, more variegated than that of 
Cortes. One important reason for this is the fact that, in 19th century colonization, 
71 Todorov, The conguest of America, p. 4. 
72 See Said, Orientalism, p. 58. 
73 Todorov, The congyest of America, p. 61-62. 
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the entire concept of conquest has been elided and replaced by another concept. 
The strangers arriving on African soil are no longer simply moving from one point 
to another within the Christian cosmos inhabited by Columbus; they are subjects of 
European knowledge in search of an object. What this means is that the former saw 
his very presence on foreign soil as proof that the new world was already a part of 
the Christian Empire of Spain. Yet even he, if we peruse his journals, was asking the 
question: how can I ~ what is here? And if we consider the explorers arriving in 
Africa from the 17th century onward, we find them asking not only this, but also, 
does it work in terms of what I am looking for? Let me be more explicit. Columbus' 
actions, if not his words, tell us quite clearly that the natives he encountered were 
always already destined to become Christian, just as the new land was always 
already destined to become the property of the King. The land and the inhabitants 
of Africa, however, are destined to become an object of study, of science, to fit into 
a pre-established grid of knowledge and take their place within this tabular space. 
This point is made by Johannes Fabian when he refers to the medieval infusion of 
the world with a certain quality of Christian time: 
In the medieval paradigm, the Time of Salvation was conceived as inclusive 
or incorporative: The Others, pagans and infidels (rather than savages and 
primitives) were viewed as candidates for salvation. Even the conquista, 
certainly a form of spatial expansion, needed to be propped up by an idelogy 
of conversion... The pagan was alw,tls already marked for salvation, the 
savage is not yet ready for civilization. 
In the expansion into Africa something different is happening. The expansion 
into a r~latively unknown space is paralleled by the prior creation of an empty space 
in the tabular scheme of universal knowledge, a space which will be filled in the 
observing activity of the traveller.75 The traveller is relatively 'low-profile' and thus 
infinitely mobile in comparison to the conquering army. He comes in search of 
knowledge, and finds what he already knew.76 As Fabian indicates, conquest in the 
19th century is no longer military, but takes place in the name of natural science. 
74 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 26. 
75 See Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 8. 
76 Ridley, notes this when he discusses the approach to travel embodied in the French exotic novel. "It 
showed travel to be both an assent to the unfamiliar, involving a loss of identity ('se depayser') and a 
recognition of the strange as the familiar ... " Imaf:es of imperial rule, p. 15. 
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Ridley has shown how this function of natural history in divorcing science from 
military might allowed military occupation of the new territories to re-enter through 
the back door. By way of example, he cites the emergence of a number of 
geographical magazines in 19th century Germany. These appeared first of all as a 
rejection of anything which could be associated with conquest by might. The journal 
Das Ausland (founded in 1828) stated in its first volume: 
'it was reserved for our a~e to see the unfading and eternally victorious 
power of the spirit. Civihzation forms the inner bonds of nations and 
conditions their interrelations, independent of the chances of military 
power .. .'"77 
Alone the association of civilization and of the spirit with military power and 
victory should make us highly suspicious of the euphoric call for inner bonds of the 
nations. Ridley then goes on to show how both this attitude and the more open 
attitude of prejudice and European superiority which supplanted it equally served 
the colonial project.78 There is a direct development from the travellogues of the 
enlightenment to the establishment of a discourse of free association between 
nations in the name of science, to that cultural relativism which was to integrate 
itself so well into the political project of colonization. 
3 CROSSING BORDERS: THE MYTHICAL MASTERY OF SPACE 
Deleuze and Guattari have claimed that the capitalist machine works only by 
breaking down, and this applies equally to capitalist representation - as with all its 
other spaces, it defines the representational spaces in which it works only by 
violating them. However, this de-territorialization of representation would 
ultimately have to lead to an absolute breakdown in communication - to chaos. Thus 
capitalist representation requires a mythology capable of re-defining a violated 
77 Das Ausland 1(1) (1828), p. 2, cit. Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 53. 
78 "Even before Germany possessed colonies the ideology had been established which broke up the 
family of man into separate and primevally warring factions and provided an explanation ( and thus a 
justification) for the destruction of one race by another." Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 54. 
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space and reintegrating it into an image of (at least relative) totality. It must 
mythologize this very process of breakdown, fragmentation, violation and 
reestablishment of spatial order. The form which captialist representation first 
developed for the process of mythologizing its own spatial breakdown was the novel. 
Epic form in general, and the novel in particular, traditionally concerns itself with 
the story of the crossing and re-establishment of borders - as a myth of de- and re-
territorialization. Not only does it define between its covers specific spaces of 
representation and privileged passages between these spaces; it also produces, in the 
act of reading, borders and passages between various qualities of space - most 
notably between subjective space as the encapsulated self-sufficient universe of the 
imagination, and the space of the socius as that support structure within which the 
individual can withdraw into his four walls and open a book in solitude. As Georg 
Lukacs shows, the essential function of epic form is its abiblity to mediate between 
the spheres of public and private experience, as opposed to the unmediated 
connection which dramatic form establishes. I read Lukacs discussion of the 
problem of the public and the private as evidence that the book, as a materiality, 
can function as a nodal point, defining a border between these two spatial qualities 
and specifying conditions of passage.79 
I have already shown how capitalist representation depends upon this passage 
from the space of the socius to the Oedipal space of privatized subjectivity. I have 
also indicated that both of these spaces are themselves defined (as qualities of 
space) by privileged passages between more or less determinate spaces. Where the 
one system of passages is interrupted, the other is able to be activated. When the 
book is closed and certain mythical passages across borders are blocked, the passage 
between the space of subjective imagination and the socius is re-activated and vice 
79 See Georg Lukacs, Werke, vol. 6: Probleme des Realismus III. Der historische Roman, ch.2, iii: Das 
Problem der Offentlichkeit (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965), pp. 154-166. Similarly, George 
Steiner states: "The practise of reading a book to oneself, in silence, is a specific, late historical 
development. It implies a number of economic and social preconditions ... What is implicit is the style of 
life of the bourgeoisie in an industrial, largely urban, complex of values and privileges." George Steiner, 
"A note on literature and post-history," in Festschrift zum achzigsten Geburtstag von Georg Lukacs, ed. 
by Frank Benseler (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965), p. 503. 
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versa. As such the novel seems capable of playing a role in the alignment of these 
two spaces. In the following, I will be claiming that this role is itself largely a 
mythical one, and that it consists in the de- and re-territorialization of those borders 
within which capitalist representation is possible. 
The privileged status of the novel as a mythologizing form of spatial 
representation is apparent in colonial literature. Within the colonial repertoire, it is 
always the novel which outweighs other forms in sheer bulk and popularity. 
Nonetheless - and I believe this to support, rather than contradict the claim I am 
making - in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa the form of the 
novel proves itself fluid enough that it can expand its thematic matter to include 
semi-fictional and semi-biographical material. I would argue that this is because the 
mythological structuration of space so vital to the colonial enterprise must be 
extended more definitely in colonial discourse to the spatial organizations normally 
reserved for scientific and historical knowledge, simply because the connection 
between the diverse spaces of these discourses must always be more precarious than 
'at home'. As a result, the conflicts between various spaces, as well as between 
various qualities of spatial organization, experience a mythical resolution, not only 
in the form of the colonial novel, but also in mythical epic forms within discourse in 
general. 
Although the novel occupies a privileged position by virtue of its form, it defines 
a mythologizing function which is easily transfered to other discursive forms. This it 
does, once again, by the specification of nodal points, of positions outside of time 
and space, by means of which borders may be crossed. A myth of unrestricted 
mobility is unrolled, in order to define the position of a border and the conditions 
under which it might be crossed. As a result, the border which is violated by this 
'mobile nodal point' - the infinitely mobile hero - is re-drawn.80 By way of 
clarification, let us begin with a few comments related specifically to the novel. In 
her analysis of Martin Jaeckel's Der brennende Busch,81 Kistner discusses this 
80 This was also the work of the travelogue, and I shall be investigating its function in chapter 3. 
81 Martin Jaeckel, Der brennende Busch [The burning bush] (Wernigerode: Gottlob Koetzle, 1934). 
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mythologizing function as a de- and re-territorializing function. She describes the 
constitution and definition of territories as being embodied in "traditional" novels in 
the person of the hero: 
Erst die Grenze konstituiert einen Raum. In einem Text wird aber eine 
Grenze erst dadurch sichtbar, daB sie iiberschritten wird. Dieser ProzeB wird in 
traditionellen Romanen durch Rolle und Funktion des Helden 
durchgefiihrt. 82 
She then goes on to describe the hero as "ein beweglicher Teil des Textes," who 
is determined to achieve what she calls a "transzendentale Unendlichkeit" in the 
continual production of new borders through crossing the old.83 Kistner describes 
this as a reterritorialization which necessarily follows the deterritorializing act of 
crossing the border, and has as its consequence that "neue Terrritorialitaten 
geschaffen oder alte Territorialitaten mit neuen Funktionen wiederbelebt 
[werden],"84 - or, in my opinion, both of these at once. Kistner is careful to define 
the spatiality of this de- and reterritorialization in the widest sense. When speaking 
of the displacement of previously valid borders she thus refers to such borders as 
"Familie, kleinbiirgerliche Enge, Karrierestreben, 'Mammon', 'Heidentum'."85 
However, Kistner also notes that the strategy of the text she takes as object of 
her study consists in a unifying gesture. 
Bemerkenswert ist. .. , daB der vorliegende Text die Kollision von Raumen ... 
vereinheitlicht und an das normative Helden-Sujet koppelt, indem der Text 
die Kollision mehrerer Raume in die Vorherrschaft des einen Raumes 
verwandelt&i Der Held wird als Grenziiberschreiter dieses einen Raumes 
konzipiert. 
I consider this unification necessary in the mythologizing function of spatial 
representation. As Cassirer notes, this encompassing of conflicting spaces in order 
to produce a coherent unity is the mythical mode of introducing order into chaos. 
Myth dramatizes the non-unity of spaces and the resulting conflicts in order to 
define a super-ordinate unity within which passages between spaces are possible.87 
82 Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 17. 
83 Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 18. 
84 Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 19. 
85 Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 19. 
86 Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 19. 
87 "Denn auch der Mythos besitzt seine eigene Weise, das Chaos zu durchdringen, zu beleben und zu 
lichten. Er bleibt nicht bei einem Gewirr vereinzelter damonischer Gewalten stehen, die der 
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In order to fulfil this mythical function, it is essential in a realistic text that the 
subjective mobility of the hero be countered by narrative strategies which are 
capable of resisting the self-destruction inherent in such mobility. These strategies 
unify diverse spaces and are the same as those which fix the moving eye as 
subjectum in the Aristotelean sense.88 It is, above all, the writer of the travelogue 
who is endangered by and must attempt to come to terms with the undermining of 
subjectivity in movement. However, the hero of a novel, as a mobile segment of the 
text, is endangered in a similar manner. 
This is, however, not only of interest as concerns subjective space, but it also 
affects social space. The borders which the hero establishes and crosses do not 
define subjectivity simply by mapping themselves onto an empty space. As we 
implied earlier in this connection, it would probably be more accurate to say that 
subjectivity can be produced as a spatial quality only by establishing passages to 
another quality of space - the space of the socius. Where the subject crosses his own 
borders, he counters the threat to subjectivity by re-drawing them and mapping 
them onto social space.89 This is a textual activity, but it is textual in the widest 
sense, for it also corresponds to an actual mastery of space upon which spatial 
subdivision is based. It serves to define possible interconnections and organizations 
of social spaces, and possible modes of subjective spatiality within the socius. The 
de-limiting movements of the mythical subject across borders are the same as those 
of the subject in physical space - not by way of analogy, but because as soon as he 
attempts to move across the same borders in physical space he becomes the same 
subject, but with one essential difference. He experiences on his own body the price 
which must be paid in crossing, which myth elides. 
Augenblick entstehen laBt und die der Augenblick wieder verschlingt. Er laBt vielmehr diese Krii.fte im 
W ettstreit und Widerstreit einander gegentibertreten - und er laBt zuletzt aus eben diesem Widerstreit 
selbst das Bild einer Einheit erstehen, die alles Sein und Geschehen umfangt und Menschen und Gotter 
in gleicher Weise beherrscht und bindet." Cassirer, Mythischer. asthetischer. theoretischer Raum, p. 25. 
88 See part 1, ch. 1, note 14. 
89 "Aber mit der Entgrenzung des Heiden in das Gebiet der politisch Heteronomen geht deren 
Eingrenzung einher." Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 107. 
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In the following discussion and analyses, I will be referring to this de- and re-
territorializing activity of the heroic subject as a mythological mastery of space. This 
mastery of space consists of defining passages which connect individual spaces to 
others, and which define at the same time passages from the space of the subject to 
that of the socius. The function of such a mastery of space is well demonstrated in 
the hypothesis put forward by Michel Serres in his reading of the Oedipus myth. 
Let us take any discursive chain where space, a space, a singularity of space 
would appear at a moment, at a link in the series. Then let there be the 
following decision or choice: either the singularity, for example, is only a 
discreet unit among others, an -nth term, and we are led down the 
combinative path, or it is in some way the variable of which the set of the 
other links constitutes the set of the possible functions.90 
Although Serres is reluctant to claim generality for this hypothesis, I read his 
exposition to indicate that it defines not only this particular myth, or myth as a 
discourse, but also a mythical function within discourse. As such, Serres' discussion 
provides us conveniently with a possible reading of the way space is constructed 
through the establishment of passages, not only between discreet spaces, but 
between different qualities of space. This is indeed what Serres indicates in his 
discussion of the Oedipus myth. He begins his discussion with "a local singularity of 
space," which is developed as "a global law that is invariably written as the 
connection of what is separated."91 The crossroads at which Oedipus kills Laius 
functions for Serres as "the sought-for singularity"92 - the discreet space which, as a 
variable, defines other spaces as a function of itself. It operates as what I have called 
a nodal point. Serres emphasises that this singularity has the power to establish 
"separations between spaces and their difficult junction."93 Serres is careful to show 
that this separation and junction takes place in a number of different qualities of 
space. First of all, the road itself defines a passage between separate physical spaces. 
Crossroads: cross, passage of a road across a ribbon that divides space, 
passing over a crack. Bridge: connection through the disconnected.~4 
90 Serres, Lan@aie and space, p. 46. 
91 Serres, Lan@aie and space, p. 48. 
92 Serres, Lan@aie and space, p. 46. 
93 Serres, Lan@aie and space, p. 47. 
94 Serres, Lan@aie and space, p. 46. 
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But Oedipus' journey also defines a passage between separate spaces which are 
given in terms of the law and the word. 
The fact that the murder of the father takes place at this cross, this 
interrupted, joined edge, this limit or fault, is a catastrophe. Thus the 
circumstance of the murder and the law is traced upon the ground. To cross 
the broken threshold of the word. The essential thing is indeed the 
bifurcation. As soon as the father is involved, once again we come back to 
the law, a bifurcation traced on the family tree: father, mother son, here 
again on the graph is inscribed the triviality of the narrative. To the left the 
one, to the right the other, and in~~st, we have already seen, is still another 
connection upon the disconnected. 
The particular space under examination here thus serves as a signifying suture 
m subjective space, according to La.can's model. This should serve to clarify, 
perhaps, why psychoanalysis finds this particular myth so fascinating. It serves not 
only as an allegory for the social construction of subjectivity; it repeats that spatial 
constellation which the subject must appropriate in order to acquire social Being. 
But, if we take Serres' claim seriously, that the myth of Oedipus is "not at all the 
discourse (discours) of an itinerary (parcours), but, radically, the itinerary (parcours) 
of a discourse (discours),"% then we must realize that it is not La.can who presents us 
with a reading of the Oedipus myth; the Oedipus myth presents us with a reading of 
La.can. What I mean by this is that the discourse whose itinerary Oedipus traces is 
the same as that which must be re-traced by Freud and La.can. And yet, there is a 
vital difference between these discourses - the itinerary and its retracing. This 
difference is given by the manner in which the discourse of psychoanalysis is able to 
integrate Oedipus' itinerary into a more comprehensive system of knowledge - a 
knowledge which must repress Oedipus if it is to speak. This is the ambivalent status 
of psychoanlytic knowledge against which La.can is constantly (and so brilliantly) 
struggling, and it is what will eventually cause Deleuze and Guattari to reject its 
claims to universality as a complicity with capitalist representation. 
Serres indicates that this repression of the mythical itinerary in the name of a 
rational unification of space occurs with the appearance of scientific discourse, and, 
more specifically, with the growth of geometry. 
95 Serres, Lan1Wajl;e and space, pp. 46-7. 
% Serres, Lan1Wa.jl;e and space, p. 48. 
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Reason, as the saying goes, has triumphed over myth. No, it is Euclidean 
space that has repressed a barbarous topology, it is transport and 
displacement without obstacles that have suddenly taken the place of the 
journey, the ancient journey from islands to catastrophes, from passa~e to 
fault, from bridge to well, from relay to labyrinth. Myth is effaced m its 
original function, and the new space is universal, as is reason orJhe ratio that 
it sustains, only because within it there are no more encounters. 
It is in this repression of myth that we find the importance of a passage between 
theoretical and mythical space within the framework of capitalist representation. 
Myth retains a knowledge of the chaos across which it charts its passage. 
Oedipus' itinerary crosses spatial accidents, bifurcations, catastrophes and 
loops. Oedipus' discourse (discours) is identical to his itinerary (parcours). It 
poses chi's on cracks, crossroads between spatial varieties that do not have 
common boundaries. This in turn presupposes that before it, in ~ther words, 
before discourse, there existed a multiplicity of unrelated spaces. 8 
Theoretical space, however, must constitute itself as universally homogeneous, 
if it is to interrogate itself. What theoretical space represses in its repression of myth 
is the knowledge of chaos. This repression is effected in the realm of the law - it is 
the work of the despotic machine. ''The earth is measured (geo-metry) by means of 
just measure (the King). The multiplicity, the dangerous flock of chaotic 
morphologies, is subdued."99 
Now, we have seen that the capitalist machine tends less and less to an 
intervention which subdues multiplicities by rule of law. Instead it tends to release 
these multiplicities and harness their productivity while at the same time defining 
conjunctions between disparate flows. When the despotic machine subdues myth, it 
subdues the chaotic multiplicity which myth has mastered. The capitalist machine 
allows multiplicity to re-appear, and must therefore of necessity have a different 
relationship to myth. Chaos can reappear only in the form of the repressed 
knowledge that once the world was chaotic. This is how I interpret Deleuze and 
Guattari's discussion of the return of the repressed. The capitalist machine can 
release the productive capacity of multiplicities only by once again charting an 
97 Serres, Lan~a2e and space, p. 52. 
98 Serres, Lan1rna2e and space, p. 48. 
99 Serres, Lan1rna2e and space, pp. 52-3. 
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itinerary of a discourse which would allow a passage and interconnection of chaotic 
multiplicities. 
This process is repeated in the theoretical discussion of space. The more theory 
interrogates the unified space it has created, the more it tends to invalidate its own 
laws - the more it tends to break this unified space down into a multiplicity of 
separate spaces. And these spaces are characterized as separate by the fact that the 
theoretical principles which prove adequate for any one of them become 
increasingly inadequate for the others. This is not necessarily experienced as a 
problem for a scientific worldview which has learned to modify its concept of what a 
law can and should be. But it is a problem for any of those theories, discourses and 
practices which depend upon an at least relative homogeneity of space, in order to 
establish continuity between discontinuous spaces. It is, in other words, a problem 
for communication. Thus, when theoretical space begins to encounter its own 
multiplicity, it also encounters myth. 
Hence the two great vicissitudes of the nineteenth century. Beneath the 
apparent unity of Euclidean space, mathematics, turning back toward its 
ongins, rediscovers the teeming multiplicity of diverse and original spaces -
and topology emerges as a science. We have not finished nor shall we ever 
again finish dealing with spaces. At the same moment, in an aged Europe 
asleep beneath the mantle of reason and measure, mythology reappears as an 
authentic discourse.100 
To this we might add - at the same moment that Europe perfects its techniques 
for expanding and transposing its borders without limit, fragmenting universal space 
into a multiplicity of geo-political spaces, it discovers colonial discourse as a 
mythical journey which is able to fix these borders in the act of crossing them. 
Colonial discourse is mythical to the extent that it charts the itinerary of that 
discourse out of which colonial space is constructed. 
I attempted to show in part I that this construction of a mythical totality from a 
fragmented spatiality is essential to the construction of subjectivity. The subject 
must construct its space as that space in which it can function as a social machine. 
Certain spacial organizations, and certain passages between spaces must be 
100 Serres, Langua~e and space, p. 53. 
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privileged. Serres describes the social construction of the space of subjectivity as 
follows: 
My body (I cannot help it) is not plunged into a single, specified space. It 
works in Euclidean space, but it only works there. It sees in a projective 
space; it touches, caresses, and feels in a topological space; it suffers in 
another; hears and communicates in a third; and so forth, as far as one 
wishes to go ... My body, therefore, is not plunged into a single space, but into 
the difficult intersection of this numerous family, into thr set of connections 
and junctions to be established between these varieties.10 
And just to ensure that we do not misunderstand this description as a theory of 
the construction of a unified and independent space of subjectivity, he goes on to 
elaborate "subjective space" as a variable which has functions (in both the 
physiological and the mathematical senses of the word) in social space. 
My body lives in as many spaces as the society, the group, or the collectivity 
have formed: the Euclidean house, the street and its network, the open and 
closed garden, the church or the enclosed spaces of the sacred, the school 
and its spatial varieties containing fixed points, and the complex ensemble of 
flow-charts, those of language, of the factory, of the family, of the political 
party, and so forth. Consequently, my body is not plunged into one space but 
mto the intersection or the junctions of this multiplicity. Again, whoever fails 
or refuses to pass like everyone else through the crossroads of these multiple 
connections - whoever remains in one of these spaces, or, on the contra;;v, 
refuses all of them - is treated as ill adapted or delmquent or disoriented.10 
For this reason, a theory of myth must also always be a theory of political space. 
In order to demonstrate this, I wish to discuss a few examples from non-fictional 
colonial discourse which specifically concern the rituals required if a border is to be 
crossed. These examples are intended to show that, even in the most commonplace 
and 'innocent' cases, an organization of space involves borders, rituals of crossing, 
and determined functions of subjectivity. It also involves a level of speaking which is 
mythical in that it postulates an unrestricted crossing of these borders. Thus, at the 
same time that colonization is exercising a stringent regimentation of space, it 
develops a mythological mastery of space. I will thus conclude this chapter with a 
brief example to illustrate an extreme case of a myth of mobility in colonial 
literature. 
101 Serres, Laniwa~e and space, p. 44. 
102 Serres, Laniwa~e and space, pp. 44-45. 
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A road might be thought of as the most basic form of mobility in colonization -
the unit of expansion along which the colonial machine advances across the 
landscape. This is true to a certain extent, provided we realize that it also 
determines the conditions under which this advance may be effected. If, for 
example, we glance at the Decree of 18 June 1912 Concerning Public Roads in the 
Protectorate, 103 we find that the very presence of a road divides the land clearly into 
public and private property.104 This division implies a clear demarkation of 
boundaries,105 as well as a ritual of crossing: 
§ 16 
If a public road crosses a fenced farm or part thereof, the gates whereby the 
farm was entered and exited are to be closed securely by the team leader 
upon leaving. 
§ 17 
It is forbidden to trespass onto gardens and fields and fenced areas of a farm 
away from the public road ... 
Furthermore, the ritual of crossing is bound to certain monetary rights and 
obligations. 
§ 11 
Resting by public roads not provided with common pastures for periods 
longer than 24 hours is not permitted. 
If a traveller wishes to remain for a longer period, or makes repeated stops 
within 10 km on a farm, he is to pay to the owner of the property on demand: 
a) for watering: great cattle, 20 pfennig per head per day, 
b) for watering: small cattle, 5 pfennig per head per day, 
c) for pasture: great cattle, 10 pfennig per head per day, 
d) for pasture: small cattle, 2 pfennig per head per day. 
This division is not simply a striation of physical space; it concerns geographic 
space, but it also designates subjective positions - as positions from which a border 
may be looked upon, as positions possessing rights and obligations, and as positions 
to which, given certain conditions, a surplus might accrue. The road, as a line of 
103 "Verordnung des Kaiserlichen Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Siidwestafrika betreffend die offentlichen 
Wege im Schutzgebiet (Wegeordnung)," in Akten des Zentralbiiros des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements 
(ZBU} [Files of the Central Office of the Imperial Government], Windhoek Archives, T.111.a.2, Bd 1, 
p. llff. 
104 "If no pastures have been designated along public roads according to § 6, a strip extending 500 m. in 
breadth on both sides of the road shall be deemed public pasture," We~ordnung (1912}, § 8. 
105 "If public pastures are not fenced, their borders shall be indicated with clearly visible markers." 
Wegeordnung (1912), § 6. 
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passage, integrates geographical and subjective space into a mechanism of social 
production at the same moment that it defines them. 
The ever increasing striation of space in colonization gives rise to strategies of 
resistance - strategies which call the border's bluff simply by crossing the physical 
space in which the border is absent. Those officials among the colonizers who have 
defined their subjective rights and obligations in terms of a ritual of crossing cannot 
automatically achieve the same mobility. This problem is frequently addressed by 
Ludwig von Estorff in his memoires of the various wars against the black nations of 
the colonial territory: 
... the major part [of the enemy] had already retreated to the east across the 
English border ... The rest scattered along the southern shore of the Orange, 
likewise in the safety of English territory. The English authorities watched 
with approval, and so it did not take long before newly equipr.sg bands had 
crossed the long border here and there to undertake new raids.1 • 
Later, von Estorff discovers that this imaginary line may also be crossed by his 
troops, provided he observe a certain ritual. Thus, in May 1906 he attacks Marinka 
south of the Orange river -
The skirmish with Marinka had taken place in English territory. I had 
disregarded my previous reservations in this regard, and the English officer 
accepted my subsequent apologies.107 
The ritual need be no more than an apology. When, in March 1908, Hauptmann von 
Erckert crosses the eastern border into English territory, the same thing occurs: 
The battle of Seatsub, as it was called, took place about 100 km east of the 
German border in English territory. I apologized to the English High 
Commissioner for this small oversight and he was satisfied. This was Lord 
Selbourn.108 
The border is not drawn as a line which cannot be crossed, but as one which 
may be crossed only in a particular manner. The crossing of the border does not 
negate it, but underlines the difference between the two fields which it separates. 
This it does with more efficiency than a simple restriction of any crossing 
106 Ludwig von Estorff, Wanderuni:en und Kampfe in Siidwestafrika, Ostafrika und Siidafrika 1894-1910 
[Travels and battles in South West Africa, East Africa and South Africa 1894-1910], ed. Christoph-
Friedrich Kutscher, Unveroffentlichte Dokumente zur Koloniali:eschichte Afrikas, gen. ed. John 
Meinert (Windhoek: Meinert, 1979), p. 126. 
107 von Estorff, Wanderuni:en und Karnpfe, p. 127. 
108 von Estorff, Wanderuni:en und Kampfe, p. 139. 
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whatsoever. For example, in a letter of 2 Oct 1912, representative Hintrager for the 
Imperial Governor informs the Regional and District Office that the 
English/German border may be crossed by troops of both sides.109 The conditions 
for this crossing are stated clearly - a veteranary certificate for hooved animals 
accompanying the crossing, crossing only in emergencies, and no use of firearms 
without express permission. 
The border also has extended effects upon the spaces it divides. The field which 
it establishes determines a number of subjective functions not directly concerned 
with the crossing of borders, but which are nevertheless affected by such crossing. 
These positions are also defined as geo-political, not via an idealistic mechanism of 
symbolic identification, but via a similar set of rights and obligations as we saw 
arising from travel on a public road.110 This is evident in a short confidential report 
addressed to Governor Lindequist on 15 Feb 1906, describing an incident in which a 
Ltn Trainer crossed the border into the English territory of Walfish Bay to take 
some wood which residents there had collected and left on the beach. When the 
latter protested, the German soldiers rounded them up, pointed their guns at them 
(which Trainer had ordered be loaded with live ammunition), and proceeded to 
cross the border with the wood. What is interesting here is not the fact of the 
crossing itself, but the ensuing embarrassment for the acting District Adminstrator 
who wrote the letter, since he had only learnt of the incident directly from Trainer 
while a guest in the latter's house. 
Since this is one of the cases where the duties of the official and citizen 
collide with the obligations a guest must have to his host, I wish to request 
most earnestly that no official use be made of my report unless this be 
rendered necessary by newspaper reports or enquiries.111 
We are faced here with a contradiction between the demands of international 
law and those of social form. Clearly, it is the crossing of the border which has 
initiated this contradiciton, and the acting Adminstrator has displaced it into a 
109 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvemements, WA ZBU A.l.d.1, p. 2-3. 
110 This is how I understand the editors of Herodote when, in an interview with Foucault, they speak of 
"the national internment of the citizen-soldier." Foucault, Questions of i:;eQi!aphy, p. 73. 
111 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU VIII.c, p. 6. 
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contradiction in subjective identity - is he first and foremost an official and citizen, 
or the guest of his host? He solves the contradiction by attempting to separate the 
two spheres. He takes great pains to emphasize that this report should remain 
confidential, and that, if at all possible, no action should be taken against Trainer. 
Furthermore, the solution he suggests to counter such problems as this is that 
military personnel be prohibited from crossing the border. The presence of the 
border gives rise to a contradiciton in subjective identity, which then leads to a 
reinforcement of the border. 
And yet, the fragmented geo-politcal spaces with their many borders must be 
totalized if knowledge is to survey the colony it has created. This takes place in a 
hierarchy of discourses and administrative functions; but it is also effected in a kind 
of colonial unconscious - the myth of unrestricted mobility. The form best suited to 
this myth is, as I indicated above, epic; its genre is the novel, and the most extreme 
exposition occurs in the sub-genre of the adventure story. This is well demonstrated 
in Herbert A Klein's Gold am Okotuso112 In this Wild-West style adventure story 
we see a constant attempt to develop a mythology of a perfectly mobile hero. This 
hero, whom they call the "Omatako rider," spends the entire course of the narrative 
tracking others across the desert and being tracked, fleeing from his enemies, hiding 
and reappearing. What we must note, in order to do justice to Michel Serres' 
insights, is that the seemingly banal space of this narrative is in fact a political space, 
in which the work of colonization is mythologized. Note the description of the hero's 
dwelling place: 
I would never had discovered this place if it had not been chosen as a hide by 
a leopard which I was stalking. It was my contest with him which won me the 
right to this secret gorge. His skin now graces the wall of the little hut that I 
built under the overhanging rock. If I had biltong and supplies I would not 
leave my hideout for weeks. It was a mystery to the natives that I did not use 
their water holes in the dry season, and suddenly appeared, fresh and well-
fed in places where they thought any white man must perish. Finally, legend 
spread its bright mantle over the mysterious rider. My horse could fly. I could 
become invisible at will and call, and could see twice as far as normal 
112 Herbert A Klein, Gold am Okoruso [Gold in the Okoruso] (Windhoek: Suidwes-Drukkery ca. 
1910). 
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humans, while my Bullets never missed their mark, even though I did not 
need to take aim ... 1 3 
And so on. Here is the colonial dream of mobility at its most banal. While the 
colonial project is bust laying tracks and marking roads across the land, designating 
borders, issuing proclamations, restricting movements etc., it dreams a dream of 
unrestricted motion, a mythical smoothing of space. Motion follows the paths of 
desire, and is profoundly opposed to the state. The Omatako Rider rides rings 
around the soldiers he meets on the way, who, as the most mobile sector of the state, 
are nevertheless weighed down with "a number of pack-horses," and move at a slow 
pace.114 Now, we would be overlooking the subtlety of this seemingly so unsubtle 
myth if we were to read it on the level of a flight from civilization, or escapism. It is 
that, but it is more. The colonizing project tends to acquire land simply by moving 
across it. This is accomplished by way of a writing, which preserves the presence of 
the colonizer in a timeless (ahistorical) reality which is passed off as the destiny and 
heritage of the land. I have mentioned this already, and in a later chapter I intend to 
show in detail a few ways in which this is effected. However, the acquisition of land 
in the name of a writing requires the establishment of borders and ensuing 
subdivision. This in tum leads to an ever increasing segmentation and fragmentation 
of space on almost every level - the administrative, discursive, perceptual, but also 
on the epistemological level. And this fragmentation brings with it a ritual of 
crossing, which is constantly violating the borders it has created. The colony must, 
however, present itself as a unity, not only for the purposes of ideology, but also 
(and perhaps this is a more important consideration), for the purpose of 
communication -its very functioning as a colony. It is the myth of mobility which 
establishes an itinerary of colonial discourse, granting the individual a mythical 
ability to join all the various spaces and spatial qualities which colonization has 
fragmented. Even in 1910 ( ca.) when this story was written, the type of mobility the 
hero enjoys was purely mythical. What then has been accomplished with the telling 
113 Klein, Gold am Okaruso, p. 26 
114 Klein, Gold am Okaruso, p. 6 
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of this myth? It is a restoration of the totality of experience which the capitalist 
fragmentation of space is constantly threatening and which appears as a specific 
attraction of colonial space in comparison to European space. The myth allows the 
subject to move at will across the space of the capitalist landscape without having to 
pay for his constant crossing of borders with any of those levies on monetary or 
subjective economy which the capitalist machine always claims as a social sacrifice. 
CHAPTER 2: LOOKING 
Soweit der Blick reicht, ein unendlich 
Dehnen 
Der Flachen, die kein Stromesgilrtel trennt, 
Daruber hochgewolbtes Firmament, 
Fem, kaum noch sichtbar, graue 
Bergeslehnen -
Das ist Sudwest ... 
Hier kann der Geist ins Unbegrenzte 
schweifen. .. 
Heinrich Meyer-Brunslar 
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1 SPACE WITHOUT BORDERS: THE AFFECT ECONOMY OF SPACE. 
l. l The productivity of boundless space 
In the previous chapters, I indicated that looking and writing are the two major 
modes in which colonization appropriates space by organizing it into a functional 
network of discreet spaces. In the following two chapters, I wish to demonstrate in 
more detail how this is effected. I will be arguing that the colonizer arrives in a new 
territory and surveys it with a gaze which is an initial appropriation of space. It 
defines spaces of objectivity and establishes relations between these spaces. It also 
determines the way in which these spaces may be rendered productive. This involves 
in all cases strategies for mapping universal principles onto specific objects 
apprehended in vision. The specificity of these objects must be negated in order that 
they may be integrated into a system of universal knowledge. Since the dialectic of 
vision is always indeterminate, it must be resolved in a manner capable of 
preserving fixed positions of subjectivity and objectivity - positions from which it is 
possible to speak, and spaces of application, in which this speech is valid. For this 
reason, the goal of looking is always writing. Furthermore, the colonizer is always 
looking with an infQrmed gaze, a gaze of knowledge, and it is important to recognize 
that this gaze issues forth from a position which has already been written. The gaze 
of the colonizer will therefore have to be analyzed as an initial apprehension of the 
new in terms of the known, a glance situated between texts. This glance is by 
definition diverse and tends toward the amorphous, and I shall be forced to analyse 
it as it preserves itself in texts. I shall be concentrating on two general 'fields' of 
looking - the gaze which takes as its object the body of the native and the native's 
spaces; and the gaze which apprehends the productivity of the land or of trade. 
Before investigating these fields of vision, however, it should serve to illuminate 
the problem of vision in colonization if we examine two novels which thematize the 
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attempt to see space without borders. This attempt 1s, analytically at least, a 
prerequisite to the colonizing vision, the informed vision which defines discrete 
spaces of knowledge. In order that borders be defined across the colonial territory, it 
is necessary that the space of the colony first be shown to be uniform and 
homogeneous - so universal in qualities that it approaches a state devoid of quality. 
This idea has been expressed by Homi Bhabha. Bhabha claims that "at the center of 
the originary myth of colonialist power ... is the demand that the space it occupies be 
unbounded, its reality coincident with the emergence of an imperialist narrative and 
history, its discourse nondialogi,c, its enunciation unitary, unmarked by the trace of 
difference."1 This necessity finds itself in conflict with the need to articulate the 
colony in terms of difference, which, as we have already seen, opens the spatiality of 
the sign into the other diverse spaces which the colony comprises. As long as 
colonization takes as its initiating gesture the gaze into borderless space, 
signification will always be undermined by the colonial project itself. The site where 
this tension must be resolved is the space of the subject, and its successful resolution 
is a prerequisite to social being. 
This has two important repercussions in colonial discourse. Firstly, the longing 
of the individual for a mystical experience of boundless space - which I would 
interpret as the narcissistic longing of unification with the object - is a constant 
theme, even in 'non-fictional' discourse. Secondly, this longing is experienced as a 
primal urge and projected onto the landscape in the form of an essentially demonic 
quality of non-European space. The indeterminacy of this relationship between 
narcissistic desire and demonic magnetism must be overcome. This is done by 
developing a manner of gazing which I will call scientific. The desiring subject looks 
into boundless space with a gaze informed by a socially determined body of 
knowledge. This may take the form of scientific principles, or of moral imperatives. 
The result is in all cases the same - a polarization of knowledge into the self-
1 Bhabha, Siims taken as wonders, p. 176. 
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reflexion of a coherent subject on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
aggressive projection of desire's chaotic indeterminacy onto the colonial object. 
The conflict arising out of the initial apprehension of boundless space initiates a 
tension within the entire corpus of colonial discourse. Desire is invariably 
articulated as tom between dissolution in this boundless space and confinement 
within boundaries - boundaries which allow it to be represented as desire. And 
invariably, the definition of boundaries and the representation of desire is a 
productive process, out of which the space of representation appears as colonial 
space. Before examining in detail an example of this process, let us look briefly at a 
few typical examples of this desire for boundless space as it expresses itself in 
colonial discourse. 
The boundless space of the African landscape opens itself initially to the 
European eye. I have tried to show above that the desire which is activated in this 
elicitation of the gaze seems well explained using Lacan's theory of the imaginary. 
The following short paragraph may stand as an illustration of this. 
Africa! Whoever has once drunk from the enchanted cup, in which the 
draught of welcome is offered to the guest; whoever has once measured 
[durchmessen] her vrt expances, if only with his eye: he is fallen under her 
spell for all eternity. 
The seduction of Africa is aimed primarily at a kind of vision which can look 
into space without focussing on any features which might disturb its homogeneity. 
However, the specificity of this gaze is always mapping the diverse and multiple 
flows of desire onto a molar structure. The eye is not permitted to wander at 
random through boundless space. After all, how could such a vision without 
qualities be narrated? And more important, how could it be productive? Even the 
attempt to represent such vision in general terms in the above passage finds itself 
focussing vision in a determinate line. The phrase: "whoever has traversed its 
endless expanses only with his eye" pivots about the word durchmessen (to cross, to 
measure precisely), in which the seemingly indeterminate vision into featureless 
2 Mattenklodt, Afrikanische Ja~den, p. 5. 
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space is shown to bear the qualities of the scientific tabulating gaze which must of 
necessity follow it. To look into empty space is already to measure it. 
The reasons for this are complex, and are probably best understood in terms of 
the Lacanian thesis that it is impossible for a desiring subject to gaze into the world 
without postulating a position of subjectivity from which this gaze issues forth. And 
furthermore, this position must always be defined in relation to a social field, within 
which both subject and object may be situated. What this means for our purposes is 
that the subject is constantly defining his desire for boundless space in terms of a 
social field; he is positioning himself in relation to a European gaze, and he is 
casting this gaze into a space whose boundlessness must be understood in relation to 
the decidedly non-European qualities of the African landscape. This is evident in 
the following paragraph: 
Wilhelm Hubner gazed into the distance. There was something about the 
glow of the stars which always enchanted him. He always felt how his heart 
was expanded and exalted. The stars spoke to him of home, of something 
weat and sublime! And it hurt him to think that they could not see these 
images at home.3 
It is this tension between the need to gaze with the eyes of the socius but to look 
onto the unknown which will eventually serve to re-allign this random longing to the 
needs of social production. For this reason, it is not by chance that this type of 
euphoric praise of Africa's boundless spaces so often shifts subtly ( or not so subtly) 
into a discourse on the future of this space as a space which is owned. This is plain 
to see in the following paragraph: 
In this small kingdom of thorns, acacias, stones, grass clumps and fodder 
bushes a land owner has elbow room on all sides, an endless view into the 
distance and into the future [Aus- und Weitblick], onto coming times and 
generations, and a rich field for all to work.4 
The narrative constructs a line of vision into empty space which is at the same 
time a vision into the future. This duality is borne by the words Aus- und Weitblick. 
And this gaze into the future sees empty space occupied by the descendents of the 
3 Hans Walther, "Die Stettiner Sanger," [The Stettin singers] in Orio~! Novellen von der Pad [Orlog! 
Novellas from the road], by Hans Walther (Berlin: Concordia, 1910), p. 37. 
4 Johannes Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner [An old African], (Wismar: Hinstorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1913), p. 448. 
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subject. Here we reach the crucial point, which is to be developed further below. 
The loss of subjectivity initiated by gazing into empty space must find a counter 
strategy which can confirm subjective being. For this reason, it is necessary that the 
freedom of boundless space be restricted to a potentiality which can never be 
actualized. Von Estorff cannot get over the idea that freedom is one of the spatial 
attributes of South West Africa. Comparing the colony to German East Africa, he 
states the advantages of the former as " ... the good pastures, the good air and the 
great freedom which the land offers its few inhabitants."5 This freedom is a 
constantly recurring motif in the discourse of South West Africa, and is worthy of 
closer attention. From von Estorff s phrasing, it seems clear that this freedom is to 
be understood primarily in spatial terms: the 10 000 hectare farms, the wide 
unfenced spaces, the open plains with their expansive views; all of this seems to 
support the argument. But we must ask ourselves what the value of spatial freedom 
might be seen to be. Here we see that there is more than one level of spatial 
organisation at work, and that there are a number of serious restricting factors 
which would call the metaphorical value of this spatial freedom into question. This 
is accomplished in a manner designed to render boundless space productive. 
This is achieved initially by limiting it against European knowledge. When, for 
example, Ludwig von Estorff gazes on an African sunset, he represents this 
experience as follows: 
Like the northern lights, the settin~ sun casts a crown of rays across the 
opposite horizon. This performance 1s indescribably beautiful and sublime. It 
is as if to compensate the wanderer for the stark, monotonous, meager 
steppes and their raw, bare, jagged mountain chains. B&1t nature is mighty in 
desolate places, and in them lies the breath of freedom. 
The first sentence addresses European experience, comparing von Estorffs 
vision to a more European sight. The next sentence places this vision once again 
outside of the bounds of the familiar and the representable. But the European 
reader has already been told the nature of the signifier which is inadequate for this 
experience, and he finds himself positioned firmly in the domain of metaphorical 
5 von Estorff, Wanderun1:en und Kampfe, p. 142. 
6 van Estorff, Wanderun1:en und Kampfe, p. 102. 
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speech. This metaphorical speech then reverts back to a simple description. Finally, 
the reader is told of the freedom which may be found here. And this all in the tense 
of the timeless present. The rhetorics of von Estorff s description tell us how the 
freedom of which he speaks is to be understood. It does not lie in the dissolution of 
self in boundless beauty, boundless emotion, boundless space. It lies in the ability to 
limit language against that which language cannot speak; to cross the border from 
denotation to the unrepresentable, and to return again; to gaze upon the specific 
features of a strange landscape and position them within the European system of 
universal representation. This freedom is an initial capture of space, effected by 
infusing it with European qualities. This universalizing gaze produces freedom in its 
ability to cross given boundaries. The mythical mastery of space creates freedom not 
only in the crossing of borders in physical space, but in its ability to tie this activity to 
a de-limitation of sugnification. The crossing of borders is also an excursion beyond 
the denotative and communicative realm of language, in order to reinforce the 
spaces which signification reserves for itself - the spaces within which it can function. 
An interesting case in point is the novel by Lene Haase: Ra~gys Fahrt nach 
Siidwest.7 Here we see an American heroine who bears with her the entire 
mythology of the Wild West: her father what we might call a mountain of a man, 
who let her daughter grow up wild in the young nation. As a sophisticated yet, at 
heart, still a wild young adult, she travels to South West Africa, only to find that this 
mythology must be modified in certain ways if it is to be mapped onto a new 
landscape. In the end she is tamed into a respectable marriage, and abandons the 
land to settle in Germany. What has been proven? That mapped onto a landscape 
seemingly unmarked by the myriad physical restraining factors of fin de siecle 
Europe is a series of privileged paths of communication, travel and vision, a network 
of nodal points and isolated fields. These are all European paths which write a 
European presence on the face of the land, and all of them have the final effect of 
restricting her movement physically while at the same time captivating her in every 
7 Lene Haase, Ra~gys Fahrt nach Sudwest [Raggy goes to South West], (Berlin: 1910; reprint ed. 
Berlin: Fleischel, 1919) 
COWNIAL SPACE• 198 
sense of the word. She is caught up in this network only because she has found 
herself in a position where she invests a certain subjective energy in it. We will find 
this hidden paradox concealed again and again in the colonial discourse of German 
South West Africa - the freedom of its wide open spaces has the power to captivate. 
[Raggy] swung up onto the low wall and, leaning on a column, gazed into the 
still, endlessly sombre and melancholy land. It was as if the drought lay over 
everything like a dull weight. Everything was dry and cracked, and the air was 
full of dust.. No moist, refreshing breath of air, no drop of moisture. A 
majestic stillness lay over the expanse of bushland. 
Raggy felt the greatness of this wild, raw land which knew no gentle scenery, 
no cheerful motif, and it held a strange attraction for her.8 
For Raggy, this captivation takes the form of a sexual attraction. Time and 
again, we find her being pursued by men who do not appeal to her in the slightest, 
and always when this happens, she displaces any possible attraction she might have 
felt for her admirer in two directions: first onto the freedom of the land ... 
Raggy did not tum aside, but rode straight ahead, towards the black 
mountains. Silently the doctor followed her. He watched her with burning 
gaze, and his breath was heavy. 
She payed him no attention. She held the reins loosely and stared into the 
white, shimmering distance. 
She thought of noone, not even of Hans. There was no memory in her. 
She had a feeling of an endless, benevolent Nirvana, of being freed from all 
earthly things. 
She always had this feeling in the great, free wildernis.9 
... and then onto the mythical memory of her father. What is crucial is that these two 
mythologies intersect in a field characterized by an apparently unlimited mobility. In 
order to demonstrate this, let us look at a long passage in which Raggy's father and 
the theme of her upbringing is first introduced. 
Since her mother had always been sickly and died early, Raggy had been 
brou~ht up almost solely by her father, who saw his own spiritual and 
physical image growing in this lovely wild bein~. It was no wonder that the 
proud, almost lonely man gave all his love to this child, whose character was 
so similar to his. He never let himself be separated from Raggy. On all his 
journeys, in the wildest lands, in luxury baths, big cities and to famous 
racecourses, he always took her along. She had the best teachers, and learned 
from her father, who showed her the whole world, and so she received an 
education far above standard. Although he was not an American, Mr Warden 
preferred to live in the United States because of its greater freedom, and so 
Raggy's nature and ideas gradually became more those of an American than 
~ German. But in all other respects, th~ wild young girl shared. the cavalier 
lifestyle of her father. Soon she was Just as much at home m expensive 
8 Haase, Raggys Fahrt, p. 243. 
9 Haase, Raggys Fahrt, p. 199. 
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restaurants and hotels, on green lawns and in the ele~ant world of big cities 
as any cavalier. It was very seldom that Raggy came mto contact with other 
women, who might have had a refining effect and brought out the feminine 
side of her character. And so she became somewhat rough, and her 
behaviour was quite cavalier. So too were here manners and speech, which, 
in the wide world, no one held against her. Perhaps that was her greatest 
charm. Sensible people shook their heads, and her German relations, 
Hamburg aristocrats, were shocked by her upbringing.10 
We can recognize in this description a polarity between the limitless (and thus 
threatening) expanses of the wide world on the one hand and the confined ( and thus 
sheltering) spaces of domesticated European towns on the other - a polarity 
characteristic of 19th century German realism. However, this polarity is more than a 
conflict between traditional values upset by expanding technological horizons and 
the possibilities which these developments provided for the bourgeois class in the 
19th century. What is at stake here is the question of how to reconcile two opposing 
factors - on the one hand, a real physical mobility which is a prerequisite for 
capitalist production; on the other hand, the need for a relative immobility which is 
a prerequisite for subjective identity. When we examine the above passage, we see 
that the latter is provided by an identification with Raggy's father (" ... this child, 
whose character was so similar to his."), but also with their common mobility itself. 
Raggy becomes identified with a cavalier, because of her ability to move about and 
to be at home in restaurants, cities, etc, but also in the wild. In this kind of discourse 
we find an interesting thing happening: subjective identity is no longer given in a 
discursive or perceptual relation to a preexistent objective world - the space of the 
objective world is established by the mode in which a moving eye chooses to 
represent its own stability.11 
Mobility is given on a number of levels. First there is a mobility through 
geographic space, the movement through "the whole world," a mobility facilitated by 
those technological means we find being accorded such a major role in the novel: 
ships and trains. Then there is a mobility from one quality of space to another, from 
10 Haase, Raws Fahrt, p. 23-24. 
11 As we might expect, this last attempt at a realist discourse will soon give way in German literature to 
the fractured identity of Expressionist perception, in which this struggle for identity of a moving eye will 
become thematic. 
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"the wildest lands" to "luxury baths, big cities and to famous racecourses." Then there 
is a moral mobility beyond the narrow horizons of bourgeois society. Finally there is 
a mobility through different qualities of subjective space, a mobility which 
transposes the freedom of physical movement onto the level of subjectivity. What is 
important here is that these qualities adhere to different qualities of physical space, 
so that in order to draw them together into an identity, it is necessary for Raggy to 
adopt a masquerade, the "attitude of a cavalier," in which she is constantly 
presenting a mask to the world. Behind this mask a multiplicity of identities 
proliferates - a multiplicity which threatens subjectivity as it does culture. 
Raggy stood a bit beyond good and evil. This was perhaps a result of her 
unusual upbringing, in which nothing was forbidden. Limits and laws did not 
exist for her. The will of her father was her only law. Since this will no longer 
tamed her, she no longer knew, at least in pnnciple, any limits whatsoever, 
neither social nor moral. In the midst of the most formal society in Germany 
she felt as free as any Indian on the prairie.12 
Although in this and the above introductory passage, the narrator presents these 
qualities in order to glorify her heroine, it is with increasing difficulty that their 
positive flavour is retained as the novel progresses. Raggy treads a narrow path 
between a subjective economy which reconciles physical movement at the cost of its 
own feeling of freedom, and one in which the masquerade fails, and subjectivity is 
lost to the wiles of the death drive. The problem is one of desire - because of her 
relation to her father, Raggy does not possess a trace of that naivity on which 
seduction feeds, and as a result she continually displaces the desire of men onto her 
own desire for mobility, in all senses of the word mentioned above. Typical of the 
way in which her desire is related to sensuality and to the sexual advances of men is 
the following passage: 
Ahrens leaned against the cabin wall opposite and observed her with a 
strange shimmer in his eyes. Because of the breeze, Raggy had carelessly 
thrown a white veil embroidered in silver over her dark hair. Her arms were 
folded under her head, and she was listening with dreamy eyes to the sounds 
of La Paloma. 
The electric light did not quite reach into this comer, and only a yellow glow 
fell on the folds of her dress. 
White rays of moonli$ht flooded her motionless face and lit up the little 
silver sequins of her vetl. 
12 Haase, Ra~KY§ Fahrt, p. 26. 
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Dahlmann leaned forward in his chair. "How beautiful the Princess Salome 
looks tonight," he murmured softly. 
Raggy turned her head indifferently, and the dreamy look had disappeared 
from her eyes. J>on't talk nonsense, Dahlmann! - Why don't you order a few 
beers instead." 
Desire is articulated in the gestures of narcissism ( the veil, the dreamy eyes, the 
motionless face). But what is this desire? As we have seen, narcissistic desire cannot 
know itself, nor can it articulate itself without becoming something else. Surrounded 
by men, Raggy always becomes the object of their desire; yet as soon as they attempt 
to approach her, she either projects a narcissitic subjectivity onto the landscape (as 
we saw happening above), in which case she is flirting with death, - or else the 
narcissistic countenance changes, she adopts the mask of the cavalier and we see 
that her desire was something else. But what? We do not know. And so this is what 
we begin looking for in the novel. Those who do not guess the answer on page 23 
are told soon enough. 
''That's just it!" Raggy sighed. Since no one impresses me, I can't marry 
anyone. I'd feel sorry for the poor guy, I'm sure I'd mistreat him horribly. -
The only man who ever impressed me was my father."14 
What is interesting is that Raggy expresses this desire for a dead father as a desire 
for unlimited motion. 
But that was just the problem! She wouldn't be able to stand a life of 
peaceful bliss. 
She would be driven out again into the wide world, to adventures and 
dangers, onto the wide ocean, to far, hot countries.15 
This desire is in turn very easily translatable into a romantic longing for 
unbounded space. Thus when Raggy climbs onto the railing at the bow of the ship 
taking her to South West Africa for the first time, this is the experience she is 
seeking: 
An endless dark surface spread out before them and merged into the night 
sky. And through the middle of this dark ocean the moonlight drew an 
endless road, sparkling in gentle motion, like a wide river of pure silver. .. 
The ship with its lights, its life and activity, could no longer be seen from up 
here. Here you stood alone on a small piece of solid ground and drove 
straight into eternity, into Nirvana.16 
13 Haase, Ra&m Fahrt, p. 59. 
14 Haase, Ra~ Fahrt, p. n. 
15 Haase, Ra~ Fahrt, p. 62. 
16 Haase, Ra~ Fahrt, p. 74. 
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This is where the narrator will soon encounter the negative aspects of Raggy's 
desire. Of course the problem here is the same facing any form of romantic longing. 
Where the subject flirts with its own fulfilment, it is playing with the death drive. As 
we have seen, the very structure of Raggy's cavalier identity introduces a tension 
between the masquerade of identity and the multiplicity it would collect and unify. 
We have already encountered this phenomenon of the transformation of the molar 
into the molecular, and we have already claimed that what is important in colonial 
discourse is the manner in which this desire is mapped onto an object. Just to 
underline this, however, let us glance briefly at a paragraph in another novel which 
might illustrate this more clearly. 
The endless monotony of the thorn bush came to an end, and the eye was 
graced with a friendly landscape of meadows and copses, and a ring of 
mountain peaks. The rider looked about him and said: "I have come to love 
this land in spite of its barrenness and desolation, in spite of its wildness and 
drought. I came full of prejudice, like many others, and I gained a new, 
beloved Fatherland. This much-cursed colony must have a magic power of 
attraction to be able to hold so many strong men. Yes, South Africa's wide 
spaces give elbow room to whoever leaves Europe's suffocating narrowness. 
They give a man great possibilities for the future, immense surfaces meet his 
hunger for land and give free play to his German wanderlust and urge for 
adventure."17 
The desire expressed here is the same as Raggy's. But here the context is more 
easily recognizable. The romantic longing which looks for a space in which it can 
unfold its phantasies is not to be read as a universal quality of desire. It has specific 
historical and geographical determinates. And the quality of space which defines 
these determinates is also not a chance quality. "European confinement" is a 
political determinate. And simliarly, the ''wide open spaces" of Africa must always 
be specified if they are to serve as a stage for this drama of desire. 
Raggy, too, maps her desire onto the wide open spaces of the landscape. Even 
before she reaches South West Africa, she states: 
"I have seen the Alps and the Rocky Mountains, and the Himalayas too, but 
none of those made as strong an impression on me as the ocean or the silent 
desert. The concept of endlessnfgs does not find expression in the mountains 
as it does in wide, open spaces." 
17 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 379-380. 
18 Haase, Rawrs Fahrt, p. 50. 
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Given this desire, it should be quite clear why Raggy is perceived in South West 
Africa as a threat to the established order of the colony. For a desire such as hers, 
the colonizing work of ordering molecular multiplicities into a molar space is 
nothing but an impediment to the freedom of movement across a smooth space. But 
let us not deceive ourselves; before she even sets foot in South West Africa, Raggy 
has objectified her desire in a manner which can only be called colonizing. When 
she decides to become engaged to Lieutenant Reburg, it is first and foremost the 
supposed unbounded freedom of a farmer's life in the colony which causes her to 
commit herself - this together with a transference onto Reburg's fatherly 
characteristics. 
"Now listen carefully, Raggy! In three years my time in South West will be 
finished. Then I want to say farewell and go farming. - That's always been my 
plan. - It's not a great life, a farmer's life! But you've got more freedom on 
your own land ... and you say that you love me! Raggy, can you wait that long? 
Will you. be my wife then?" He looked into her eyes with a serious and 
quest1omng look. 
A feeling of joy rose in Raggy, of peace and shelter in the arms of this good, 
faithful man. 
Perhaps it was possible to tame all these wild urges, this adventurous blood ... 
and to be happy. 
And he didn't want to lock her up in Germany in a narrow city life; he was 
offering her the free, wild life of a farmer in an uncivilized country. 
She would always have horses and be able to go hunting ... And he was so 
d . 1 119 strong an m ove .... 
For most of the novel, Raggy then experiments with this hypothesis that her 
desire may be fulfilled in the boundless space of the colony and in the protective 
(though absent) arms of Reburg. The narrator goes to great lengths to expound the 
possibilities of free movement in the spaces of South West Africa. Soon after Raggy 
arrives in Liideritzbucht, however, we begin to realize that this is only an apparent 
freedom - there are other forces which serve to regulate the freedom of movement 
and render it productive for colonization. 
Paradigmatic for this development in the colony is the portrayal of the diamond 
fields. When Raggy first visits the fields, they have not yet been surveyed; they are 
open to anyone, and a kind of anarchy characterizes the way in which the money-
19 Haase, Ra~gys Fahrt, pp. 89-90. 
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hungry prospectors relate to their space. Thus Raggy discovers a group of 
prospectors removing the claim markers of another group. 
That was very nice! They tore down other people's posts and put up their 
own. And then the other people's prospecting posts were simply gone. Why 
didn't they keep guard over them? 
Since the fields had not been surveyed, no one could prove that their posts 
had been here. Anyway, what did it matter to her? Who knew how long Mr 
Kohn's and Mr Schlau's prospecting plates were safe before they met with 
the same fate. 
In any case, they hjd planned well, since everything was to be revised by law 
in the near future! 
What is important in the construction of the colony is not the chaotic, unstable 
spatial configuration prevailing at this early stage; what will be significant is only the 
configuration at the time of transformation into a spatial order fixed in 
representation (surveying) and ratified by the law. We have already observed that 
this must be effected via the establishment of nodal points which serve to distinguish 
various discreet spaces. 
Raggy's mobility is not simply a mythical mastery of physical space. It is also an 
attempt to master those spatial imperatives which the socius must place upon 
individual subjective desire. Raggy attempts not only to cross physical space as if this 
could be achieved without moving from one spatial quality to another; she also 
attempts to act within the social domain as if class restrictions, moral standards etc. 
could not restrict her in any way. Her freedom of movement has only personal affect 
value for her. As a result, she finds herself increasingly at conflict with the general 
aims of colonization. The domain where this conflict is carried out is that of 
communication. The spatial organization of the colony is charaterized by a 
channelling of information which effectively counters its spatial expanse, at least as 
it affects Raggy. The nature of this organization is to subvert Raggy's projection of 
desire onto boundless space by reversing this projection and reducing all of her 
physical mobility to a subjective quality which the inhabitants of the colony then 
firmly condemn in terms of prevailing moral standards. When, on her very first day 
in Liideritzbucht, Raggy goes riding with Dahlmann and Dr Ernst, her complete lack 
20 Haase, Ra~gys Fahrt. p. 192. 
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of inhibitions as well as her unusual elegance makes her the object of local 
attention. 
"You're causing a sensation here!" Dahlmann said, smiling. 
"Yes, they've never seen anything so fashionable and elegant." Doctor Ernst 
laughed. 
"Strangely enough, half of the ladies here are narrow-minded people from 
small towns, and the other half are barmaids and other noble creatures of 
dubious standing." 
"Are there no ladies here?" asked Raggy in astonishment. 
"Oh yes, a few, but they keep to themselves." 
'That's terrible. I thought things were freer here in Africa!" 
"Well, you'll see, my lady, South West is just one small town ... "21 
It is through the gossip of this "small town" that the most important spatial 
transformation in the novel is effected - Raggy's permanent separation from 
Reburg. Raggy's mobility, in all the senses mentioned above is mustered under the 
anonymous eye of the speech of the socius - for this is another name for gossip. This 
gossip restores spatial order in two ways - it reduces Raggy's mobility to a 
transgression of spatial order which is situated in her subjective constitution, and, by 
the network it establishes throughout the colony, it reduces the field through which 
she moves to a perfectly saturated (if imperfectly transmitting) network of 
communication. 
When Raggy notes this fact, she attempts to render it harmless by grasping it in 
terms of class relations - she regards the gaze which falls on her from among the 
populace as that ambivalent mixture of spite and admiration which the master finds 
in the gaze of the servant, and in which the former knows to read his irrefutible 
superiority. 
"I couldn't care less what a few proles gossip about me! I just want to have a 
look at the land, and as long as I pay, I couldn't care less what the inhabitants 
think. - When we dock in Hamburg I'm still the lady, and the others 
disappear amongst the middle-class people."22 
This is of course exactly what will happen in the end. Raggy will discover that 
her dream of free spaces has not materialized. But at least she has succeeded in 
retaining the relative freedom to make the "middle class people" (in English in the 
original) disappear into an indeterminate mass (whereby it remains an enigma 
21 Haase, RaW'§ Fahrt, p. 152. 
22 Haase, RaW'§ Fahrt, p. 154. 
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whether the identification of the proletariat with the middle class is to be traced to 
the author's poor knowledge of the English language , or social theory, or both!). In 
contrasting these two possible "freedoms," the novel is dramatizing a basic conflict in 
colonial discourse's mythology of boundless space. 
In this regard, Hugh Ridley implies that class-based arrogance, such as that 
shown by Raggy, is unsuitable to the colonial understanding of its own social 
stuctures. Colonial discourse attempted to develop a mythology of a "classless 
society," or at least a society in which class barriers were relatively flexible, allowing 
a greater mobility. If we examine this mythology more closely, we can see that we 
are dealing with a proto-fascist discourse, in which desire of the masses is mobilized 
for the ramification of capitalist production. When Ridley speaks of an "equality 
based on achievement and resposibility and not upon inherited money or traditional 
social status,"23 I interpret this as a freeing of labour power for a more efficient 
functioning of capitalist machinery. This is supported by Ridley when he refers to 
Memmi's "highly critical account of the proto-Fascist social behaviour latent in 
colonial society."24 
As the novel progresses, it becomes increasingly apparent that Raggy's mobility 
must also be seen as a social mobility. This is a recurrent preoccupation with the 
German colonial novel, which, as Ridley notes, "most fully illustrates colonial life as 
an escape into classlessness."25 It is this flight into classlessness that provides the 
fascist dimension of colonial fiction. Wherever class is experienced as a restriction 
of individual desire, colonialist fiction presents a mythology of an escape into 
boundless space which is an escape into classlessness. Thus in Johannes Dose's 
book, the protagonist - a young officer, Erb von Erbenheim, - is (wrongfully) 
convicted of stealing a ring to pay his gambling debts. As a result, he becomes an 
outcast from the nobility. This renders him unable to live in the strictly class-
structured society of contemporary Germany, and so he leaves for Africa. He is 
23 Ridley, Imafi;es of Imperial rule, pp. 126-127. 
24 Ridley, Imafi;es of Imperial rule, p. 127. 
25 Ridley, Imafi;es of Imperial rule, p. 128. 
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welcomed by his uncle with a myth of classlessness, which the latter spells out as 
follows: 
" ... the incredibly sensational story of the son of an aristocratic Councillor of a 
Provincial Court, who pawned a ring he had found, or that wasn't his, in 
order to pay his gambling debts.. that was even in the East African 
newspapers ... and that's why I wrote your mother and had you sent out here. 
There's no room for people like us in oh-so-honourable Germany. But here 
there's elbow roo1l}; to make a new, broad-minded Germany ... The story's 
buried. Forget it!" 
Nevertheless, the very formulation of this myth makes it clear that classlessness 
is to be understood as an abolition of boundaries which are purely spatial. What is 
being produced here is a freedom of movement. If we return to the argument 
concerning the conflict between the despotic machine and the capitalist machine, we 
will recall that this appears as a conflict between a form of production with strongly 
defined boundaries, and another one which introduces mobility into it. Clearly, this 
is the conflict with which we are dealing.27 
This conflict is also evident in the theme of women's emancipation, which 
Ridley ties to the question of classlessness. 
Women must also be numbered among those $lad to have escaped from 
Germany. Many felt that the active, demanding hfe of the settler gave to the 
settler's wife much more responsibility and status than was available to 
women in Germany. For this reason German colonial fiction remained close 
to the circles working for women's emancipation. At the same time, however, 
many women appear to have escaped from Germany for the opposite reason. 
Because they disapproved of the moves towards emancipation, because the 
'modern woman' m Germany horrifed them, they set up in the colonies a 
regressive, peasant style of life, gratefully accepting the simplicity of the 
demands which this life made on them.28 
This conflict is well illustrated throughout "Raggys Fahrt," and we discover at 
the end that Raggy's experiments in mobility revert to a reconfirmation of the 
boundaries between the classes, just as her experiments in emancipation serve to 
prove that happiness can only be found under a benevolent man's thumb. 
26 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 106-107. 
27 For this reason I would only agree to a certain extent with the interpretation put forward by 
Bergmann that a rigid class structure has been transposed onto African society simply by extending it 
to include the blacks (Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. TT). This model does not do sufficient 
justice to the subtlety of the colonial enterprise, nor does it take into account that this class structure is, 
at the time in question, already well on the way to being demolished in Europe. 
28 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 128. 
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This realization centers around the scenes where she confronts a man whom she 
can compare with her father. In doing so, she will find that (inverting Lacan's 
formula that man's desire is the desire of the Other) the desire of the father was 
nothing but the father's desire for her, ("It was no wonder that the proud, almost 
lonely man gave all his love to this child, whose character was so similar to his.")29 -
because of this, she is his master. 
Her whole body trembled as in a fever. 
He was on his knees before her, be~ng. 
There was not a droP. of blood left m her face. She looked down at him with a 
brutal, mocking snnle. "You!," she whispered, brutally grasping his hands, 
which she held tightly. "I don't want to, do you hear me?!" Her voice 
trembled. "I'm your master! You!"30 
With the knowledge that the one place which seemed most likely to provide her 
with the longed-for scene of free movement in a boundless space is infused with a 
network of communication mythologising its own capture of space; and that the one 
man who seemed most likely to represent her father is, for this very reason, her 
inferior, she returns to Hamburg, to marry her cousin and settle to a life of domestic 
bliss. An anti-colonial novel? Most certainly not. For what has been accomplished is 
a complete and remainderless reduction of a real physical mobility across qualityless 
spaces and a real desire for flight - a reduction to an individualized quality which, 
after coming into conflict with prevailing social norms, returns upon itself and 
presents itself as originating in a self- sufficient individual divorced from these 
norms. The faults of the socius have been successfully reduced to the weakness of 
the individual, and this weakness has been overcome. 
1.2 The dangers of boundless space 
We have seen that colonial discourse must construct a boundless, featureless, 
homogeneous space which may serve as the stage upon which colonial desire may 
29 Haase, Rag~s Fahrt, p. 23. 
30 Haase, Ragm Fahrt, p. 400. 
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produce its phantasies. Because of this, the even stronger necessity of establishing a 
rigid spatial order within the colony gives rise to a conflict within the 
representational mode. It follows that colonial discourse will take great pains to 
isolate a productive cathexis in boundless space and distinguish it from that 
romantic longing which bears the seeds of colonization's destruction. Where 
boundless space cannot be made productive in colonial discourse, it becomes the 
space of chaotic desire, onto which the death drive is projected. Let us consider a 
novel in which this is the case. 
In Orla Holm's novel QYita we see an attempt to contrast two different ways of 
gazing on the landscape.31 It is the wide open spaces with their indeterminate 
horizon and their borderless expanse which yield the demonic quality of the African 
experience. The gaze which dedicates itself to the borderless expanse is depicted 
here as the gaze of romantic yearning, and is incorporated in the two "weak" figures 
in the book, Ina von KeBler and Dr Nielsen.32 Ina responds to the monotonous 
lifestyle in the colony with a longing for unbounded freedom: 
Then I often have a feeling as if I couldn't go on - as if I had to stay there, 
down below in the valley, while so many people wander past me - While they 
all climb up to the heights! Standing up there gazing out, so far ... over the 
whole wide world down below.33 
Ina's weakness lies not merely in the fact of her relationship with an unbounded 
space, but in the extent to which she allows its indeterminacy to seize her. We have 
seen that, in colonial fiction, we often encounter characters who draw a strength (in 
social production) from this spatial quality. They do so, however, because of its 
efficacy in establishing a dialectic of identity which positions the subject at the 
center of the world. In contrast to this, Ina experiences the romantic gaze as a loss of 
identity. Her husband, the practical, consciencious commanding Officer at 
Otjosondo, realises the dangers involved in his wife's attitude. 
31 Orla H~~1 Ovita. Episode aus dem Hereroland [Ovita. Episode in Hereroland] (Dresden: Carl 
Reillner, 190'.r'). 
32 See Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 111. 
33 Holm, Qili.a, p. 16. 
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Where was it all to end?! Wouldn't they both lose their norm in the end and 
wander about aimlessly in the grist of African life?34 
In stating his fears in this manner, he makes it clear that the ability to contend 
with the demands of colonial life involves a certain spatial organisation, a certain 
will which holds subjectivity positioned against another force which is purely chaotic, 
and aims at the dissolution of subjectivity. In a Freudian reading we would not have 
far to look for the battle of Eros and Thanatos. For our reading it is important to 
note the surfaces onto which this supposed battle is mapped in the text. It is here 
that we encounter the figure of Dr Nielsen, who represents one of the stereotypes of 
colonial fiction - the European intellectual unable to come to terms with colonial 
"reality."35 In a progressive slide from the values of civilization into the abyss of 
racial contamination, Nielsen attempts to develop a "theory of happiness" based on 
the free energy of natural man, i.e. the Herero. 
At the beginning of the novel, we find this connection being implied when we 
see Ina repeating the privileged gesture of romantic yearning, the gaze from a 
window, but stressing that this window also borders the space of bourgeois sexuality. 
The view from this space allows her line of vision to fall on the territory of the 
Herero. 
The married bed-chambers had been furnished up in one of the towers. At 
night a fresh breeze wafted there, and from the windows one could see over 
the wide plains with their numerous Herero villages, which looked from a 
distance like large brown mushrooms, out to the grotesque northern 
mountains. Here at the window was Mrs von KeBler's favourite place.36 
However, Ina's romantic character is described as "unable to immerse itself in a 
natural mood ... "37 Her fault is identified with a bent to melancholy, that disease of 
civilization which Dr Nielsen wishes to eradicate. When Nielsen is first mentioned, 
we learn that a missionary had refused him access to a waterhole on the grounds of 
his immoral association with Herero women. Here the boundlessness of African 
34 Holm,~. p. 21 
35 "Much loved by writers was any plot which involved the visit to the colonies of a person with 
preconceived, European ideas about how to behave. These ideas were invariably tested against the 
realities of colonial life and, in a tragic or comic outcome, found wanting." (Ridley, Images of Imperial 
rule, p. 125) 
36 Holm,~ p. 23 
37 Holm, Qyira, p. 24 
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space becomes a demonic element against which the moral qualities of the 
European must struggle. "One finds no limits here - degenerates, loses all 
measure ... "38 For First Lieutenant Von KeBler there is no question of succumbing to 
the demonic force of Africa's boundless spaces. The will which holds them at bay is 
his sense of duty. There is only one occasion in the course of the novel where we 
find him struggling between the two, and this struggle is easily overcome: 
The endlessness of the sky arched over the wide plains ... The many scattered 
pontocks, their colorless monotony only hazily defined in the distance ... 
A crippling sadness fell over the First Lieutenant. .. Dismally, he nodded to 
himself. But then his eyes wandered to the fort, above whose battlements the 
flag of the Em(>ire was waving proudly in the wind. And it surged through 
him, the old spirit flared up in him once again: he h~d to remain strong, he 
mustn't give in! His principles demanded it - his duty! 9 
Neither Nielsen nor Ina have access to this ideology. This is what provides for 
their downfall, and it is manifested primarily in their inability to master space. When 
Nielsen and Ina meet, Ina has lost herself in the bush, and it is Nielsen who shows 
himself to be capable of mastering the technical difficulties of traversing African 
space. It is, however, only a relative capablity. Later we find him setting out on two 
journeys, neither of which he can complete because of his lack of practicality. Ina 
and Nielsen alike, both representatives of the romantic yearning for boundlessness, 
find themselves helpless in the face of the real dangers of Africa. Their inability to 
master space - to organise it and make it work - allows them to fall prey to the chaos 
of an uncivilized land. In both cases, the gaze which orients itself toward 
indeterminate spaces assumes a sexual quality. Ina's daydreams at the window align 
her loss of identity with the danger which sexuality poses to the ego. 
Yes, Frau Ina's thoughts became more concentrated from day to day, 
heavier, more melancholy. Only sometimes, standing at the window, when 
she dreamed out into misty distances of the African world, did her weariness 
diminish and fall away. Her eyes widened and wandered, searching, to the 
mountains - - and then suddenly her eyes would close. The immense Sandfeld 
appeared before her, shrouded in the darkness of night. A nameless fear fell 
ov~r her, a shiv~ng and trembling - and then she thought she heard the 
vmce of a man ... 
38 Holm, lli'.i1.a, p. 43 
39 Holm,~. p. 232 
40 Holm,~ p. 117 
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For Nielsen this danger is a very real one. Whereas Ina remains an ineffectual 
dreamer, his unceasing urge to put his dreams into practice leads him to live out his 
own destruction. This takes the form first as a dissolution of the identity which 
civilization has given him, and is manifested in the burning of his books. 
He possessed no more books. What for? Literature on South West Africa, 
that was just rubbis~ written by people who had no idea, like the blind 
speaking about color. 1 
Nielsen's attempt to surrender to the indeterminacy of uncivilized Africa 
requires that he abandons any form of looking which might be determined by 
civilization, since such a determination is a falsification in his opinion. As a result of 
this, he finds himself in a logical impasse which is the predicament of any traveller. 
His desire to gaze upon something new is a determined wish which can only be 
formulated from a definite cultural position. As such, it involves a goal, which is the 
transfer of that gaze back to the civilization from which it has been brought. 
The actual purpose of his voyage to Africa, to explore the northern regions of 
the Herero, had long since been abandoned. To explore the Herero regions, 
what irony! This area could no longer be called terra incognita. Let others 
write about the Hereroland and its inhabitants; he had set his sites on greater 
things: a book which would cause people to take notice, a book which would 
cast light into the darkness .. 42 
And yet, if this desire is to be realized, it must be realized in the realm of writing, a 
realm which is profoundly antagonistic to such desire. 
Colorless, like the landscape which now surrounded him, an image without 
grace, a work without spirit, that was his criticism of the book which was 
already finished in his head, and only needed to be written down ... And now, 
since he had failed in his prime goal, he could find no more joy. His gaze 
wandered with a kind of indifference, almost disparagingly, over the 
remarkably bitter virginity of the landscape.43 
As we have seen in part I, writing involves and evokes a blindness out of which 
the subject appears to be split, and within whose closed field he must attempt to 
construct himself. In defining himself through the act of writing, Nielsen is 
necessarily drawing a border between the space of his subjectivity and the boundless 
Africa in which he seeks liberation from that very same European subjectivity. This 
41 Holm,~ p. 129 
42 Holm,~ p. 118 
43 Holm,~ p. 121 
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is not a political problem - not yet. It does, however, have two political dimensions. 
Firstly, it prepares the way for an implicit attack on those voices in contemporary 
Germany which were speaking out against civilization, and who were formulating a 
radical critique of language. This leads us to the second dimension - that the space 
of subjectivity cannot be confronted except as a socially determined space. Nielsen's 
attempt to tum his back on his culture, when combined with his desire for loss of 
subjectivity, is easily mapped onto a real political situation. This is given in the novel 
by the Herera war, which is portrayed as a state of chaos structurally analogous to 
Nielsen's desire. In this respect as well we find Nielsen preparing his own death. In 
the end he attracts the zero entropy which he seeks in African space - in the form of 
the love which Magdalena, the cunning and deceptive Herera woman, feels for him; 
in the form of his absolute inability to traverse African space; in the form of his own 
death at the hands of the people who he had hoped would teach him happiness. 
This novel shows us that the strength which the European draws from the 
encounter with Africa is always in the form of a test which must be passed. It is the 
encounter with the limits of European Being. In this sense, it is no accident that the 
encounter which fails the test is presented in the form of a romantic longing. Just as 
the Romantics seek ways out of the spatial normativity which Kant had summarized 
in the name of Enlightenment thought, so the "weak" character in the colony seeks 
the colonial experience as a dissolution of spatial order. The position which 
discredits this ''weakness" from the very beginning is that of an a priori knowledge 
which reveals itself in practice as having always been correct. This is demonstrated 
in the figure of Kurt von KeBler, who Bergmann describes in these terms: 
The sceptical pragmatist did not need to express and discu9 his thoughts. He 
was right to start with, and reality would only confirm this. 
The dreams of Ina von KeBler and Dr Nielsen threaten the work of spatial 
organization which colonization attempts to effect. As such, they also find 
themselves aligned with those forces of death and chaos which civilization attempts 
to hold at bay. When we read the novel in this manner, the strategic importance of 
44 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 112. 
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the romantic dreamers becomes clear: they illustrate that the alternative to the 
colonial project can only be be grasped as death and chaos. The colonist who, as Ina 
and Nielsen, is unable to sublate or sublimate this urge for an unrestricted flow of 
desire must face his/her own death. 
What is important for us is that the moment at which romantic longing is forced 
to confront reality and the pragmatist is proved to have always been speaking the 
truth. This is marked by the outbreak of the Herero wars. The attitude which the 
Herera had assumed under the influence of the missionaries is portrayed as a 
masquerade - the repetition of the gestures of civilization while maintaining 
savagery concealed in their inner beings. When the narrative unmasks this 
masquerade it shows us that the romantic relation to space flirts with death not only 
in a metaphorical sense, but in a very real sense. In refusing to contribute to the 
order of colonial space, the romantic dreamer contributes to the chaos of savagery -
the reversal of colonization. 
Thus the text leads us through the spiritual agonies of romantic longing into the 
very real agonies of the Herera war. As such, it manipulates us into a position from 
which a war of liberation appears to the European gaze, not as a rebellion against 
the barbarism of colonial rule, but as an extension and consequence of the threat to 
civilization which follows from the romantic attempt to remove all limits. There is a 
subtle difference between this primary narcissism and the universality of myth, and 
it is to be found in the question of representation. What I have been calling 
romantic longing ( quite inaptly, since the Romantics sought the totality of 
consciousness specifically in the domain of representation) seeks a totality of 
experience prior to any fragmentation. This is precisely what Oedipal representation 
tells us we would ask for if desire could speak. Mythical experience, on the contrary, 
seeks a totality of experience through unifying fragmentation on a higher level. 
What we must realize is that the narration of primary narcissism and its failure is 
itself a myth of mobility, which clearly shows where those borders exist which can 
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only be crossed at penalty of death. And it maps these borders onto real geo-
political spaces. 
2 KNOWLEDGE AND EMPTY SPACE. LOOKING WITH EUROPEAN EYES. 
2. l The acquisition of space in vision 
I have already claimed that the discourse of colonization encloses spaces, 
lending them a homogeneity in the drawing of borders. It releases individual desire 
from the imperatives of these borders in a mythical mastery of space. Finally, the 
mythical structuration of passages across borders re-confirms their position and 
function. The structuration of space is effected on a number of levels, but the goal of 
colonization must always be to organize geo-political space in such a way that its 
productivity is maximized. If we bear this goal in mind, the actual physical 
organization and division of space is certainly not the first "colonization" of space, 
and I do not wish to claim that it is the most important. Before it is even possible to 
trace paths and mark borders, there must be a well-defined network of 
communication between various theoretical spaces, for it is the distinction between 
theoretical spaces which will determine the nature of the border. In other words, a 
body of knowledge must be present, whose fields of specialization are capable of 
being transposed onto physical spaces within the territory. Clearly, we are dealing 
with a spatial organization which is not purely geo-political. The anthropologist and 
the geologist, for example, establish fields of spatiality which only intersect at 
certain points. Yet these points are vital if the practical application of European 
knowledge is to succeed. It is in the organization of geo-political space that these 
points of intersection must be coordinated. Geological space intersects with 
anthropological space as long as the exploitation of mineral ore conflicts with the 
traditional rights of the indigenous nations. Capitalism organizes geo-political space 
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so that this conflict can be resolved - in the favour of maximized social production. 
In colonization, it is the task of mythical space to promote an ideology of freedom 
which totalizes these strictly defined borders and intersections of spaces into an 
experience of unlimited mobility. 
When the European traveller moves through this complex space, and writes of 
his experience, he acts as a mediator between empirical observations and the spatial 
organization which knowledge requires. The organ of mediation is the eye. Vision 
has a primary function in subsuming given sense impressions under a pre-existing 
structuration of theoretical space. The informed gaze of European knowledge 
focuses on an object and defines it as a space in which European power has effect.45 
Having stated this, it may now be said that, for the mode of knowledge which 
supported and motivated the various exploratory projects from the Enlightenment 
onwards, there is a certain sense in which vision amounts to colonization. Without 
actually occupyin~ territory in the strict sense, the gaze of the traveller establishes 
spatial order in an unknown landscape through the mediation of informed vision. 
The expansion of knowledge, which travel took as its goal, relies upon a dialectic of 
a priori knowledge which informs vision, and determined vision which modifies 
knowledge - it relies upon a visual hermeneutic. This is presided over by a 
transcendental principle which, I am arguing here, is to be defined in terms of the 
socius. The ordered space which presides over this dialectic is preserved in any of 
the various scientific discourses which European knowledge reserves for this 
purpose. The mediating eye which gazes upon the landscape is not simply gathering 
information. It is experimenting with the possibility of transposing discursive spaces 
of knowledge onto the landscape. This is why, when we read the documents of 
European exploration and travel, we are reading various blueprints for the 
construction of colonies. Indeed, Fabian has suggested that the expedition itself 
"should be thought of ... less as a certain number of people moving from a point of 
45 It is thus significant that Memmi begins his book with a description of the gaze of the colonizer: "We 
sometimes enjoy picturing the colonizer as a tall man, bronzed by the sun, wearing Wellington boots, 
proudly leaning on his shovel - as he rivets his gaze far away on the horizon of his land." Memmi, 
Colonizer and colonized, p. 3. 
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departure to a point of destination, than as a kind of mobile colony."46 I do not wish 
to examine this idea in too much detail. The strategies involved here would warrant 
a study in its own right. I do, however, believe that, given the preceeding discussion, 
I am justified in stating as an "axiom" of colonization that the informed gaze of the 
European traveller acquires space in the service of colonization. In the following 
paragraphs, I wish to mention a few important aspects of this "axiom." Then, in the 
subsequent sections, I will examine in more detail the function of the mediating eye 
with specific reference to German South West Africa. 
The eye of the traveller acquires and organizes space by constantly alternating 
between the specificity of vision and the transcendental position of universal 
knowledge. As Said points out, "knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond 
self, into the foreign and distant. 
The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object 
is a "fact" which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the 
way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even 
ontologically stable. TQ have knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to 
have authority over it.47 
If we consider the mythic mobility of the subjective position in narrative, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, then it is evident that this mythic function is also 
integral to the subject of the travellogue. But, whereas the mobility of the hero is 
given by an unrestricted ability to cross borders, the subject of the travellogue has an 
additional mythic function - it is not only an infinitely mobile eye, but also a position 
of universal knowledge. As such, the ego of the traveller is capable of establishing a 
field of spatial order in the same manner as the nodal point. And it, too, occupies a 
position which is both material and specific, as well as being outside of time and 
space. We saw in part I that this dual status of vision characterizes subjective 
knowledge, and determines the social being of the subject. Looking is always 
effected from a socially defined position - it is always on the verge of writing. We 
have seen in connection with Lacan how this is possible, and the Lacanian model 
46 Johannes Fabian, Lanirua~e and colonial power, The appropriation of Swahili in the former Bel&ian 
Con~o 1880--1938. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
47 Said, Orientalism, p. 32 
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seems particularly applicable when we examine the narrative strategies of explorers' 
travellogues. 48 
However, we must not forget that we are dealing not only with vision, but with 
writing. We have also seen in our discussion of Lacan that we need to be cautious of 
any attempt to accord Imaginary vision a status of priority with respect to writing on 
the one hand and social production on the other. The colonizing gaze is effective 
only via a writing, and when the colonizer gazes out over his territory, he does so on 
the verge of writing. This is not to be understood in a temporal sense; looking does 
not precede writing. The gazing European positions himself where there is writing 
and looks out onto spaces where there is not. However, the gazing subject moving 
through a strange environment is in search of strategies for fixing his passage and 
lending it, and thus himself, ontological qualities. As a result, he leaves a trace as he 
moves through the landscape - a writing on the ground and in books. In the 
following chapter, I shall discuss this writing and the way it takes possession of the 
space it inscribes. 
When the informed vision of the traveller gazes on reality, it apprehends a 
reality preserved in representation, and, in representing itself, it preserves itself as a 
cause. We have already seen how this serves to compel a certain investment in 
universal symbolic representation. This investment is usually well marked 
48 This point is well made in the following paragraph from Mary Louise Pratt's essay on vision in the 
, travellogue: 
"In this kind of writing, the 'face of the country' is presented chiefly in sweeping prospects that open 
before or, more often, beneath the traveller's eye. Such panoramic views are an important 
commonplace of European aesthetics, of course, and that undoubtably accounts for much of their 
appeal here. In the context of exploration writing like [John] Barrow's (Account of travels into the 
interior of Southern Africa in the years 1797 and 1798, London 1801), however, such views acquire and 
serve to familiarize meanings they may not have on the domestic front. Barrow's own language 
suggests, for example, the fantasy of dominance that is commonly built into his stance. The eye 
'commands' what falls within its gaze; the mountains 'show themselves' or 'present themselves'; the 
country 'opens up' before the European newcomer, as does the unclothed indigenous bodyscape. At 
the same time this eye seems powerless to act or interact with this landscape. Unheroic, 
unparticularized, without ego, interest or desire of its own, it seems able to do nothing but gaze from a 
periphery of its own creation, like the self-effaced, noninterventionist eye that scans the Other's body." 
Mary Louise Pratt, "Scratches on the face of the country; or, what Mr Barrow saw in the land of the 
Bushmen," in "Race." writin~ and difference, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally published in Critical Inguiry, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 
13( 1) ( 1986), p. 143. 
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linguistically. It would be interesting to study such marking in detail.49 Let it suffice 
here to mention that the German language commands two privileged strategies for 
transforming subjective perception into universal description: the shift from the past 
tense to the timeless present to suspend the temporality of perception, and the use 
of the indefinite pronoun "man."50 Said claims that the "figures of speech associated 
with the Orient ... are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the 
timeless etemal."51 Pratt shows how the timeless present is used as one of the 
strategies employed "to minimize all human presence, including that of the peoples 
whose journey is being told. In the main, what is narrated proves to be a descriptive 
sequence of sights/sites, with the travellers present chiefly as a kind of collective 
moving eye which registers these sights."52 Europeans are also present in the 
travellogue "as the deleted subjects of passive verbs"53 This deleted linguistic 
,, presence should tell us something about the relation between linguistic space and 
the space of vision. When the text reports, for example, that something "was 
observed," the absent eye leaves a trace in the form of its organizational effect 
within the remainder of the sentence. This is also the trace which the traveller 
leaves in the discourses of the disciplines - a preliminary structuration of the object 
of vision according to given forms of knowledge. As Pratt observes, 'The ideology 
that construes seeing as an inherently passive act cannot be sustained."54 
As the space of the world becomes increasingly fragmented through the work of 
the disciplines and their discourses, we find that the travelling scientist begins to 
usurp the mythical function of travel and utilize it in the service of universal 
49 Greimas and Courtes give some interesting conceptual frameworks for such a study. For example, 
"spatial disengagement appears as a procedure having as its effect the expulsion out from the domain of 
the enunciation of the term not-here of the spatial category and of thereby founding at the same time 
both the 'objective' space of the utterance (the elsewhere space) and the primordial space - which is 
recognizable only as a topic presupposition - of the enunciation." Semiotics and language, p. 90. They 
also make a distinction "between utopic space, a place where the human doing surmounts the 
permanence of being, a place of performances (which in mythical narrative is oftentimes underground, 
underwater, or in the heavens), and paratopic spaces, where competencies are acquired." Semiotics and 
langua~e, p. 181. 
50 These strategies are typical of the discourse of realism. See Said, Orientalism, p. 72. 
51 Said, Orientalism, p. 72 
52 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 142. 
53 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 143. 
54 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 159. 
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knowledge. The self-effacing leap from the particular to the universal is aimed 
increasingly at defining a particular space within universal knowledge, as well as the 
passages of access to this space. Johannes Fabian notes how, in the wake of the 
Enlightenment, the "topos of travel"55 emerged "under the reigning paradigm of 
natural history," thereby replacing "an earlier, enormously popular genre of mostly 
sentimental and aesthetisizing tales of travel."56 Within the project of natural 
history, travel becomes an instrument for the acquisition of a knowledge which is 
structured according to tabular space. 
In the episteme of natural history the exercise of knowledge was projected as 
the filling of spaces or slots in a table, or the marking of poi~tp in a system of 
coordinates in which all possible knowledge could be placed. 
Paradigmatic for this understanding of travel were the questionnaires with 
which the various academies of the natural sciences equipped travellers. 58 The 
traveller was instructed before he ever left home to adopt a certain attitude to the 
sights he was going to see. He was interested in apprehending that which could be 
positioned within a pre-formed grid, a table of knowledge. This tabulation allowed 
the natural historian to position himself at a distance to his object. The space of the 
table fixes difference as a distance between subject and object "by allowing Time to 
be reabsorbed by the tabular space of classification."59 Fabian then goes on to show 
that the establishment of this tabular space in which knowledge can be fixed serves 
to privilege still more what was already the privileged mediator of knowledge: 
vision. 
Because knowledge was thought to operate by collecting, comparin~, and 
classifying impressions, the notion of the mind as a naturalist's collect10n or 
cabinet encouraged further extension of visual bias toward the spatial. Not 
only the sources of knowledge, but also its contents were imagmed to be 
visible. Add to this the rhetoric of teaching such knowledge, and the 
transformation from visible source to visible content is completed. Taught 
55 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 6. 
56 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 8. 
57 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 8. 
58 See Urs Bitterli, Die 'Wilden' und die 'Zivilisierten' (Miinchen: dtv, 1982). 
59 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 147. Here, Fabian taJces recourse to Foucault's concept of tabular 
space, "i.e., the kind of taxonomic space that must be postulated if cultural differences are to be 
conceived as a system of semiological constructs, organiz.ed by a logic of oppositions." Time and the 
~.p.54. 
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knowledge became arranged, tx?rdered knowledge, easily representable in 
diagrammatic or tabular form. 
This tabular spatiality has a further dimension: the asymmetry between the field 
of objects and the field of knowledge. Fabian is interested primarily in 
demonstrating how this tabular spatialization of knowledge necessarily entailed a 
negation of the temporal dimension of its object, and how this negation facilitated 
the emergence of the other as an anthropological object. In doing so, he does not 
neglect to note the workings of power in this negation of time and creation of the 
object. The space of anthropological knowledge - the negated time of the other - is a 
space in which power relations are exercised. The power of the anthropologist over 
his object is only one such relationship. In the same way that Fabian sees the 
traveller gazing at the world on the verge of anthropological knowledge, so we must 
see him gazing on the verge of every other disciplinary spatialization, including that 
superordinate spacial enclosure which totalizes the colony as a geo-political space. 
Fabian realizes this when he observes: 
Among the historical conditions under which our discipline emerged and 
which affected its growth and differentiation were the rise of capitalism and 
its colonial-imperialist expansion into the very societies which became the 
target of our inquiries. For this to occur, the expansive, agressive, and 
oppressive societies which we call the West needed Space to occupy.61 
The empty space of the questionnaire - of tabular knowledge - is certainly not 
an innocent space: it is synonymous with - I would even suggest that it is exactly the 
same space as - the "empty space" into which European powers were about to 
expand. The establishment of borders which define individual tabular spaces, the 
relations and transformations which connect these spaces to one another, the 
passages which may be thought between individual spaces as well as between 
different tables, the superimposition of one table onto another, etc. - these are all 
operations which determine the spatiality of the colony. And they determine it as an 
objective realm, even before the building of fences and the establishment of border 
control. 
(i() Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 120-121. 
61 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 143-144. 
COLONIAL SPACE • 222 
2.2 Gazing on native spaces 
The theme of empty space is a vital one in colonial discourse, and if we are to 
appreciate its function we must realize its multi-dimensionality. It serves as a useful 
ideology of expansionism; it provides a contrasting image to that of overcrowded 
Europe which began to emerge in the 19th century; it enhances the romantic longing 
which seeks to transpose primary narcissism onto a landscape in which, for the sake 
of phantasy, it cannot afford to encounter a human being who is radically other; and 
it expresses a real inability of the European eye to look at the world· and see 
anything other than European space - a space which is by definition empty where it 
is not inhabited by Europeans. This latter manner of gazing on the world is not 
unusual, nor is it by any means outmoded. Jane Tompkins discusses an example 
from the year 1956, in which Perry Miller describes American history as "the 
massive narrative of the movement of European culture into the vacant wilderness 
of America."62 Tompkins goes on to show that what, in Miller's case, is simply a 
rather silly assertion, may be detected as an underlying strategy in a number of less 
obvious statements. Here she cites an example in which Indian society is described 
as "divided, self-satisfied, undisciplined and static" as opposed to the "unified, 
visionary disciplined and dynamic" Puritan society in 17th century New England, and 
in which the resulting encounter is described as "not... a clash of dissimilar ways of 
life, but rather the expansion of one into areas where the other was lacking.1163 The 
emptiness of space is not simply given by the absence of human inhabitants, but by 
the quality of space the natives are seen to inhabit a quality which can only be seen 
as a lack from the point of view of the European observer. 
62 Perry Miller, Errand into the wilderness (Cambridge, Mass, 1964), p. vii, cit. Jane Tompkins, 
"'Indians': Textuality, morality, and the problem of history," in "Race." writin~ and difference, ed. 
Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally 
published in Critical Inguit:y, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 13(1) (1986), pp. 61-63. 
63 Alden T Vaughan, New En~and frontier: Puritans and Indians. 162():1675 (Boston, 1965), pp. vi-vii, 
cit. Tompkins, pp. 63-64. 
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It is important for us to realize that in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries 
the definition of the spaces occupied by the native is gradually relegated to a 
different field of knowledge than the definition and description of the landscape. 
The point of intersection in geo-political space is marked by the qualitative 
emptiness these fields assign to their objects. On both levels, knowledge employs 
textual strategies which will ultimately be utilized in mapping this emptiness onto 
real geographical space. The creation of different textual and disciplinary spaces for 
natural man and nature without man will eventually be repeated in geo-political 
space with the creation of native reserves and nature reserves. 
Throughout much nineteenth-century exploration writing on the imperial 
frontier, this discursive configuration effaces the European presence and 
textually splits off indi~enous inhabitants from habitat. It is a configuration 
which, in (mis)recognit10n of what was materially underway or in anticipation 
of what was to come, verbally depopulates landscapes. Indigenous peoples 
are relocated in separate manners-and-customs chapters as if in textual 
homelands or reservations, where they are pulled out of time to be 
preserved, contained, studied, admired, detested, pitied, mourned. 
Meanwhile, the now empty landscape is personified as the metaphorical "face 
of the country" - a more tractable face that returns the European's gaze, 
echoes his words and accepts his caresses.64 
The ability of the European gaze to see empty space where there is native 
society is one of the most important factors affecting the establishment of the new 
world as an object of knowledge in terms of the European disciplines. This is well 
demonstrated by Fabian with regard to what is probably the most representative 
discipline in this regard - anthropology. Referring to structuralist anthropology, but 
uncovering a characteristic of the anthropological gaze which is recognizable in 
virtually every European science of the colony, Fabian shows how the space in which 
anthropological knowledge is expounded requires "a native society that would, 
ideally at least, hold still like a tableau vivant ... Tbe illusion of simultaneity (as 
between the elements of a picture that is contemplated, or between the visual object 
and the act of its contemplation) may lead to an utter disregard for the active, 
productive nature of field-work and its inevitable implication in historical situations 
and real, political contradictions.'t65 As Fabian points out, this manner of looking is 
64 Pratt, Face of the countzy p. 146. 
65 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 67. 
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directly inherited by anthropology from the travellogue. We may support Fabian's 
insight with any number of passages which we might choose randomly from the 
travellogues of 19th century explorers in South West Africa. Let us glance briefly at 
a passage from Charles John Andersson. 
The Damaras, speaking generally, are an exceedingly fine race of men. 
Indeed, it is by no means unusual to meet with individuals six feet and some 
inches in height, and symmetrically proportioned withall. Their features are, 
besides, good and regular; and many might serve as perfect models of the 
human figure. 
The technique of freezing the native body under the gaze of the European eye 
in order to establish it as a field of objectivity will extend throughout the discourse 
of colonization. This is not a development peculiar to colonization. The eighteenth 
and 19th centuries see an ever increasing will to what might be called symbolic 
vision in scientific discourses; that is, the will to see universal principles in the 
specific. This will is marked by the same violence which characterizes encounter. 
The object can only be apprehended within the field of knowledge if its specificity is 
elided. This is achieved by reducing it to a symbolic element within the universal 
knowledge of the conqueror. Once this reduction has been effected, any operations 
and interventions performed within this objectified space appear as operations 
within the realm of signification. Their effects are perceived not in terms of specific 
effects on specific bodies, but as productions of meaning. The space of the native's 
body becomes a signifying space, whose meaning consists in its ability to disappear 
within universal knowledge. It is this writing which is absolutely essential if the 
scientific gaze is to prevail. 
The gaze which apprehends the savage is of necessity a complex one. We have 
already seen this in our discussion of Fanon, where I noted the psychoanalytic 
complexity involved in asserting subjectivity from the position of the master and 
holding it suspended between narcissism and aggression, between the absolute 
destruction of the other through rejection and through assimilation. We have also 
66 Charles John Andersson, Lake N~ami; or Explorations and discoveries durin~ four years' 
wanderin~ in the wilds of South Western Africa (London: Hurst and Blackett 1856; reprint ed. Cape 
Town: Struik, 1967), p. 49. 
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seen that, when subjectivity is constituted in discourse the paranoiac structure of 
knowledge fixes subjectivity in terms of positions defined by European knowledge. 
As a result, we might expect to find discursive strategies in the discourse of 
colonialism which establish the space of the native's body as a highly differentiated 
space of European discipline. This is illustrated in Sander Gilman's discussion of the 
way in which the medical gaze appropriated the body of the black woman in the 
service of a theory of aberrant sexuality. Individual Hottentot women and 
prostitutes were studied with the aim of developing a typology of aberrance. Now, a 
will to a typology of aberrance is not to be dissociated from the will to symbolic 
vision, since it must seek in the individual exception a universal principle of 
deviation. This is evident m the anthropometric studies on prostitutes, which 
attempted to link their sexuality to specific features such as "asymmetry of features, 
misshapen noses, overdevelopment of the parietal region of the skull, and the 
appearance of the so-called Darwin's ear."67 Nor is it to be dissociated from a will to 
positioning the observing eye of the scientist within universal knowledge. Thus 
Gilman refers to the sexual psychologist Havelock Ellis, who "believed that there is 
an absolute scale of beauty which is totally objective and which ranges from the 
European to the black."68 This will to objective scientific vision is not confined to 
the development of universalist theories. It also involves a set of strategies for 
ensuring that only the universal is seen. That is to say, the scientific eye establishes 
the body of its object as a space in which certain power relations prevail. The 
objectification of the body takes part in a "network of power relations [which] ends 
by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without 
being exactly localized in them."69 Fabian has shown how certain forms of 
anthropological "knowledge" merge into the "political," citing the cultural relativism 
67 Sander L. Gilman, "Black bodies, white bodies: toward an iconography of female sexuality in late 
nineteenth-century art, medicine and literature," in "Race," writing, and difference, ed. Henry Louis 
Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally published in Critical 
Inguir:y, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 13(1) (1986), p. 243. 
68 Gilman, Black bodies, white bodies, p. 237. 
69 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, vol. 1: An introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1978),p.96. 
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of Margaret Mead as an example. He goes on to show that such an approach is 
"easily put to work for such nonrelativist purposes as national defence, political 
propaganda, and outright manipulation and control of other societies:00 
Anthropology is only one such example. The disciplines which objectify the 
physiological, psychologycal, mythical, social, ambient, etc. spaces of the other 
develop epistemological categories to create a framework within which the other 
may be secured as other. These epistemological categories rely upon certain spatial 
strategies for their implementation. 71 The gaze of the scientist gives rise to a space 
whose universality requires a relative fixing of the spaces occupied by his own gazing 
eye as well as that occupied by an object. This implies a definition of separate spaces 
(the individualized space of the native's body, or of his village, or tribe, etc. as the 
domain of knowledge), as well as defining transformations between various levels of 
spatial organization (the way in which the specific space of the native's body is to be 
related to the abstract space of physiological "normality"). This dual definition of 
spaces serves to tie the space opened up in vision to the discursive spaces of 
knowledge. The body of the other is created as the site where the discourses of 
European knowledge link diverse spaces and times. Pratt describes one such 
discourse of encounter, the portrait of manners and customs, as "a normalizing 
discourse, whose work is to codify difference, to fix the Other in a timeless present 
where all 'his' actions and reactions are repetitions of 'his' normal habits. Thus, it 
textually produces the Other without an explicit anchoring either in an observing 
self or in a particular encounter in which contact with the Other takes place."72 
This is only partially correct. As long as we are concerned with the temporal 
dimension only, it may be possible to accept that the other exists as a kind of free-
floating quality defined in terms of a distance between hypothetical subject and 
70 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 49. 
71 "When in the course of colonial expansion a Western body politic came to occupy, literally, the space 
of an autochthonous body, several alternatives were conceived to deal with that violation of the rule. 
The simplest one, if we think of North America and Australia, was of course to move or remove the 
other body. Another one is to pretend that space is divided and allocated to separate bodies. South 
Africa's rulers cling to that solution." Fabian Time and the Other, (1983) p. 29-30. 
72 Pratt, Face of the country. pp. 139-40. 
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object positions; however, as soon as we realize that these positions are transposed 
without apparent difficulty or misunderstanding onto physical positions, onto bodies, 
then we see that it is quite misleading to believe that the other is produced "without 
anchoring in an explicit self or in a particular encounter." It would be more accurate 
to say that this production takes place in an oscillation between the discursive space 
described by Pratt on the one hand and the physical space of encounter on the other 
hand. And, as we have seen, this oscillation has the effect of tying together multiple 
and diffuse spaces, and lending them the status of universal truth. This leads us to 
the conclusion that the production of Africa "in the so-called opening up of central 
and southern Africa to European capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth 
century"73 was indeed a production of that space which we know as Africa, and 
those spaces which we know as the native. This was not simply a production "of 
Africa for European imaginations - ... that is, of ideology in connection with the 
European expansionist policy there."74 The narratives of Africa, the African 
landscape and its inhabitants produced a space which was equally effective - it 
worked just as well (or badly) - in the landscape itself as in the imagination or in 
books. The mechanics of this production are relatively simple: they involve 
strategies for mapping the timeless qualities of otherness onto specific objects 
apprehended in vision. 
In gazing on the natives, we find, once again, that fictional discourse has a 
mythologizing role to play. It creates a mastery of the encapsulated spaces which 
scientific discourse tends to create. The scientist who fixes his gaze on the space of 
the native's body - epitomized by the ethnographer or anthropologist - creates for 
himself a paradoxical position. His informed gaze produces the space of the native 
as a universal space which he himself can never occupy. Yet the hermeneutic nature 
of his knowledge requires that the border which he draws between himself and the 
native must continually be crossed and re-crossed, if he is to claim any knowledge 
73 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 141. 
74 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 141. 
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more profound than simple descriptions. Consider Gerald Mc.Kiernan's description 
of the 'Bergdamaras': 
They kill game enough to furnish skins for clothing, if they do not have 
permanent abodes; but they are too lazy to dress them, and when the sun 
shines, they do not need them. The lower class of natives, such as I speak of, 
have only one aim in life and that is to fill their stomachs, and their energies 
are all directed to that.75 
Such descriptive statements require an initial postulate of identity, in order to 
prove the otherness of the native. How else could Mc.Kiernan speculate upon the 
desires of the native, or project a European class structure onto the native socius? 
This is the thrust of Fabian's claim that it is possible to recognize in ethnographic 
discourse "an index revealing ( or hiding) the fact that not one but two subjects 
inhabit the semantic space of the statement. One is the Indian ... [or the black - J.N.] 
the other is the ethnographer ... 1176 
The production of the space of the native's body as a space of knowledge might, 
at first glance, appear to take place in fictional discourse as well. Consider the 
following passage from the novel by Maximilian Bayer, Okowi - Ein Hererospion? 
As the title suggests, this book fixes its gaze upon on a particular native and poses 
the question, friend or foe? In this respect, it could be seen as being paradigmatic 
for the colonial encounter with the native. Consider the paragraph in which Okowi 
is first gazed upon: 
A tall Herero stepped forward and stood calmly. He wore a loin cloth and his 
skin was a handsome shimmering brown-black. He carried a heavy club, a 
kirri, but it hun;casually in his hand. He stood there like a statue, in a proud, 
confident pose. 
The similarity to the descriptions which we find in 'non-fiction' and travelogues 
is striking. Nevertheless, we should not overlook the differences. Firstly, the Herero 
in Bayer's description retains his temporal specificity. Bayer does not resort to the 
timeless present to describe his object. Thus he does not adopt the rhetorical stance 
75 Gerald McKieman, The narrative and journal of Gerald McKiernan in South West Africa 1874-
1879, ed. P. Serton (Cape Town: van Riebeeck Society, 1954), p. 68. 
76 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 91. 
77 Jonk Steffen [Maximilian Bayer], Okowi - ein Hererospion? Eine Geschichte aus dem 
sudwestafrikanischen Krie~e [Okowi - A Herero spy? A tale of the South West African War] (Berlin: 
Weicher, 1910), p. 25. 
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of the anthropologist. He does not project a universal quality onto his object, 
although this is presumably accomplished by his reader under the weight of 
intertextuality. Secondly, the manner in which the native strikes a pose appears 
almost as a caricature of the anthropological descriptive mode. The effect of this 
exaggerated action is an elicitation of the European gaze. The native, in striking a 
pose, is offering his body as an object of vision. Thus it is described as a statue. And 
like a statue, it provides a possible form for narcissistic identification. This is indeed 
the role which Okowi is to play in the novel. As the title suggests, the book fixes its 
gaze upon this particular native and poses the question: friend or foe? In this 
respect, it reproduces the colonial encounter. The narrative experiments with 
various attempts to cross the border between the gazing European eye and the 
mysterious space of the native. Various forms of self projection are attempted, in 
which the narrative endeavors to 'enter the space' which the native occupies. In the 
end, Okowi is established as a friend, but in doing so, his unsuitablity as a surface for 
narcissistic projection has been proven. His non-European qualities have been 
strongly defined. At the end of the book, Okowi says 
"If you Germans bring happiness to the land and peace to my poor tribe, then 
we Mbandjerus will come to you as friends. - There shall be an end to the 
misery which has been. May you teach my people, that they become wise, 
strong, and good, like you Germans are!"78 
In the mythical act of crossing, the border between the white man and the black has 
been re-drawn. 
In spite of the ending, the benevolence of this narrative makes Okowi an 
exception among colonial novels. And yet, it remains typical in its general strategy of 
mapping timeless qualities of otherness onto a specific object apprehended in vision, 
and establishing the specific as a symbol for the universal category. Here we would 
have to label this category 'The good native who does not resist colonization.' More 
representative of the way in which the fictional discourse of German South West 
Africa redraws the border between white man and black man in the mythical act of 
crossing is Hans Walther's short story, Fraulein [Missy], from the collection Orlog!. 
78 Steff en, OkoID, p. 236. 
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In this story, the question is posed whether a mode of mapping timeless qualities of 
the other onto actual bodies can at the same time facilitate the organization of 
space required by colonization. Here we see the narrative emphasizing that the 
decisive point in the strategy of mapping is quite simply whether an attitude - a 
mode of apprehension - works or not. Fraulein is the ironic nickname given to Lance-
corporal Ritter, not because he is in any way cowardly or squeamish. On the 
contrary, he is described as " ... a good, competent soldier who could always be relied 
upon"79 The passage in which the narrator tells us of the origin of his nickname is as 
follows: 
Lance-corporal Ritter had been given this name because of a tenderness 
which dwelt in his strong body, a ~ood-natured softness which his comrades 
did not understand and which his superiors opposed, so that it did not 
become weakness. He could not offend anyone or hurt anyone, and he would 
rather do all the work himself than speak a harsh word to the one who should 
have done it but didn't. He had gained the nickname because he had or/if 
asked to be dismissed from the commando which was to shoot chief Siider. 
This is the decisive point. Ritter is incapable of that distancing gaze which the 
European eye has been cultivating for such a long time, and which allows the 
genocide perpetrated in the Herera wars. A few pages later this is stated more 
clearly: 
But when it came to the blacks, his good-naturedness was absolutely 
dangerous. He saw in the black man just another human being, like his 
countrymen. 81 
In other words, Ritter postulates an initial absence of difference between the 
native and the European. The space of the native's body, which ethnography has 
worked so hard to delineate, has been reduced hypothetically to the same space as 
that of the European. The border has been crossed. The narrative corrects this 
anomolous situation by placing Ritter in a position in which he is forced to shoot a 
Hottentot girl, whom he had previously rescued from the side of the road, and who 
is in the process of betraying him and his companions. At the end of the story we 
learn that the key to his behaviour lies in the concept of duty -
79 Hans Walther, "Fraulein" [Missy], in~. p. 171. 
80 Walther, Fraulein, p. 169. 
81 Walther, Fraulein, p. 171. 
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"No! What I did before, what I did afterwards, whether I rescued the child or 
shot her ... it was all the same. - It was my duty." - The man spoke as if 
confessing. 
"Not to think of oneself!"82 
What his companions had interpreted as weakness, what the modern reader 
might have understood as an admirably humane quality in the face of general 
brutality, is reclaimed for the colonial project as a committment to duty which is 
capable of shifting with equal abandon between the position of compassion and that 
of a killer. In a way, this makes it more callous than the simple naive obedience of 
Ritter's fellow soldiers. But it is not my intention to engage in moral speculation. 
What is important for us is that, whereas his fellow soldiers adopt the attitude of 
soldiers - they kill because it is their military duty, Ritter adopts the attitude of a 
scientist. He is committed to a more abstract duty, and for that reason, he 
hypothesizes an equality of mankind. But like a good scientist of his time, he allows 
empirical data to prove his hypothesis incorrect. We have seen that a hypothetical 
sharing of experience is the necessary first step in gaining knowledge about the 
native. But if this shared experience is to become knowledge, it must be processed 
as a writing. That is, a space must be opened between the eye, which extracts 
meaning, and the object, whose specificity disappears within a signifying system. In 
this way, the latter is reduced to an object at a distance from the knowing subject. 
But in addition, it is this distance which allows such knowledge to become functional 
- and we have already seen that the functionalization of anthropological knowledge 
places it always on the verge of effecting a political repression. This is what the fable 
of Ritter tautologically demonstrates - that the hypothesis of equality with the 
savage proves itself wrong, not because it testifies to an individual weakness or a 
sentimental character, but simply because in the scenario which colonial discourse 
projects as reality, it does not work. 
The mythical mastery of space undertaken in colonial discourse becomes more 
difficult when it confronts the native in his own space, in the setting of a spatial 
organization which testifies to a structured socius - the native village. What is most 
82 Walther, Fraulein, p. 211. 
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typical of descriptions of the native village is the sense of loss which the European 
eye must feel in the face of this spatial order - an order of which the European 
cannot partake. We may generalize two basic reactions to this sense of loss. The one 
is open aggression, and the other, more subtle reaction is an attempt to develop a 
position from which the complexity of native space may be surveyed. The former 
reaction is typical of narcissistic aggression, and results from the subject attempting 
to project himself into a space which he cannot occupy. The result is, as we have 
seen, a paranoiac structuration of knowledge, in which the object is fixed in a field 
defined by subjective economy on the one hand and the organizational mode of 
European knowledge on the other. The European eye is in a position to survey a 
tabloid of native life in its entirity. As a result, we are presented with fleeting images 
of native space. These are fixed as objects of European knowledge, and almost 
invariably arouse disgust in the viewer. As an example, the following passage from 
Raggys Fahrt nach Siidwest. 
On the beach to the right was a small Herera village, a row of dirty pontocks, 
built of old sacks and tin cans filled with sand. This village was surrounded by 
a ring of all kinds of rubbish. An acrid qualm from the campfires mingled 
with an unbelievable and indefinable stink. Tall, handsome men and women 
moved to and fro between the huts, deformed by greasy European clothing.83 
Note that it is not necessary for the timeless present to be introduced as a 
distancing strategy. Here the European eye finds itself capable of surveying the 
space of the native village, and aggressivity manifests itself in open disgust. Note 
also that the anthropological motif of the "handsome, men and women" is 
introduced only to display the natives as a caricature of themselves mimicing the 
appearance of Europeans. 
An interesting contrast to this is provided by the Ambo village, which 
McKieman describes as follows: 
The exterior of his place - which occupied considerable ground - presented 
nothing but a line of palisades or stockade made of slender poles, about 
twelve feet high and about a foot in thickness. Small huts were scattered 
about the walls, and lounging about them were numbers of armed retainers, 
keeping guard. The entrance was at the eastern side, as are those of all the 
Okonyama residences. All of them are also built after the same plan as the 
83 Haase, Raigys Fahrt, p. 153-154. 
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chiefs, varying only in point of size, according to the wealth of the owner. 
Passing through the mam entrance, which is made to close in case of danger, 
we found ourselves between two lines of stockade in a passage extending all 
the way around the place, and only wide enough for two men to pass. 
Followmg our guide around to the west-side, we passed through the second 
line, and followed another passage to the eastward. So on, tracing and 
retracing our steps, crossi~t ~nd recrossing winding passages till all but the 
guide were completely co~~ed, and none of us could have found our way 
out again without assistance. 
As may be seen, this space requires a ritual of entry which is not determined by 
the European. Nor is it possible to suurvey this space with the eye, or to map it. Nor 
could it be described in specific terms. How then is the European to establish any 
form of knowledge about this space; how is he to represent himself in passage 
through it? 
There are several ways in which colonial discourse reacts to this space. One is to 
incorporate the spatial structure of the Ambo village into European myth - the myth 
of the maze. This is the tendency in McK.iernan's narrative. Here the space of the 
native socius is accessible via a European mode of confronting the limits of its own 
socius. The crossing from European space into non-European space repeats the 
crossing which has always been possible from the space of European knowledge to 
those spaces in which knowledge takes on another form. But in doing so, it allows 
the crossing itself to be incorporated into a totalized European experience. 
Another possible reaction to this space is for descriptive discourse to present a 
generalized schema of the Ambo village, such as that given by von Eckenbrecher: 
An Ambo village is an extensive palisade made of many hundreds of poles. 
The inside is a confusion of little alleys, a re~lar maze, in which the various 
huts are situated. The huts are of different sizes, and their very finely-woven 
pointed rooves are made from grass. The men, each wife, the grown and half-
grown sons and daughters each have a special hut. In addition, there are the 
store huts and baskets, the beer pots, and the kraals for the large and small 
cattle. It is difficult for the uninitiated to find his way. The chiefs village is 
built in the same way, only larger.85 
It is in keeping with the observation made earlier that she presents her 
description in the timeless present. The aporia of such a schematization is its 
inability to present any description which could be useful in finding a passage 
84 Journal of Gerald McKieman, p. 106. 
85 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir Kab und nahm, p. 27. 
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through this space, since the design of the Ambo village is always specifically 
unknown, even though it may be integrated in general terms into European 
descriptive knowledge. Von Eckenbrecher is also quite correct in tying this to the 
fact that the European observer is the other of the native socius - an outsider, a non-
initiate. Nevertheless, the detached description can replace that sense of loss which 
may ensue from the recognition of being excluded from a social order. This is 
achieved simply by integrating that social order into a more universal perspective -
that of European knowledge. 
Another strategy would be a shift in rhetorical attitude. Pratt notes the multiple 
dissociation arising from being placed at the center of someone else's stage, and 
observes a tendency in the travellogue to parody and self-parody whenever the 
situation arises where the traveller must appear at the court of the native.86 Indeed, 
McKiernan's account does finally reverie to parody; he portrays the chief as "a child, 
wanting to play and be amused ... 
We had at the wagons an electrical machine; he had seen it and nothing 
would do, but that we must send for it. It worked with a crank and was very 
powerful. He had a wonderful nerve for holding it, and was highly pleased 
that he could stand a greater shock than any of our party.87 
In most descriptions I encountered, however, there is a marked sense of unease 
as the European is led farther away from a space he feels he can master, and into 
the heart of a space he must experience as decidedly hostile and other. Thus, for 
example, Wilhelm Mattenklodt's description of the passage into the center of such a 
village. When Mattenklodt's hunting party visits the village of the "Ovambo Sultan 
Niangana," they are taken to see the chief: 
His villa~e is hidden in the forest not far from the river. It is surrounded by a 
high pahsade fence covered in matting, behind which a swarm of round huts 
stoop under heavy grass rooves. Sultan's slaves led us through a maze to the 
counsel place, where upon entering we were met by at least a hundred 
wa~~rs, red to the teeth, crouching and eyeing us with curiosity and 
susp1c10n. 
86 Pratt, Face of the country, p. 151. 
87 Journal of Gerald McKiernan, p. 107. 
88 Mattenklodt, Afrikanische Jagde!!, p. 15. 
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Like von Eckenbrecher, he confidently begins the description of his passage 
with a distanced observation presented in the timeless present. However, as soon as 
the distance is negated in the act of passage, he must switch to the past tense. Here 
the sense of threat is immediately evident. Even McKieman, states that, "after a 
long detention," they were "glad to get away."89 In all of these reactions, colonial 
discourse has developed strategies for representing this alien space as a pocket of 
strange territory within the universal field of European knowledge. 
3 TRADE AND KNOWLEDGE, ONE-WAY SPACE. 
In the previous section we saw how descriptive strategies serve to orient the 
gaze of the European on native space in such a way that it could be surveyed and 
integrated into European knowledge, or rejected as a space of danger or savagery. 
We saw that this involves a strategy of passage between specific space and universal 
quality. In this section I shall attempt to show another set of descriptive strategies 
which shift the focus of the gaze from the timeless present to the future. This is 
almost invariably employed in the service of development capital; that is, together 
with the necessity and possibility of developing the land so as to make the colonies 
profitable. Whereas the colonizing gaze of the scientist looks at the specific and 
negates it in a universalizing gesture, the gaze of the developer focusses on its 
specificity in order to negate it within a scenario of capitalist production. This latter 
gaze is no less a spatializing gaze. It, too, negates the specific temporal 
determination of vision in order to create a space of knowledge. It, too, is a writing, 
in which a signifying space is established - a space which produces meaning by the 
temporal negation of a specific position within a signifying system. 
One major institutional factor supporting this discursive strategy was the 
appearance in the 1880's of various societies seeking to promote colonial 
89 Journal of Gerald McKiernan, p. 107. 
COWNIAL SPACE• 236 
development. Among these, for example, was the Central Society for Commercial 
Geography and the Promotion of Gennan Interests Overseas, whose chairman, Dr 
Robert Jannasch, composed a revealing travellogue - A Description of the 
Kaokoland, dated 17.3.1885.90 The name of the society which Jannasch headed itself 
informs us in the most direct terms of the strategies involved in the determination of 
his vision. These revolve around a subtle shift from the discourses of natural science 
to those of commerce, a strategy which is quite common in travel discriptions of this 
type. This is certainly to be expected, for these texts set out to portray the land in its 
potential for German exploitation. The land is apprehended as that which it has not 
yet become. 
Jannasch begins with an 'objective' description of "the land between the 22nd 
and 18th degree latitude south."91 He describes in cursory fashion the topography, 
vegetation, geology and water conditions. In the best style of contemporary 
discourse, he then moves to the question of land utilization. 
The entire region is given over to free nature. Only individual Cimbetas and 
Berg-Damaras graze their herds on the mighty pastures~ which are capable of 
providing good grazing for millions of cattle and sheep. 2 
Where descriptive discourse does not allow the land to be depicted as empty, it 
is shown to be under-utilized, under-developed. When J annasch gazes at the ''wide 
table-lands," he sees not only "deeply incised gorges and eroded vallies .. , whose 
slopes are covered with dense jungle .. ," he also sees jungles " ... whose volume 
comprises valuable woods."93 It is not always easy here to distinguish reported vision 
from hearsay reported as vision, or from phantasy. Nor need we interrogate the 
truth of these visions. What concerns us is that Jannasch is visualizing the landscape 
on three levels: in terms of what he sees and can report in the discourse of natural 
history; in terms of what he has heard (''The Damaras who come here in trading 
parties constantly complain of the cold during the winters there ... ");94 and in terms 
90 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvemements, WA ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, pp. 70-73. 
91 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvemements, w A ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70. 
92 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvemements, WA ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70. 
93 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvemements, WA ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70. 
94 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvemements, WA ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, p. 71. 
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of what might be, the potential of this landscape for German economic interests. It 
is a typical strategy of this discourse to create a landscape in which these three 
visualizations coincide. While gazing on the landscape with the eye of knowledge, 
the traveller gathers the speech of the native into the field of this knowledge and 
imagines the productive future of the landscape. At the same time, however, he also 
allows his phantasy to roam freely, projecting various desires onto this landscape. 
Thus he phantasizes that these are jungles "in which elephants and panthers still 
roam ... "95 This phantasy will eventually have to be repressed in the name of 
knowledge and productivity. As a relatively unpredictable, desiring mode of 
apprehending the world, it is directly opposed to the interests of the developing 
gaze. Nevertheless, it will persist in other discursive forms, as an alternate spatial 
experience. It will serve to define the conditions under which the borders of 
knowledge may be crossed. The repression of the desiring gaze leaves its trace on all 
the discourses of the developer and explorer. This leads to certain contradictory 
positions and tensions which must be resolved if such discourse is to remain 
coherent. This is well illustrated in a short story by Karl Dove, Auf unbekannten 
Pfaden [On unknown paths].% 
In this story we see a clear description of the way the desire of the explorer - the 
desire to look on the new - transforms itself into a desire for production of capital in 
the name of the colony. The story begins with the desire of the explorer in its purest 
form; that is, in the dual investment in gazing on the new and speaking the unheard-
of: 
My soul was faced with ever more glowing and intense images of fantastic 
places where no person had ever set foot, and upon which my own eyes were 
the first to alight; and of which I would then inform the astorushed world.97 
Indeed, this is exactly what Jakob Krebs experiences. He sets out in search of and 
discovers a hidden valley of whose existence he has learnt from Missionary Bohm. 
After penetrating deep into the heart of this hidden and fertile land, which is 
95 Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.11.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70. 
% Karl Dove, "Auf unbekannten Pfaden" [On unknown paths], in Die Kobra. Sjidafrikanische 
Erzahluni:;en [The cobra. South African Tales] (Berlin: W S Schmidt, 1911). 
97 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 70. 
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teeming with game and has abundant permanent water, he discovers and is 
discovered by a lost tribe of Nama. Krebs is made their "prisoner" in order to protect 
the secret of their valley from the intrusion of the white man - that is, he is made 
their guest and treated like a chief or a sorcerer, but he is not permitted ever to 
leave the valley. Here a mythology of the Edenic landscape is confronted with the 
"necessity" of expansion of geographic knowledge and, as we learn, of capital; for 
this is the decisive point. Krebs discovers diamonds in the valley . 
.. .in all probability, te5 ground upon which I stood bore riches worth many 
hundreds of millions. 
The natives are of course unable to appreciate these stones in terms of capital value: 
My conjecture became certainty upon receipt of a number of other 
diamonds, which were given to me by the natives; the latter believed that my 
amazement over the stones I held was simply a sign of pleasure because of 
their wonderful play of colors.99 
And this is one reason why the question of whether the valley should be placed 
under the care of capitalist development or left in secrecy is made to pivot about the 
presence of the stones. Krebs himself writes 
[The success of my explorations] is so important that it could influence the 
future of the entire German Protectorate in unthou$ht-of ways. And this, too, 
will have to be crwited to me as a remaining achievement for a great and 
promising colony.1 
It is important to realize that there are two possible ways of interpreting Kreb's 
desire to gaze on the new with explorer's eyes. We could see it as representative of 
the despot's desire, a desire which urges him at all times toward writing. Thus Krebs 
finds himself in an impossible situation where, to tell of his discovery and find 
confirmation of his great deed, he must leave the valley. This he does only at the 
risk of death. Thus he writes of his discovery in his journal, and can be reassured 
with the hope that his writing will grant him meaning when he has no being. And 
yet, we must be cautious here; Krebs finds it possible to define his desire in such a 
way that meaning and death are both productive through their presence - whether 
98 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 86. 
99 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 86. 
100 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 84. 
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Krebs lives and tells the world of his own discovery or dies and leaves his written 
memoirs, meaning is a productive presence. 
If success crowns my plan to flee at last the captivity in which I have been 
held for just a year now .. the world will hear enough of this wonderful place 
from my own mouth. If I should fail, I must reckon with the not remote 
possibility that my body will be found somewhere, and at least preserve the 
most important thing, the course of my explorations, in these papers, so that 
at least after my death I will gain fame as the first European to set foot in this 
land.101 
Throughout the story there is a constant tension between, on the one hand, the 
possibility of a productive harnessing of meaning in the name of individual desire; 
and on the other hand, the necessity to pay for this productivity in meaning with 
death. This tension persists right up to the last paragraph. Here we are told that it is 
precisely this productive function of death and signification which has tied individual 
desiring production to social production and served to enrich the colony . 
... he was a great explorer, and if he can really see from up there what 
transpires down here, then I think it must cause him great joy to know that 
his deed will not be forgotten. I will have a copy of these notes made ~t the 
English Residency in Walfish Bay, and ensure that they are distributed.1 2 
And yet, in the final sentence, the fact of death cannot be denied. 
And so the unfortunate man will at least find in death the fame which he 
sought in vain during his life.103 
The strategy of this text is to present us with the possible mode of personal loss 
facing the explorer and then transpose this onto a social structure in which any form 
of individual loss is productive. Capitalist production is able to harness the structure 
of subjectivity in signification and reverse it, so that the mutual exclusion of being 
and meaning is subsumed in the name of social production. Being without meaning 
is harnessed as a productive force, as is meaning without Being. 
Earlier in this chapter we saw that the sense of loss which follows when the 
European eye gazes on "empty" space is resolved in strategies of distancing which fix 
the object in a space defined by the field of European knowledge. In the visual field, 
concrete experience is enlisted in order to produce the object of European 
101 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 84. 
102 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 88. 
103 Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 88. 
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knowledge as defining the limits of civilization. When we consider the paradigm of 
capitalist development in colonial discourse we can see that the process in question 
is the same. Here, too, discourse defines passages between two different types of 
space - the universal space of capitalism, which is produced by banishing temporality 
in the tense of the timeless present ( this is the tense we find in the above passages 
whenever the theme of development is broached); and the concrete space of 
capitalism which is produced by mapping universal space onto concrete bodies. Thus 
we might speak of such a thing as the capitalist gaze which situates the landscape 
and its inhabitants within the field of universal knowledge, while at the same time 
specifying this universality by concrete relations between bodies. 
In order to illustrate what I mean by this second, specifying function, let us turn 
once again to Margarethe von Eckenbrecher: 
As gifts they [the "bushmen"] hold tobacco and salt in great esteem, while 
they are not fond of sugar. They love to smoke the intoxicating Dagga 
(hemp). It has been said of the bushmen that they know where diamonds are 
to be found. I know of a case where a matchbox full of Dagga was been 
traded for diamonds of considerable worth.104 
Here again, von Eckenbrecher begins with a description in the timeless present, 
defining the relation of the "Bushmen" to commodities. This we can read as 
establishing part of the capitalist repertoire of value in terms of the market. The 
knowledge which is decisive for the trader is the assymetry of value, and the desire 
of the market. As such, capitalism always depends upon a concretization of universal 
abstract principles (the fact that a profit can be made) into a specific relation (what 
must be sold to whom for how much). This process is described by Deleuze and 
Guattari as a transformation of surplus value of code into surplus value of flux. 
According to them, it is money which provides the site of this transformation.105 The 
concretization involved in this transformation determines a particular quality of 
space - that space in which the transformation of the abstract into the concrete may 
be performed. This is the tautological universal space of capitalism. In the above 
example, the quality of space opened up between the European eye and the 
104 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir a;ab und nahm, p. 46. 
105 Deleuz.e und Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 228. 
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''bushman" as object is specified in terms of a number of passages defined by various 
flows and their interruption. The desire of the "bushman" is apprehended by 
capitalist knowledge and interrupted by a flow of commodities (hemp). At the same 
time capitalist knowledge avails itself of the "bushman's" specific knowledge, which 
is a practical knowledge (where the diamonds are to be found). It is effective, 
however, by relativizing this practical knowledge as non-knowledge (the extreme 
disproportion of value between the matchbox full of hemp and the "considerable 
number" of diamonds). Thus we find that the space between the subject and the 
object of colonial trade is defined by an assymetry of flows between the two. This is 
the most elementary colonizing gesture which capitalism performs. It actualizes a 
certain form of codification in an apparently equal trade. But the inequality exists 
on the level of the code. Capitalist knowledge alone - and not the knowledge of the 
'bushman' - has access to this code. This ensures that the flow of value betweeen the 
two will always be resolved in the capitalist's favour. Capitalist knowledge 
determines spaces of trade as those spaces across which a number of flows may be 
initiated, such that the balance of value accrues to the subject of knowledge. And 
this knowledge is specific and concrete.106 Colonial discourse is constantly 
interpreting this 'one-way' space in a number of ways. For one, the description of 
trade ties universal knowledge (which is capitalist knowledge) to the familiar social-
Darwinist theme of the survival of the strongest. The fact that the capitalist knows to 
read and apply the value of code proves that he is justified in doing so. And 
furthermore, the fact that the native willingly participates in the ritual of trade and 
is satisfied with its conclusion proves that he has a similar, if less developed, 
committment to the code. Its universality is established in the moment of its specific 
realization - in the moment of trade. This common comrnittment to the code is the 
birth of credit, and once it is initiated, it cannot be stopped. This is evident in the 
manner in which the natives lost their cattle and their land. 
106 Even McKiernan states explicitly that "much that my route book contained had reference to routes, 
waters, conditions of country as regards trade and such matters, but of no interest here [i.e., the United 
States - J.N.]," Journal of Gerald McKiernan, p. 25. 
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The white man was able to acquire stock without financial aid from the State, 
and having acquired stock, he could graze it on the land on which the 
despoiled natives had formerly grazed it. The natives, being reduced to 
penury and being no longer independent, would be compelled to enter into 
the service of the white mfl~ and act as the herds of the stock which they had 
formerly called their own. 0 
And once the committment to the code has been established, any practical 
means of applying the code seem justified. Thus, with the promulgation of the 1903 
Credit Ordinance, "traders were given ... one year in which to collect outstandings, 
which would be prescribed thereafter, and they fell on the Herem cattle like a pack 
of ravenous wolves ... Apart from the taking of their cattle, there was a gradual 
appropriation of their land, a process which went on concurrently with the cattle-
lifting and grew in proportion as the number of cattle acquired by the white "traders" 
increased.11108 The manner in which this is initiated is unimpressive, quaint, and 
innocent. This is well illustrated in the following paragraph: 
Usually in the afternoons the natives would come to barter cattle for various 
articles of trade, flour, rice, sugar, coffee, clothes, shoes ... The concept of 
payment was incomprehensible to many. And so we used stones and coffee 
beans. My husband placed a handfull in front of the person concerned, who 
then took as many away as he thought the animal he was selling was worth in 
Marks. When an agreement was reached, the seller of the cattle then shoved 
as many stones or beans to my husband as the amount for which he wanted 
to have this or that... It is clear that this kind of barter is very long-winded, 
and it becomes more difficult, the higher the price of the bartered animal. 
Cash was almost never used for paymen\jn South West, and even one's own 
workers were payed as described above.1 
Here we can see clearly that capitalist knowledge brings two bodies together by 
repeating the flow of commodities and money on the level of representation. The 
code is firmly controlled by capitalism (since payment is effected in the same mode 
as purchase). We can also see that this representation of a flow assumes ritual 
proportions and committs both partners equally to the same passage between the 
codification of flows and the flows themselves. 
As a result, the desire of the colonized is utilized for the purposes of capitalist 
production, while at the same time the knowledge which the colonized attaches to 
107 Great Britain, Report on the natives of South West Africa and their treatment by Germany. 
Imperial Blue Book (Windhoek, 1918), p. 50. 
108 Imperial Blue Book, pp. 50-51; See also ch. 10, pp. 46-50. 
109 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir iab und nahm, p. 92. 
LOOKING • 243 
his desire is denied. What I mean by this is - the trader takes the 'bushman's' wish 
for hemp seriously, but there is never a hint that the 'bushman' might be correct in 
his knowledge that hemp is a very valuable substance, while diamonds are virtually 
useless. Capitalist knowledge must always distinguish clearly between the relativity 
of specific, practical knowledge and the universality of abstract principles upon 
which its practice is founded. It is this distinction which allows capitalist knowledge 
its cynicism, for the morally indefensible act is always specific, and never to be 
contemplated on the same level as the principle which necessitated it. The 
distinction between specific and universal knowledge is also that which allows 
capitalist knowledge to render the actions of the native significant within the system 
of universal representation. The native may only be moving stones in order to sell a 
cow, but the capitalist sees in those motions a mirror of himself and his world. 
CHAPTER III: WRITING 
All women and children who had come to 
us were given the Proclamation to the 
Nation drafted in Otjiherero and chased 
back into the desert. 
General Lothar von Trotha 
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1 OPENING A SPACE OF KNOWLEDGE IN WRITING 
1.1 Writing on the earth/on paper 
In the previous section, I attempted to show that the indeterminacy of a gaze 
which seeks to realize its desire within a boundless space threatens the integrity of 
the subject, threatens communication and representation, and is therefore a very 
real threat to the social order. I also claimed that the way out of this dilemma is 
envisaged by colonial discourse as a commitment to spatial order. This is defined in 
terms of fixed boundaries and privileged passages between spaces. The European 
subject gazing onto a strange object, looking across a strange space, is thus forced to 
adopt a manner of looking which can serve as an inital ordering of space. In this 
chapter, I aim to show that the force which renders the indeterminate gaze of desire 
suitable for the process of colonization is a force which proliferates as writing - in 
the widest sense of the word. This is quite simply the necessity of developing a 
representational technique for ensuring that any specific individual positions of 
subjectivity are appropriated in the service of universal representation. 
This will present itself first of all as a question of the subject's mobility in an 
unknown space. We saw that unlimited mobility has two moments - it threatens the 
integrity of the subject by releasing desire from its social bounds; and, in a reversal 
of this release, it defines spaces of subjectivity as a function of the various spaces 
which this mythic mobility has linked. Lacanian theory attempts to explain, in terms 
of the structure of subjectivity, why this should be so. We have seen in our discussion 
of Lacan's theory of the gaze that the gazing subject positions himself in social space 
by an abstraction of lines of vision relating to a real surface. The problem of the 
subject moving through an "unknown" space and struggling with the repeatability of 
his motions exemplifies this manner of looking. This is because the process initiated 
when the European subject moves through an alien space is paradigmatic for the 
self-interrogation of consciousness. The lack of familiar objects against which he can 
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measure himself leads to an initial threat to subjective identity. The subject who 
retains an identity while moving through a strange space is necessarily placing 
himself in the position of a transcendental subject, the abstract subject who might at 
some later time stand where he is standing. He is constructing an abstract 
transcendental identity which would always move through this same space in the 
same manner. This is the function of mapping. Here he is representing himself 
spatially within a signifying system - a symbolic order. As such, his desire is the 
desire of a transcendental subject given as a position within a signifying order. This 
signifying order is given as a social space which is, for his purposes, interchangeable 
with the space of the landscape through which he is moving. In short, his gaze 
produces the space of the landscape as a social space in which his own position 
promises the unity of being and meaning. However, mapping is only the most 
obvious example of this symbolic fixing of the mobile subject. In the following, I will 
present a number of examples to show that the very mobility of the European in 
colonial space, like the informed vision of the scientist, issues from writing (in the 
widest sense of the word) and produces writing - a writing in books and a writing on 
the earth. 
On 24 April 1884, what would later be referred to euphorically as "the birth 
certificate of German Colonial Politics"1 was issued in the form of a telegram from 
Bismarck to the German consul in Cape Town, which read as follows: 
According to communications from Mr Llideritz, the Colonial Officials are in 
doubt regarding any claim to protection from Germany which may be 
applicable to his acquisitions north of the Orange River. You are to declar~ 
officially that he and his settlements are under the protection of the Empire. 
With this geographical definition, we see the beginning not only of the colony, 
but also of what will be a constant and often difficult struggle to define exactly what 
the territory of German South West Africa may be taken to comprise. We will be 
examining the problems accociated with tracing the borders of the territory on the 
1 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 59. 
2 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 59. 
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map and transferring these tracings to the landscape in a later section. At the 
moment, let us note that it is not purely by chance, nor is it a matter of convenience 
that the birth of the colony must be marked by the issue of a "birth certificate" - that 
it must be written. The issue of this certificate is the signature which the despot 
applies to what has in fact been a long and gradual inscription of the earth. The 
birth of the colony is the result of an ever increasing allignment between a writing 
on paper and an inscription of the earth. 
Prior to Bismarck's official declaration, there existed an increasing activity of 
writing on the earth - an activity which should be construed in the dual sense of a 
writing about that region that was to become South West Africa on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, an actual tracing on the earth, a marking of the earth with 
lines capable of bearing meaning. There is, in the early (what we might call 
preparatory) stage of colonization, a constant dialogue between these two writings 
on the earth. This takes the form of a proliferation of lines at various levels. At this 
stage I prefer to speak of lines rather than texts, since the tracings on the earth 
function more on the level of lines - their organisation into unities which might be 
referred to as texts is only accomplished at a later stage. Lines on the earth give rise 
to lines of writing in books, and these in turn allow more lines to be traced on the 
earth. And attached to lines of writing are 'lines of thought' and 'lines of argument' -
these function as means of spatial organization on a level which appears to be 
universally valid. 
The origins of this process cannot be situated definitely, and it is this dialogue 
which constitutes what we saw Todorov referring to as Europe's ancient memories 
of Africa. There have always been travellers in Africa, and there have always been 
strange tales of what they saw. These strange tales define spatial passages which do 
indeed possess universality. But their universality lacks the essential quality which 
colonization requires of universal spatial structuration; that is, another set of 
determined passages which will link it to the specific. Colonization requires a 
writing which not only traces mythical passages, but maps them onto specific 
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landscapes in accordance with specific rules. And in colonization it is not the mythic 
passages themselves which must fulfil the requirements of universality, it is this 
abstract principle of transformation. 
When we refer specifically to the region between the Orange and Kunene 
rivers, we could establish a definite genealogy of a written German presence, 
culminating in Bismarck's declaration of 1884. Such a project would be a worthwhile 
endeavour in its own right, and its form can only be indicated here in the most 
cursory fashion. We can speak of three rough divisions of writing which are 
important here, all of which existed more or less independently, motivated by 
different interests, often at odds with one another, and nevertheless communicating 
with one another on various levels, and often working together. These writings are 
defined by the presence of the missionaries, the traders, and the 
explorers/adventurers.3 These are only approximate categories. To do justice to 
such a genealogy, for example, we would have to accord the large "Colonial 
Societies," which were founded for the purpose of economic exploitation of the new 
territory, a category of their own;4 likewise the scientific expeditions. There is a 
complex interaction of interests here. The scientific expeditions often served to link 
the interests of the "societies" with those of an "impartial" scientific discourse. And, 
as we have seen, we only need mention the names of the early societies to see the 
3 A study of the type I am proposing is yet to be made. There are, however, a number of very useful 
and informative studies of these categories. For the role of the missionaries, see K. J. Bade (ed), 
Imperialismus und Kolonialmission. Beitrage zur Kolonial- und Oberseegeschichte 22 (Wiesbaden: F. 
Steiner, 1982); Jan de Vries, Mission and colonialism in Namibia (Braamfontein: Ravan, 1978); Horst 
Gruender, Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1982); Karl 
Hammer, Weltmission und Kolonialismus (Miinchen: dtv, 1981); Heinrich Loth, Die christliche Mission 
in Siidwestafrika (Berlin, 1963). Ridley discusses the literary treatment of the conflict between mission 
and imperialism (Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, pp. 104-111.) For accounts of travel and exploration, 
see Eduard Moritz., "Die Anfange der Erforschung von Siidwestafrika," in Koloniale Rundschau (1918), 
pp. 114-126, 234-249; Paul Ritter, "Die ersten Forschungsreisen iiber den Oranje" in Deutsche 
Kolonialzeitung 54 (1942), pp. 153-155. A useful study in English, not only with respect to trave~ but 
for general historical information, is Alvin Kienetz, Nineteenth-Century South West Africa as a 
German settlement colony (University of Minnesota. PhD, 1976). Kienetz gives a large number of 
excerpts from travellogues translated into English. 
4 See M. Nussbaum, Vom Kolonialenthusiasmus zur Kolonialpolitik der Monopole (Berlin, 1962); R. 
V. Pierard, "The German Colonial Society 1882-1914" (PhD dissertation, State University of Iowa, 
1964); K. J. Bade, Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit, Beitrage zur Kolonial-
und Oberseegeschichte 13 (Wiesbaden: Freiburg, 1975); Otto Diehn, Kaufmannschaft und deutsche 
Eingeborenenoolitik von der Jahrhundertwende bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (Hamburg, 1956). 
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important role which the movements of capital played in the growth of the colonial 
Idea: the Central Society for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German 
Interests Overseas was founded in 1878 by Robert Jannasch; the West German 
Association for Colonization and Export was founded by Friedrich Fabri in 1880,5 
and involved cooperation with Woermann; the German Colonial Society was 
founded on 6 December 1882; and together with the Society for German 
Colonization, founded on 28 March 1884 by Carl Peters, was amalgamated into the 
German Colonial Society on 19 December 1887. At a later stage, such an 
investigation would have to add the very important category of the settler, whose 
writing then ties in with the writing of the "Societies" by way of the "Settlement 
Society .',6 
The role of the traders is interesting in this context. Deleuze and Guattari have 
noted that ''writing has never been Capitalism's thing. Capitalism is profoundly 
illiterate."7 In the colonial showplace we find this illiteracy being ushered in by the 
trader. He does not write in the same way that the missionary and explorer writes, 
because his activity signifies only itself - it justifies and explains itself without 
recourse to a higher authority. And yet, initially, in the showplace of the colony, the 
traces he leaves on the earth are able to be incorporated into the writing which 
belongs to the despot. This holds true whether we see the despot as the Kaiser, or 
the Colonial Idea - they amount to the same thing. What is important is that the 
trader leaves marks on the earth which are subsequently incorporated into a system 
of meaning revolving around German presence. We shall see presently how this 
works, particularly in the "opening up" of the colony via a series of pathways. The 
trader, however, continues to occupy a marginal position within the despotic regime. 
He enjoys an unusual mobility across borders, and he is able to cross them in a 
manner which, while confirming their presence, confirms them as an effect within 
5 Fabri had published a plea for colonization in 1879, entitled Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? Eine 
politisch-okonomische Betrachtun~ (Gotha: Perthes, 1879). 
6 See Gerd Sudholt, Die deutsche Ein~eborenenpolitik in Sildwest-Afrika, von den Anfangen bis 1904, 
pt. 2, ch. 2: "Die Tatigkeit der Siedlungsgesellschaften" (Hildesheim: Olm, 1975); K Frey, "Aus der 
Friihzeit der weillen Besiedlung Siidwestafrikas." in Afrikanische Heimatkalender 27 (1956), pp. 89-104. 
7 Deleuze and Guattar~ Anti-Oedipus, p. 240. 
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the system of flows of money, and not as a qualitatively subordinate division within a 
homogeneous and universal space. The trader does not master space in a mythical 
manner, he attempts to render it productive. The mythical mastery of space is only 
possible in narrative, and, although we find the trader's mobility often mythologized 
in colonial discourse, the marks he leaves on the ground are in-significant, and if his 
journey is to be repeated, then only by himself. We will find constant evidence in 
colonial discourse of the conflict which arises between the mobile trader and the 
enclosing, bordering work of colonization. 
It seems reasonable to assert that, by the early 1880s, these distinct writings had 
come to align themselves ever more with the idea that they were not only distinct 
writings in the service of God or Knowledge on the one hand, nor of personal 
interest on the other hand, but that they were also in the service of German 
possession of South West Africa. Thus we find statements such as the following 
being made: 
The question has been put to me often enough in recent times, just what von 
Liideritz and Germany are doing in Angra Pequena. I answer by showing, 
partly by way of my own experience, what Germany's sons have, through the 
most strenuous labours, already accomplished in those parts of South West 
Africa to which An~ra Pequena (and Walfish Bay) are the gateways. When 
the German flag 1s hoisted over those harbours, it is not as if some 
"discoverer" accidently sailing past were, through ceremonial form, to declare 
"uninhabited" land his own. For almost 50 years now, Germans have been 
working there, and hfve begun to sow the seeds of Christianity and Culture 
in those wild regions. 
Here we can see quite clearly the ease with which the civilizing discourse of 
Christianity, that of expanding knowledge and trade align themselves in the name of 
the colonial and national Idea. It is interesting to note that the organization of these 
writings into a discourse which could properly be called colonial accompanied the 
administrative organization of the colonial Idea in the form of the Colonial 
Societies. Thfs is not surprising, when we consider that those who were writing 
books and articles on their experiences in Africa were often the same as those 
pleading for German colonization, and again they were often directly involved in the 
8 C. G. Buttner, Das Hinterland von Walfischbai und An~a Peguena. Eine Ubersicht der Kulturarbeit 
deutscher Missionare und der seitheri~en Entwicklun~ des deutschen Handels in Siidwestafrika 
(Heidelberg: Winter 1884), p. 3-4. 
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founding or administration of the societies (Friedrich Fabri and Carl Peters). And of 
course those who believed they stood to gain financially from colonization also did 
much to plead its case (the steamship magnate Woermann). It would thus be 
tempting to believe that colonization could be viewed as a well-engineered scheme 
managed solely by individuals motivated by personal interests. It is, however, 
important to realize the two conflicting moments at work here. On the one hand, 
these individuals and societies had a strictly organizational function. That is, they 
sought to coordinate existing forms of writing and to compile a text which could 
have definite political effects. On the other hand, however, this activity was not in 
the service of signification, nor of the despot. Its goal was not the production of 
meaning, but of capital, and any meaning it might produce in the form of an 
ideology of colonization was incidental. 
The conflict between capitalist development and the colonial Idea also appears 
as a conflict within government. This became increasingly evident during the Herero 
rebellion, when Parliament was not prepared to continue financing what it 
considered to be a grossly mismanaged protectorate administration. This finally led 
to the dissolution of Parliament and its re-constitution in the so-called 'Hottentot 
Elections' in 1907, when Chancellor von Bulow, a strong proponent of the colonial 
Idea, came to power. Bismarck himself had never been very convinced of any 
advantages of colonization. Thus he stated in 1865 
... the advantages one hopes to gain for the commerce and industry of the 
motherland are founded largely on illusion. As the experience of colonial 
policies in England and France demonstrates, the costs involved in 
establishing, supporting, and, above all, retaining a colony are most often in 
excess of the gains which the Motherland derives from it; and this quite apart 
from the fact that it is difficult to justify the imposition of considerable 
taxation upon the entire nation for the advantage of individual branches of 
trade and commerce ... 9 
Even after his official declaration of support, Bismarck was continually 
reluctant to support the colonial project. He did, in fact, take the idea of a German 
presence in Africa quite seriously. But, in contrast to the colonial proponents, who 
saw only (or mainly) the effect which German colonization would have on the 
9 Cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonieg, p. 110. My translation. 
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quality of African space, Bismarck realized that it would also change the quality of 
European space. Thus on 5 December 1888 he commented to Eugen Wolf, a well 
known African explorer and proponent of the colonial Idea: "Your map of Africa is 
very nice, but my map of Africa is right here in Europe. Here is Russia and here is 
France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa."10 
As a government policy, colonization cannot succeed without attaching itself to 
a discursive strategy which can represent African space as a function of European 
space; that is, colonization must be made attractive in terms of the European 
experience of Europe. This must be accomplished not only by arousing a general 
passion for exotic and distant lands, but also by a means of argumentation which 
concerns European experience. On 2 March 1885, Bismarck told the Reichstag: "A 
politics of colonization is only possible when it is supported decisively and with 
conviction by the will of a majority of the nation."11 These sentiments were echoed 
by Dr Miquel, addressing the founders of the Colonial Society: 'The colonial 
question should be a question behind which the entire nation stands."12 As the 
colonial Idea grows, we find an ever increasing attempt to define the relation 
between German space and European space by mapping these spaces onto the rest 
of the world. Thus Carl Peters: 
The colonial movement is the natural culmination of the struggle for German 
national unity. It was only natural that, having established on the battlefields 
of Koniggratz and Sedan their position of power in Europe, the German 
people felt an immediate need to put an end to the wretched and in part 
despicable status which our nation held beyond the great seas, and at the 
same time to share in those material advantages which have in all times 
ensued from the large-scale development of sovereignty.13 
When the disparate writings on South West Africa begin to organize themselves 
in the service of the colonial Idea, they function in two ways: firstly, they effect a 
mythology of colonization, and so arouse the popular imagination to the point where 
colonization becomes a serious prospect within the European framework of German 
politics; secondly, they dissolve again into a complex network of what I have been 
10 Cit. Born, Von der Reichsgriindun~, p. 125. My translation. 
11 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 24. 
u Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 24. 
13 Cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 100. My translation. 
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calling "passages" - interconnections between different quantitatively determined 
spaces and different qualities of space. These passages define spaces by defining the 
ways in which their borders may be crossed. The work of establishing passages 
culminated in the Congo Conference in 1884 in Berlin, in which the central issues 
were the quantitative partitioning of African territory, and the right to maritime 
passage along the Congo and Niger rivers.14 It was possible to establish these 
borders and passages in Berlin in the form of 'Platonic dialogue' only because a 
series of qualitative passages between discursive spaces of negotiation, the geo-
political space of Europe, and the geo(-political) space of Africa had already been 
established. 
During the main part of the period of German presence in South West Africa 
the two forces of despotic and capitalist representation will remain relatively 
distinct. They characterize the process of transformation of the despotic machine 
into the capitalist machine. In either case, we must recognize the importance of 
writing as the mediation which allowed German presence in Africa to be translated 
into the colonial Idea and its mobilizations of people and capital. Writing served, so 
to speak, as a site of transformation from the indeterminate motions of desire into 
the presence of German colonizers in South West Africa - a transformation of the 
molecular into the molar in the space of the sign. Writing served to collect the 
myriad diverse lines traced by the movements of explorers, traders and scientists, 
later of settlers and soldiers, but also by the natives, and organize them into a "text" -
a unity which could be called the colony. At the same time, it collected diverse 
statements relating to the colony and collated them into a body of knowledge. And 
this organisation served as the motivating force which was able to effect the 
movement of more settlers and soldiers, traders and scientists. The writing which we 
tend traditionally to privilege as belle;lettres was no exception to this process. Jacob 
had already realized this in 1938: 
14 See the report of the Berlin correspondent of the 'Times' on the opening of the Congo Conference, 
cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutsschen Kolonien, p. 116. 
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In the face of this strong increase in the German exploration of Africa, it is 
quite understandable when ever more German authors made an effort to 
demonstrate to the German people this advantages and possibilities of 
owning the newly opened tropical regions. 
Indeed, I have already put forward the hypothesis that in colonization the belles 
lettres have a vital mythologizing function. Wherever the coordination of various 
levels of writing, and the passages between various spaces, begin to break down, the 
belletristic discourse seeks to restore order through the definition of mythical 
passages. 
In the following discussion, I shall be exploring various types of script which 
serve to mark the earth in the same gesture as they mark the written page. That is to 
say, the spatiality of the sign, in which meaning is constantly threatened by 
difference, enters the service of the spatializing machine. The threat to meaning is 
converted into a production of spatial order, and the text is rehabilitated by its 
functionality - it works. I will be working with the hypothesis that the energy which 
converts the loss inherent in the trace of difference into the production of spatial 
order is an affect energy, and that it is a vital strategy of these texts to harness the 
inevitable sense of loss arising in the production of meaning. When we ask how this 
harnessing is effected, we will see that the loss inscribed in the text finds itself 
compensated in a promise of fullness which the production of spatial order yields. 
This loss can be an affect loss, such as the fading of stains of German blood where it 
has marked the earth - a loss which must be preserved for sentimental reasons; or it 
can be a practical loss, such as the fading of wagon tracks, which need to be 
preserved for technical reasons. Whatever the reasons, there is the necessity of 
fixing the script of the spatializing machine in a system of representation which 
constantly re-inscribes the earth. 
1.2 The script of travel 
15 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 23. 
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I now wish to tum my attention to one particular result of the development of a 
specific technology of travel in the colonization of German South West Africa. I will 
be attempting to show that this development served not only to facilitate actual 
physical passages between spaces, but that it is accompanied by a discursive 
repetition of these passages. Whereas the technology of travel marks the earth with 
physical passages between spaces, discourse preserves these passages on a number 
of levels: as the course of civilization, as an itinerary of suffering, as an extension of 
knowledge, and finally as a script marking the land as a German possession. I shall 
claim that the ultimate result of this is a contradiction between the technical 
demands of travel and the discursive repetition of passages. This is resolved in the 
form of a mythical mastery of space. 
In the discourse of German South West Africa, we find that the most important 
means of crossing space, the ox wagon, is almost always associated with the 
advancement of civilization and therefore with a self-justification of German 
presence in the landscape. A typical passage is found in Johannes Dose's Ein alter 
Afrikaner: 
In this inaccessible (unwegsam) land, the rough, primitive apparatus of the 
Treck provides the best service, because its simplicity means that it can easily 
be repaired. A smooth wooden shaft lies across the necks of each pair of 
oxen. To the right and left of the neck are two thin boards, the yolk pieces, 
which are joined together under the neck by a piece of hide. The yolks of the 
eight to ten pairs of oxen are attached to the treck chain, and only the last 
team is fixed to the shaft - and the simple apparatus and vehicle which 
allowed civilization to conquer South Africa is ready. The unsprung wagon 
jolts and shakes horribly. Everyone curses it. But this crude ox wagon waded 
through the foot-deep dunes of the terrible Namib, crossed the thombush 
steppes, swam the rivers and climbed the mountains. Without it, the war and 
victory over the Hereros would not have been possible, without it South West 
Africa would not have become a German land. 
They treck from waterhole to waterhole, twenty to thirty kilometers per day, 
depending upon how good or bad the road is, which was nothing but the 
track of a wheel.16 
The passage begins by describing the land as unwegsam (inaccessible), an 
adjective which conveniently associates the penetrability of the land (from a 
European perspective) with the establishment of roads. It then presents us with a 
detailed description of the means by which this penetration is effected, and 
16 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 354-355. 
COLONIAL SPACE• 2.56 
emphasizes its simplicity, durability, but also the hardships which it causes as a 
means of travel. The penetration of the land is shown to be an ordeal which must be 
· appreciated in retrospect. Note the shift in tense from the description of the wagon 
and the discomfort it causes (in the timeless present) to the achievements of the ox 
wagon in the penetration of the land (in the preterite). And this penetration is made 
equivalent to the advance of civilization. Here the movement of the ox wagon is 
shown to effect another writing, the script of memory which ties the penetration of 
the land to personal hardship. We shall see at a later stage that this script becomes 
very important in writing the German presence on the land. Finally, the paragraph 
gives away its secret when it makes the progress of the wagon "from waterhole to 
waterhole" dependent on the quality of the path "which was nothing but the track of 
a wheel." We see that the penetration of the "impenetrable" land always brings with 
it this tautological gesture - no one was there first, but the tracks the wagon leaves 
are always the re-inscription of the tracks left by the previous wagon. The tracks 
from one waterhole to the next write a pre-existent geographical knowledge onto 
the earth. From the discussion in part I it should be apparent that the spatiality of 
the track is of the same nature as the spatiality of the sign: it is a mark which is 
always already there, and whose priority is erased in its retracing. An ox-wagon is a 
writing machine. In this respect von Eckenbrecher is more honest: 
When I speak here of South West African roadways, these must not be 
confused with European high roads. The former are nothing but simple 
paths, often only passable with the greatest danger. They were made by 
game, zebras, and are now used by human feet, or else they resulted over the 
years when the driver of one ox wagon tried to follow the tracks which the 
one before him l',1d left, optimistically thinking: where he got through, I'll 
also get through!1 
And yet, her honesty is restricted to the admission that the penetration of the 
land has been a gradual process, and that the white colonizer has not always already 
been there. The civilizing gesture is also recognizable here, in the series of 
inscriptions created by the foot of an animal, the foot of a human, and the wheel. It 
is interesting that this mysterious foot placed between the animal and the wheel 
17 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir .:ab und nahm, p. 12. 
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again reveals a secret of the text. We know that those who travel by foot in this 
country are either (on seldom occasions) explorers writing European presence on 
the face of the land, or else they are those faceless natives who have become part of 
the face of the land. The fact that von Eckenbrecher speaks of these feet in the 
present tense, as llfilili the paths, tells us that she can only mean the latter. The 
paths which the wheel traces are admittedly tracings of feet that were there and still 
are there, but this tracing is at the same time an obliteration of those footprints. 
This obliteration is not only a physical, but also a textual operation. Here it makes 
use of the strategy of dissociating human feet from any human individuality, and at 
the same time associating them with the feet of animals. Where the wagon has 
passed, knowledge of the marks of the savages is reduced to a European memory of 
animals. I shall have more to say about this function of memory later in this chapter. 
Looking at this passage, we should also ask what von Eckenbrecher has 
achieved in the first sentence by implicitly asking the European imagination to erase 
its knowledge of what a road is in order to comprehend the conditions in South 
West Africa. Her writing signifies a space which the European eye (reading in 
Germany) can imagine only via the mediation of her words. The script on the 
landscape and in memory, this script of civilization, is installed as an extension of 
European language, simply because this language has the flexibility required to 
encircle new spaces within existing bounds of knowledge. The appeal to European 
knowledge to "capture" the conception of travel in South West Africa may be 
equated to the appeal to "capture" the space which this travel inscribes. We must not 
underestimate the role played by language in this process of inscription, since it is 
the book which plays this vital mediating role between the inscription of the earth 
and European knowledge. The mediating function of the book allows any affect 
investment in the narrative to be transfered with relative ease to an affect 
investment in the colony. From what we have seen in Part I, we would expect the 
central agency of mediation between subjective affect investments and an affect 
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investment in colonization to be a desire for the law. Our expectation is clearly met 
in the following passage from Ra~~s Fahrt nach Sildwest -
To the right and left of the pad, as the wagon tracks in the sand are called, 
are the skeletons of many oxen and horses, who laid down from exhaustion 
and died a wretched death in the waterless desert. Almost all of them had 
turned their heads into an upward position, and Jhe empty sockets of their 
eyes stared up in mute reproach at the blue skies.1 
Here, the writing of the wagons also leaves a script of hardship, which serves as 
an open question mark directed at a transcendental eye. As in von Eckenbrecher's 
description, we can see exactly where this transcendental eye would have to be 
situated - in Europe. This is evident in the two symmetrical gestures - the heads 
pointing upwards with a voiceless indictment and the writer rhetorically appealing to 
European knowledge to read the specific suffering which marks its limits, and which 
her language cannot speak. The script addresses the transcendental European eye in 
order to invoke its gaze. Thus the first sentence informs this European eye that the 
roads in South West Africa are nothing it has ever seen before and that they have a 
name that the European has never heard before. This is, incidentally, not an 
isolated instance. Ludwig von Estorff, for example, says virtually the same thing. 
This road was nothing but the track of a wagon and was called "pad" ... Some 
of these desert marches were very strenuous, and could only be accomplished 
by mustering all one's forces.19 
Now, we would not be doing justice to the strategic function of this invocation of 
a European eye in order to dramatise the hardship of the penetration of the colony, 
if we failed to realize that this European eye is specifically a German eye, and that 
the presence which is being inscribed on the earth is a specifically German presence 
as opposed to that of the other colonial powers engaged in the "scramble for Africa." 
Thus we find Dose stating the following: 
Swakopmund was and will be a disappointment to anyone. Small and low-
built, it lies at the foot of the hideous sand desert, the wide, waterless, God-
accursed Namib. But even this Sahara with its fearful dimensions has its 
claim to fame - to this broad wall of dune, impenetrable without a wagon and 
shipments of water, we owe the fact that this colony is our possession, and 
18 Haase, Ragm Fahrt, p. 172-173. 
19 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kampfe, p. 27. 
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that South Wt;J} had not long since been taken by the English, but was free 
for the talcing. 
Here it is clear that the type of hardships associated with crossing the Namib by 
ox wagon is a kind of divine test which a race such as the English would supposedly 
not be capable of passing. Here the word Besitz (possession) is not accidental. This 
test ensures that the marks of the ox wagon on the sand of the Namib signify not 
only German presence but also German possession. 
The complex script of possession which the technology of travel writes on the 
earth is intensified when it comes to the question of travel during the wars against 
the Herero and Hottentot nations: writing is imbued with an affect value which 
serves to organize textual and geographical space in such a way that marks of 
suffering are preserved. Here the technology of travel is initially the same -
Cumbersome, pulled by the long rows of oxen, the large wagon rolled on. 
Now the high, heavy wheels ground through the sand; now a wheel climbed 
over a rock which lay in the track; grinding and groaning in every joint, it fell 
back into place ... And so we moved on in a long train on a road which was 
marked by little more than old and new wagon tracks.21 
It is evident in Frenssen that the movement of soldiers through the colony is 
extensively guided and determined by the presence of wagon tracks.22 But here we 
should note two things. Firstly, the nature of the hardship associated with travel 
becomes much more specific, more affect laden and more intense, and secondly, 
there arises a strategic need to streamline mobility of troops, by making them less 
dependent on preexisting pathways, as well as by expanding the network of these 
pathways. I shall be discussing the intensification of German suffering later, where I 
will attempt to show how this suffering is converted into a script of possession. Let 
us first tum our attention to the problem of mobility in warfare. 
In the first decade of the 20th century the railway line plays an increasingly 
important role in the mobility of troops, and is also an important factor in the bitter 
debate in Germany over whether and to what extent the colony should be financed 
20 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 348. 
21 Gustav Frenssen, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Sudwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht (Berlin: Grotesche 
Buchhandlung, 1906), p. 49. 
22 Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 135. 
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from the Imperial coffers. The problem of troop mobility is one of the prime 
considerations which causes von Estorff in 1909 to seek to convince Dernburg of the 
necessity of a railway network. 
I was of the opinion that the country must of necessity be provided with a 
railway network. A direct connection from Windhoek to Keetmanshoop was 
absolutely essential if the reduced Protectorate Troops were to ensure the 
security of the country ... [In response, Dernburg replied] that it would surely 
be possible to convince Parliament that these railways s~uld be built... 
provided the military motives were placed in the foreground. 
While Dernburg is clever enough to realize that the need for mobility must be 
argued in military terms, von Estorff indicates elsewhere that he attaches a moral 
dimension to the question of mobility. 
In order to catch the small and very mobile bands, one had to distribute one's 
forces over large areas, forming small, mobile units. But these in turn 
required many small, greatly endangered supply transports, and were always 
in danger of meeting unexpectedly with superior forces and being defeated. 
As soon as the enemy met with success, he gained strong reinforcements. 
This type of warfare is called the "little war." It does not lead to great 
decisions, but protracts decisions considerably, requires large forces and 
disspirits them quickly. The more agile and mobile party has great 
advantages, and these are greater the less his requirements and the better his 
knowledge of the land. These advantages were on the side of the natives, so 
that for a long time they balanced the superior qualities of our troops: the 
greater courage and discipline, the greater strength and better equipment.24 
Encountering guerilla warfare for the first time, von Estorff sees himself faced 
with a dilemma. The vastly superior mobility of the enemy allows it to fight a war 
which, for him, is essentially cowardly (later he tells us that the character and 
lifestyle of the indigenous peoples grant them the talent of a war of ambush and 
deception. );25 and yet, if he is to succeed, von Estorff himself must acquire this 
mobility. He solves his dilemma by separating the issues into a moral and a 
pragmatic one: the building of roads and railway lines continues to be a part of the 
moral responsibility of the colonizer to bring civilization to the land, and the ability 
to move across the landscape independently of this network becomes a practical 
matter of acquiring knowledge in order to defeat the enemy. We see the moral 
value which von Estorff attached to the building of roads in the following passage: 
23 von Estorff, Wanderunw und Kiimpfe, pp. 146-7. 
24 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kampfe. p. 120. 
25 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kampfe, p. 126 
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I was, however, troubled by the morale of the men. They had become wild 
through constant campaigns, and had squandered their high wages in drinks, 
and then there was the company of the native women ... Without hesitation I 
set out from Windhoek with the major part of the garrison in the direction of 
Walfish Bay and Swakopmund to the edge of the desert, where I occupied 
them in road works on the poor surface of the so-called Bayweg.26 
And in the following passage we see his conviction (striking as it is when we 
compare it to the above denouncement of guerilla tactics) that the German troops 
must acquire the same spatial knowledge as the Hottentots: 
The experiences which the Protectorate Troops gained from the rebellion are 
the following: they must acquire the advantages which the enemy had over 
us: great mobility, great marching ability, exact knowledge of the land, 
development of a sense of orientation and knowledge of all means of 
orientation, including the ability to recognize and read tracks. Whatever the 
Hottentot ~f uld do, the Horseman in the Protectorate Troops must also be 
able to do. . 
This spatial knowledge consists in the ability to read. The Hottentots possess 
the advantage that they are able to read the writing which the German soldiers 
inscribe on the earth, as well as the significant lines of topographic and stellar 
configurations. In addition, their own movements are faster, more efficient, and do 
not have the status of writing - they are illegible to the Germans. War requires this 
ability to read the writing of stars, prints in sand, etc, and to use this script to move 
quickly across the landscape leaving as little trace as possible. This is what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean by the smoothing of space initiated by the nomadic war machine. 
The war machine here seeks to move in non-significant lines, but when it is captured 
by the State it functions by its ability to read and to write. There is a constant 
deciphering and re-translation into writing on the earth. It is probably a necessary 
consequence of his conviction that the war against the Herero and Hottentots is 
fought on the side of civilization when von Estorff emphasizes that the lines of 
movement developed by the troops are essentially the same as those desirable in 
peace. 
The fact that South West Africa is now provided with an adequate railway 
network should also be seen as one of the fruits of our wartime experiences. 
26 von Estorff, WanderUD!1;eD und Kampfe, p. 49. 
27 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, pp. 297-8; See also von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kampfe, p. 
156. 
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The same applies to the continued development of wells in the Kalahari and 
elsewhere. Here the goals of war and peace go hand in hand. 28 
This claim is, however, in direct contradiction to the attempt to divorce troop 
mobility (as knowledge) from the pre-existent lines of the railway. When we read 
von Estorffs accounts of his experiences in the South West African wars, we find 
him struggling time and again with the relative mobility which the enemy possesses 
because of its independence of the roads and railways. 
I was soon reinforced by officers ... and men ... But in spite of that, I could not 
go in pursuit, since the enemy had fled into the mountains on paths which 
were, as the natives who knew the land ass¥Jed me, not passable for our 
wagons of food supplies and other necessities. 
What is more, we must question his implicit assumption that the aims of peace 
benefitted from the practice of war. Rather than to claim that one positive result of 
the rebellion of the natives is an increased mobility of the Europeans, I would 
suggest that war is a consequence of the increased mobility of the 'peaceful' 
European invaders. This is borne out if we consider that the establishment of 
privileged lines of access to all parts of the territory (a tendency which we find 
greatly enhanced by the demands of warfare) tends to acquire that territory before it 
is "conquered" in the sense of a military and police network directly controlling the 
movements of people. This is similar to the effect of the Suez canal described by 
Said: 
De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient's distance, its cloistered 
intimacy away from the West, 1ts perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier 
could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was 
transsubstantiated from resiliant hostility into obliging, and submissive, 
partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging 
to another world, strictly speaking. There was only "our" world, "one" world 
bound together because the Suez canal had frustr%ed those last provincials 
who still believed in the difference between worlds. 
We have already seen that the hardships of travel invoke a transcendental eye 
which can preside over individual suffering, giving it meaning. This eye also serves 
to unify space in the manner described by Said. It does this by tying subjective affect 
investment to a political interest - an interest which functions as knowledge. This 
28 Cit. Jacob, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 299. 
1.9 von Estorff, WanderunK'.eD und Kampfe, p. 70. 
30 Said, Orientalism, p. 92. 
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invocation of a transcendental eye which authorizes possession in travel is related to 
what Fabian observes as a secularization of knowledge in 18th century travel. 
For the established bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century, travel was to 
become (at least potentially) every man's source of "philosophical," secular 
knowledge. Religious travel had been to the centers of religion, or to the 
souls to be saved; now secular travel was from the center] of learning and 
power to places where man was to find nothing but himself. 1 
The advent of the capitalist machine brings with it a decentralization of power 
and diversification of knowledge. Instead of setting out from the known to a 
destination which is always already known, secular travel sets out from the known to 
discover the unknown; but it sets out to discover the unknown as a repetition of the 
known. Whereas the despot always already knows and owns the world, the capitalist 
must constantly cross the boundaries of knowledge and ownership. It is by constantly 
relinquishing ownership that he renders them productive. 
This constant crossing of borders is a mythical mastery of space, and it is this 
mastery that allows the conflict mentioned above to be resolved. The contradictory 
demands of an increasing organization of space through the construction of physical 
passages (railway lines etc.) on the one hand, and an increasing need to move 
independently of this organization on the other hand is, in my opinion, best 
understood as a conflict between the stratification of space in colonization and the 
need to counter any resistance to this stratification. Guerilla warfare seeks to master 
space in ways that the technology of colonialism cannot initially utilize, and the 
colonizer seeks to counter this by appropriating guerilla techniques into its own 
mastery of space. The resultant contradiction is resolved in the mythical mastery of 
space. The ideology of German presence as a civilizing force requires a myth of 
spatial totality. The power which organizes space confirms itself by defining the 
passsages across the boundaries it draws. As we have seen in our discussion of the 
crossing of borders, this is the work of the conquering European as a hero, a myth of 
one who can move about freely, unrestricted by pre-defined lines of travel and 
unrestricted by borders. 
31 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 6. 
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1.3 Erasing the marks of the native 
In colonization, there is another marking of the earth with suffering, and 
subsequent fading of these marks. That is the suffering of the native. Here, colonial 
discourse establishes strict parameters within which writing is meaningful. However, 
because the preservation of suffering in writing marks the landscape with a script of 
possession, colonial discourse must ensure that the marks of suffering of the 
colonized are obliterated. The initial strategy involved here is a blindness to the 
suffering of the colonized. However, the texts of colonialism also develop a strategy 
for preserving the marks of the suffering savage as proof of their savagery. That is, 
when interpreting these marks ( and thereby bestowing upon them the status of 
legibility), the European eye banishes them from the status of writing. What is 
preserved is the necessity of their own self-destruction. 
It is with a great deal of astonishment that the reader must confront the many 
descriptions of the trail left by the fleeing Herera as the German troops pursue 
them into the Omaheke desert at the end of the Herera war. Although it is made 
quite clear to us at all times that this is the final move in the genocide of the Herera 
nation, we are asked to read this trail in a manner quite different to the marks left 
by the suffering of German soldiers. Its meaning, the texts tell us time and again, is 
not to be apprehended on the level of the extreme hardship which the dying nation 
is experiencing, but as evidence of their essential lack of civilization; that is, as 
evidence of the basic justification of the genocide. One of the most striking 
illustrations of this is found in Frenssen's Peter Moors Fahrt nach Stidwest: 
On the following morning we dared to follow the enemy ... The earth had 
been trampled flat as a board over a breadth of about a hundred meters. The 
enemy had stormed away with his cattle in such a dense and broad mass. 
Along this path of flight lay blankets, hides, ostrich feathers, crockery, 
women's jewelery, dead and dying cattle, and staring, dying and dead 
humans. A terrrible stink of old manure and rotting corpses oppressively 
filled the still, hot air. 
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The further we pro$fessed in the burning sun, the more pitiful the route 
became. How low this proud, wild nation had humiliated itself in its deathly 
fear. Whereever I lowered my eyes from my tired horse, there lay all their 
possessions in piles: oxen and horses, goats and dogs, blankets and skins. And 
there lay the old and wounded, women and children. A pile of small children 
lay, penshing helplessly, beside women whose breasts hu~ long and limp. 
Others lay alone, their eyes and noses full of flies, still alive. 
The operative sentence here is the one describing the transformation of a proud 
and wild people into something base, animal. In commentating this passage, 
Bergmann notes that the European observer counters his guilt with the belief "that 
the Herero are an inferior race and are not capable of suffering as are 
Europeans ... "33 The Herero die without suffering - but not, I would claim, in order 
to alleviate European guilt, but in order not to leave marks on the ground. 
Bergmann himself notes that the soldier who, at the end of the rebellion, observes 
that 40 000 Herero have died, does so not with a feeling of guilt, but with the 
realization that the land now belongs to the whites.34 And when, in the passage at 
the end of the book, Peter Moor's reservations regarding the morality of the 
genocide are put aside, it is not the lack of suffering on the part of the Herero, but 
their absolute lack of civilization which is the chief factor in his argument. The 
Herero can suffer and feel pain, but their suffering cannot assume the monumental 
proportions of European suffering, because they cannot write. It is the writing of the 
colonizer which allows him to extract meaning from the pain of the Herero, 
incorporating this pain into what he portrays as his own cosmic tragedy. Suffering is 
the basis of tragedy, and out of tragedy, subjectivity is born into the socius. Thus the 
transitive nature of the Herero's suffering and their inability to write yield their lack 
of civilization - their inability to comprise a socius. 
An inability to write is, however, not necessarily an inability to leave a mark. 
Indeed, it is the intensity of the mark which is so important in demonstrating its 
inability to function as a writing. Consider the following description: 
The path of flight could not be missed. Their mortally wounded were simply 
left to perish. The positions of the corpses could be seen from the sickenmg 
32 Frenssen, Peter Moor, pp. 162-163 
33 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 119. 
34 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 119. 
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swarms of flies, bloated with the poison they had sucked. Carcasses of 
animals, puffed up in decay by gases; calabashes, household things and all 
kinds of worthless bits and pieces marked the q~ht. It was hideous for the 
Germans to march all day in the gruesome stink. 
The reason I am claiming that this is not writing is its symbolic perfection - its 
perfect transparency, the remainderless transmission of death without that loss out 
of which meaning arises. As I stated earlier, it is this attempt to portray suffering as 
if it were without loss which should horrify the reader. It is the simplicity of this 
writing - the simple abandon of this gesture with which one nation's demise is made 
to declaim in the petty tragedy of a 'master race' - which characterizes genocide. 
The same reduction of the savage's actions to a chaos out of which writing 
extracts meaning is evident in those places where the destruction resulting from 
rampaging natives and their traces on the German farms is described. Thus 
Frenssen: 
... then we came to the first halt, which had been destroyed by blacks. They 
had burned the modest house, torn down the corrugated iron roof, smashed 
the few houshold effects, and taken the rest.36 
There is, however, a strategic problem associated with this will to 
meaninglessness. We have seen that this strategic problem arises in the practice of 
guerilla warfare, where the German troops find themselves unable to read the traces 
of the savages. The reason why I include this in the problem described above is that 
it is, so to speak, its reverse side. What the European eye produces as a lack of 
meaning is, of course, a system of meaning radically different to the European 
writing. As such it is also radically opposed to the State. The traces of flight, as we 
examined them above, are lines of flight, in the sense outlined by Deleuze and 
Guattari; that is, "a real smoothing of the space, which reacts in its turn on the 
striated space."37 With regard to the smoothing of space by the war machine, 
Deleuze and Guattari note that "the lines of flight themselves... always risk 
abandoning their creative potentialities in order to turn into a line of death, to be 
35 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 407. 
36 Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 41. 
37 Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 11. 
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turned into a pure and simple line of destruction."38 Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
Fascism in this connection, but I would argue that the traces left by fleeing natives 
are either legible or illegible according to whether they bear death as a sacrifice for 
the sake of the State (this is the function of genocide in fascism), or whether they 
bear the State's own potential destruction. It is in this latter function of the line of 
flight that I would situate the practice of guerilla warfare. "Historically, as well as 
conceptually, nomads have a particular affinity with the line of flight, since it is 
along which characterizes lines of technological flight that they invent new weapons 
to oppose those of the State."39 
European discourse has a number of strategies which it employs to re-constitute 
chaotic flows of desire in the molar unity of social production. These revolve around 
the fiction of the split subject who has drawn a border between what he may 
understand as his desire and the space in which this named desire may be called his 
own - the space of his subjectivity. However, if Deleuze and Guattari are correct, the 
flows out of which this subject has arisen continue to move at random across and 
through matter; and these chaotic flows of desire are a constant threat to the subject 
and his order. The colonizing subject easily visualizes this opposition as a distinction 
between his European subjectivity and the amorphous realm of savagery. As a 
result, the savage acts as a surface onto which the European may project that which 
it can never be - the chaotic flows of desire which move through savage and settler 
alike. This is the form such a visualization would take: 
Alas, this lovely land was under the brutal uprising of de-humanized niggers. 
Stunned, the horsemen now saw the traces of the widespread murder, came 
across the rubble of devastated farms, in which the blood and smoke could 
still be smelt. These burnt-out walls must have been a stately home for South 
West. Now the windows stare from empty sockets, all mute, dead and 
destroyed. You can see how, suddenly, in deathly panic, this farmer fled from 
his pretty house, or was killed in the courtyard. All the bedsheets, sofas and 
chairs are slashed open, the cupboards choppen up, all glasses and teacups 
stolen from the sideboard, but the saucers and cognac ~lasses are left alone, 
since the kaffirs don't know what they are for. And m the middle of this 
terrible chaos of furniture, tables, mirrors, trinkets, folders and porcelain, all 
smashed together and so broken up that it looks like a roller had driven over 
it, right in the middle there stands a piano, absolutely untouched ... The 
38 Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 11. 
39 Paul Patton, Conceptual politics, p. 66. 
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Hereros must have taken the instrument for a fetish and left it unharmed, 
together with a case of Worcestershire Sauce.40 
The traces which the savages leave on the earth testify to the precariousness of 
the order which European labour had established. Everything is reduced to a state 
of chaos. The conflict here is presented in thermodynamic terms. What had been 
accomplished by the expenditure of European energy is a postponement of the 
effects of entropy. This is a specifically European endeavour, since it is the work of 
the savage to unleash the demonic power which this stored up energy contains, and 
to allow the power of death full play. It is for this reason that the savages appear to 
the European as "de-humanized." Their actions are our own "Angst, aus der eigenen 
Kultur herauszufallen, - aus der Kultur, die wir allein als Kultur wahmehmen."41 We 
should however appreciate that this apparent conflict is a relative conflict and is 
contained as such within the strategies of colonization. The spatializing machine of 
colonization integrates and renders productive not only the labor of the colonizer, 
but on another level also the force of death and destruction described by the second 
law of thermodynamics. In the above example, we can see once again how the 
European eye focusses on the sight of savage destruction, and, having surveyed the 
chaos therein, blinds itself to this chaos in order to extract a surplus meaning from 
what it sees. What is striking in many such passages is the degree of pleasure the 
European eye can extract from the spectacle of its own culture in ruins. The despise 
this eye holds for the paraphernalia of European subjectivity - all the precious little 
part objects - is clearly evident in the intensity with which the narrator partakes of 
their destruction. And then, having let his desire roam free, he allows his gaze to 
settle once again on those objects in which the border between desire and the socius 
is preserved as a border between himself and the savages: saucers, cognac glasses, 
Worcestershire sauce, a piano. These objects serve as a focal point for a renewed 
encircling of the space of the socius - a space which has come to include the traces 
of the savage as evidence of European knowledge. European knowledge preserves 
40 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 357. 
41 Horn, Fremdheitskonstruktionen, p. 406. 
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the site of savagery as a place where the order of the European socius is strictly 
separated from the chaos of desiring production. 
This is a re-territorializing strategy, and as such it is more than writing. The 
script which labor has written on the land postpones death in the name of meaning. 
The script in books which commentates this other script achieves the same thing. 
But between the two there is a passage which is defined by death's productivity and 
plenitude, and has nothing to do with writing. The farmer's death activates the script 
of labor and the script in books, but in doing so, it focusses desire onto a physical 
surface, a geographic position, and it organizes the chaotic movements of desire into 
the space of the socius. It also divides the chaotic space of the colonized from the 
ordered space of the colonizer. 
This is why, when confronted with guerilla tactics such writers as van Estorff 
always take a moral stance, from which they can confirm their subjective integrity by 
the very fact that the military machine is inadequate against this type of warfare. 
Thus, a paragraph such as the following, in which van Estorff expresses concern and 
frustration, must be followed by one confirming his morality. 
This time of defense [Christmas 1905 to March 1906] was a most difficult 
period, for time and again the mobile enemy succeeded in his ambushes. 
Furthermore, the animals had to be spread out over large areas, and it was 
most difficult to keep watch over them and ensure their safety. The agile 
Hottentots crept under the grazing animals and tried to drive them off while 
others attacked the watch. Or they were waiting in ambush in the mornings 
when the watchmen went to their posts. They often succeeded in shooting 
officers and men and gaining considerable spoils. Our pursuit was always too 
late, for they found their way quickly onto the souJhem shore of the Orange, 
where they were in the safety of English territory.4 
Von Estorff then takes recourse to a discourse of 'honourable' warfare, whereby 
the guerilla tactics of the savages are taken to reflect their inferior character. 
The war was conducted in this wild rocky landscape. That alone was difficult 
enough, since the natives were provided everywhere with the best hiding 
places for their practice of ambush, for which they are so well prepared by 
their character and lifestyle. We lost almost as many officers and men in 
reconnaissance and patrols as in the battles, and in addition, the immense 
difficulties of this wild land were a great hindrance.43 
42 von Estorff, Wanderun"en und Kampfe, p. 124. 
43 von Estorff, Wanderun"en und Kampfe, p. 126. 
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Onto this inherent baseness of the savage, von Estorff grafts a baseness of the 
'jewish' merchants who support them. 
Marinka had few supl?orters, but he had been incited by English traders, 
jews, to attack us agam. They hoped that the excellent business they had 
known during the rebellion would flourish once again.44 
Thus in the trail of the fleeing savage we can recognize the struggle ensuing 
from the creation of lines of flight and the attempt to re-incorporate these within the 
State's productive machine. The traces of the savages have become a part of the 
colonizer's writing. They possess all the prerequirements: the ubiquitous sand as 
writing slate, the disembodied eye extracting meaning, the cruelty with which 
meaning has been produced. However, and this is the vital point, the production of 
meaning by the European gaze must always render the marks of the fleeing native 
meaningless in themselves - chaotic. This process is so complete that the traces 
cannot even mean their own shortcomings. They are pure non-meaning, and they 
testify to pure non-being. 
The framing and production of the native's suffering within the space of 
European tragedy is not restricted to the narrative of war. It is a more general 
function of colonization and comprises one of the mythical dimensions of colonial 
discourse. European discourse is constantly surveying its own narratives from a 
timeless realm in which its diverse and specific suffering becomes meaningful within 
a totality of experience. This mythical realm cannot afford to encounter any 
historically determined dimension of suffering which could not be subsumed within 
its space. It cannot confront the suffering of the colonized. This is why the mythology 
of the colonized is continually negated in colonial discourse. The colonizer cannot 
bear to hear the native speaking of his own specific suffering and his own totality of 
experience, unless he does so within European scientific discourse. Thus the act of 
negation depends upon a complicity between European scientific and mythic 
discourses; and this must be totalized within the universal space of European 
knowledge. This universality is, as I have indicated, given by its ability to move freely 
44 von Estorff, Wanderunien und Kampfe, p. 135. 
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across the borders it has drawn. I have said much about the spatial dimension of this 
mobility. It also has a temporal dimension, given by the memory which European 
discourse constructs out of the reflexion on its own narratives. The truth value of 
European discourse at any one moment results from a complex interaction between 
this totalization of discreet spaces, and the memory of past errors which have been 
overcome. The native's knowledge is negated on both counts. Where it is specific, it 
becomes a part of European universal knowledge; and, where it is mythological, it 
becomes incorporated into European memory of its erroneous past. 
From the very start, colonial discourse brings with it a memory of European 
experience as a grid of knowledge within which the new can be apprehended. We 
have already indicated that this structures the entire project of exploration as a 
means of producing scientific statements about new lands. When we look beyond 
the claims which motivate this project, however - that is the quest for truth -, we find 
that the memory of European experience has the power to compensate for the sense 
of loss which automatically accompanies the encounter with the new. This is equally 
applicable to scientific and non-scientific discourse. It does this by tying subjective 
experience to a pre-established mode of spatial order, and by mapping this spatial 
order onto the perception of the strange landscape. This process is comparable to 
that of transfering personal suffering into a writing on the earth. Here, too, we find 
that it is in the production or activation of a script that colonial space becomes 
meaningful and is organized as that space in which experience is European. The 
consequence of this is that those who are not in a position to activate writing in 
order to produce spatial knowledge - the colonized - are integrated into the 
spatializing machine, and, as a result, their memory becomes meaningful only where 
it is the memory of the colonizer. Furthermore, the knowledge which results from 
this production finds itself confirmed by all that which it excludes. 
In order to illustrate the destruction of the native's memory let us consider the 
following anecdote. C. G. Buettner wrote in 1884 of how the English commissioner, 
Mr Palgrave, had taken a number of Herero "including several educated Christians 
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such as Wilhelm Maharero, eldest son of the ... chief of the Herera" to Cape Town, 
since he considered it ''would be expedient for English politics if a few educated 
Herero came to Cape Town to gain a personal impression of the power and might of 
England." There they were shown the "steam ships, railways, military installations, 
schools, printing presses etc." However, when they returned, they could only say to 
Buettner: 
Muhonge, we already knew about all of these things, since you yourself have 
told us of them time and again, and we have also seen them in your pictures. 
But we never believed that it really could be so. So we were surprised that it 
is really as you had told us. 45 
Here we can see what might have been a reversal of the relationships of 
colonization - a parody. The native is sent to England on a voyage of discovery. 
However, what results is only a self-parody of the native's knowledge. What he 
discovers is European memory, which has preserved a place for him in its own field 
of truth. His only access to truth is via the memory of the white man - a memory 
which preserves the speech of the native as error. We must be quite explicit here. 
Memory is not a privileged private possession of the subject. European discourse 
constitutes memory and develops practices whereby memory is inscribed on 
subjective space. Thus, while for the colonizing culture, the strange land and its 
people become the object of scientific knowledge through discovery, the same 
encounter does not result in a similar discovery for the colonized. They too are 
confronted with the new, but for them the new is their own land, themselves and 
each other cast into a foreign mould and seen from the positions prescribed by the 
white man's knowledge. 
1.4 Writing on the earth with Gennan blood 
The idea that to trace a script across a surface is to mark it as a possession is a 
recurrent theme which is recognizable in various forms in the discourse of 
45 Buettner, Das Hinterland von Walfischbai, p. 65. 
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colonialism. The work involved in crossing a space is preserved in a script which 
orders that space according to certain principles conducive to social production. The 
importance of textual space in this ordering process lies precisely in this 
preservation. We can see from the descriptions of travel in the Herero and Nama 
wars that the indelibility of the script of travel is much enhanced by the suffering of 
the traveller. Consider the following descriptions of the hardships of travel by ox-
wagon during the Herero war of resistance: 
I sat on the chest in the front of the wagon, with my arm, which stung and 
burned, in a sling. Behind me in two rows in the long Cape wagon lay two 
sick and four wounded men. The black man beside the oxen raised his long, 
lean arm for the first blow of the whip and screamed at the animals. Then the 
wagon wheel jolted against the first stone in the path,Jnd fell again, lurching 
heavily. Behind me, someone groaned with difficulty. 
There were seven of us. The lieutenant lay in the front. As the wagon rattled 
and shook, I could see his pale head ... framed in the front opening ... as it 
swayed back and forth on the sack against which he was leaned, without his 
eyes openin~··· The officer had been shot through the chest. Beside me lay 
Sergeant W1lloweit, who had previously been with the Lithuanian Dragoons, 
and groaned sharply whenever the right rear wheel fell into a hole or hit a 
stone.47 
The affect value of such suffering is considerably greater than the discomforts of 
travel in 'peace-time.' This becomes even more apparent when the mark which 
suffering leaves on the ground is not a wheel track or a railway line, but the blood of 
a wounded or dying person. Consider, for example, the following passage written by 
Clara Brockmann: 
And this land must remain German, German to the very marrow. It was 
certainly ~ught dearly enough with all the noble blood which its earth has 
absorbed. 
I shall be arguing that this much-broached theme, which is here so succinctly 
formulated, is not a metaphorical formulation, but that the gesture to which 
Brockmann and others are refering is a writing on the ground. We have seen that 
meaning in writing arises where a transcendental eye extracts a surplus value from 
the exhibition of a sign, and it is in this sense that the nature of the appeal in the text 
46 Frenssen, Peter Moor. p. 90. 
47 Walther, Fraulein, p. 165. 
48 Clara Brockmann, "Deutsche Frauen in Siidwestafrika," in Kolonie und Heimat 22 (1909), cit. 
Warmbold, Ein Stiickchen neudeutsche Er4 p. 239. 
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is to be interpreted. Furthermore, the blood which falls on the land is an ephemeral 
mark, and is all the more imbued with that sense of loss which characterizes writing. 
Thus the importance of those texts which seek to activate this script is twofold: we 
are asked to produce meaning by assuming the position of the transcendental eye, 
but we are also asked to produce this meaning as compensation for that specific loss 
incurred by writing with blood. 
The appeal in the script of blood to a transcendental eye is formulated as a 
political position, which is grafted onto a geographical space. This becomes 
apparent if we peruse any of the correspondence concerned with the establishment 
and maintenance of tombs in the years following the suppression of the Herera and 
Nama rebellions. The prime concern here is that the grave be maintained in a state 
worthy of the dead. This may be illustrated by a letter of 17 December 1912 from 
the commander of the Protectorate Troops, Major Grautoff, to the Governmental 
representative in Windhoek. Grautoff reports that the grave of a Lieutenant who 
fell in the Herera war has recently been discovered, but it is "at present in an 
unworthy state.'49 Now, if we consider that a tombstone is normally intended as a 
display; that is, as a sign to be pondered over, with an inscription to be read, we may 
be struck here by a certain contradiction. When discussing the cost of maintaining 
the graves, it is constantly mentioned that many of them are "far from the lines of 
transportaion."50 In other words, they will almost never be seen by any "white eyes," 
except those responsible for the maintenance itself. A paradox? Not if we recognize 
that the marking of the ground with tombstones is a writing in the most profound 
sense - its meaning is intended first for the one who writes, and second for the 
transcendental eye, which is also the position to which the meaning of death accrues. 
We will be returning presently to the tomb or grave as a special form of marking 
positions of death. For the moment let us consider some of the characteristics of the 
script of blood. In order to understand better the nature of this writing, let us turn to 
some of the treatments it receives in the colonial discourse of German South West 
49 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 40. 
50 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 10. 
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Africa. Consider, for example, the following request expressed by the dying pioneer, 
Jobst Renner, in Johannes Dose's Ein alter Afrikaner: 
Don't deprive me of my dream, my comfort. Promise me not to leave this 
land, which we have purchased with so much blood, but to love South West, 
the Cinderella of our colonies ... 51 
We can see that this appeal is a complex one. It is first of all an elicitation 
spoken by a dying person, who in the moment of dying has the right to extract a 
promise from those around him as a show of love. The voice which would speak this 
promise would thus have to acknowledge the "purchasing power" of death - its pact 
with surplus meaning. It is here that the position of the transcendental eye is 
established. The recognition of death's "purchasing power" is then displaced onto 
the actual script to which the eye is directed: German blood on/in the land. And the 
position from which the marks of blood on the land become meaningful is 
established as a geo-political position: the position which refuses to leave the land 
because the script of blood has effected its purchase. 
Indeed, it would not be amiss to read the entire project of colonial discourse as 
a tautological appeal to assume a geo-political position from which its script 
becomes meaningful. Thus we should understand colonial texts, just like Jobst 
Renner's appeal, as bearing within them reading instructions which are at the same 
time political and geographical positions. In this way, the text seeks to establish its 
meaning in that space in which it actualizes its meaning. For this reason, it would be 
misleading to read a document such as Frenssen's Peter Moors Fahrt nach Siidwest 
purely as an attempt to dissipate information about the type of sacrifices brought by 
Germans during the wars with the Herero and Nama, and to clothe this in the form 
of an adventure story. It is this, of course, but it is more - it is an attempt to stipulate 
that position from which the mark - the script - of these sacrifices becomes 
meaningful. 52 
51 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 440-441. 
52 Warmbold hints at this in his interpretation: "Da es sich uberdies um einen deutschen Krieg auf 
kolonialdeutschem Boden handelt, der auf hochst eindrucksvolle Weise mit einem deutschen Sieg 
endet, brauchte Frenssen auch um die Zustimmung nationaler Interessengruppen nicht zu bangen" 
Warmbold, Ein Sttickchen neudeutsche Erd, p. 121. 
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This involves, however, the additional strategy of presenting this position as 
always preexisting its actualization - it is always already there. What is elided is the 
moment of production involved not only in the writing, but more particularly in the 
actualization of meaning. Thus when Peter Moor discovers the story of German 
presence and suffering in South West Africa, he discovers it as something which was 
awaiting discovery - a story waiting to be told. 
Now and then they [ the old soldiers] would speak of the fifteen-years of 
battles in the colorues, some or all of which they had taken part in, and of the 
battles of the past three months. They mentioned many a place where brave 
deeds were done, and many a bold man, dead and living. I was astonished 
that, in this land, Germans had already done such great and difficult things, 
of which I had never heard or read a smgle word~ and that so much German 
blood had flowed in torment in this hot, dry land . .J3 
The script in blood is a writing which must be incorporated into another text in 
order to derive its meaning. This does not make it less than writing, for it is the very 
essence of writing to initiate an endless chain of commentary in search of the loss of 
meaning which writing always entails. What I wish to stress is that there is a 
machinery which derives a fullness of meaning at the moment when it choses to 
interrupt this proliferation in the name of a production which is not purely textual. 
This is what I have been calling the spatializing machine, since what is produced 
here is space. 
When the script of blood marks a space as German possession, it thus opens 
subjective space onto the space of the socius along the lines we saw in our discussion 
of Lacan's theory of the space of the subject. The apprehension of subjectivity -
particularly in vision - pre-supposes both a social space and a material surface upon 
which the marks of subjectivity may be written, as a barrier against death. In order 
to illustrate this point, let us consider the following paragraphs from Peter Moor. 
He [the old soldier] looked up and spoke with a hoarse, pained voice: "We 
will still have to be hard and kill for a long time. But in the meantime, as 
individuals and as a nation, we must strive for lofty thoughts and noble deeds, 
so that we can contribute our part to the brotherhood of humanity which is to 
come." He stood and looked thoughtfully across the wide, moonlit steppe, 
and then back at the still, dead body. 
I had often thought during the campaign: 'What a pity! All the poor sick men, 
and all those who have fallen. It's not worth all that good blood.' But now I 
53 Frenssen, Peter Moor. pp. 66-67. 
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heard a great song, which resounded over all Sogth Africa and the whole 
world, and lent me an understanding of the matter. 
Let us focus on a formal connection between these two paragraphs: the 
alternate gaze of the old soldier upon the determined, bounded space of the dead 
body and upon the indeterminate, unbounded space of the open steppes is repeated 
in the "great song" which Peter Moor situates alternately in relation to the politically 
determined space of Southern Africa and the politically indeterminate space of the 
whole world. The relation which these two bear to one another is not only formal, it 
is also semiotic: Peter Moor's work in positioning his song spatially is an extraction 
of meaning from the gaze of the old soldier. We are told this in the lines where 
Peter Moor states that he has come to understand something which he did not 
understand previously. Let us not begin by asking what it is he has come to 
understand. Let us rather ask first how he has come to understand. The answer is 
that he has come to occupy that position which the trooper creates in alternating his 
gaze between the dead body and the wide open spaces of the landscape. In 
occupying it as a position from which meaning is possible, he creates it as 
transcendental. The two of them work together to produce a text which renders the 
script of death and of spilt blood legible. But it does more than that - and here we 
can ask what it is that Peter Moor comes to understand. The text which is produced 
by the old trooper repeats once again the gestures of seeing and hearing, but it 
repeats them as an instruction for stopping the proliferation of texts at a particular 
place. It shows how the constant repetition of form in writing can be transformed 
into a production of geographical space as the ordered space of an ideal socius. This 
it does by extracting that particular meaning from the dead body which is capable of 
giving meaning to an undifferentiated geographical space. This is what the trooper 
calls "being hard": instead of suffering at the sight of blood, he asks us to transform 
our suffering into a commitment to meaning. Warmbold states this as follows: 
Nichts kann den Anspruch deutscher Siedler auf ihre neue Heimat, nichts 
den Anspruch des deutschen Reichs auf seine 'Schutzgebiete' nach Ansicht 
Frenssens iiberzeugender verdeutlichen, als "allein die Tatsache, daB von den 
54 Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 201. 
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auBereuropaischen Erdteilen zumeist der Boden Af1!as deutsches Blut, 
deutschen SchweiB und deutsche Tranen getrunken hat." 
This is, in effect, exactly the same appeal which we find in the official 
imperative to mark the graves of the fallen soldiers and civilians, and to maintain 
them in a worthy condition. The pain of loss which death must awaken is 
transformed into a commitment to a social order - an order which may be mapped 
onto the landscape. As we see in the above quote, the Nazis will repeat this same 
imperative as an argument for the restoration of the colonies to Germany. The land 
is marked with German blood, and so the colonies are Germany's rightful 
possession. What has been lost with the colonies is, however, also the ability to 
extract meaning from the marks of blood. Thus a call for the restoration of the 
colonies must be a call for a renewal of linguistic competence. 
It is Germans who, with hard work and toil, have built the African colonies of 
Togo, Cameroon, South West and East Africa. Germans hav~ spilt their 
blood for them, and their graves are scattered throughout Africa. 
The graves in the lost colonies are the site of a double loss: the original loss in 
death, and the loss of that meaning which had served to postpone death. 
1.3 The grave: script on the earth, script in the heart 
This brings us to another strategy in rendering the script of suffering legible -
the marking of the ground with tombstones. I will be attempting to show that these 
mark positions which can serve as nodal points - as positions at which an 
organisation of space may be effected in various different spatial qualities at the 
same time. I will be arguing that the most important connection here is between the 
marking of the earth and the marking of subjective affect economy: a script in the 
earth and a script in the heart. But again, this is a script which serves as the 
55 Warmbold, Ein Stiickchen neudeutsche Erd, p. 123. The quote refers to Herbert Todt, Die deutsche 
Bege~ung mit Afrika im Speigel des deutschen Nachkriegsschrifttums (Frankfurt, 1939), p. 2. 
56 Senta Dinglreiter, Wann kommen die Deutschen endlich wieder? Eine Reise durch unsere Kolonien 
in Afrika (Leipzig, Berlin: Hase und Koehler, 1935), p. 9. 
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signature and at the same time as proof of performance to a contract of sale. Thus it 
is possible for Dose to gaze upon the graves of nameless soldiers and extract the 
following meaning: 
Hundreds of these wooden crosses are scattered throughout Damaraland and 
the thorn bush, and testifY to the German heroes who gained a new Germany 
for us with their blood.5 
!noted above that the script of blood on the earth becomes meaningful as a 
result of the production of a position to which this meaning accrues as a surplus. I 
noted further that this position is defined not only in the texts which may derive 
meaning from the script of blood, but also from the way in which this script is tied to 
an organization of geographical space. The discourse surrounding ( and marking) the 
grave is paradigmatic for this process. It defines a position from which the traces of 
suffering and death become meaningful, and it ties this position to geographical 
space. As such, we should recognize that the marking of a grave is equivalent to the 
establishment of a meta-text: a writing about writing. 
Mournfully, Erb von Erbenheim stood with his wife at the grave, on which, as 
a monument, a mighty, ru~ed, unhewn block had been placed; it has been 
smoothed only where the mscription stood: the glorious words: 'He was an 
Old African.' 
In that indelible script, which no wind nor weather could erase, the memory 
of his friend and father had been written deeply and faithfully into his 
heart.58 
The sorrow which Erb von Erbenheim feels at the loss of his uncle is sublated in 
the script on the grave. In preserving loss as suffering and transforming it into a 
meaningful script, the writing on the grave attains a permanence both in subjective 
space (as a memory) and in geographical space. This is again not intended as a 
metaphor. The place to which Erb must come in order to have the script of death 
activated in the most effective manner is the grave of his uncle - the place where 
writing ties these two qualities of space together. As stated above, however, the 
script on the tomb is not primarily a writing to be read. It is a production of meaning 
which may serve as a production of space. This is demonstrated in the following 
passage from Peter Moor: 
57 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 431. 
58 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 448. 
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In the narrow, meager garden, where one could see the toil with which 
German bands had tended it in the sparse earth, lay a pile of white stones. 
Below them, covered one meter down in the dry land, lay the line-keeper and 
his wife, who had been ambushed and killed by blacks. The five or six sailors 
from the 'Habischt,' who maintained the station at present, had nailed a 
wooden cross from a packing crate and written the names of ~e dead on it 
with a blunt pencil, and below: 'Fell at the bands of murderers.' 
Herc the act of writing marks the grave as that place where order has been 
created by German labor. The meaning which the grave establishes as the surplus 
value of suffering is easily transformed into a social imperative: the call for revenge 
and justice. Once again, subjective space and geographical space open onto social 
space. In organizing the space of subjectivity as the preservation of a memory - that 
is as a barrier to death -, the grave is also organizing social space by marking a place 
where its borders have been violated. 
The claim that, in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa, the 
grave organizes subjective and social and geographical space is by no means far-
fetched. We need only consider the administrative discourse generated by the 
question of erecting plaques and maintaining the graves. Thus we find the 
suggestion being put forward that, due to the "very considerable difficulties which 
would be involved in having the plaques erected by the troops, "60 this task be 
handed over to the police. Elsewhere (and just 2 months later), this idea is expanded 
upon so that the maintenance of graves would also fall under the jurisdiction of the 
local police authority. In this letter, Major Grautoff draws up a table of various 
police districts, and assigns the resposibility for specific graves to the corresponding 
districts. The graves here serve as a position in which a subjectively motivated desire 
for meaning is tied directly to an imperative to map social order onto geographical 
space. This is effected via a tabular, spatializing knowledge. We even find one 
section where Grautoff groups a number of graves together under the juristiction of 
the relevant police authority "once the police station has been established in 
59 Frens.sen, Peter Moor, p. 41. 
oo Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvemements, WA ZBU DJV .n.13, Bd 1, p. 10. 
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Nakab.''61 Is the presence of the grave serving here as a motivation for the 
establishment of a police station? 
Even when the extraction of meaning is not so explicit as in the above examples, 
we can clearly recognize the same function of the grave. Consider the passage from 
von Estorff: 
I visited the battlefield there [in the mountainous regions of Hereroland] and 
the grave of my brother Otto, who had fallen here on 9 April 1904. A high 
white cross now stood at the head of the graves, and an iron railing 
surrounded them. Deep solitude reigned here, the wind played with the 
grasses of the steppe, and they rested in deep peace.62 
Note the way the establishment of a grave as a marker on the landscape effects 
a multi-leveled script in a striated space: the landscape is marked with a cross and a 
fence; this point enters into a dialogue with the openness of the steppe (in the same 
way we observed earlier in an example from Peter Moor); it serves to repeat a 
memory trace, and to inscribe an affect value onto the landscape. 
In the example quoted earlier from Peter Moor, the passage from the grave as a 
meaningful geographical position to social space is prescribed as following the 
border between a killing which is criminal and that which is legitimate. When the 
old soldier ensures us that the perfect socius can only be created if the German 
soldiers harden themselves to the genocide they are perpetrating ( a common plea in 
the colonial discourse of German South West Africa), the passage from subjective 
space to social space defines the border between two kinds of killing. Killing is on 
the nether side of the socius (as murder), or else it serves as a means to a utopian 
socius. We can also find other examples in which the grave serves to define a 
passage to a possible utopian social structure. Sometime in the future we are 
promised a perfect plenitude of meaning, in which the grave will bear the 
significance of the sacrifice it marks plainly for all to see: 
These men [the victors of Great Nahas] are the greatest heroes of the entire 
Herero and Hottentot war, but they have earned little fame, and their dead 
have found a modest grave. But in later and more thankful times in the 
61 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 13. 
62 von Estorff, Wanderun~en und Kampfe, p. 140. 
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colony, their deeds will be sun£ and spoken of, and their graves will become a 
German memorial cemetary.63' 
This utopian socius serves as the motivation for assigning meaning to the grave. 
The grave as a script always implies the possibility of a socius in which the social 
dimension of meaning will be self-evident. What I mean by this is that the labor 
involved in establishing a grave presupposes a socius which will by necessity read the 
grave as a script. The underlying presumption of the grave as a mark of the perfect 
socius becomes apparent when we consider descriptions of the native grave as a 
mark of savagery. Consider this extensive description of the native grave: 
Since it was such a magnificent cool morning, we decided to walk. From the 
heights of Gui-Garns we viewed the broken-down pontocks, and, at Samuel's 
request, helped him look for the grave of his father, who had died here two 
years ago. At first we could not find it. Finally, the rascal led us gleefully to a 
hole, some half a meter deep, in which a few scraps of hide lay. That was the 
grave. There was not a trace of a corpse nor its shroud of hide. The hyenas 
had dug up the corpse and had a hideous meal. We couldn't help but ponder 
on the grisly fact, and cold shivers ran up my spine. The dead man lies tightly 
wrapped and sewn in skins, as is the custom of the natives ... [The hyenas] pull 
him from his sandy resting place and drag him across the desert ... His bones 
are scattered here and there, and when one rides over the savannah, a 
bleached skull grins at you, and the open grave yawns and tells a terrible 
story. 
When we whites bury our dead, we take care. We dig the grave much deeper, 
and weigh it down with stones, then cover the mound far around with the 
branches of thornJrees. The still sleeper below should be protected from the 
gruesome beasts. 
The phantasy in which von Eckenbrecher indulges here is that of an absolute 
loss of subjectivity - the consumption of the body which, after death, is positioned in 
geographical space. When this position is itself destroyed, the meaning which is 
extracted in death is no longer present, and death is absolute. This is a knowledge 
which informs virtually all discourse concerned with the grave. And it is a knowledge 
which is at all times political, since it is always tied to the social conventions of 
burial. Thus in the following paragraph meaning is extracted from death by a most 
literal attempt to create a passage from subjective space to geo-political space. 
"I know I have black fever... when I'm dead, let my heart be preserved 
carefully and sent to Germany, where it can be laid in the $rave of my 
mother." The last thought, the last wish of the dying man was his home and 
63 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 447. 
64 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir iab und nahm, p. 83-84. 
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his mother's grave. There his heart had remained, and there it will find 
peace. 
This Sanitary Officer was also one of the pioneers who had fought to gain us 
a new Germany, one of those African heroes ... 65 
It is, however, not only the soldier who realizes that his life stands or falls with 
his ability to preserve himself in a writing which inscribes his being onto the face of 
the earth, and inscribes geo-political space as a space which has been purchased. 
The scientist is engaged in the same life and death struggle. This is typified, as Said 
notes, by the Orientalist Chateaubriand, who attempted to have his name inscribed 
in the stone of the pyramids. 
Writing was an act of life for Chateaubriand, for whom nothing, not even a 
distant piece of stone, must remain scriptively untouched by him if he was to 
stay alive ... if he had not succeeded in prol~ging his life by writing, it [his 
self] would be merely excessive, superfluous. 
Scientific knowledge, like mythology, is a writing which prescribes passages 
between subjective experience and physical space. The loss which is inevitably 
incurred in subjective experience ( as inaccuracies in observation, the exclusion of 
background noise, the attempt to disregard chaos) is regained in the establishment 
of method (as systems for preserving meaning by modifying the physical world). 
2 SPACES FOR NATIVES 
2.1 Native reserves: contractual rights 
The conflict between the attempt of the natives to establish an effective practice 
of resistance and the various strategies developed to counter this is evident in the 
debates surrounding the question of the native reserve. Here, however, the question 
of an imposition of European spatial order must be addressed more directly, 
because of the very nature of the "problem" as perceived by the colonizer, and the 
solutions proposed. Thus, for example, von Estorff opposes von Lindequist's 
65 Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 208-209. 
66 Said, Orientalism, p. 175. 
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schemes to establish spatial enclosures and divisions to retain the natives on 
humanitarian grounds. 
In Germany, he [von Lindequist] had thought out the scheme of 
transplanting all the Herero to the South and all the Hottentot to the north, 
so that in future they could be kept better under control. For this purpose the 
Herero who had surrendered were initially sent to concentration camps in 
Windhoek. This measure was all the more incomprehensible, since 
Lindequist had seen their terrible effects on the Boer families in South 
Africa. The same happened here. The Herero, who were accustomed to a 
free life, could not contend with cramped conditions in the narrow tent 
camps, even though everything was done to ensure cleanliness and good 
food ... The war, the pursual into the desert and this final senselessness all but 
wiped out the Herero nation. It was a proud, promising nation. Our duty was 
to educate, and not to destroy this natiJ>f· This was evil and foolish. Later 
there was a lack of labor in the colony ... 
But what grounds this semi-humanist discourse, issuing from the mouth of one 
who had personally participated in the war and the genocide? Von Estorff may have 
considered von Lindequist's and von Trotha's policies inhumane, but that didn't 
prevent him from fighting alongside von Trotha at the Waterberg, and subsequently 
driving the Herero into the desert. How does von Estorff manage to draw the line 
between honourable warfare and genocide? Where does his policy of forcible 
proletarianization manage to distinguish itself from von Trotha's unashamed lust for 
Herero blood, which von Estorff criticized so strongly?68 Von Trotha's attitude is 
apparent in the following paragraph: 
My precise knowledge of so many central African tribes, Bantu and 
otherwise, always proved with absolute certainty that the Negro does not 
respect a contract, but only naked force. Yesterday, before marching, I tried 
by military tribunal all rebels captured during the past days, and had them 
hanged. All women and children who had come to us were given the 
Proclamation to the Nation drafted in Otjiherero and chased back into the 
desert.69 
What is at stake in the conflict between von Estorff s and von Trotha's point of 
view is the incompatibility of two alternative forms of organizing the chaotic mass of 
the Herera into an ordered European socius. Where, for von Estorff, the Herera 
must be conquered and integrated into the economic structure of the colony; for von 
Trotha they have to be eradicated. For von Trotha, the power of Germany must be 
67 von Estorff, Wanderun~en und Kamofe, p. 134. 
68 von Estorff, Wanderun~en und Kampfe, p. 117-118. 
69 General Lothar von Trotha, ms. of 4 October 1904 to Alfred von Schlieff en, in Lesebuch zur 
deutschen Geschichte, ed. Bernhard Pollmann (Dortmund: Chronik, 1984), p. 65. My translation. 
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marked on a space congruent to the space of German imperial territory, and since 
the Herero have shown themselves opposed to imperial sovereignty, they must be 
punished - either hanged or driven so far into the Kalahari that they either die of 
thirst or cross the border into English territory.70 Von Trotha is interested in 
organizing society not in a functional manner, but in a writing. What this means is 
that he is intent upon marking either bodies or spaces or both. We can see in this 
attitude a remnant of the despotic spectacle of torture, of which Foucault has the 
following to say: 
If torture was so strongly embedded in legal practice, it was because it 
revealed truth and showed the operation of power. It assured the articulation 
of the written on the oral... It also made the body of the condemned man the 
place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point 
for a IJ!fnifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymetry of 
forces. 
This dual gesture of clearing a visible space of truth and power is, as we have 
already indicated, the gesture of writing, and writing is the domain of the despotic 
machine. How else could we explain the ridiculous gesture of von Trotha handing a 
legal pamphlet to those women and children he is about to drive to their death? 
Where it is not possible to write relations of power on the body of the native, then 
these must be written on a space from which the native has been banished. This is 
literally what von Trotha attempted. 
Each and every one of the Herero people must leave the land ... Inside of the 
German border, all Herero, with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will 
be shot. I will not take any more women and children, but will drive them 
back to their people or have them shot. That is my word to the Herero 
nation.72 
For von Estorff, the mark of German sovereignty is more subtle, more 
'humane': the Herero must come to desire the relations of production extant in a 
white settler colony. That is to say, German colonial power must be inscribed on a 
space which is individualized and mobile: atomized. It need not be written on the 
native's body, but must be concretized in the form of his desire. This is precisely the 
70 "They will have to perish in the Sandfeld or make their way across the border into Bechuanaland." 
cit. Pollmann, Lesebuch zur deutschen Geschichte, p. 66. My translation. 
71 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 55. 
72 "Aufruf General von Trothas an das Volk der Herera, 2.10.1904,: in Vorwarts (Berlin, 16.12.1905), 
cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 176. My translation. 
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process which had been set in motion with the establishment of native reserves and 
was to be continued after the Herero war. But we must be cautious here of the 
relativizing moral strategies which capitalism brings into play in its usurpation of 
despotic desire. The fact that we find von Trotha's paranoid phantasies despicable 
does not mean that we should find von Estorff s humanism acceptable. 
The basis of complicity which allows these two "opposing" views to enter into 
dialogue with one another is best illustrated by examining the way both open onto a 
mythology of unrestricted movement in boundless space. In many instances, it is 
possible to generalize a discourse of colonialism, including fictional, semi-fictional 
and non-fictional texts. In some respects, however, this is a misleading practice. 
Colonial fiction often attempts to employ a different set of textual strategies to 
define a space of the colony. This is nowhere more apparent than when it comes to 
the question of marking a boundary between native spaces and the spaces of the 
European. Although from the mid 1890's onward the question of native reserves 
remains a continual topic of debate in administrative circles, I have been unable to 
find a single passage in any of the colonial fiction I examined in which this debate, 
or anything like an official demarkation of native space is mentioned. The reason, I 
suggest, is the following: 
Colonial literature attempts a mythologization of colonial space by confronting 
two conflicting "economies" - one characterized by the social order, and another 
which would seek a smoothing of space - a space without qualities - in which 
boundless space overcomes the European constraints on mobility, and particularly 
on 'social mobility' - on any attempts to break out of the class structure of German 
society. As Ridley observes, such constraints were experienced by the colonizer as 
widespread. 
Although German administrators might particularly appreciate their escape 
from pen-pushin~ and form-filling, and German soldiers their escape from 
the rigidly stratified officers' mess, in many other professions l'eople felt that 
a meaningful life could begin only in the colonies. The vanous crafts and 
trades were much more ol'en13han in Germany, and individual initiative was far less restricted by tradit10n. 
73 Ridley, Ima~es of Imperial rule, p. 128. 
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As we have seen, however, boundless space is constantly re-organizing itself into 
another form, in which the fictional subject must confirm a re-establishment of 
order, if he/she is not to confront an absolute loss of subjectivity. The fictional 
discourse of colonization therefore must find a space in which one form of spatial 
organization must be overcome, and another must be established. The solution 
which seems to present itself in almost all cases is a displacement of the social 
causes of constraint onto the level of geographic space. Although there is a certain 
emphasis on social mobility in the colony (as indicated in the passage quoted 
above), this is thematized much less openly than is geographic mobility. Unlimited 
geographic mobility becomes the prerequisite to increased social mobility. Hence 
Hans Grimmm's myth of the Volk ohne Raum which was to prove so popular with 
the Nazis, and which Jurgen Bergmann summarizes as follows: 
Die Enge und Gedrangtheit in Deutschland macht seine Menschen physisch 
und psychisch krank (313), sie macht reinliche Abenteurer zu Schurken, weil 
sie keine Gelegenheit fiir ihre eigentiimlichen unruhigen Krafte finden (314), 
sie zwingt die Bauernsohne, die auf den kleinen elterlichen Hofen kein 
Auskommen mehr haben, sich an die Fabriken der Stadte zu verkaufen (315) 
oder in fremde Lander auszuwandern, der Landesmangel ist die Ursache fiir 
das Entstehen einer besitzlosen Klasse und dafiir, daB diese Besitzlosen heute 
in Deutschland iiberwiegen, ... ja, diese Raumnot bedeutet den Untergang 
Deutschlands und schlieBlich der ganzen Welt.74 
This displacement of the question of mobility onto the geographical level is 
already strongly in evidence in the earliest colonial fiction, and is accomplished in 
two ways: firstly, movement and travel become technical questions - the only 
restrictions on mobility become the quality of roads, the presense of water, the 
ability to read traces on the earth etc.; secondly, the space across which unlimited 
motion is possible must be phantasized as isotropic - that is, it need not be seen to 
be empty, but the population which exists there must not in any way be permitted to 
restrict movement. 
We have already seen the way in which the technology of travel produces a 
script of possession - a signature - on the face of the colonial landscape. 
Furthermore, according to the principles discussed in part I, the capitalist machine 
74 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 131. The numbers in brackets refer to Volk 
ohne Raum, by Hans Grimm (Miinchen, 1934). 
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commands strategies for deterritorializing the territories which this writing 
produces, and re-territorializing them as spaces which appear to be spaces of 
subjectivity. This process is well demonstrated in the development of native 
reserves. Now, the European gaze which would recognize a border of a native 
reserve, is compelled to look upon a border between an exclusively German space, 
and a space in which "no foreigner .. [may], without the permission of the State 
Adminstrator ... dwell, take possession of land, or engage in trade or commerce ... "75 
Such a gaze would be forced to disrupt the reorganization of space described above. 
It would be forced to admit that its geographical mobility is restricted, and it would 
be forced to look upon subjective space from a position which it can never occupy -
the position of the native. It even finds itself described in administrative discourse as 
"foreign." Thus, in order to uphold its mythologization of space, colonial fiction 
elides this gaze. 
Nevertheless, the structure of space in fictional discourse tells us something 
important about administrative restructuring of space in the creation of reserves. 
The latter discourse follows exactly the same strategy: a displacement of stratified 
geographical space onto the level of subjective space, with a corresponding 
smoothing of space within the boundaries of the reserve. But in the administrative 
discourse of the reserves it is the native's space which is smoothed, i.e. artificially 
removed from the effects of the state. And this is achieved at the cost of a 
stratification of the native's subjective space. The reserve is created as a space in 
which the native retains a mythical sovereignty, but in which this sovereignty is 
granted on condition of a re-definition of native subjectivity in terms of the 
colonizer's socius. This is particularly apparent in the agreement of 24 August 1898 
between Hendrik Witbooi and Missionary Friedrich Judt of the Rheinische Mission: 
Captain Witbooi grants this Society ... the right to settle with its members at 
the places of their choice and to carry out any construction or development 
which they might, by their own free judgeme9J, deem advantageous to the 
economic or spiritual well-being of the natives. 
75 Theodor Leutwein, "Denkschrift uber Eingeborenenpoliti.k und Hereroaufstand" (Berlin, 1904), pp. 
71f, Anlage 28, cit. Sudholt, Die deutsche Eina;eborenenpolitik, p. 151. My translation. 
76 Cit. Sudholt, Die deutsche Eina;eborenenpolitik, p. 151. My translation. 
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The myth of the native's absolute sovereignty ("Captain Witbooi grants this 
Society ... ") is only to be achieved in the form of the contract. This is because it 
grants absolute sovereignty in retrospect, in exchange for something else. The native 
can prove that he possesses sovereignty over his territory only by giving that 
sovereignty up. And we find again and again that what he exchanges for this myth of 
sovereignty is an acceptance of the Law. This strategy of contractually assigning the 
native specific territories should be recognized as an extension of the strategies of 
marking the earth with a script of European possession. This emerges quite clearly 
in the following statement: 
No regulations have to date been promulgated regarding the acquisition of 
unowned land. The Memorandum on the South West African Protectorate 
with Special Reference to the Period 1 October 1892 to 30 September 1893 
(Col. Gaz. 1893, App. N 23) sets forth, however, that only a small part of the 
Protectorate is actually inhabited and farmed by native tribes, but who 
nevertheless claim for themselves the right to dispose of extensive areas. The 
Government, however, has reservations in generally recognizing claims to 
real estate which the natives base upon a temporary nomadic ownership, 
since it is questionable whether the concept of ownership did in fact exist 
among the natives in earlier times, or whether it was not brought to them by 
the white man. For this reason, it wishes to preserve and protect the natives 
in their actual possessions, provided they remain faithful and devoted to the 
German Protectorate Government. At the same time, however, it wishes to 
determine the exact borders of the tribal territories and allocate these 
regions to the natives in the form of so-called reserves, so as to facilitate the 
settlement by Europeans of land not being used by the natives, as well as to 
put an end to the constant border conflicts. Once the borders of the reserves 
have been determined, the remaining parts of the Protectorate are gradually 
to be declared Crown Land, and administered for the economic 
improvement of the land and to cover administrative costs ... n 
The hypothesis I put forward earlier was that travel leaves traces in texts and on 
the earth, and that these traces serve as a script of possession. If this hypothesis is 
correct, then it would seem to me that the claim to ownership which the natives base 
upon their nomadic movements must be read as a parody of this script. In claiming 
ownership, they are stating the obvious - that if land can be possessed by crossing it, 
then they have already crossed the land which the white colonizer claims to have 
taken into possession. Unfortunately, this parody is rendered ineffectual by the 
gravity with which the discourse of the colonizer pursues the idea that ownership 
n Carl von Stengei Die deutschen Schut7.iebiete, ihre rechtliche Stellun~ Verfassung und Verwaltung 
(Munchen und Leipzig: Hirsch, 1895), pp. 231-232. My emphasis. 
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must be proven by the existence of a mark on the land. The natives do not live on 
the land, nor have they marked it with their labor, nor have they (we saw this above) 
built roads. Therefore, they cannot own the land. The nomad native is phantasized 
as perfectly mobile and not leaving traces on the ground. As a result, it seems 
perfectly justifiable to define their territory as self-contained segments of space 
without quality, bordered from the rest of the colony by the colonizer's boundaries. 
The myth of a space in which the native is absolutely mobile will continue to 
dominate the discussions surrounding reserves and villages. Nevertheless, it 
disguises an attempt to force the native to participate in the Christian worldview on 
the one hand, and on the other hand in the capitalist socius. These two forces acting 
on the native are, as we have seen, essentially at odds with one another.78 All 
conflicts within the administrative discourse regarding native reserves should be 
read not only in terms of a conflict of interests between natives and colonizers, but 
also in terms of this conflict of interests between the capitalist and the despotic 
(Christian) machines. This is also a conflict of interest between the church and the 
settlers.79 
As Sudholt shows, Leutwein believed that the complex conflict of interests 
could be alleviated by establishing definite demarkations separating whites from 
blacks, and individual "tribes" from one another. This was a relatively liberal notion 
in the context of contemporary colonial policies, and it should also be seen in light 
of Leutwein's attempt to take traditional territories and customs into account in the 
establishment of the reserves. Nonetheless, Leutwein had no illusions about what he 
was actually accomplishing in his policy of contractual negotiation and reserves. 
Thus, by way of justification of his policies, he wrote in 1904: 
It was hoped that the natives could gradually be accustomed to the situation 
at hand. In the end, nothing was to remain of their old independence. As was 
78 "Die Sorge des Gouvemements, daB die Mission durch derartige Vertrage auf Umwegen sich fur 
weite Teile des Landes den Besitztitel verschaffen konnte, zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die 
gesamte Korrespondenz in der Reservatsfrage." Sudholt, Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik, p. 153. 
79 "Wollten einerseits die Missionen durch Uberschreibung groBer Landgebiete Missionsreservate 
einrichten und damit die Christianisierung vorantreiben, so vertraten viele weiBe Ansiedler eine 
Haltung, die auf moglichste Zuriickdrangung der Stamme in enge Reservate abzielte .. ." Sudholt, ~ 
deutsche Ein~eborenenpolitik, p. 161. 
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in fact the case, this kind of peaceful policy was intended to go hand in hand 
with, in cases of disobedience&f gradual disarming of the natives, together 
with a dissolution of tribal ties. 
The fact that native sovereignty and contractual ability is a myth is easily seen 
when we examine the way in which such land agreements as the above were seen to 
be terminated by default as a result of the wars of liberation. This, I would suggest, 
has nothing to do with the necessities of contractual law, but must be seen in the 
light of the above argument. The contract is seen to be nullified not because of an 
explicit breach, but because the native's acquiescence to the colonizer's socius was 
seen by the colonizer to imply subservience in every other respect as well. When this 
subservience was not accepted by the native, and particularly the Herero and Nama, 
the Germans regarded the land agreements as null and void. With Leutwein's 
admission of the failure of his policy, the way was prepared for von Trotha's policy 
of extermination. 
[Now] we know ... that a colonial policy based solely on contracts with the 
natives is, in the long run, not feasible in a settlement colony. Either both 
races must be placed on an equal footing (Cape Colony), or one must be 
made subordinate to the other by way of force.81 
The alternative of equality was never a serious proposition in German colonial 
politics, and Leutwein was aware of this. Furthermore, he had never hidden the fact 
that the contractual establishment of reserves was intended as a means of acquiring 
land. In his annual report for 1895-6, Leutwein speaks of the need to reduce the 
amount of land occupied by the Herero. Bley observes that his method, the 
regulations regarding government ratification of purchase, amounts to a de-
politicization of the decision by reducing it to an administrative matter.82 In this 
year he speaks of a "peaceful" transfer of native land to the whites. Bley describes 
the process of disinheritance as effected initially by war, famine and drought, 
leading to economic need which necessitated the sale of land "in the interests of the 
tribe."83 His parting words as Governor before he made way for von Trotha, in 
80 Leutwein, "Zur Arbeiterfrage in den Kolonien," in Koloniale Rundschau (2.2.1909), p. 110, cit. 
Sudholt, Die deutsche Eini:;eborenenpolitik, p. 162. 
81 Leutwein, Zur Arbeiterfrai:;e. 
82 Helmut Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 102. 
83 Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 115. 
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which he admits the failure of the reserve policy, can thus have only been seen as an 
admission that a war of extermination might be justified. 
2.2 Houses: Oedipal relations 
As a result of the default of contractual rights, the question of demarkation of 
native spaces becomes displaced after the defeat of the Hereros. After the Herero 
war, the government deliberately stalled plans of the Rheini.sche Mission to establish 
native reserves.84 When we look through the official correspondence concerning 
itself with this matter, we see an increasing preoccupation with the native· villages 
and dwellings. We have seen how, from the moment of encounter onwards, the 
European looked upon the native space as if upon the limits of civilization. If the 
policy of native reserves could not succeed in establishing separate spaces for whites 
and blacks, it would be necessary to establish alternative strategies for banishing 
these limit spaces from the space of the colony. These strategies are to be seen as a 
continuation of the policy of the reserves, but in a different form - that of the forced 
establishment of private living spaces based upon the European family structure. 
This continuity will become clearer if we see it in the context of the increasing 
division between the private and public spheres which accompanied the growth of 
European capitalism. We would expect the forced installation of the capitalist 
machine to be accompanied by a forced adoption of the European family structure. 
This is why architecture is invariably seen as an index of civilization. The social 
Darwinism of Lewis Morgan states that 
house architecture, which connects itself with the form of the family and the 
plan of domestic !i~e., a~for1~ a tolerably complete illustration of progress 
from savagery to c1VIhzat1on. 
This will reach the extreme where in Peter Moor the old trooper can say: 
84 Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 103. 
85 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient society or Researches in the lines of human pro~ess from sava~ei:y 
throuw barbarism to civilization (London, 1887), p. 6, cit. Bergmann, p. 54. 
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These blacks have earned their death before God and man, not because they 
murdered the two hundred farmers and rose agai~t us in rebellion, but 
because they never built houses and never dug wells. 
It is for this very reason that architecture becomes not only an index of 
civilization, but a strategy of colonization. And it is a strategy which changes the 
representational organization of space. 
The colonizer says: your father is your father and nothing else, or your 
maternal grandmother - don't mistake them for your chiefs; you can go have 
yourself triangulated in your comer, and place your house between those of 
your paternal and maternal kin; your fanuly is your family and nothing else ... 
Yes, then, an Oedipal J~amework is outlined for the dispossessed primitives: 
a shantytown Oedipus. 
This changed nature of spatial representation not only with regard to 
architecture, but also town planning, administration, health services, etc., is a forced 
one, and is achieved in the years following the defeat of the Herem through a 
number of regulations and stipulations. I wish to briefly outline the importance of 
this process for the present discussion. 
Attempts to determine the organization of native space in the years following 
the Herem defeat may be broadly classified into: attempts to separate the space of 
the native settlement from that of the whites, and attempts to control the 
organization within the settlements. Here we are clearly speaking of those 
settlements which are in the proximity of ''white" areas. This is of importance, since 
the abandonment of the reserve policy implies that the attitude to those settlements 
in direct proximity to the white areas will eventually extend to native spaces 
throughout the entire colony. As early as 1905 we find official proclamations 
appearing which attempt to control movement across the boundaries of native 
settlements. These invariably had the form of a simple curfew: 
Unauthorized entry by whites to this native townsh~ after dark, as well as 
unauthorized loitering in the pontocks, is prohibited. 
If the expression of this curfew as a prohibition on whites comes as an initial 
surprise, let us note that this does not, as in the case of the native reserves, represent 
86 Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 200. 
87 Deleuz.e and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 169. 
88 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.1, p. 12. 
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an attempt to create a space in which the native enjoys sovereignty, regardless how 
mythical such sovereignty might be. We are dealing quite simply with the necessity 
of separating the races. In order to illustrate the point, however, let us glance briefly 
at a letter of 9 August 1912 written by the District Officer of Swakopmund and 
addressed to the Government, in which he comments on negative reports regarding 
living conditions in the Swakopmund native settlement. The intial negative reports 
had been submitted by Missionary Eich in support of plans to build a small native 
settlement outside of Swakopmund. Eich had supported this initiative because of 
what he saw to be an intolerable moral situation resulting from the proximity of the 
dwellings of natives to those of their white employers. 
Although immorality is an evil characteristic of Africa, it has never been seen 
as in Swakopmund. Among the causes of this fact are above all the war and 
its consequences, as a result of which families have been torn apart, and 
people of both sexes have, upon returning, been forced to live together in 
cramped kraals, where every last remainder of shame has disappeared, 
exacerbated by the fact that the voluptuousness of many white men has 
brought income to the women and to the men, who act as procurers.89 
The problem is identified by the missionary as a problem of the breakdown of 
family structures, and the relative indeterminacy of spatial quality inherent in a 
situation where white and black are living side by side. This is then incorporated 
into a moral argument. In the letter responding to these complaints we learn that 
"the question of sexual intercourse between white and black" is "very delicate." It is 
however, a practice which must be curbed: 
It has long been a scientific fact that this is undesirable - on the one hand, in 
order to maintain the repute of the white race, and, on the other hand, to 
avoid half-breeds. This has also been establishw by the latest studies on 
mixed marriages. But how to hinder or reduce it? 
The possibility of using paragraph 17f of the Municipal Code to disenfranchise 
those whites married to or living with non-whites is rejected. The reason given is 
that "such a prohibition would open the door to boasting."91 The only feasible 
solution which is offered is the following: 
89 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2. (emphasis in original). 
90 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. li. 
91 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. lk. 
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For the present, it must be coutered by importing white women and 
strenijhening that social consensus which despises sexual intercourse of this 
kind. 
This letter is also quite explicit in identifying alternative strategies which might 
impose a formidable system of control on the natives. The first of these strategies is 
architectural and addresses the problem directly: 
Once the city has announced that, for the present, the construction of a 
general township is not planned, it will be possible Jo exert more pressure on 
employers to fit out their natives' houses correctly.9 
This is, to all intents and purposes, a relatively innocent undertaking. However, 
we should not forget that the establishment of architectural regulations necessitates 
an inspecting body which is responible for surveilling the space affected by these 
regulations. 
It is intended, first of all, to establish ~idelines for native dwellings, then to 
undertake an inspection of all dwellm;~ and finally, to engage the police 
force to ensure gradual implementation. 
Due to the conditions in the colony, the surveilling and inspecting body is the 
police. However, this fact should alert us and make us aware of the possibility that 
this inspecting activity may be extended into spheres beyond that of building 
regulation. This would further be expected if we consider the fact that building 
regulations cannot be divorced from building use. The dwellings are to be 
constructed in a specific way, because they are to be used in a specific way. And 
these specifics all rotate around the structure of the nuclear family. Thus the 
construction of buildings must be accompanied by the introduction of regulations 
stipulating who may live where. 
It will, however, be possible to achieve an improvement if, as part of the 
guidelines for the provision of native dwellings, it is stipulated that seperate 
dwellin~s ar~ to be provided for unmarried men and for unmarried women 
respectively. 5 
So alongside their inspecting activities, the police assume a demographic role -
the tabulation and classification of the population they control. 
92 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. lk. 
93 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements. WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. li. 
94 Akten des Kaiser lichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU w .III.f.2, p. li. 
95 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements. WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. lk. 
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In addition, an attempt is to be made to improve the family life of the natives 
by recording exact information regarding family status in the police register, 
and to issue natives belonging to one family with, in addition to the general 
pass, a small metal token with a number designating the head of the family. 
This is to prevent the women cl~ming to be married to one person one day 
and another person another day. 
Thus we find ourselves transported within the range of a couple of pages from a 
"compassionate" and "humanist" concern with dwellings to a strategy of surveillance 
and classification. We may, incidently see exactly the same development in the 
question of medical care for the natives: 
It may be seen that the city is concerned that something be done for the 
health of the natives by the fact that a local decre5, has been issued making 
regular medical inspection mandatory for coloreds. 
The operational word here is "regular," since it implies a means of tabulating 
and surveilling the population to ensure compliance with the law. 
And finally, it is quite correctly (if only implicity) recognized that this 
surveilling, inspecting and demographic work is directly threatened by any random 
mobility on the part of the natives - either across the boundaries of their dwelling 
place, or across the boundaries of the nuclear family. In order to counter this, 
another strategy is suggested. 
Finally, in order to awaken a sense of thrift among the natives, an attempt is 
to be made to arrange for the natives to be issued savings books from the 
Swakopmund Bank Co-op, so that they will not be forced to spend all their 
money for the maintenance and return journey of ~giatives from further 
inland when the latter come on their so frequent visits. 
In keeping with the workings of the capitalist machine, these movements are to 
be curbed not simply by law. This was certainly also the case; however, the District 
Commissioner seems to have had enough experience to tell him that there are more 
effective ways of controlling mobility. One of them is, as we saw earlier, to displace 
spatial stratification onto the level of subjectivity and desire, while apparently 
allowing a freedom of geographical movement. One way of achieving this 
displacement is by showing that movement itself is not to be excepted from the 
96 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. lk. 
97 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. li. 
98 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. lk. 
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commodity structure of the capitalist socius; or, to put it succinctly, that mobility in 
capitalist society must be purchased with a reinvestment in borders. 
3 MAPS 
A map is a special case in the representation of spatial relations, since it 
contains specific information for how it is to be read, and how this reading is to be 
applied in geographic or geopolitical space. I have, however, already claimed that 
this projection of meaning onto geo-political space is characteristic of colonial 
discourse in general, and that this is what allows us to read it as creating spaces in a 
non-metaphorical way. When we examine mapping as a form of spatial 
representation, we are concerned with the most obvious example of a structuring of 
space in the representational mode. Fabian notes that the map functions as a 
spatialization of knowledge similar to that of a tabular grid. 
Maps are devices to classify data. Like tables and diagrams they are 
taxonomic ways of ordering cultural isolates with the help of categories of 
contrast and opposition: source vs. variant, center vs. periphery, r,ure form vs. 
mixed variant, displaying criteria of quality vs. those of quantity ... 99 
Fabian is referring specifically to anthropology, but we can note for our 
purposes that a spatial display of knowledge such as a map is not only a space in 
which knowledge is fixed according to certain pre-determined categories. It is also a 
blueprint for the application of the knowledge in spaces which are equivalent on 
another level. A map certainly cannot claim to yield a true and complete 
representation of a space. What it can claim is that it works, provided it is used for 
the purposes for which it is intended, and provided the rules of transformation from 
representational space to the other spatial quality strictly followed. This becomes 
apparent if we look at what the map has become today. A geological map will tell us 
where a certain geological formation is to be found, but we cannot use it to find the 
best way to reach a certain village by car. Similarly, a "political" map portrays the 
99 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 55. 
COWNIAL SPACE• 298 
space of a nation as if it were of uniform quality - which, for limited political 
purposes, it is. We must consult another map to discover that population is not 
uniformly distributed throughout the territory. If, however, we consult a 
meteorological map, we will see that the borders on the political map are non-
existent. 
In this section, I wish to trace some strategies which a political and topographic 
map may employ in order to define the rules of its application; that is, to define 
privileged passages to other spatial organizations. The earliest attempts to map 
Africa arise from a necessity in the technology of travel. The permanence of fixed 
topographic features must be established, in order to ensure the repeatability of the 
voyage. Most of the cartographers who produced these maps, however, were 
conscious of the fact that the map was to be looked at. That is to say, these maps are 
a spatial representation which allow the passage between phantasy and accuracy to 
parallel the passage from the space of the navigator's table to the space of a 
coastline. It is common for cartographers and historians to misread these attempts 
to combine factual sightings with a free play of phantasy as attempts to obscure a 
lack of knowledge on the part of the cartographer. Thus, according to Urs Bitterli, 
on a map of 1668 by Olfert Dampers, 
the outline of the dark continent is extremely exact, and a certain latitudinal 
distortion of the map image may be attributed to the fact that there were still 
no adequate aids to determining the exact geographical longitude ... The 
hinterland was, however, Terra incognita for him, and since he did not wish 
to evidence how little he knew of it, he had no choice but to obscure his 
scientific aporia with the charm of artistic inventiveness, by inhabiting the 
geo~raphic no-man's-land with all types of animals and remarkable networks 
of nvers and mountain ranges - a practice which persisted into the middle of 
the eighteenth century.100 
We should, however, be cautious of interpreting such a map according to too 
simplistic a theory of reference, precisely for the reason of the changed relation 
between representation of knowledge and the practical circumstances of its 
application. The very fact that Dampers included drawings of fantastic animals in 
the interior of his Africa indicates that we are not dealing with a trigonometric 
100 Urs Bitterli, Die "Wilden" und die "Zivilisierten," Die europaisch-Uberseeische Begegnung, dtv 
wissenschaftliche Reihe 4396, p. 48. My translation. 
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projection of geographical positions, but with a representational device which plays 
on the ambiguity between the signifier in the discursive mode and the truth value of 
its signification, or its reference value, or its historical use value. Of course the 
Portugese ship's captain and navigator visiting factories on the coast of Africa 
possessed the discursive competence to read Dampers' map correctly. 
Whether we are concerned with a modern map or one such as Dampers', the 
question of "accuracy," which I would prefer to term "reference," is secondary. What 
is more important is the question of complicity between the codification of 
knowledge and its specific application by those who sought to profit thereby (no 
matter how small, heterogeneous, or ill-defined these "interest groups" were). When 
changes in specific practices render these specific passages useless, they tend to 
"prove" the obsolescence of those modes of representation in which these passages 
are defined. It is only with the growing empiricism coupled to the growing tabulation 
of discursive representation of empirical facts to create a coherent body of 
knowledge during the Enlightenment, as well as the necessities arising from the 
practice of exploration, that this mode of representation becomes regarded as an 
obstacle to truth. Cartographers from the late 18th century onward prefer blank 
spaces to imaginary rivers and mountains. In the attempted banishment of 
metaphoric representation from scientific discourse, truth is produced as a 
discursive fixing of the relative positions of a transcendental subject and an object 
delineated in space. And yet at the same time, scientific discourse reserves the right 
to produce this truth by proving that a previous truth is erroneous. We have already 
confronted this fact on a number of occasions, and we have described it as the 
ability of universal knowledge to cross the very borders within which it defines itself. 
And we have already put forward the idea that this constant crossing of borders 
produces a mythical mastery of space outside the realm of truth. Let us proceed to 
interrogate this production of truth through a mythical mastery of space. 
As the explorers "penetrate" the interior of Africa in the 19th century, the 
definition of passages between representational space tends to align itself 
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increasingly to the colonial project. Hence we find that the practice of confirming a 
field of truth while producing an earlier representation as error extends itself to the 
representational system of the savage and its respective knowledge of space. If we 
examine the navigational methods of inner Africa's early European explorers, we 
find that they rely almost exclusively on the knowledge of "native guides" to help 
them reach their goals. And yet, we find them employing various strategies to erase 
this dependence, and to incorporate the knowledge of the guide into universal 
knowledge. For example, when Curt von Francois sought a route to the Okavango 
swamps in December 1890, he informed himself of the position of water in the area 
from the chief of the !Kung nomads (whom he does not even give a name), a man 
whom be himself describes as "the single person most knowledgeable of the land." 
At the same time, however, he redefines this knowledge as a passage between 
geographic space and the representational space of the map. 
The chief ... told me that the water situation had been better in previous 
years. Many of the now dry depressions had been full of water all year. He 
also claims to have observed that the river bed of the Okaluombe indicated 
on the map south of Debra had delivered its water to lake Ngami.101 
Similarly, when Livingstone set out to explore the Liambey river north of Lake 
Ngami in 1852, he found his way into this new territory with the aid of a chief 
Sekeletu, who "received him in a most hospitable manner and was an excellent host 
for 8 months ... For his further journeys, he received from chief Sekeletu 33 boats 
and a party of 160 men."102 Andersson likewise relied on a certain Lecholetebe to 
provide him with boats and guides so he could explore the Teoge river north of 
Ngami. However, he was forced to interrupt his journey due to an agreement 
between Lecholetebe and the chief of the Bayeye, whereby the latter did not 
provide Andersson with the expected provisions when he reached his village. What 
was clearly an act of resistance to the encroachment of unwanted Europeans on 
101 Mitteilunien von Forschun~sreisenden und Gelehrten aus den deutschen Schut~ebieten 4 (1891), 
ed. E Danckelmann, (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn), p. 'liJ7. 
102 Petermann, August Heinrich, ed., Mittheilunien aus Justus Perthes' ieow:aphischer Anstalt iiber 
wichti~ neue Erforschunien auf dem Gesamtiebiet der Geow:aphie (Gotha: Perthes, 1855), p. 51. 
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Lecholetebe's territory was immediately codified by Andersson as an affirmation of 
his objective knowledge of the nature of the savages: 
Not the most alluring promises of presents and rewards had yet succeeded in 
inducing [Lecholetebe} to assist anyone in this manner... To my great 
astonishment, but no ess delight, and without the slightest objection, he 
agreed to my proposal. As, however, I could not flatter myself that I had 
produced a more favourable impression than any other traveller, I suspected 
deceit of sime kind; and the sequel proved I was not mistaken in my 
conjecture.1 3 
When we examine any of the numerous passages describing the unreliability 
and treachery of the native guides, we can see that the discourse of exploration is 
constantly crossing the boundary of the native's knowledge, looking back upon the 
space of knowledge which has just been relativized, and drawing conclusions about 
the status of this activity. The explorer's constant self-reflection upon his own ability 
to cross borders into unknown territory is what constitutes his mythological mastery 
of space. Thus, the manner in which Andersson proceeds with his narrative. After 
the passage quoted above, we are presented with almost a hundred pages describing 
the history of exploration of Lake Ngami, its geography, botany and zoology, as well 
as the appearance, government, mythology, etc. of its inhabitants. Thereafter, 
Andersson recounts the ultimate failure of his expedition due to Lecholetebe's 
scheme in the following words: 
Mortified and annoyed at the shameful manner in which I had been treated, I 
was, nevertheless, ~lad to have come thus far. I had learnt much in this short 
time ... , to say nothing of the beautiful, diversified, and novel scenery which 
almost daily presented itself to view - which alone was a sufficient reward for 
my troubles and anxieties.104 
No good explorer of the 19th century - and Andersson is no exception here -
would write a book about his journeys without attaching a map across which his 
movements are traced with a line. The map is the symbolic representation of 
exploration, and it has the vital function of positioning the subject of knowledge 
within the objective space of a landscape. I would argue, however, that this 
positioning cannot take place as an extension of European knowledge without the 
mythologizing function of the text. The texts of exploration commentate the maps 
103 Andersson, Lake Nii;ami, p. 439. 
104 Andersson, Lake Nii;ami, pp. 496-7. 
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they display. The maps present the knowledge, but it is the text which displays this 
knowledge as a mastery of space. The text, as a mythological account of a passage, 
reconciles the contradictions betweeen the physical practice of exploration and its 
representation as knowledge. This mythological function of the text applies not only 
to the travellogue, but just as well to the administrative and scientific discourses 
which commentate the problems of mapping. The problems associated with the 
emergence and development of the science of mapping are comparable to those of 
exploration, since both practices are characterized by the struggle to find practical 
ways of applying a theory of geographical absolutes. In the 19th century, this theory 
is to be found in the form of triangulation and astronomy. 
The technique of ascertaining geographical position relative to a "known fixed 
point" through triangulation had already been developed by Snellius some 250 years 
prior to Livingstone's and Andersson's explorations of Lake Ngami and the 
surrounding territory. This was regarded as extremely accurate, and has formed the 
basis of surveying ever since. However, it is a long and tedious process, and hardly 
practical for a scientific expedition. The triangulation of a 600 km stretch of 
German/English border in South West Africa took 5 years from 1898 to 1903.104 In 
4 years, with the use of guides, Livingstone had covered five times that distance 
across territory unknown to Europeans.105 It is true, Livingstone was careful to take 
astronomical sightings from which his position was later calculated by Thomas 
Maclear, the King's astronomer at the Cape Observatory.106 However, Livingstone 
could not have relied upon these readings for any degree of practical accuracy. In 
fact, in an article of 1894, we still find the would-be traveller being advised against 
astronomical navigation and being told to mark his route by topographic 
observation, involving the measurement of travelling time and direction with a clock 
and compass, noting landscape features, and charting relative topographic position 
104 Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 17 (1904), pp. 6-26. 
105 Petermanns Mittheilungen (1855), p. 51. 
106 Petermanns Mittheilungen (1855), p. 52. 
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using a levelled table to which a sheet of paper has been attached and a diopter-
ruler to draw lines of angular distance between sighted features of the landscape. 
The final derivation of the map is left in most cases to cartographic 
specialists; it is possible for them to construct a map through simple 
techniques using the charted sightings copied onto tracing paper ... In general, 
the results obtained by route construct10n and above all by trigonometric 
sighting chffls are much more accurate than astronomical sightings for 
longitude.10 
When we discussed the Lacanian theory of the constitution of subjectivity in the 
field of the gaze, we noted that the subject emerges as a position determined by the 
lines of vision implicating him within a social field. We noted also that the surface 
upon which such lines of vision projected images was vital in determining the nature 
of subjectivity in the soicus. If we reconsider the above recomendation from this 
point of view, it should strike us that we are not only being presented with a 
topographic technique for mapping the subject's position in the landscape, but also 
with a formula for mapping the socius onto geographical space via the mediation of 
subjectivity. It is the goal of mythological mastery of space to effect this mediation. 
As the map progresses from imaginary rivers to surveyed borders, its reference 
value appears to increase to the point where the passage from the topographic and 
political field of the map to the geopolitical field of the colony appears to be 
virtually automatic. The truth value of the map appears to depend upon a 
banishment of desire and myth. It is by hiding its mythical status that the map fixes 
relative positions of transcendental European subjectivity and enclosed African 
objectivity, and produces these positions as political, geographical, and subjective 
positions, as well as positions from which exchange may take place. And yet, it is 
possible to show that these positions can exist only by virtue of a mythology of the 
hero who crosses borders. 
Let us consider an example to demonstrate this. The treaties of 1890 between 
Germany and Great Britain, and 1886 between Germany and Portugal fixed "the 
sphere in which the exercise of influence is limited to Germany"108 by enclosing the 
107 MitteilunGen aus den deutschen SchutzGebieten 7 (1894), p. 14. 
108 Hertslet, E, The map of Africa by treaty, vol. 2 (London: Harrison & sons, 1909), p. 901. 
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space of South West Africa as a mythical space possessing homogeneous political 
quality. Nevertheless, this enclosure can be effected technically only by establishing 
a transcendence for which the border is no obstacle. We have already seen on 
several occasions that dialogue establishes a border of difference by an initial 
complicity against noise and chaos. In the following example, it should become 
apparent that, if the border is to be created, this complicity is required not only in 
diplomatic negotiations, but in the application of certain mathematical principles. I 
shall attempt to show that when mathematical principles of spatial order are applied 
to the landscape, certain contradictions arise whose solution is mythical, in that it 
prescribes a privileged passage of application which has nothing to do with the truth 
value of mathematics. It has been said that when an irresistable force meets an 
immovable object, something must give. Now, just as that something is the discourse 
which formulated this very principle, so too must the contradiction of mathematical 
principles and their application lead to a principle, of application which denies the 
contradiction. 
When the border between German South West Africa and British 
Bechuanaland was traced onto the "Original map of Great Namaqualand and 
Damaraland compiled by Th. Hahn, P. D. 1:742 016 (Cape Town 1879)," the town of 
Rietfontein fell 20' east of the 20th degree in British territory.109 When Curt von 
Francois surveyed the route from Stolzenfels to Rietfontein in 1890-92, his 
observations calculated by Dr C Stechert of Hamburg placed Rietfontein with 
19°44'40" well within German territory. The town of Stolzenfels was similarly 
positioned considerably further west than in Hahn's map.110 In evaluating Francois' 
observations in 1893, Dr R. Kiepert said: 
The considerable displacement of Stolzenf els to the west, which I undertook 
only with much hesitation, necessitates a shortening of the course of the 
Orange river, a compression of the areas on both sides of its banks between 
19°5'E Gr and the coast on the one hand, and on the other hand an 
expansion of the region east of 19°5'E Gr.111 
109 Mitteilun~en aus den deutschen SchutZiebieten 6 (1893), p. 40. 
110 Mitteilun~en aus den deutschen SchutZiebieten 5 (1892), p. 244. 
111 Mitteilun~en aus den deutschen Schutz~ebieten 6 (1893), p. 41. 
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We are faced here with the problem of relative variables in topographic 
representation and the difficulty in situating them in a field of absolute truth. If we 
take the positions of towns as constant and allow the border to be traced as a 
transcendent quantity, relating trigonometrically to the fixed point of Greenwich, 
England, then when the position of the towns in question presents itself as variable, 
the 20th degree, while axiomatically remaining a perfectly straight line, becomes an 
irregular curve when traced on the landscape relative to these towns. This 
paradoxical situation can only be corrected by recognizing the transcendent truth of 
the 20th degree's absolute straightness, and establishing relative positions of 
individual towns within the objective space of the colony measured within the 
absolute field of angular distance east of Greenwich. 
It may appear that in stating this problem in such a way, I am hopelessly 
complicating what is a simple matter of an error in taking readings. What I am 
trying to show is that the application of transcendental principles is always 
erroneous. The crucial point is the question of which quantities may be produced as 
erroneous, and how precisely the passage from a representational (mathematical) 
spatial order to its application in geo-political space is to be effected so as to 
suspend these erroneous quantities. 
As we have seen, this passage is defined according to the myth of mobility across 
borders. This myth finds its political expression in diplomacy. It should thus come as 
no surprise to us that the only solution to the doubt which remained when the two 
teams measured the border in different places was one which combined the 
practical application of knowledge and political diplomacy. In the years 1898-1903, a 
joint British and German surveying team ascertained the position of the border 
relative to its adjacent towns by triangulation and marked it using beacons. This 
expedition 'placed' the towns of Stolzenfels and Rietfontein where they are today, 
the former to the west, the latter to the east of the 20th degree. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision to colonize in Southern Africa 
means nothing else than that the native 
tribes must withdraw from the lands on 
which they have pastured their cattle and 
so let the white man pasture his cattle on 
these self-same lands. 
P. Rohrbach, 
German Settlement Commission 
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If colonization is the story of borders, their drawing, administration and 
crossing, then one of the most problematic borders in German South West Africa 
has certainly always been the northern border with Portuguese Angola: 
At the time, the border between German South West Africa and Portuguese 
Angola was fixed with no consideration to the tribes. A border was 
determined by simply joining the Cunene River with the Okavango River by 
a straight line. That 1s why Portuguese Ambos cross into our territory when 
they are harassed by the Portuguese, and, likewise, the German Ambos 
would have crossed into Portuguese territory if they had realized how serious 
their position was [regarding the possibility of attack by the Germans during 
the Herero uprising]. The only possibility would have been to attack them 
together. Portugal tried it alone in 1904. This expedition suffered a total 
defeat in the not-so-glorious batlle of Humbe. A second expedition was 
planned, but it never materialized. 
The fact that the northern border bisected the Ovakuanyama nation is a 
problem which is addressed time and again by various parties, who react to it 
according to their interests. It is almost universally regarded with regret that what 
was such a simple gesture on the cartographer's table was to have such unforeseen 
repercussions when transferred to geo-political space. The Blue Book report issued 
by Great Britain observes that 
The arbitrary fixing of the northern boundary of the Protectorate, which is 
formed by part of the course of the Kunene and Okavango rivers and a line 
drawn from west to east between them, had as a result the cutting-up of some 
of the land of the Ovambos, so that, after ~nnexation by Germany, an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs was brought about. 
Leutwein, too, refers to the position of the border in 1890 as "arbitrary", 
whereby his main concern seems to be that "the majority" of this tribe, which he 
estimated at 70, - 80,000 strong, had been placed under Portuguese jurisdiction.3 He 
had good reason for regret, since the Ovambos were to become - and particularly in 
the years following the decimation of the Herera nation - the most important source 
of labor for the colony. 
In August 1915, S. M. Pritchard, the British Commissioner for Native Affairs 
journeyed to Ovamboland on a routine visit.4 At the time of Pritchard's visit, 
1 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir ~ab und nahm, pp. 25-26. 
2 Imperial Blue Book, p 134. 
3 Imperial Blue Book, p 135. 
4 Major S. M. Pritchard, "Report of the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in the Protectorate of 
South West Africa," Windhoek, 1915. 
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fighting on the Portuguese side of the border had threatened to drive Ovakuanyama 
refugees into the South West Africa protectorate. This would have caused conflict 
with those occupying the territory south of the border, since drought had decimated 
food supplies. Pritchard notes his inability as well as the inability of Portuguese 
troops to cross the border. 
I had already pointed out to [Chief] Martin that as the fighting, of which we 
had information, had occurred in Portuguese territory, where I had no 
status, it was a difficult matter for me to take any steps on [Chief] 
Mandume's behalf; nor could I cross the boJder into Angola any more than 
the Portuguese could enter the Protectorate. 
When Pritchard related his attitude to Mandume, the complicity between the 
two European nations who have defined this border is quite clear . 
.. .I warned him that a large Portuguese army had arrived in Angola and that 
the time had long since passed when a Native tribe, however brave, could 
engage, with any hope of success, in hostilities with white troops ... 6 
When Mandume surrenders to Pritchard and asks to be allowed to settle south 
of the border, Pritchard cannot guarantee that Britain will permit this.7 In 
desparation, Mandume burns his village and flees across the border. This brings us 
to the crux of our discussion, for in deciding to take refuge south of the border, 
Mandume unwittingly calls the bluff of European complicity, and demands to know 
just where the border lies. 
He was very agitated and repeatedly asked to be shown exactly where the 
border line passed through his country - stating excitedly that the Portuguese 
respected no borders and would not be satisfied until they had crushed him 
and his people and driven them far into the protectorate. I assured him that I 
would visit the Portuguese army in order to arrive at a settlement with its 
Commander as to the precise locality of the boundary to be observed by both 
it and Mandume ... 8 
Nonetheless, Mandume has placed himself in a position in which he too is 
forced to enter this complicity. In recognizing the border as significant, he has 
surrendered (at least in principle) his mobility to the European organization of 
space. This has serious disadvantages for him. Mandume is concerned that many of 
his people and cattle are still north of the border. Pritchard informs him that they 
5 Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 12. 
6 Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 16. 
7 Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 17. 
8 Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 18. 
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cannot be regained, since the border cannot be violated. Mandume is agam 
concerned about the position of the border. As a result, Pritchard meets the 
Portuguese commandant and they agree that " ... for the present and pending a 
definite settlement a line running due east to west through Namakunde [the town 
where they are meeting] should be regarded as the boundary." The 1:500 000 
topographical sheet Ondangwa, issued by the Chief Director of Surveys and 
Mapping, Mowbray (1985) shows the present position of the nothern border 
approximately 9.5 km south of Namacunde. It intersects the Cunene River just north 
of the Ruacana Falls, and is thus more in keeping with the original treaty between 
Portugal and Germany. The temporary boundary which Pritchard negotiated would 
have intersected the Cunene approximately 22.5 km upstream of the present one. 
They also agree to establish a neutral zone as " ... the country falling between the 
boundaries claimed by the German and Portuguese Governments respectively." 
Pritchard also suggests "that all reasonable steps should be taken by the Portuguese 
to patrol the boundary line on their side to prevent incursions of Natives either from 
the north or the south ... " In interrogating the physical position of a border which he 
cannot see, and in seeking to use it to his own advantage, Mandume has achieved 
just the opposite of what is in his interests. He has joined in the European 
complicity which allowed the border to be drawn, and he has sacrificed his 
mobility.9 On both sides of the border, he has become a foreigner in his own land. 
This is the story of colonization. 
******************** 
The story of colonization does not end. Once it has begun, it continues telling 
itself over and over again, even after the colonizers have all been sent home. It is 
one of the ironies of colonization that, out of an amorphous and diverse population, 
it creates a national identity, a cohesive group which is ultimately strong enough to 
overthrow the colonizer. And yet, the borders the colonizer drew are still there; 
when we look at the map of Africa today, we still see 19th century Europe traced 
9 Report of the Officer in Char~e. p. 22. 
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across its surface. Africa is still trying to recover from its colonial experience. And 
while it tries, the colonizer is back again, in a different guise, more ubiquitous -
multinational corporations, networks of information.10 The old colonizer was so 
difficult to overthrow, because, no matter where he was attacked, it transpired 
afterwards that he had in fact not been there, but somewhere else; the new 
colonizer's power lies in the fact that he is everywhere. If the concept of revolution 
is still thinkable today, it must be thought in the face of such a colonizer. 
I have attempted to show how colonization organizes space. It is an uncertain 
and unstable procedure, and is constantly leading to crises and conflicts. The border 
which the colonizer draws eventually becomes an obstacle to him, and provides a 
relative shelter for the forces of resistance. Thus, until recent years, the Angolan 
border seemed to provide some degree of shelter for armed resistance in Namibia. 
But the colonizer always reacts in the same way; he reserves for himself the mythical 
ability to cross the border as if it were not there, and he tells himself that this is only 
to protect the border. And if he destabilizes his neighbors in the process, he tells 
himself that this is because his neighbors have not respected the border. And when 
he finally returns to his territory, he congratulates himself that this line across the 
earth, which no one can see, has been drawn again. Beyond it, he phantasizes a 
chaos in which he somehow feels the flows of his own desire. 
10 "It is widely accepted that knowledge has become the principle force of production over the last few 
decades; this has already had a noticeable effect on the composition of the work force of the most 
highly developed countries and constitutes the major bottleneck for the developing countries. In the 
postindustrial and postmodern age, science will maintain and no doubt strengthen its preeminence in 
the arsenal of productive capacities of the nation-states. Indeed, this situation is one of the reasons 
leading to the conclusion that the gap between developed and developing countries will grow ever 
wider in the future." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge, trans. 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and history of literature, vol. 10, gen. ed. Wlad Godzich 
and Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 5. 
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